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Existing research demonstrates that corporate financing decisions influence the cash-
flow rights and control rights of the securities issued by companies differently and that 
the same corporate capital structures and/or ownership patterns have diverse effects 
and aims across countries, especially when emerging countries are analysed.  The 
1research purpose of this investigation is to understand how corporate financing 
decisions are affected by ownership structure in emerging countries.  For this purpose, 
two game-theoretic models are developed and an empirical test is carried out. 
 
The first theoretical model analyses a number of key factors inducing a separation of 
ownership and control in emerging countries.  This model argues that large private 
benefits of control, extreme risk, low investor protection, inefficient capital markets, 
and governments sympathetic to incumbent management at the expense of outside 
investors are factors contributing to create a separation of ownership and control in 
emerging markets.  The second model examines the positive side of network creation 
through the analysis of the interaction of empathy and economic gains.  This model 
identifies important factors promoting the formation of business groups in emerging 
countries. 
 
The empirical study is a two-fold analysis.  Firstly, it tests the effects of well-known 
determinants of capital structure on debt; secondly, the effects of ownership and 
control in the financial policies of emerging countries are analysed.  To do so, 
corporate financial data and firm-level data of Mexican publicly traded companies for 
was gathered.  As expected, asset tangibility, company size, profitability and market to 
book ratio proved to be important firm-specific capital structure determinants, similar 
to the case of developed countries.  Business risk and effective tax rate are key firm-
specific capital structure determinants, as emerging markets research has identified.  
The two factors proposed by this researcher, viz. consolidation and liquidity are 
significant in the determination of capital structure of the Mexican publicly traded 
companies.  Further, almost two thirds of Mexican publicly traded companies are 
family controlled.  When families are large shareholders, they favour debt financing; 
 xi 
whereas when families are the majority controlling shareholder they prefer issue 
shares, the latter supports the risk management argument proposed by Hagelin et al. 
(2006) and Céspedes et al. (2010). 
 
 xii 
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A novel emerging research area in corporate finance is the investigation of the effects 
of the various corporate governance and legal systems on capital market development 
and corporate financing choices.  Researchers have identified that ownership patterns 
are different in developed and developing economies and that corporate financial 
structures influence differently cash-flow rights and control rights.  La Porta et al. 
(2000) argued that the breadth and depth of capital markets, the pace of new security 
issues, corporate ownership structures and the efficiency of investment allocation are 
all shaped by the efficiency of legal and enforcement systems across countries.  
Bebchuck (1999) noticed that the incidence of concentrated and dispersed ownership 
varies greatly around the world, this being the case even among countries in a similar 
stage of economic development.  For example, in the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom dispersed ownership is the dominant pattern whereas control blocks 
are dominant in countries of Continental Europe.  Further, La Porta et al. (1998) 
documented that concentrated ownership is the most common ownership structure 
around the world.  Concentrated ownership structures can lead to controlling 
structures, mainly exerted by families, which are very often present in economies with 
weak legal and enforcement systems and inefficient markets and institutions. 
 
The investigation of control rights in corporate financing decisions is a fairly new 
research subject.  Early capital structure research focuses on the analysis of the cash-
flow rights associated with securities.  Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) capital structure 
model, for example, explained how a leverage-increase change (an increase in the 
manager’s equity stake) can align a manager’s interest with those of investors, 
hindering a manager’s incentives to divert company funds toward his/her own private 
benefits.  Recent research has identified that financial structure affects both cash-flow 
rights and control rights.  For instance, an increase in a manager’s equity stake may 
increase his/her value adding incentives as he/she has more of the cash-flow rights (as 
explained by Jensen and Meckling’s model), but it may also enable him/her to increase 
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his/her control rights.  This may reduce corporate control and may enable the manager 
to become entrenched, which may induce value reducing behaviour. 
 
Further, it has also been demonstrated that the same corporate capital structures and/or 
ownership patterns have diverse effects and aims across countries.  The divergence of 
effects and aims may respond primarily to country factors such as: the origin of legal 
and enforcement systems, economic development, maturity of financial markets and 
their supporting institutions, culture and the psychology of investors.  Glen and Singh 
(2004) and Booth et al. (2001) provided evidence that, in the case of emerging 
countries, the effects exerted on capital structure by their institutions and country 
particulars have at least the same impact as all the other determinants together.  For 
example, La Porta et al. (1998) suggested that concentrated ownership structures can 
be a substitution mechanism for coping with lack of investor protection and weak legal 
enforcement systems.  Colpan and Hikino (2010) argued that diversified business 
groups may be an effective substitute for imperfect capital markets, which typifies 
emerging economies.   
 
Finally, it has been noticed that during the twentieth century, business group 
organisation has been the most important form of large enterprises, particularly in 
emerging markets.  According to Colpan and Hikino (2010, p. 16), business groups 
have remained ‘... a core of the large enterprise sector with their characteristic wide 
and unrelated product portfolio, often combined with the “pyramidal structure of 
ownership”.  Moreover, usually families have kept their ownership and control of 
business groups’. 
 
Business groups around the world share many attributes, but also vary in some 
dimensions.  Khanna and Yafeh (2007) argue that the differences among business 
groups are a product of the underlying conditions leading to their formation.  These 
underlying conditions are essentially reflected in their structure, control, ownership 
and interaction with society.  Because of their diverse nature, the ultimate socio-
economic effect of business groups is ambiguous.  Some business groups have thus 
proved to be detrimental to the economies, but others have been shown to be welfare-
enhancing.  Furthermore, there is some evidence of a change in the role/effect of some 
business groups at different periods of time, according to changes to the underlying 
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conditions of the environments where they operate.  A case in point is that of Mexican 
business groups, to which the rebound of the Mexican economy after the Mexican 
financial crisis in 1995 has been attributed by some practitioners and scholars 
(Castañeda Ramos 2002, 2005 and 2007). 
 
This complex interaction between the factors behind the design of ownership structures 
in emerging countries and the factors affecting the selection of corporate financing 
policies is the research subject of this investigation.  That is to say, the key research 
question of this thesis is how corporate financing decisions are affected by ownership 
structure in emerging countries.  In order to investigate this, a theoretical study 
consisting of two theoretical models and an empirical investigation has been 
undertaken. 
 
The first theoretical chapter develops a game-theoretic model to examine some 
important factors that can induce a separation of cash-flow rights and control rights in 
the ownership structures of emerging countries.  The four main factors analysed are: 
the degree of managerial risk-aversion, the level of private benefits of control, the 
alignment of the social planners’ interests with the incumbent management or the 
investors, and the efficiency or inefficiency of the financial markets via their 
irrationality.  There are two main contributions of this model to the existing literature 
on ownership and control in emerging economies.  The first contribution is the explicit 
analysis of two mechanisms of control, the voting rule and the dual-class shares; and 
the analysis of the incumbent equity stake as a commitment device to exert high effort.  
The incumbent equity stake depends on his/her degree of risk-aversion.  The second 
contribution is the fact that the findings of this model are documented with four 
company cases from Mexico. 
 
The second theoretical chapter elaborates a game-theoretic model to assess the 
interaction between empathy and economic gains under two possible economic 
scenarios (viz. good state of economy and bad state of economy) to identify some 
factors which promote the formation of business groups in emerging economies.  This 
model demonstrates that: the cost of forming a business group; the probability of a bad 
economic state occurring; and the level of empathy-enhancement in the bad economic 
state are all factors at play in business groups formation.  The contribution of this 
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model is its proposal of a theory for business groups’ formation incorporating the 
assessment of a behavioural aspect empathy/trust which is regarded as important in 
emerging markets.  Further, this theory acknowledges the positive or wealth-enhancing 
side of business groups in emerging markets, something which has been recognised 
only recently. 
 
The empirical study comprises two stages.  The first stage of this investigation 
investigates the effects of well-known determinants of capital structure on debt.  
Following Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Booth et al. (2001), asset tangibility, 
company size, profitability, market to book ratio, business risk and effective tax rate 
are included as proxies for the determinants of capital structure.  Then, liquidity and 
consolidation are also added, aiming to achieve a more accurate approximation of the 
effects of determinant of capital structure of emerging markets, in particular of 
Mexican companies.  For this purpose, a data set comprising firm-level data of 78 
Mexican publicly traded companies is gathered.  The second stage of this study 
assesses the effects of ownership and control in the financing policies of emerging 
markets.  To this end, a second data set comprising firm-level data of 35 Mexican 
publicly traded companies was gathered.  This chapter therefore investigates the 
effects of the determinants of capital structure in an emerging economy: Mexico.  
Further, it also assesses the effects of ownership and control on capital structure.  
Hence, these finding firstly contribute to the general research on capital structure, 
which has traditionally focused mainly on developed countries.  Secondly, they 
contribute to the existing literature on ownership and control.  Finally, the gathering of 
such a detailed dataset of control and ownership may also be a contribution towards 
further research. 
 
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows.  Chapter 2 surveys the literature relating 
to the research area.  In order to provide a general background, this chapter discusses 
four subjects, each in one section, which are: ownership structure, capital structure, 
business groups, and the economic-financial environment and corporate governance 
practices of Mexico.  This chapter begins with the review of the main theories or 
frameworks regarding: ownership structure and corporate governance, ownership 
structure and corporate control and ownership structure and legal and regulatory 
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systems.  Later, this chapter discusses the empirical literature and concludes with a 
revision of ownership structures in emerging countries. 
 
Chapter 3 presents a game-theoretic model regarding the separation of control rights 
and cash-flow rights in emerging economies, and proves it with evidence from four 
Mexican company cases.  The chapter starts with a brief review of the theoretical 
framework.  Later, it develops the theoretical model, and then a numerical example is 
provided.  This chapter concludes offering a review of the corporate legislation in 
Mexico and discusses empirical evidence from four Mexican company cases. 
 
Chapter 4 develops a game-theoretic model with reference to Mexican business 
groups, empathy and market crashes.  This chapter begins with a brief review of the 
theoretical framework.  Subsequently, it presents the theoretical model and concludes 
by offering some final remarks. 
 
Chapter 5 begins with a brief review of the theoretical framework, which comprises a 
review of measures of capital structure.  This is followed by a description of the data 
and sample selection.  Later, the empirical testing of the general determinants of 
capital structure is presented, followed by the empirical testing for the effects of 
market power on capital structure.  This chapter concludes by presenting the empirical 
testing of control and ownership on capital structure.  Since this investigation was 
carried out with a second set of data, this section of the chapter starts with a brief 
review of the theoretical framework, which comprises a review of measures of 
ownership and control variables.  This is followed by a description of the data and 
sample selection.  The estimation strategy for all the models is the static panel model.  
The statistical software used is STATA version 10. 
 
Chapter 6, the final chapter, discusses the conclusions reached from the analysis of the 
theoretical models and the outcomes of the empirical investigation.  Later, this chapter 
explains how these findings relate to developments in corporate governance in Mexico.  
This chapter concludes by mentioning the limitations of the research and identifying 





Literature  Review 
 
 
There is a growing consensus that ownership patterns and the financial structure of 
companies play a very significant role in the creation (dilution) of their value.  
Financial experts, economists and legal scholars have researched diverse factors 
interacting in these decisions, aiming to find predictable outcomes from their interplay, 
and thus identify “an optimal capital structure”. 
 
Previous corporate finance and management research has explained how internal 
factors like corporate charter provisions and corporate governance practices; and 
external/macro-economic factors, such as: the origin of legal systems, the level of 
economic development and maturity of financial markets, culture and the 
psychological behaviour of investors/managers have a strong influence in ownership 
structures.  Corporate ownership structures vary among countries and even among 
firms; however, there are some identifiable ownership patterns that are typical of 
developed and emerging economies. 
 
Additionally, the corporate finance theory has been used to assess the capital structure 
theory over the course of the last sixty years, providing quite contentious but relevant 
theoretical and empirical findings.  In general, “the optimal capital structure formula” 
has not been identified yet, but key findings such as stylised determinants of the 
corporate capital structures in emerging and developed economies, along with their 
interplay with the external factors previously mentioned have already emerged. 
 
It is worth noticing that a common empirical finding from both lines of research is that 
country and company particulars have proved to be at least as important as the 
standard determinants to their ultimate effect in the value of companies (Booth et al. 
2001, Chapelle 2005, Klapper and Love 2002 and Wald 1999, among others).  
Therefore, having taken into account that the focus of this investigation is the Mexican 
listed companies, which are mainly business groups, it is necessary to conduct a survey 
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regarding the economic-financial features of Mexico and its governance regulations 
and practices in order to achieve the aim of this investigation.. 
 
The main two purposes of this chapter are: (1) to understand the interplay of ownership 
structure and corporate financial choices by discussing their foremost 
theories/approaches; and (2) to contextualise the Mexican listed companies features 
and practices by examining the features and functioning of business groups and by 
reviewing the financial-economic environment of Mexico, and its corporate 
governance regulations and practices. 
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows.  This chapter is divided into five main 
sections: 2.1 Ownership Structure, 2.2 Capital Structure, 2.3 Business Groups, 2.4 The 
Case of Mexico: Economic-Financial Environment and Corporate Governance 
Practices and 2.5 Conclusions and Final Remarks. 
 
The ownership structure section is developed by surveying key literature regarding 
ownership and its interaction with corporate governance (2.1.1), corporate control 
(2.1.2) and legal and regulatory systems (2.1.3); to conclude with a review of the 
relevant empirical evidence (2.1.4), giving particular attention to the evidence from 
emerging markets (2.1.5).  The capital structure section begins by discussing the 
evolution of this research area, firstly in terms of theories (2.2.1) and secondly, in 
terms of empirical evidence (2.2.2).  Later, this section examines the developments and 
applications of capital structure in emerging markets (2.2.3).  The business groups 
section commences by analysing their main features in both developed and emerging 
economies (2.3.1) and discussing their particularities (2.3.2).  Important findings of the 
main approaches used when investigating business groups are presented in section 
2.3.3.  The last theoretical section of this chapter is section 2.4, which is dedicated to 
investigating the application and effects of the previous theories in Mexico as an 
emerging economy.  This section starts by providing an economic-political 
background of emerging markets (2.4.1.1) and continues with the discussion of the 
particularities of Latin America as a specific emerging region (2.4.1.2) in order to 
build awareness of its cultural influence in the Mexican economy when drawing up 
and/or implementing economic-politico reforms (2.4.2).  Section 2.4 ends with the 
analysis of the corporate governance practices in Mexico, discussing the main 
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achievements and the challenges remaining to be overcome, and their possible 
implications to the Mexican economy (2.4.3).  To conclude this chapter, section 2.5 
offers some general conclusions and final remarks. 
 
This researcher would like to mention that throughout the text of this thesis the terms 
markets and economies are used interchangeably, as well as the terms emerging and 
developing although the latter term is not in use any longer. 
 
 
2.1 Ownership Structure 
 
It could be argued that the implementation of efficient corporate financing policies 
results in the difference between success, survival or failure of companies most of the 
time.  Considering the most basic scenario, any financing policy requires the selection 
of the best financial sources to be invested in the most profitable projects.  Keeping 
things simple, the three main choices are: (1) to use retained earnings, (2) to borrow 
money via debt instruments, and/or (3) to issue new shares.  The second and the third 
options apply not only to domestic markets but also to international markets. 
 
To be able to make an accurate decision, one has to bear in mind that any security 
entitles not only cash-flow rights but also voting rights.  These might or might not be 
explicitly written on them, but in any case, these rights are merely inherent to the 
securities as their actual exercise is affected by factors related to the country and the 
companies’ issuers of such securities.  Some examples of these key factors are: the 
type/tradition of corporate governance, the origin of the legal and enforcement 
systems, the economic development of the country and its financial markets and 
institutions, corporate governance practices, culture and the psychology of the 
investors and managers, among others (Bebckuck 1999, Booth et al. 2001, Chong et 
al. 2009, Fairchild and Yuyan 2006, Kappler and Love 2002, La Porta et al. 1998 and 
1999, Litch 2005 and Lopez-de-Silanes 2002, among others). 
 
Aiming to understand the importance of corporate ownership structure and its 
interaction with the corporate financing decisions, this section reviews the relationship 
between ownership structure and corporate governance, ownership structure and 
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corporate control, and ownership structure and legal and regulatory systems.  It 
concludes with the empirical evidence in this area. 
 
 
2.1.1 Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance 
 
Corporate governance is an emerging research area but with well-founded underlying 
theories
1
, which broaden its scope making it difficult to capture all its 
factors/determinants in one single definition without compromising them.  Denis and 
McConnell (2003) and Castañeda Ramos (1999) however have offered two 
complementing definitions, under different approaches
2
, that provide a fair 
understanding of its main internal and external determinants
3
.  On the one hand, Denis 
and McConnell (2003, pp. 1-2) conceptualised corporate governance as ‘…the set of 
mechanisms –both institutional and market-based– that induce the self-interested 
controllers of a company… to make decisions that maximize the value of the company 
to its owners’.  On the other hand, Castañeda Ramos (1999, p.24) describes corporate 
governance as guidelines that ‘…determine the way benefits and business risk are 
distributed with the intention of reducing conflicting goals and motivating the best 
effort of the different stakeholders.  Hasan and Jinnah (2009), nevertheless, trying to 
reconcile both strands describe corporate governance as ‘a philosophy and mechanism 
that entails processes and structure which facilitate the creation of shareholder value 
through management of the corporate affairs in such a way that ensures the protection 
of the individual and collective interest of all stakeholders’ (p.50). 
 
Aiming to advance the analysis of these determinants in order to improve the current 
understanding of corporate governance, Gillan (2006) proposed a detailed framework 
that depicts ten of the main factors surrounding corporate governance.  These ten 
factors were classified into two general categories namely, the internal-factor category 
                                            
1
 The theories underlying corporate governance include disciplines such as finance, economics, law, 
management, accounting, organisational behaviour and behavioural finance, among others (Mallin, 
2007). 
2
 Dennis and McConnell (2003) assume that the priority of companies is to increase the wealth of its 
shareholders, whereas Castañeda Ramos (1999) prioritises the interests of all stakeholders instead. 
3 
By internal determinants it is meant the factors and mechanisms developed inside of companies that 
regulate their governance.  External determinants refer to those factors and mechanisms developed by 
external entities, which regulate companies. 
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and the external-factor category.  The factors included in the internal-factor category 
were: board of directors, managerial incentives, capital structure, bylaw and charter 
provisions, and internal control systems.  The factors forming the external-factor 
category were: law and regulation; capital markets; market for corporate control and 
labour and product markets; market for information and analysis of capital markets; 
markets for accounting, financial and legal services; and private sources of external 
oversight.  In the same spirit, Miguel et al. (2005) identified five different institutional 
determinants characterising corporate governance systems around the world.  These 
determinants were the legal protection of investors, the effectiveness of boards of 
directors, the level of ownership concentration, the development of capital markets, 
and the market for corporate control. 
 
Since corporate governance is defined/modelled by the mechanisms, policies and 
practices that aim to bring about the best functioning and fairest allocation of corporate 
resources, it is important to distinguish the leading participants in the framework that 
the company uses to operate.  In other words, to determine whether the company focus 
is a shareholders framework or a stakeholder framework.  According to Mallin (2007) 
the main difference between the shareholder framework and the stakeholder 
framework is that the former has as its main objective to maintain or enhance 
shareholder wealth, whereas the stakeholder framework aims to maintain or enhance 
social welfare, which not only includes the shareholders’ benefits but also the benefits 
of outsiders, such as employees, customers, suppliers, creditors and the local 
community in general. 
 
 
2.1.2 Ownership Structure and Corporate Control 
 
The idea that ‘… the potential for conflicts of interest between owners and 
controllers… [arises] when ownership and control of corporations are not fully 
coincident’ (Adam Smith 1776, cited by Denis and McConnell 2003, p. 1), seems to be 
the cornerstone of the conflicting relationship between ownership structure and 
corporate control.  Empirical evidence suggests that this inequitable relationship 
frequently ends in private benefits for controllers, which are mostly at the expense of 
11 
 
minority shareholders and company value.  There are different theories explaining the 
selection of corporate ownership structure and their effects on corporate control.  The 
following review aims to survey the main research in this area. 
 
Initial research in corporate ownership and control examines the effects of differences 
in cash-flow rights and voting rights.  For instance, Grossman and Hart (1988) 
proposed that the relevance of a corporate security-voting structure relies on its 
applicability as a mechanism for shifting corporate control.  Further, the assignment of 
voting-rights might determine both the type of party that will have control –‘high-
private benefit party or high-security benefit party’– and the value of income claims 
under the controlling management.  The main results of Grossman and Hart’s (1988) 
study propose that a one-share one-vote rule is a superior corporate strategy for 
maximising security benefits, as it fosters the selection of the most efficient 
management.  However, this rule does not always maximise the value of shares.  In 
other words, a one-share one-vote rule is shown to be the dominant strategy when 
either an incumbent’s private benefits or a rival’s private benefits are insignificant.  It 
is a neutral strategy when the private benefits of both parties are insignificant, whereas 
it might be a non-optimal strategy when both private benefits are significant.  
Moreover, this study also shows that the determination of a majority rule for takeover 
bids becomes important when the one-share one-vote rule is not present.  These results 
hold when considering two different sorts of controlling benefits: security benefits and 
private benefits
4
; dual classes of shares, both being widely held; and also the fact that 
any shareholder is considered to be pivotal. 
 
Harris and Raviv (1988) emphasise that governance rules affect share value.  This 
might be because governance rules influence the proportion of private benefits to be 
extracted from the winner contestant by shareholders in the takeover bidding process.  
Harris and Raviv (1988) analyse the optimality of both various assignments of votes to 
shares and the simple majority rule in two different contexts: corporate value and 
social welfare, in order to determine the winner of control contests.  The major results 
of this analysis, which agree with the findings of Grossman and Hart (1988), show that 
                                            
4
 According to Grossman and Hart (1988), security benefits are those mainly represented by the total 
market value of corporate income streams, whilst private benefits are those enjoyed only by the current 
management.  Some examples of the latter are synergy benefits, prerequisites of control and diversion of 
resources from security holders, in extreme cases, among others. 
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one-share one-vote rule combined with a simple majority rule work as an optimal 
social
5
 governance scheme.  Thus, under one-share one-vote rule, shareholder property 
rights are fully protected since value-reducing bids are not possible.  However, when 
considering corporate value, extreme shares
6
 might maximise the aggregate value of 
the shares issued, since they allow choosing the winner contestant to extract her/his 
private benefits of control.  Further, supermajority rules result in better rivals being 
defeated by worse incumbents, whether or not one-share one-vote rule is present.  The 
opposite results would be the outcome when sub-majority rules are applied.  Finally, 
when there are multiple classes of shares, inferior rivals may defeat better incumbents, 
even with a simple majority rule.  Important assumptions in this analysis are: investors 
are considered to be small but not infinitesimal
7
; investors might become pivotal when 
their votes are sufficiently close to the winning edge; and there is initial trading among 
investors, which might end in the cash-vote ratio of investors’ portfolio.  This cash-
vote ratio is important because it might influence the determination of the winner.  It is 
noteworthy that the last assumption presupposes a strong legal system that would not 
allow any security trade separating cash flow claims from voting rights. 
 
In addition, Stulz (1988) examines the effects of voting rights and financing policies 
on corporate value.  Stulz (1988) argues that the proportion of the voting rights 
controlled by the management might be a key element in the ownership structure of 
publicly traded companies.  This is because this proportion directly affects the value of 
companies.  The main results from this analysis propose that shareholder’s wealth 
increases or decreases when management strengthens their control.  In other words, 
company value is positively related to low voting rights held by the management, 
whereas company value is negatively related to voting rights as the latter becomes 
large.  Further, an increase in the proportion of the voting rights held by the 
management will decrease the probability of a successful tender offer, increasing the 
premium offered.  Moreover, this analysis also shows that management can modify the 
proportion of voting rights held, not only by selling and buying shares, but also 
through different mechanisms such as capital structure changes, corporate charter 
                                            
5
 According to Harris and Raviv (1988) optimal social means that the total share value is maximized, 
hence the best rival/contestant always wins.  
6
 Extreme shares are a dual class of shares in which one class has all the claims to cash flows while the 
other has all the voting rights. 
7
 Considering investors to be a small helps to incorporate the effects of large-investors. 
13 
 
amendments, and acquisition of shareholders clienteles, among others.  All these 
mechanisms affect company value due to their effects on the proportion of voting 
rights held by the management.  A particular feature of this analysis is that the results 
are explained in terms of a positive probability of succeeding in a takeover bid, rather 
than the gain to be obtained in the case of winning.  This might be because outside 
shareholders are considered to be atomistic
8
.  Finally, this analysis also assumes a one-
share one-vote rule, a simple majority rule and a risk-averse management with limited 
resources. 
 
A different approach is presented by La Porta et al. (1999), who argue that the type of 
commercial law/code ruling countries, depending on its origin
9
, strongly determines 
the ownership structure of companies.  In other words, their argument proposes that 
ownership structure might act as a substitution mechanism when lack of investor 
protection and low degrees of law enforcement are present, i.e. widely-held companies 
have shown to be more frequent in common law countries than in civil law countries. 
 
Additionally, Bebchuck (1999) develops a rent-protection theory of corporate 
ownership structure, based on the ‘contestability’10 of control, which is reflected in the 
selection of a dispersed or a concentrated ownership structure of corporate votes and 
shares.  This theory acknowledges not only the importance of legal systems, but also 
the existence of incentives and opportunities for controlling shareholders to both 
benefit from and expropriate minority shareholders, when determining the corporate 
ownership structure.  Furthermore, Bebchuck’s theory helps the understanding of the 
current ownership patterns worldwide and within countries.  He groups these patterns 
into three different classes of ownership structures: the non contestable (NC), the 
contestable (C) and the partially contestable (PC) structures.  In the case of the NC 
structure, control is locked as there is a high concentration of shares.  In contrast, the C 
and the PC structures allow the appearance of a potential rival, who might try to take 
control from the incumbent against his or her will.  This situation is possible because 
these two structures are dispersed ownership structures of votes and shares. 
                                            
8
 The main feature of atomistic shareholders is that they cannot collude, thus they cannot force a higher 
premium (Stulz 1988). 
9
 The four most common commercial systems by their origin are: common law, civil law, German 
system and Scandinavian system.  
10
 Meaning by contestability ‘… that a rival can seek to wrest control from the incumbent against its 




This theory demonstrates that when private benefits of control are large, initial 
shareholders might prefer to set up controlling ownership structures, although a 
dispersed structure would offer efficiency advantages.  It is also shown that in this 
case, dispersed ownership structures might be an unstable equilibrium
11
.  Additionally, 
when private benefits are substantial and a controlling ownership structure is 
established, separation of cash-flow rights and voting rights would tend to be 
implemented.  This separation can be achieved through different special arrangements 
such as dual-class of shares, cross-listing shares, and pyramid structures among others.  
These arrangements are used because they allow a lock on control to be maintained 
without incurring large liquidity and/or risk costs, although they might produce 
important agency and/or tax costs.  Furthermore, this theory proposes that controlling 
shareholding structures should be more common in countries where private benefits of 
control are large, whereas dispersed ownership structures should be more frequent in 
countries where private benefits are small.  To arrive at this proposition, Bebchuck 
(1999) contrasts the index of legal protection
12
 with the premia paid for control blocks, 
concluding that in countries where legal systems do not offer good levels of investor 
protection, higher private benefits of control seem to predominate.  In other words, 
controlling structures seems to be a product of inefficient legal systems.  Therefore, it 
is possible that ‘… a corporate law system that effectively limits private benefits of 
control can produce more efficient choices of ownership structure’ (Bebchuck 1999, p. 
0). 
 
Following the same line of inquiry, Burkart and Panunzi (2006, p. 2) emphasise that 
‘the impact of legal rules on the relation between ownership concentration and 
monitoring intensity are not uniform but depends on how legal rules interact with 
monitoring’.  Burkart and Panunzi (2006) analyse the interaction between monitoring 
and managerial incentives in the relationship between legal protection and ownership 
concentration.  To this end, they propose a risk neutral model that allows for two types 
of moral hazard.  The first type regards the managerial effort needed to be exerted in 
order to find a new project.  The second type relates to the possibility that the manager 
                                            
11
 This is because raiders would gain control of companies with dispersed ownership at low prices and 
extract these benefits of control. 
12
 The legal protection index is built by La Porta et al. (1998). 
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expropriates the proceeds from the project rather than distributes them to shareholders.  
Important considerations in this model are that shareholder control comes with costs 
and benefits and that there is a managerial private-benefit extraction, which is subject 
to legal and monitoring constrains.  Additionally, this model assumes that large 
shareholders and the management are distinct parties, outside ownership concentration 
is determined by the trade-off between managerial incentives and shareholders control 
and ownership is fully dispersed in regimes with strong legal protection. 
 
Two major results from this analysis are that, firstly, legal rules and monitoring might 
be not only considered as substitutes but also as complements.  Hence, when legal 
protection and monitoring are considered substitutes, the relationship between legal 
protection and ownership concentration might be non-monotone.  This is because 
better laws weaken the monitoring incentives.  Conversely, when legal protection and 
monitoring are considered complements, ownership concentration and legal protection 
would be inversely related since better laws might strengthen the monitoring 
incentives.  Further, it is shown that better legal protection may worsen the conflict of 
interest between large and small shareholders.  Secondly, this analysis documents that 
the limitation of private benefit extraction might increase shareholder control by 
discouraging managerial incentives.  In other words, to maximise net shareholder 
return, it would be optimal either to curb monitoring or to offer a higher wage or a 
bonus to the manager.  Moreover, Burkart and Panunzi (2006) document that the 
ownership structure and the bonus are chosen to solve the dual moral hazard problem 
of providing incentives and limiting managerial expropriation, where the optimal 
mixture of the first two components depends on the quality of the law.  Therefore, in 
general, good legal protection might result in dispersed ownership and in private 
benefits to be complemented with a bonus to satisfy the manager’s incentive constrain.  
Conversely, low legal protection might need concentrated ownership, which increases 
monitoring, to curb private benefits expropriation. 
 
Finally, Burkart et al. (2003) present a model of succession in a company owned and 
managed by its founder.  This model examines the costs and benefits of delegating 
management through the possibility of expropriation from outsiders who are 
professional managers.  The model proposes that the interaction of monitoring costs 
16 
 
and legal investor’s protection with amenity benefits13 might influence the founder 
decision to remain managing the family company or to appoint a professional manager 
to do it.  In this model, the two dilemmas to be solved by the founder are whether to 
separate management from ownership and how to split the ownership of the company 
if going public. 
 
Key assumptions in the development of this model are: family management is 
generally inferior to professional management in terms of profitability.  The 
professional manager is financially constrained, whereas the founder is not.  This 
model does not consider any risk aversion parameters, thus, neither the founder nor the 
professional managers are risk averse.  All kinds of law governing corporate activities 
and investor protection are important.  This means that firms would have no 
opportunities to improve investor rights through their bylaws, corporate charters or 
contracts.  This last statement, however, seems to deny some empirical evidence that 





The results of this model suggest that both law and monitoring might reduce 
managerial expropriation; although the size of amenity benefits, when extreme, will 
drive the decision to keep together or to separate management from ownership.  In 
contrast, when the size of amenity benefits is moderate, the interaction of monitoring 
costs and the quality of investors’ protection will influence that decision.  Further, this 
model also shows that the previous statements broadly hold in two different scenarios. 
These are firstly when there is no collusion and secondly when there is collusion 
between the founder and the professional manager to expropriate minority 
shareholders, the second scenario being more complex.  The complexity of this 
situation is based on the incompatibility of collusion with monitoring costs when 
amenity benefits are moderate.  This is because when both amenity benefits and the 
protection of investors are intermediate, there is no optimal level of monitoring leaving 
rents to professional managers.  Finally, investors’ protection and concentration in 
ownership seem to be negatively related.  This means that concentrated ownership 
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 This term refers to ‘non-pecuniary private benefits of control, meaning utility to the founder that does 
not come at expense of profits’ (Demset and Lehn, 1985 cited by Burkart et al. 2003 p. 2168).  
14
 See for example Bebchuck 1999, Klapper and Love 2002, Lopez-de-Silanes 2002 and Chong et al. 
2009, among others.  
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might go together with weak legal protection, which implies that ‘[t]he separation of 
ownership and management is an indication of superior corporate governance 
environment; [whereas] the lack of such separation and the prevalence of family firms 
is evidence of financial underdevelopment’ (Burkart 2003, p. 2193). 
 
 
2.1.3 Ownership structure and Legal and Regulatory Systems 
 
A classic approach to dealing with the relationship between legal systems and 
ownership patterns is the one provided by La Porta et al. in 1998.  They argue that the 
ownership structure of companies might be closely framed by the origin of legal 
systems.  Furthermore, ownership concentration might become a substitute for legal 
protection, as only large shareholders can hope to receive a return on their investments.  
This can be explained when considering the security rights granted to their holders as 
the defining feature of those securities.  Nonetheless, these rights should not be 
considered as inherent in securities since the former seem to depend on the regulations 
of the jurisdiction where the securities are issued. 
 
In order to identify the role of legal systems in corporate governance, La Porta et al. 
(1998) empirically examine whether legal systems, in terms of the rights granted to 
shareholders and creditors
15
 and the level of law enforcement
16
, differ across 
countries
17
.  After this examination, they analyse the main effect of those differences 
in corporate governance systems. 
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 Regarding shareholders’ rights, there are three different categories for the variables examined, which 
are: voting powers, ease of participation in corporate voting, and legal protection against expropriation 
by management.  Related to creditors’ rights, the categories of the variables are: the respect for security 
of the loan, the ability to grab assets in case of a loan default, and the inability of management to seek 
protection from creditors unilaterally. 
16
 The measures examined to determine the quality of the law enforcement are: the efficiency of the 
judicial system, rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation by the government, and the likelihood of 
contract repudiation by the government (La Porta et al. 1998). 
17
 La Porta et al (1998) built a database which embodies important aspects of the legal rules and the 
quality of enforcement of those rules in 49 different countries that have at least five domestic and 
completely publicly traded companies in 1995.  The countries are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, The Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, 
South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. 
18 
 
It is worth mentioning that the classification of legal systems used by La Porta et al. 
(1998) identifies four groups, which are common law countries, French-civil law 
countries, German law countries and Scandinavian law countries.  This classification is 
based on the following variables: 
 
‘…(1) historical background and development of legal systems, (2) theories and 
hierarchies of sources of law, (3) the working methodology of jurist within the legal 
systems, (4) the characteristics of legal concepts employed…, (5) the legal 
institutions of the system, and (6) the divisions of the law employed within a system’ 
(Glendon, Gordon and Osakwe 1994, cited by La Porta et al. 1998). 
 
A key finding from this analysis is that legal regulations and their level of enforcement 
vary significantly across countries.  Further, these variations can be comprehensively 
explained taking into account the origin of legal systems.  La Porta et al. (1998) 
reported that French-civil law countries present the lowest levels of protections to both 
shareholders and creditors and of law enforcement.  Conversely, common law 
countries offer the highest level of protection to shareholders and creditors, while the 
German and the Scandinavian law countries fall between these two groups.  Regarding 
the quality of law enforcement, German law countries appear to have the best level of 
enforcement, while Scandinavian law countries almost reach those levels.  Common 
law countries present better levels than those of French-civil law countries.  
Additionally, La Porta et al. (1998) propose that legal systems might affect corporate 
governance, and therefore, companies may adapt to the possible limitations of those 
systems.  Possible ways of coping with poor legal systems include implementing 
substitute rules, by means of remedial mechanisms, such as high ownership 
concentration
18
, mandatory dividend policies, and legal reserve requirements, among 
others.  Finally, the empirical evidence indicates that French-civil law countries are the 
ones where most remedial rules are enforced. 
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 The analysis of the ownership concentration was performed with the five largest companies of each 
country of the sample, considering the threshold of the three largest shareholders. 
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Continuing with this line of inquiry, La Porta et al. (2000) perform a complete analysis 
of the effects and consequences of legal protection to investors
19
 in corporate 
governance.  Three important remarks are contained in this work.  Firstly, La Porta et 
al. (2000) emphasise that legal protection to investors might be not only a key 
determinant of corporate governance, but also a closely related factor to corporate 
finance.  This seems to be the case because different legal systems provide investors 
with different rights to avoid expropriation from insiders.  This may, for the most part, 
end in differences regarding corporate ownership concentration, dividend policies, 
development of financial markets and company’s access to external finance. 
 
Secondly, La Porta et al. (2000) propose that the legal approach provides a more 
complete explanation concerning the differences in corporate governance systems than 
the bank-centred and market-centred approaches.  Under the view of Bank and Market 
centred governance, either banks or financial markets are the main providers of finance 
and governance, which overlooks the fact that both institutions could be completely 
developed or underdeveloped.  Therefore, this approach provides an incomplete view.  
On the other hand, the legal approach acknowledges the judicial and historical 
explanations of legal systems, which are based on the differences in the legal 
philosophies of those systems, and in the political and historical differences that 
shaped them.  That is to say, the legal approach incorporates the legal protection 
granted to investors.  Based on the legal approach, La Porta et al. (2000) suggest that 
civil law may be associated with greater government intervention in economic activity 
and weaker protection of private property than common law.  Finally, La Porta et al. 
(2000) explain that the exercise of good corporate governance practices might enhance 
economic development.  Further, an efficient reform in corporate governance needs to 
take into consideration the rights to be granted to investors, although this may require 
radical changes to legal systems. 
 
On the other hand, Gilson (2005) proposes that law, in terms of its functionality, may 
play a better role in classifying corporate ownership into efficient and inefficient 
controlling shareholder systems, rather than into widely-held and controlling 
ownership structures.  Thus, countries considered to have an efficient controlling 
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 This study considers both outside shareholders and creditors as investors, while both managers and 
controlling shareholders are considered as insiders. 
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shareholder system, that is countries with functionally good law, may support both 
controlling and widely-held ownership structures.  However, countries with an 
inefficient controlling shareholder system, that is countries with functionally bad law, 
may only support controlling ownership structures. 
 
Gilson (2005) develops a novel theoretical frame of the controlling ownership 
structure, in terms of the trade off between monitoring and private benefit extraction, 
to understand the actual patterns of corporate ownership.  Gilson (2005) argues that 
law, legal efficiency, politics and country particulars are basic factors in the analysis of 
corporate ownership patterns.  In relation to this, Gilson (2005) argues that law might 
have an important role in corporate ownership that may result in different costs and 
benefits, instead of contending that different
20
 laws may end in specific ownership 
structures.  In other words, according to this perspective, controlling shareholder 
structures can occur in countries classified
21
 as common law and as civil law countries, 
as in the case of the U.S. and Mexico, but can result in different costs.  Moreover, 
Gilson (2005) suggests that to analyse the effects of private benefits of control
22
in 
corporate ownership patterns may offer a more complete explanation of these patterns 
as these benefits may incorporate the effects of the particulars of each country.  The 
latter might include the quality of shareholder protection, legal enforcement and 
politics, among others. 
 
Finally, Gilson’s analysis seems be supported by the following empirical facts.  Firstly, 
most public companies (apart from North American and British companies) seem to 
have controlling ownership structures that most of the time do not correspond to their 
cash-flow holdings.  Secondly, either law and legal efficiency or politics appear to 
have failed to provide an accurate rationale of corporate ownership patterns.  This can 
be noted as some controlling ownership structures are present in countries with good 
law and/or in countries without a remarkable social democratic affiliation. 
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 The classification of laws established according to their legal origin. 
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 This classification corresponds to the legal origin of their legal systems. 
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 According to Gilson (2005), private benefits of control can be pecuniary and non-pecuniary.  
21 
 
Additionally, Licht et al. (2005) argue that considering legal systems to be the main 





 may offer a more complete answer.  Nevertheless, both determinants 
together, culture and legal rules, might provide a more accurate account of worldwide 
corporate governance regimes since corporate governance laws can be seen to 
systematically relate to the prevailing culture. 
 
Licht and co-authors’ study focuses on the analysis of litigation over voting rights as a 
means for dealing with conflicting economic interests in the corporation.  To this end, 
Licht et al. (2005) adopt the cross-cultural psychology view, contrasting the key 
dimensions of culture derived from the two leading theories in this field
25
.  From this 
analysis, Licht et al. (2005) propose a new framework to group and analyse countries 
based on the similarities in their cultural profiles to cope with conflicting economic 
interests in corporations.  This framework consists of six categories: English-speaking, 
West European, East European, Far Eastern, Latin America and African countries. 
 
The main results of this study highlight both the adequacy of considering culture, in 
terms of the societal acceptance of litigation, as a salient determinant of corporate 
governance and the appropriateness of culture to be operationalised to test hypotheses.  
Additionally, this study suggests that the content of formal legal rules should be 
compatible with and partly reflect the prevailing cultural orientations in a society.  
Further, cultural orientations may persist in the face of formal legal reforms.  These 
previous contentions are supported by the main statistical results from this study, 
which show that greater reliance on concrete legal rules enforceable in the courts may 
be stronger in nations high on the Schwartz cultural orientation of mastery and low on 
harmony orientation.  This is because these cultural features could be comparable with 
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 The main limitation may be that the findings provided by these studies are based on shareholder rights 
rather than investor rights, which excludes any analysis of creditor rights.  Therefore, the general 
superiority of statutes in common law countries for protecting investors (meaning both shareholders and 
creditors) may be vague (Licht et al. 2005). 
24
 Culture, according to Licht et al. 2005, refers to the complex of meanings, symbols, and assumptions 
about what is good or bad and legitimate or illegitimate that underlies the prevailing practices and norms 
in a society. 
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 On the one hand, there is a theory developed by Schwartz in 1994 in his work entitled “Cultural 
Dimensions of Values: Toward an understanding of National Differences, in Individualism and 
Collectivism”, which suggests embeddedness/atonomy, hierarchy/egalitarianism and mastery/harmony 
as three main bipolar culture value dimensions.  On the other hand, Geert Hofstede (1991) proposes that 
individualism/collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity/ femininity may be 
major bipolar elements for characterising culture. 
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giving power to investors and encouraging them to fight for their rights.  Additionally, 
investor legal rights may be stronger in nations high on the Hofstede individualism 
dimension and low on the uncertainty avoidance dimension.  Finally, this study 
provides evidence that societal acceptance of litigation may be significantly related to 
a heritage of British rule. 
 
A counter argument regarding the appropriateness of strong legal systems to enhance 
corporate performance is that proposed by Fairchild and Yiyuan (2006), which 
suggests that, in venture capital contracts, strong legal systems may be value-reducing.  
This “reversed” effect may be the result of tough legal systems destroying empathy 
between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist (VC), and, consequently, reducing 
their incentives to exert cooperative efforts.  It is of note that because of the 
characteristics of venture capital contracts, implicit relationships between VCs and 
entrepreneurs may be considered more important than legal systems in achieving 
higher corporate results. 
 
Fairchild and Yiyuan (2006) develop a double-sided moral hazard model
26
 in order to 
analyse the relationship between legal systems, the strength of venture capital 
contracts, and the post-investment performance of the venture.  This psychological 
game-theoretic model is innovative as it incorporates not only an empathy sub-game, 
but also allows for the interaction between the effective sympathy level, the culture 
closeness and entrepreneurial penalty parameters.  Further, this model also considers 
policy implications, providing a discussion of the particular case of Chinese ventures.  
In general, the main results of Fairchild and Yiyuan’s model propose that tough 
contracts might be value-maximising for ventures in jurisdictions with highly effective 
legal systems and low cultural closeness.  Conversely, soft contracts might be effective 
for ventures ruled by highly ineffective legal systems and high cultural closeness.  In 
the case of China, this model suggests, despite the empirical evidence, that soft venture 
capital contracts would be optimal, as it has been argued that China may have a weak 
legal system but a high cultural closeness. 
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 This is a double-sided moral hazard model because it considers that both venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs contribute to the success of a venture, as both contribute to the wealth creation. 
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Important assumptions in this model are: the selection of the sympathy levels is 
sequential and starts with the entrepreneur’s choice; there are two possible levels of 
sympathy
27
; and control and empathy
28
 are substitutes. 
 
 
2.1.4 Empirical Survey 
 
Initial empirical research in the USA regarding the relationship between ownership 
and control suggests that corporations were dispersedly held and controlled by 
professional managers who did not account for the ownership structure of those 
companies (Berle and Means 1932, cited by La Porta et al. 1999, p. 471).  However, 
the opposite facts seem to portray a fairer contemporary overview of the ownership 
concentration and the protection of minority rights of companies worldwide.  This 
latter statement is based on the outcomes of the classic research on corporate 
governance
29
 carried by La Porta et al. in the late 90s.  The main findings of this study 
demonstrated that many large companies have controlling shareholders, except for 
those companies based in countries with high levels of minority shareholders 
protection, which were more widely held.  Families or the State typically controlled 
the former companies, whereas financial institutions seldom exerted equity control on 
them.  Controlling shareholders participated actively in the management of those 
companies.  Further, controlling shareholders typically had control over companies in 
excess of their cash flow rights.  The pyramid was the mechanism most extensively 
used to separate cash-flow rights from voting rights.  It is noteworthy that dispersion of 
ownership, which appears to go together with good shareholder protection, seemed to 
drive the results of this research. 
 
To arrive at these conclusions, La Porta et al. (1999) carried out two kinds of tests 
where the definitions of ownership used relied on voting rights rather than on cash-
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 The level of sympathy can be either full sympathy equals one or non-sympathy equals zero. 
28
 In this model, control provides a measure for the effectiveness of a society’s legal system and 
empathy measures the society’s culture of trust (Fairchild and Yiyuan, 2006). 
29
 The countries that are part of the sample are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The 
United Kingdom, and The United States of America.  These countries were chosen according to their 
GDP in 1993. 
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flow rights.  The first class of test was carried out to determine the quality of the legal 
protection
30
 that countries offer to minority shareholders.  The second class of test was 
performed to determine the frequency of controlling shareholders
31
 in different 
countries and their identity. 
 
Additionally, Nenova (2003) argues that the value of control-block votes might be an 
important part of company value and it varies across countries.  Nenova (2003) carried 
out an innovative cross-country analysis
32
, which measured the value of control-block 
votes (taken together) in terms of private benefits.  Nenova (2003) reported two major 
results of this analysis.  On the one hand, the value of control-blocks votes was 
significant in magnitude and varied across countries
33
.  Furthermore, control-block 
votes looked significantly less valuable in a strict legal environment than in a lax legal 
environment.  On the other hand, salient determinants of the value of control-blocks 
votes might be legal environment, law enforcement, investor protection, takeover 
regulations and power-concentrating corporate charter provisions, as they explained 
68% of the cross-country variation in the value of control-block votes. 
 
Nenova (2003) proposed two different interpretations of these results.  The first one 
highlighted the large effect of law in the value of control-block votes, supporting La 
Porta et al.’s (1997) findings regarding the effects of legal systems in corporate 
ownership structure.  In other words, Nenova’s results (2003) demonstrated that 
French civil law countries presented the highest median value of control-block votes 
(22.6%), while common law and Scandinavian civil law countries scored the lowest, 
with 1.6 and 0.5% respectively.  These figures can be explained under the intuition that 
weaker laws reduce expropriation costs so encouraging higher control benefits, which 
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 The indices used to determine the quality of the legal systems (investor protection and level of law 
enforcement) were those built in the article ‘Law and Finance’ by La Porta et al. (1998). 
31
 For this purpose, the general procedure followed is to assess the percentages of voting rights, both 
direct and indirect altogether, per shareholder.  The parameters are 20 and 10 percent. On the one hand, 
20 percent of voting rights is established as this percentage is usually considered enough to have 
effective control on a company.  On the other hand, a more conservative view of control proposes 10 
percent of voting rights as standard. 
32
 The study examines 661 dual-class firms in 18 different countries.  The countries were chosen 
according to their market capitalization volume as of 1995 and the availability of this information in the 
DATASTREAM database.  The countries forming the sample are: Austria, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, The United Kingdom, and The United 
States of America. 
33
 For instance, in Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries the value of control-block votes is close to 
zero, whereas in Mexico it accounts for almost 36% of company market value. 
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in turn increase the value of control-block votes.  On the other hand, taking a more 
conservative view, these same results could be also interpreted as the effectiveness of a 
refined legal framework in protecting minority shareholders’ rights.  It is of note that 
Nenova’s (2003) results were reported after being adjusted for takeover probability, 
block-holding costs, and dividend and liquidity differences between the share classes.  
Finally, these results hold when measuring the total value of all votes composing the 
control block, assuming dual-class and widely held companies, a simple majority rule 
and a competitive control market. 
 
Acknowledging the current magnitude of indirect ownership and its effects, Chapelle 
(2005) proposed a linear input-output matrix to calculate the separation between 
ownership structure and control by determining the integrated (direct and indirect) 
ownership shares in a set of companies.  Chapelle (2005) used this input-output matrix 
to compute the ‘separation ratio’ of the Belgium firms and contrasted her results with 
the existing findings for Italy, The Netherlands and The United States of America. 
 
 
2.1.5 Ownership Structures in Emerging Countries 
 
In the case of the emerging markets, current research is focussed on identifying the 
main features of the ownership structures existing in this kind of countries and their 
functioning.  For instance, emerging countries have shown highly concentrated 
ownership structures and a great difference between cash-flow and voting rights (La 
Porta et al., 1999; and Silva et al. 2006).  This divergence from the one-share one-vote 
rule may be mainly achieved through the use of pyramid and/or cross-holding 
ownership structures; the issuance of different classes of shares, including non-voting 
shares; and the application of super majority rules. 
 
Carvalhal da Silva and Câmara Leal (2006) analyzed the control and ownership 
structure of Brazilian firms
34
; and the effects of voting and cash-flow rights on the 
valuation and on the performance of those firms.  The main results of this analysis 
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showed that concentrated ownership is a very common feature of Brazilian companies, 
while most of them are controlled by a single direct shareholder.  Further, there was a 
discrepancy between voting and cash-flow rights namely, 1.69 percent on average in 
2002.  This seemed to be achieved by the use of indirect control structures such as 
pyramids, shareholders’ agreements, and non-voting shares.  In other words, on 
average, 77 percent of these companies had an indirect ownership structure and 45 
percent of their shares were non-voting shares, while the percentage of outstanding 
shares was around 47. 
 
Carvalhal and Câmara’s analysis documented that, in general, the valuation and 
performance of Brazilian firms were positively related to cash-flow concentration and 
negatively related to both voting concentration and to the separation of cash flow and 
voting rights.  However, it is of note that Brazilian firms with controlling shareholders 
showed relatively higher valuation and performance levels than those of Brazilian 
firms with non-controlling shareholders. 
 
Silva et al. (2006) investigated the effects of business group affiliation, giving special 
attention to the ownership-control structures and to the role of family ties and 
interlocking directorates, on the economic performance of Chilean companies
35
.  In 
general, their results documented that Chilean firms have a high concentration of 
ownership and control
36
.  Additionally, most of these firms belonged to business 
groups (114 out of the 117) and had an average interlocking of directors of 56 percent 
and family ties of 22 percent.  Chilean firms affiliated to business groups were shown 
to be larger, to have smaller Tobin’s Q and to generate a higher return on assets than 
those of non-affiliated firms. 
 
Moreover, Silva et al. (2006) found a cubic relationship between performance, 
ownership concentration and business affiliation
37
, with break points at 21 and 76 
percent.  That is to say, at both low and high levels of ownership concentration (below 
21 percent and above of 76 percent, respectively) performance increased, while at 
medium levels (between 21 and 76 percent) performance decreased significantly.  It is 
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 The sample was formed of 177 non-financial Chilean companies that traded in 2000. 
36
 On average, controlling shareholders held 53 percent of the economic rights, but 65 percent of the 
voting rights. 
37
 Business affiliation is analyzed in terms of family ties and interlocking of directorates. 
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of note that these values were consistent with the critical values of ownership stated by 
Chilean law.  Finally, Silva et al.’s findings suggested that the effect of social ties on 
firms’ performance mainly depended on the concentration of voting rights and on the 
kind of the social tie.  In other words, performance may be further increased by social 
ties when there was a low concentration of voting rights, and even more when there 
was a concentration of economic rights.  Finally, in general family ties showed a 
positive impact on performance, whereas interlocking of directors may exert a negative 
impact. 
 
Finally, Klapper and Love (2002) analysed the relationship between law, corporate 
governance and performance in fourteen different emerging countries at company 
level
38
.  To carry out this examination, Klapper and Love (2002) contrasted different 
indices regarding country-level measures of the existence of the law
39
, the 
effectiveness of its implementation
40




This investigation brought up two main findings.  Firstly, the empirical evidence of 
this analysis showed that the overall degree of company-level governance is strongly 
positively related to country-level measures of investor protection, although there is 
considerable variation at company-level governance within countries.  Secondly, the 
imperfections of contracts, the asymmetry of the information, and the particular 
characteristics
42
 of companies were significant determinants of governance at company 
level.  In other words, legal systems and the degree of law enforcement might be key 
determinants of corporate governance.  However, when measuring governance at 
company level, a firm’s particular characteristics proved to be relevant.  Klapper and 
Love (2002) therefore argued that companies might have some flexibility in improving 
their levels of corporate governance by adding charter provisions that enhance the 
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 The sample of this study consists of 374 companies in 14 emerging countries, which are: Brazil, 
Chile, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, The Philippines, Singapore, South 
Africa, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey. 
39
 Law existence is mainly measured by the Shareholder Rights Index, established on the basis of the 
work of La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny in their Law and Finance paper. 
40
 The efficiency in implementing law is measured by the Judicial Efficiency Index. This index is 
provided by the International Country Risk Guide in 2000. 
41
 The Governance Index captures the entire legal environment. This index is built with the first six 
categories of the governance indices provided by the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) report of 
April 1991.  
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.  In this regard they found that good governance practices 
were more meaningful, in terms of corporate performance and market valuation, in 
countries with weak shareholder rights and inefficient law enforcement than in 
countries with strong shareholder rights and efficient law enforcement. 
 
Regarding the relationship between performance and corporate governance, Klapper 
and Love (2002) found that, at firm level, better corporate governance was positively 
related to better operating performance and market valuation.  Further, this relation 
became statistically more significant when country fixed effects
44
 were included.  
Additionally, they showed that firm levels of governance might outweigh the country-
level effects of legal systems when determining market valuation.  
 
It is of note that Klapper and Love’s (2002) investigation is important because it 
provided corporate and country evidence of the behaviour of corporate governance in 
emerging economies, which, unlike rich economies, are characterised by more 
concentrated ownership and weaker legal environments. 
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 Some useful provision should be related to the appropriateness and timely disclosure of the financial 
information, to the selection of independent boards, and to the application of disciplinary mechanisms to 
avoid the expropriation of minority shareholders rights, among others. 
44
 The country effects, which are mainly concerned with legal effects, are encompassed by the indices of 
judicial efficiency, shareholders rights and legality. 
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2.2 Capital  Structure 
 
Capital Structure can be defined as ‘[t]he mix of the various debt and equity capital 
maintained by a firm’.  Capital structure is also called financial structure because it 
represents the composition of corporation’s securities used to finance its investment 
activities (Ross et al. 2002, p. 919). 
 
 
2.2.1 Theoretical Survey 
 
A transcendent study on Capital Structure is the irrelevance model published by 
Modigliani and Miller in 1958.  Modigliani and Miller’s (M-M) research findings 
(expressed as propositions) brought a whole new view to this field.  In 1958, M-M 
claimed that the type and proportion of the securities (i.e. debt instruments and equity 
shares) used to tap a company were irrelevant since the value of its outstanding 
securities would remain unaltered.  This statement is known as the M-M proposition I 
or ‘the irrelevance proposition’ (Modigliani and Miller 1958).  In other words, M-M 
proposition I contends that the value of a company will always be the same under any 
capital structure.  This proposition lies on the strong assumption that capital markets 
are complete and without imperfections such as corporate and personal taxes, 
bankruptcy costs, information asymmetries and agency costs, among others.  However, 
since this ideal world where capital markets are perfect and complete does not exist, 
Modigliani, Miller and many other financial economists widen their research to 
incorporate not only the analysis of the market imperfections overlooked, but also of 
other factors (e.g. country features, culture and psychological behaviour of managers, 
among others) that may influence the selection of the capital structures. 
 
According to Barclay and Smith (2005) most of the current capital structure theories 
focus their analyses on any of the following three factors: (1) taxes, (2) contracting 
costs, or (3) information costs.  It is important to remember that even when these 
theories may predict different or rather opposite outcomes, this does not mean that they 




M-M proposition II analyses the effects of taxes on the capital structure of companies, 
pointing out the economic benefit that could be achieved if debt were included into the 
capital structure of the company.  Its addition may lower the expected corporate tax 
liability, and consequently, increase the earnings (cash) after taxes (Modigliani and 
Miller 1963).  M-M proposition II was the first framework mentioning the debt 
benefits of tax shields.  However, this proposition assumed a risk-free debt scenario, 
which may lead to the belief that 100 percent of debt financing would be the best 
capital structure option.  In the view of the M-M proposition II, the value of a levered 
company might equal that of an identical unlevered company plus the present value of 
the interest tax shields.  The latter represents the contribution of debt financing to the 
market value of the company.  A flaw with this analysis, however, is the possible 
overestimation of the tax advantages caused by overlooking the effects of financial 
distress.  Further, in 1977, Miller evaluated the effects of personal and corporate taxes 
in capital structure.  His analysis asserted that these effects result in the equilibrium of 
aggregate supply and demand for corporate debt, in which personal income taxes paid 
by the marginal investor in corporate debt just offset the corporate tax saving.  
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) extended Miller’s work demonstrating the effects of tax 
shields other than interest payments on debt, such as non-cash charges. 
 
Consequently, a more sensible framework would be one that takes into account not 
only the advantages of debt, for example: the benefits of tax and no-tax shields, but 
also its costs such as the contracting costs including the expected financial distress 
costs (or underinvestment problem) and the direct and indirect
45
 costs of bankruptcy.  
In other words, a theory where the optimal debt-equity ratio reflects the point where 
the marginal costs of debt just offset its marginal benefits (Jensen 1986). 
 
Therefore, taking into account both the benefits and costs of debt, it is expected that 
the company value would be maximised by debt financing as long as this does not 
exceed the optimal corporate debt-equity level because once exceeded, debt financing 
would no longer be at risk-free rate.  In consequence, debt issuance will increase the 
average cost of capital (WACC), reducing the company’s value.  In general, this 
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scenario is analysed by the Static Trade-Off theory (STO), which assumes that there is 
a target level of debt to which companies move towards in order to maximise the 
company value.  This target level is the result of a number of company factors, such as 
profitability, asset type, business risk; and also a number of institutional factors like 
the bankruptcy code and tax code (Booth et al. 2001).  All in all, this argument 
proposes that too much debt may cause the expected financial distress costs to increase 
further than the debt benefits.  This would leave companies with the possibility of 
experiencing underinvestment problems.  Nevertheless, too little debt financing may 
result in an excess of free-cash-flows which may favour overinvestment behaviour 
(Myers 1977 and Jensen 1986). 
 
In this regard, underinvestment can be understood as the circumstance in which 
companies (mainly high-growth companies having problems with their debt servicing 
and whose value is primarily given by intangible investment opportunities) might 
choose to miss positive investment opportunities in order to avoid/limit wealth 
transference from investors to creditors due to the high expected financial distress 
costs.  Conversely, overinvestment could be the propensity of corporate managers to 
invest the excess cash-flow generated in activities leading to growth at the expense of 
profitability, such as diversification projects either in the same core business or worse 
in unfamiliar business (Myers 1977).  This situation has been identified mainly for 
mature companies with large cash-flow generation and low investment opportunities. 
 
Focussing on the effects of informational costs, there are at least three notable theories 
suggesting that it is possible to achieve ‘an optimal’ corporate capital structure.  These 
theories are: the Market Timing (MT) theory, the Signalling theory and the Pecking 
Order (PO) theory.  All of them share the premise that corporate managers might have 
more and better information about the company than outside investors. 
 
In corporate finance, the Market Timing theory assumes that managers might tend to 
‘time’ their stock offerings, favouring the issue of overpriced securities but avoiding 
(or limiting, at least) the issuance of undervalued securities.  This is because managers 
are thought to be concerned about ongoing investors so they would like to prevent the 
dilution of the value of existent shareholders’ claims.  In other words, the MT theory 
expects that companies experiencing high equity valuation might show low levels of 
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leverage, whereas companies whose equity price is undervalued, might show high 
levels of debt.  This appears to be the case since equity value is more vulnerable to 
corporate announcements than debt securities value, since the value of debt securities 
is fixed.  Managers, therefore, believing that the company has profitable investment 
options, but undervalued stock, would favour debt financing.  On the other hand, 
equity financing might be preferred if the stock is considered to be overvalued.  
However, there may also be some other companies tempted to issue overvalued 
securities even though they lack a specific profitable investment opportunity.  This 
makes the reasons for and the signals of this behaviour less clear.  For example, Baker 
and Wurgler (2002, p. 1) mentioned that managers might like ‘...to exploit temporary 
fluctuations in the cost of equity relative to the cost of other forms of capital’ if they 
believe that the equity market is inefficient or segmented. 
 
As a result of this kind of behaviour, and bearing in mind that managers might have a 
better knowledge of the company than outside investors do, the market (investors) 
seems to have decoded those signals offering a systematically negative response to 
most leverage-reducing transactions
46
, whereas a positive stock price reaction is given 
to most leverage increasing transactions (Barclay and Smith 2005 and Jensen 1986). 
 
The Signalling theory is very similar to the previous framework as both are developed 
around the idea that managers possess better corporate information and corporate 
knowledge thereof, than outside investors.  The Signalling theory suggests that the 
company’s market value depends on the perception of its return streams.  
Consequently, changes to these streams might alter the market valuation of the 
company, even though its corporate financial structure does not change (Ross 1977).  
In other words, in addition to presuming managers have better information than 
outside investors, the Signalling theory also considers that corporate financing 
decisions are designed primarily to communicate managers’ confidence in the future 
financial performance of the company and to promote a rise in the shares’ market 
value when managers believe that the company is undervalued (Barclay and Smith 
2005).  However, because investors know that not all corporate information is widely 
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 Barclay and Smith (2005) pointed out that recent empirical literature shows that overpriced or 
underpriced companies issuing new equity showed a drop in their stock prices at the time of the equity 
offering announcement.  Nevertheless, the drop was very slight for companies considered to have 
promising growth opportunities. 
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available and that managers are the ones who have the most access and knowledge of 
this information, they seem willing to trust corporate announcements only if there 
might be significant consequences associated with misleading the market. 
 
Consequently and as previously mentioned, debt financing has been recognised as a 
successful signalling device because it obligates companies to make a fixed set of cash 
payments over the term of the debt security.  Furthermore, the failure to comply with 
these payments can result in severe consequences, including bankruptcy.  Therefore, 
the Signalling theory predicts a high market valuation for most leverage-increase 
transactions, but a low market valuation for most leverage-decrease transactions 
(Jensen 1986). 
 
In addition, keeping the asymmetric information argument while elaborating on the 
analysis of its informational costs, there is a theory suggesting that the capital structure 
of companies should be driven by the preference to be financed by the funds internally 
generated instead of by external financing (Myers 1984 and Myers and Majluf 1984).  
This theory is known as the Pecking Order theory (PO).  It explains that external 
financing might always generate costs, and that these costs will largely vary according 
to the market perception of the future corporate profitability (following the asymmetric 
information argument), and to some extent, to its growth opportunities.  As a result, the 
PO theory presumes that the optimal corporate capital structure is given by a financing 
hierarchic order rather than a target level of leverage.  In view of the PO theory, 
therefore, a company might be able to maximise its value (since the transaction costs 
will be reduced) by systematically selecting internal financing (e.g. retained earnings) 
rather than external financing.  It could also do this by choosing the less risky external 
sourcing (i.e. issuance of debt rather that equity) when internal financing would no 
longer be sensible.  The PO theory thus predicts low debt ratios for companies with 
few investment opportunities but substantial free cash-flows.  On the other hand there 
would be high debt ratios for high-growth companies with low cash-flows, as result of 
the reluctance to issue equity.  It is noteworthy that this prediction is the opposite of 
the tax and contracting arguments. 
 
Finally, bringing back the argument of debt as a disciplinary instrument, the capital 
structure has also been explained under the perspective of the Agency Theory (AT).  
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As defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308), an agency relationship is a contract 
under which ‘...one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision making authority to the agent.’  Thus it seems sensible to think that if both 
parties would like to maximise their own utility, the agent (managers) may have 
incentives to act for their own benefit at the expense of the principal (investors).  
Therefore, it might be rather difficult for the principal to ensure that the agent will 
make optimal decisions from the principal’s viewpoint at zero cost47. 
 
Consequently, the AT can be defined as the framework that analyses the main conflicts 
of interest between corporate managers and their agents frequently generated by the 
payout policies of cash to shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  This theory 
assumes that shareholder’s payoffs might reduce managerial power because they 
decrease the resources under managerial control.  Accordingly, managers might have 
an incentive to promote company’s growth beyond its optimal size as this 
growth/expansion might help them to recover some power or give them some 
pecuniary compensation, as result of the increase in the resources under their control.  
For example, even though external financing such as common equity might generate 
substantial agency costs of managerial discretion, this type of financing might be 
valuable for companies with strong investment opportunities and with managers and 
investors pursing the same growth objective.  However, the opposite might be the case 
if a company does not have a strong investment opportunity because then debt might 
have served to limit the agency costs of managerial discretion. 
 
In other words, the AT proposes that an optimal capital structure might be achieved by 
trading off the agency costs generated by the potential conflicts of interest between 
inside and outside investors against other transaction costs.  This is for the reason that 
the distribution of the future cash-flows of a company might be linked to its capital and 
ownership structures.  For example, Barclay and Smith (2005) pointed out that the use 
of debt rather than equity might help to reduce what economists call the agency cost of 
equity or ‘... the reduction in value that arises from the separation of ownership and 
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 Some examples of agency cost might include ‘... the cost of structuring, monitoring and bonding a set 
of contracts among agents with conflicting interest, plus the residual loss incurred because the cost of 
full enforcement of contracts exceeds the benefits’ (Fama and Jensen 1983, p. 327). 
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control in large, public companies with widely dispersed shareholders’ (Barclay and 
Smith 2005, p.11).  However, this advantage of debt financing seems to hold for 
mature companies with low investment opportunities in the sense that the 
concentration of equity ownership looks facilitated.  However, for high-growth 
companies with few/no cash-flows available, this agency cost advantage might be over 
weighed by the risk-sharing benefits from expensive outside financing. 
 
It is worth noting that even though all the aforementioned capital structure theories 
were framed using both company and institutional factors
48
, it seems that the product 
market field was not the focal point in any of them.  Research on capital structure and 
product market structure can be considered as incipient, and its vast majority seems to 
have been developed assuming that managers generally have incentives to maximise 
output rather than profits or total value.  Two salient perspectives that have been used 
to address the effects into the corporate financial policies and product market are: (1) 
the strategies used by companies competing in the product market and; (2) the effects 
resulting from the product/input or product/input market characteristics, both 
considering debt as a bargaining device (Harris and Raviv 1991). 
 
In general, it could be said that the aim of the research related to product market 
strategy (also known as product market competition) is to analyse how leverage might 
change the payoffs to equity, altering the equilibrium product market strategies.  The 
goal for research on capital structure and the product or input characteristics might be 
the identification of the characteristics of the product (input) or of the product market 
(input market) that significantly interact with the debt levels (Harris and Raviv 1991).  
Initial work in this first branch of research proposed that, using a Cournot-equilibrium 
model, oligopolistic companies might favour debt financing
49
 even though it will 
increase their business risk, because these companies might opt for a more aggressive 
output policy (Brander and Lewis 1986 in Harris and Raviv, 1991).  In Cournot 
oligopoly models leverage acted as a commitment device for producing more, as 
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 For example, the STO theory proposes that the target level of debt to which a company moves 
towards in order to maximise its value is the result of its asset type, its profitability and some transaction 
costs, besides the institutional factors like the bankruptcy code and tax code.  Similarly, the capital 
structure under the PO theory is driven by the interaction between the company investment 
opportunities, its profitability and some market imperfections like information asymmetries. 
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 This is based on the Jensen and Meckling (1976) argument explaining that increases in leverage may 
induce equity holders to pursue riskier strategies. 
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companies had strong incentives to produce large outputs because this might cause 
their rival companies to produce less.  Consequently, in equilibrium both companies 
would choose a positive level of debt, being worse off in this equilibrium than if they 
were in an all-equity Cournot equilibrium as, with leverage, companies produce more 
than the Cournot output.  Furthermore, it has also been shown that when oligopolies 
persist over time, tactic collusion might be possible through the use of punishment 
strategies triggered when a rival deviates from the collusive output level (Harris and 
Raviv 1991). 
 
The main idea behind research related to product/input or product/input market 
characteristics seems to lie in how the costs of products or product market 
unavailability might affect stakeholders (i.e. customers, suppliers, workers, et cetera), 
bondholders and investors; and also the bargaining game between management and its 
suppliers.  In the first scenario, Titman (1984) suggested that the capital structure can 
be used to commit the shareholders to an optimal liquidation policy which might 
acknowledge the costs of liquidation imposed on stakeholders (i.e. a price raise for 
product or product market unavailability or uniqueness) and then transferred to 
stockholders by means of a price reduction.  In other words, it is expected that 
companies will only default if there are some liquidation proceeds after considering 
(absorbing) the liquidation costs imposed on stakeholders.  Conversely, shareholders 
would never wish to liquidate, while bondholders might prefer go into liquidation 
whenever the company is in bankruptcy.  Therefore, companies experiencing a 
substantial effect because of the characteristics of its product or product market, such 
as those offering unique products/services or durable goods, are expected to have less 
debt than those companies producing less specialised products/services or non-durable 
goods. 
 
The second scenario proposed that debt might serve as a bargaining-strengthener 
device for shareholders when dealing with (input) suppliers (Harris and Raviv 1991).  
The reasoning here is that in a bargaining process between a levered company and its 
suppliers, bondholders endure the largest share in case of failure or a small share in 
case of success.  Thus, an increase in leverage might extend the shareholders’ threat 
point in negotiations with suppliers.  As a result, debt might help to increase company 
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value and its levels will depend on the bargaining power and/or market alternatives 
that companies have. 
 
All in all, according to the maximisation hypothesis of the output and the shifting-
risk
50
 argument of the agency theory, a positive relationship between debt financing 
and market structure is expected, an outcome similar to the tax-shield theory, the 
agency theory, and the signalling theories predictions.  Nonetheless, it is of note that 
there might be some boundaries to the levels of debt given by the product and market 




2.2.2 Empirical Survey 
 
Empirical international research (heavily dominated by USA research at the beginning) 
has corroborated that capital structure decisions might be framed by the 
aforementioned determinants (taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, information 
asymmetry costs, product market, and patterns of ownership, among others); along 
with others like country particulars and the psychological behaviour of investors, 
which seem to have very complex effects on them. 
 
Graham (2000) analysed the effects that corporate tax benefits exert on corporate 
financial policy and company value.  His analysis used a simulation reporting analysis 
that accounted for the following two assumptions: companies do not pay taxes on all 
stages of nature, and there is a possibility that companies carry-back and carry-forward 
the tax-loss provisions.  Green and Hollifield (2003) revealed that, at corporate level, 
personal-tax advantages from raising equity (distributing cash through repurchases) 
may be larger than those from raising debt (distributing cash through dividends or 
taxes) when tax shields can be uncertain or redundant.  They also found that personal-
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 The replication of the “shifting-risk argument” in this context could be as follows.  One may imagine 
a scenario with shareholders and lenders as the principal and agent parties, respectively.  In this context 
shareholders may have incentives to increase debt financing to finance risky projects since lenders will 
receive the payment of their interest and principal if the project succeeds, while shareholders will 
appropriate the residual income.  Nevertheless, if the project fails, the lender will endure the loss.  It is 
of note that business risk and financial distress costs are somehow overlooked.  
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tax advantages from raising equity are not enough to offset the tax advantages from 
raising debt when payments to debt are fully deductible. 
 
Regarding bankruptcy costs, Baxter (1967) demonstrated that these are nontrivial 
costs since it is possible to obtain an optimal capital structure when the tax advantage 
of debt is traded-off against the likelihood of incurring bankruptcy costs.  Altman 
(1984) argued for the importance of indirect and direct bankruptcy costs, providing 
some empirical evidence where the sum of both costs
51
 were sufficiently large to give 
credibility to an optimal capital structure based on the trade-off between gains from 
leverage-induced tax shields and expected bankruptcy costs.  Branch (2002) analysed 
the different classes of bankruptcy-related costs categorising them into four different 
areas and measuring their impact on the optimal capital structure.  The four areas are: 
real costs borne by the bankrupt firm, real costs borne by the claimants, losses to the 
bankrupt firm that are offset by gains to other entities, and real costs borne by other 
parties. 
 
Concerning agency costs, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that distribution of cash 
flows provided by firms may depend on their ownership structure.  Even in a world 
without taxes, it might be possible to find an optimal leverage once the significant 
agency conflict between outside shareholders and managers is solved, as a result of the 
separation of ownership and control.  Titman (1984) acknowledged that an agency 
relationship exists not only between stockholders and bondholders, but also between 
the firm and its customers or between the firm and its employees. 
 
In relation to asymmetry information, Myers and Majluf (1984) performed an 
empirical analysis of the firm’s financing and investment decisions through a 
signalling model.  They stress that asymmetry provides managers with incentives to 
issue overvalued securities, although the market anticipates this and reacts negatively 
to security issuance.  It also provides incentives to issue debt when securities are 
undervalued.  Boyer et al. (2003) demonstrated that information asymmetry may not 
affect product differentiation.  This result contrasts with the main literature on 
signalling, which stresses that information asymmetry has a non-negligible impact on 
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The total (direct and indirect) cost of bankruptcy amounted about 15% of pre-distress firm value for 
industrial firms and around 7% for retailers.  
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strategic behaviour.  In this analysis, Boyer and co-workers used the model of spatial 
competition under mill pricing and quadratic transportations costs. 
 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) verified whether capital structure’s determinants of US 
public companies are similar to capital structure’s determinants of public companies 
from countries financially comparable to the United States e.g. the Group of the Seven 
(G-7)
52
.  This study relies on the analysis of four factors which are: tangibility of 
assets, market-to-book ratio, size and profitability.  It does this while considering the 
effects of the differences in accounting practices
53
 and the different legal and 
institutional environments.  The main result of this research shows that at aggregate 
level, the G-7 companies hold similar levels of leverage, with the United Kingdom and 
Germany being relatively less levered.  Further, institutional factors such as tax and 
bankruptcy codes, the role played by banks and by security markets, the patterns of 
ownership and the market for corporate control; may influence the extent to which 
firms are levered by country.  Finally, Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggest that a more 
appropriate difference between bank-oriented countries and market-oriented countries 
may be their election for public financing (stocks and bonds) or private financing 
(bank loans), rather than the amount of leverage held by their companies. 
 
In the same line, Wald (1999) investigated the role of institutions and agencies on 
capital structure’s determinants in developed countries.  Wald’s analysis (1999) uses a 
one-year
54
 cross-country sample formed by five developed countries.  These countries 
are: France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 
 
This investigation avows that institutions and agencies may be also important 
determinants of capital structure.  To this end, Wald (1999) assesses the effects of the 
characteristics of eight firms on corporate financial decisions according to the view of 
moral hazard and agency theories.  The characteristics analysed are: risk, physical 
property and equipment, inventories, research and development expenses, 
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 The countries embraced by the G-7 are: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom 
and the United States of America. 
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 Rajan And Zingales identified the following practices as the main sources for accounting differences.  
The type of balance sheet reported in terms of individual or consolidated; the method used for valuating 
assets i.e. historical cost or current value; and the items/entries reported in the balance sheet such as: 
financial leases and pension liabilities, among others. 
54
 The year of the financial data is either 1991 or 1992.  This depended on the latest data provided by 
Worldscope database by the time of this study. 
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depreciation, profitability, sales growth, and size.  The results of this study show that, 
although leverage seems to be very similar between these countries, institutions may 
be considered as a salient capital structure determinant as these vary the effects of 
other determinants on corporate financial decisions.  Some of these variations are 
obtained when risk, profitability, size and/or growth are analysed. 
 
Miguel and Pindado (2001) provided some evidence of both firm’s characteristics55 
and Spanish institutions
56
 being key determinants of corporate capital structure in 
Spain.  To this end, Miguel and Pindado use different theories of capital structure such 
as tax, financial distress, static trade-off, pecking order, and free cash flow theories to 
explain the behaviour of the previous determinants.  The sample of this study is 
formed by all non-financial Spanish firms quoted on the Spanish Stock Exchange from 
1990 to 1997. 
 
The novelty of this study lies in three facts: it provides evidence of a non-G-7 country 
that is Spain.  Secondly, it develops and empirically tests a dynamic target adjustment 
model, where the optimum debt level is a linear function of the determining factors of 
capital structure.  Further, this model is calibrated using a two-step Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM).  Finally, it contrasts the effects that the main Spanish 
institutions may exert on their corporate financial decisions in two possible 
environments, one with information asymmetries and one without them.  The main 
results from this study are as follows.  Spanish companies rely more on private debt
57
 
than on public debt since public debt has been shown to be more expensive due to the 
underdevelopment of the Spanish bond market.  Further, although the transaction costs 
of the Spanish firms adjusting their debt ratio to their target-debt ratio are high, these 
costs look inferior to those borne by US companies.  In addition, under asymmetric 
information there is an inverse relationship between the levels of debt and cash flow.  
This may confirm the pecking order theory, which appears to be reflected in the under-
investment problem.  In contrast, in the absence of asymmetric information there is a 
direct relationship between the levels of debt and cash flow.  This may corroborate the 
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 The firm characteristics analysed are: taxes, assets, cash flows, free cash flows and investments. 
56
 The institutions explored are tax code, bankruptcy laws, public and private debt, and patterns of 
ownership structure. 
57
 Private debt may help in lessening agency problems because managers are more aligned with 
investor’s interests.  In contrast, public debt may provide fewer financing constrains. 
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free cash flow theory and the over-investment problem, thereof.  That is to say, firms 
may issue debt to avoid managers carrying on with negative present value projects.  
Finally, Spanish companies have been shown to have concentrated ownership 
structures, which help to reduce the cash-flow problem previously described. 
 
Sogorb-Mira and López-Gracia (2003) also analysed the financial structure of Spanish 
companies, but they focus on small and medium enterprises
58
 (SMEs).  Sogorb-Mira 
and López-Gracia (2003) argue that both the pecking order and the trade-off 
approaches may contribute to explain theoretically the financial policies of Spanish 
SMEs.  This study shows some evidence of Spanish SMEs attempting to achieve a 
target leverage, but scant indication of these firms adjusting their leverage level 
according to their financing requirements. 
 
Menéndez-Alonso (2003) suggested diversification in the product market as a 
determinant of firm capital structure.  Nevertheless, this study does not find a 
significant relationship between firm leverage and the degree of diversification of the 
Spanish manufacturing firms.  This contrasts with the results from previous studies of 
American and Australian markets that suggest a positive relation based on coinsurance 
effects and transactions costs.  Conversely, Singh and Nejadmalayeri (2004) 
demonstrated that international diversification strategy positively associates with 
higher total and long-term debt ratios for French Multinational Corporations, since it 
reduces the overall cost of capital despite higher equity risk. 
 
Korajczyk (2003) assessed how macroeconomic conditions and firm-specific 
factors may change the determinants of capital structure over time and across firms.  
The main result from this study reveals that in financially unconstrained firms leverage 
varies counter-cyclically with macroeconomic conditions.  Conversely, in financially 
constrained
59
 firms leverage varies pro-cyclically. 
 
Hatzinikolaou, et al. (2002) analysed the effects of inflation uncertainty on a firm’s 
debt-to-equity ratio.  They propose that inflation might be considered as a significant 
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 The sample comprises 6482 small and medium Spanish companies during the five year period 1994-
1998. 
59
 Theoretically, a financially constrained firm is one which does not have sufficient cash to undertake 
investment opportunities and faces severe agency cost when accessing financial markets. 
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determinant of capital structure.  This is because inflation uncertainty diminishes the 
debt-to-equity ratio and causes a loss of value to the firm’s stockholders.  Furthermore, 
inflation has a pervasive effect on capital structure budgeting decisions, which reduces 
the number of projects financed by issuing debt. 
 
 
2.2.3 Capital Structure in Emerging Countries 
 
Initial research on capital structure in emerging countries suggests that their corporate 
financial decisions are influenced by similar factors to those in developed countries.  
However, in the case of emerging countries, the effects exerted on capital structure by 
their institutions and the particulars of each country may have at least the same impact 
of all the other determinants together (Glen and Singh 2004 and Booth et al. 2001). 
 
Booth et al. (2001) examined the determinants of capital structure in emerging 
countries.  They investigated the role of some macroeconomic variables i.e. 
development of security markets, real GDP growth rate and inflation and tax rates.  
They also studied the role of some institutional factors i.e. tax rates and business risk, 
on corporate financial decisions in emerging countries.  The sample of this study 
comprises the largest public companies of ten emerging countries
60
 during the period 
1980 to 1990. 
 
Booth et al.’s investigation presents evidence that capital structure decisions are 
affected by the same determinants in both developed and emerging countries
61
; 
although some signs and/or the size of some coefficients appear to be different from 
what may be expected.  Further, there are persistent differences across countries 
suggesting that specific country factors are at work.  In other words, under their model, 
in terms of total debt ratio, country effects explain around 43 percent of the corporate 
financial decisions, while financial variables alone explain between 40 and 43 percent.  
Important findings regarding debt are that emerging countries seem to have lower 
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 These countries are: India, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Turkey, Zimbabwe, Mexico, Brazil, Jordan 
and Korea. 
61
 Total-debt ratios decrease with the tangibility of assets, profitability, and the average tax rate and 
increase with size (Booth et al. 2001, p. 115). 
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levels of debt than those held by the G-7 countries.  Further, the difference between the 
total book-debt and the long-term ratios looks greater in emerging than in developed 
countries.  This may be the result of emerging countries being largely tapped by short-
term debt and trade credit.  Moreover, profitability is shown to be highly and 
negatively correlated to debt.  This could be due to the substantial agency and 
informational asymmetry problems that these countries encounter, besides the 
underdevelopment of their long-term bond markets.  Moreover, business risk and the 
market-to-book ratio are important factors when analysed in isolation, as they tend to 
be subsumed within country dummies.  Finally, main outcomes concerning 
macroeconomic effects suggest that, in general, debt levels vary negatively with 
inflation and equity market capitalisation, but positively with real economic growth 
and the proportion of liquid liabilities to GDP.  In the case of institutions, ownership 
and legal systems have been shown to have a salient but complex effect on capital 
structure decisions. 
 
Glen and Singh (2004) contrasted corporate capital structures, asset structures and 
rates of return of 22 developed markets
62
 and 22 emerging markets
63
 from 1994 to 
2000.  This study centres its attention on the analysis of the effects of the economic 
variables: country, sector and size
64
.  Glen and Singh (2004) commented that the major 
findings of their study may disagree with some anecdotal assumptions regarding the 
weakness of emerging markets i.e. low or null market and product market competition.  
These findings are: first, capital and asset structures between developed and emerging 
markets may be rather similar, despite the considerable cross-sectional variation that 
exists within these two groups.  Second, the country variable exerts salient effects on 
size and sector variables as the former accounts for 85 percent of the variation on the 
latter two variables. 
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 The countries which compose the sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bermuda, Canada, The 
Cayman Islands, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, 
Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The United Kingdom and The United States of 
America. 
63
 The countries which compose the sample are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, The Czech 
Republic, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, The 
Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela. 
64
 According to Glen and Singh (2004) organisational size could be thought of as a proxy for economic 
growth.  Besides, this might influence corporate leverage, trade credit, return on stock, market for 
corporate control and managerial compensation. 
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In general, the main results of this study
65
 can be summarised as follows.  The size 
distribution of firms
66
 looks fairly similar between the two groups (developed markets 
and emerging markets). The exception is that the emerging market group contains 
more small and fewer large firms.  Further, regarding debt, emerging market firms 
show lower total-debt and noncurrent debt levels, but higher levels of current debt than 
developed market firms do.  That is to say, the percentages shown by emerging 
markets are 49, 13 and 30, respectively; in contrast to 52, 18 and 28 shown by 
developed markets (Glen and Singh 2004).  Regarding assets, the levels of fixed assets 
held by emerging market firms seem to be higher than those held by developed market 
firms.  Finally, emerging market returns on assets and equity are shown to be both 
more volatile and generally lower than those of developed market firms, albeit they 
have increased over the last few years. 
 
Another interesting study showing that country particularities account for more than 
the rest of the capital structure determinants was completed by Wiwattanakantang in 
1999.  This empirical research
67
 combines a few well-known capital structure 
theories
68
 along with different corporate governance determinants to discover the 
empirical determinants of capital structure of Thai listed companies.  The main results 
of this study reveal that, as is the case in developed economies, factors such as 
profitability, tangibility, taxes and growth are all significant in affecting capital 
structure.  Furthermore, factors related to corporate governance of Thai listed 
companies, such as ownership structure, also influence corporate financial decisions, 
especially debt policy choices.  A particular case in point is the high levels of debt that 
seems to be held by the single-family owned companies, in which the ownership 
belongs to the managers.  This fact seems to differ from the general finding of non-
significant influence from management ownership on debt-equity decisions. 
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 These results are based on the financial data of year 2000. 
66
 Size is measured by the natural logarithm of total corporate assets.  This calculation tries to reflect the 
effects of the two main classes of corporate assets; those that are material and those that represent its 
human capital. 
67
 This study worked with a sample of 270 non-financial Thai firms listed in the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand in 1996. 
68
 Such as the tax-effect theory, the signalling theory and the agency costs theory. 
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A novel approach that takes into account both sides
69
 of loan markets to explain 
differences in capital structure decisions is that offered by Li et al. (2006).  They 
argued that classical theories of capital structure such as the Pecking Order Hypothesis 
and the Static Trade-Off Model cannot be properly applied to emerging economies to 
explain their capital structure. This is because these theories assume similar companies 
face none or the same constraints in accessing efficient financial markets to solve their 
financing needs.  However, financial markets in emerging economies are very 
underdeveloped and companies are not at the same level of development.  Therefore, 
not all companies have open access to those markets.  This last idea highlights the 
importance of country and institutional features as determinants of capital structure in 
emerging economies. 
 
Li et al. (2006) carried out an inter-region investigation of capital structure decisions 
and debt maturity among Chinese manufacturing companies.  For this purpose, they 
used a firm-level database containing financial and ownership information of all the 
manufacturing Chinese companies
70
 during 2000 to 2003.  Some general results 
indicate that Chinese non-listed manufacturing companies appear to have more 
leverage than most listed companies from other emerging countries.  At the same time, 
the Chinese non-listed manufacturing companies mainly employ short-term debt in 
their capital structures.  Li et al. (2006) pointed out that these results seem to be driven 
by the fact that ownership structures
71
 and country and region features, i.e. economic 
development and the quality of the institutional framework, may be equally important 
as company characteristics in explaining the differences of capital structure choices
72
 
in China.  Additionally, they found that in China, as in other emerging economies, 
institutions have different degrees of development
73
 within the regions of the country, 
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The supply side mainly represented by banks, and the demand side that embodies all companies. 
70
 Of these, 99% are non-listed companies, which is very important since most of the empirical studies 
in the field relate to listed companies, besides which they do not provide details of their ownership 
patterns.  Additionally, non-listed companies bring out the case that the economic development of most 
emerging economies is based on the development of their small companies.  Even so, small companies 
seem not to benefit from the advances of their institutions as much as large companies. 
71
 The seven ownership groups found are: state ownership; collective ownership; private ownership; 
shareholding corporations; Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan ownership; foreign ownership; and others.  
72
 For instance, state ownership is positively associated with leverage and long-term debt, while foreign 
ownership is negatively associated with leverage. 
73
 The four indices used to measure the development of the institutions are: banking development index, 
the legal environment index, the marketization index, and the deregulation index. 
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and these differences may affect financing decisions in a similar way as the 




2.3 Business Groups 
 
Preliminary research associates business groups (BGs) with emerging markets and 
leads us to consider them as inefficient and even corrupt organisations because of the 
findings regarding ownership patterns, governance and other organisational features.  
Recent empirical evidence, however, has revealed another facet of business groups 
which demonstrates how useful they can be, particularly in economies where markets 
and institutions are not fully developed. 
 
Moreover, the fact that business groups exist in some mature industrial economies and 
predominate in the economies of so many emerging countries reveals that BGs have a 
strong worldwide advantage as an organisational structure over the other existing 
structures, for example: individual firms, state-owned enterprises, multinational 
companies (MNC) and conglomerates.  This advantage has been identified as their 
capacity to internalise functions for which no available external market or supporting 
institution exists (Colpan and Hikino 2010, Colpan et al. 2010, Khanna and Rivkin 
2001, Khanna and Yafeh 2007 and Langlois 2009). 
 
 
2.3.1 Business Groups in Developed and Emerging Economies 
 
To provide a unique definition of business groups may result in a difficult task since 
these groups imply ‘... different organization models and business arrangements to 
individual scholars belonging to diverse academic traditions’ (Colpan and Hikino 
2010, p. 15).  Further, this task becomes more complex if one assesses its 
interpretations across countries. 
 
Business groups, in the most general contexts, have been defined as ‘collections of 
firms bound together in some formal and/or informal ways, characterized by an 
“intermediate” level of binding’ (Granovetter 1995, cited in Langlois 2009, p. 21); as 
‘... informational mechanisms for coordinating complementary activities – for gap 
filling.’ (Langlois 2009, p. 0); or as ‘... clusters of coordinated activities carried out by 
interlinked but legally independent enterprises’ (Colpan et al. 2010, p. 6). 
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Granovetter’s (1995) definition, although general, recognises ownership, control and 
organisational dependency of the affiliated units as important aspects that characterise 
business groups.  Langlois’ (2009) definition identifies the process of coordinating an 
array of complementary activities (gap-filling) as a key reason for business groups to 
exist; whilst Colpan et al.’s (2010) conceptualisation acknowledges/reconciles both 
perspectives.  Additionally, Langlois’ (2009) and Colpan et al.’s (2010) definitions 
identify the relevance of the organisational structure of business groups as it enables 
their units (companies) to share key information about the needs to be fulfilled to 
restore operations/trade and hence promote economic growth. 
 
Current research highlights the fact that diversified business groups are characteristic 
of emerging markets.  However it has been shown that they do also exist in developed 
markets.  Langlois (2009) explained that in emerging economies
74
, firms aiming to 
reduce the cost of monitoring and law enforcement might favour the organisational 
structure of business groups since business pyramids are often controlled by the family 
founders.  On the other hand, in developed economies, firms preoccupied by solving 
the gaps created by factors like novelty and change may prefer more decentralised 
organisation structures such as inter-firm networks.  Nonetheless, these economies do 
also have a high presence of pyramidal business groups.  Langlois (2009) suggested 
that residual rights of control in governance could be one of the main reasons that keep 
pyramidal business groups being the prevailing corporate organisational structure in 
developed economies with strong institutions of third-party enforcement and investor 
protection. 
 
Focussing on emerging markets, a complete conceptualisation of business groups is 
that provided by Khanna and Rivkin (2001, pp. 47-48) who described them ‘... a set of 
firms which, though legally independent firms, are bound together by a constellation of 
formal and informal ties
75
 and are accustomed to taking coordinated action
76
.’  
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 By emerging economies, Langlois (2009) refers to those which are still growing, so their financial 
markets are still not perfect and their institutions (i.e. political and market-supporting) are still weak or 
even non-existent. 
75
 Among the informal ties, Leff (1978) noticed ‘other-regarding’ behavioural factors such as trust and 
culture, in their role as significant bounding ties; however, his research was incipient, so that did not 
offer a full account of the importance/effects of the presence of this kind of factors in a business group.  
Leff’s definition describes a business groups as ‘a group of companies that does business in different 
markets under a common administrative or financial control, and [...] its members are linked by 
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Building on this definition, Khanna and Yafeh (2007) identified that equity is the most 
common formal tie, whilst founder families are the most common informal one.  
Khanna and Rivkin (2001) observed that most of the affiliated companies of these 
groups are associated with a single extended family, and these companies often operate 
in multiple unrelated industries, a finding that seems opposite to the conventional 
wisdom for advanced economies
77
, in particular the USA.  Finally, in most of the 
emerging markets, group affiliated companies tend to be relatively large and 
economically important.  Khanna and Rivkin (2001) found that company affiliation 
sometimes helps to increase the average group’s profit78, and demonstrated that the 
knowledge of the firm’s group affiliation provides, at least, the same information as 
the knowledge of the sector/industry to which each of these firms belongs, when 




All in all, it seems that due to market imperfections business groups have an useful 
ongoing place in economies, as there will always be diverse market and institutional 
inefficiencies
80
 to overcome.  Further, business groups are expected to exist not only in 
emerging economies but also in developed ones
81
, although their existence and 
prevalence should be more affluent in the former.  Moreover, since there are not 
clearly recognised particulars differentiating the organisational structure of business 
groups in developed and emerging economies, it might be that their functioning and/or 
                                                                                                                              
relations of interpersonal trust on the basis of similar personal, ethnic or commercial background’ 
(Leff 1978, cited in Khanna and Rivkin 2001, p.48). 
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 Some examples of coordinated actions are: (1) ‘...sharing a brand name, (2) raising capital jointly, (3) 
lobbying bureaucrats and politicians, (4) pooling resources to invest in new ventures, [... and (5)...] 
exchanging resources internally, [such as reallocating] capital [...] to members in distress or to 
members whose opportunities outweigh their ability to generate capital themselves, [among others.]’ 
(Khanna and Rivkin 2001, p.48). 
77
 This claim refers to the main problems that may arise when managers overlook stakeholders needs 
and goals to focus on their own, like ‘empire building’ objectives or/and ‘risk aversion’ issues, among 
others discussed by Jensen (1986) and Jensen and Meckling (1976), among others. 
78
 Khanna and Rivkin (2001) analysed fourteen different emerging economies, which are: Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Peru, The Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey.  Their empirical results suggested that firms affiliated to a business group 
performed better than individual firms in six countries, but worse than individual firms in three 
countries.  The other five countries did not present any differences between the profitability rates of 
their affiliated and individual companies.  It is of note that Mexican companies’ performance was 
consistent with the last group performance. 
79
 Khanna and Rivkin’s (2001) empirical findings showed that the profit rates of the companies affiliated 
to a business group were closer one to another in twelve of those fourteen countries. 
80
 These imperfections are translated into transaction costs to minimise or to obtain a gain from. 
81
 Langlois (2009) mentioned that pyramidal business groups are very present nowadays in modern 
open-access societies such as Canada, Israel or Sweden. 
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adapting mechanisms to the environment where they operate the factors/features 
differentiating between them. 
 
 
2.3.2 The Particularities of Business Groups  
 
Currently, there is not a consensus on whether to consider business groups as welfare-
enhancer or welfare-detriment agents.  Khanna and Yafeh (2007) argue that business 
groups are the product of the underlying conditions leading to their formation; 
therefore, business groups are bound to be extremely different.  These underlying 
conditions are essentially reflected in their organisational structure, control and 
ownership and interaction with society.  In terms of structure, the three main forms 
into which BGs have evolved are: horizontal diversification; vertical integration which 
sometimes leads to the possibility of enhancing monopoly power or/and imperfect 
competition; and involvement with the financial sector.  Control and ownership are 
mainly reflected in the extent to which business groups are set up as pyramids or have 
cross-shareholdings, and the extent to which they are controlled by families or by 
outside investors.  Finally, their interaction with society refers to the nature of their 
interaction with the government, id est. a close relation or a turbulent one. 
 
Focussing on the different organisational structure forms of business groups, 
according to Khanna and Yafeh (2007), corporate diversification (also known as a 
strategic involvement in multiple industries/sectors) can be beneficial to shareholders 
when: the affiliated companies have resources that can be deployed in other industries; 
there are some inefficiencies in equity markets and/or labour markets; there is limited 
enforcement of contracts; and when there is inadequate rule of law, among others.  
Conversely, diversification can be harmful when it is mainly used as an empire-
building devise or for risk aversion.  Empirically, there is a consensual view that 
corporate diversification
82
 destroys shareholders value in the USA, and destroys share 
holders values for a certain length of time in South Korea.  However, this seems to be 
a particular phenomenon which happened as result of government policies (Schneider 
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 In relation to asymmetry information problems, raising capital within a diversified business group 
might be more efficient (e.g. less penalised) than tapping outside financial markets. 
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2009).  Borrowing the diversification discount argument, Khanna and Rivkin (2001) 
tested it and found no evidence of a diversification discount in eleven of the 14 
emerging countries sampled. If anything, they found some evidence of a 
diversification premium in this type of countries.  Building on that investigation, 
Khanna and Yafeh (2007) reported that diversification discount tended to be lower in 





Vertical integration in business groups is thought of as an organisational device to 
ameliorate high transaction costs between unrelated parties due to institutional failures.  
Some examples of these costs are ones related to: underdeveloped legal and judicial 
institutions, inefficient contract enforcement and corruption.  According to Khanna and 
Yafeh’s (2007) research evidence, vertical integration was not only used to cope with 
the inadequacy of contracting institutions, but also, and maybe more importantly, to 
obtain monopoly power or to alleviate the double monopoly problem.  Furthermore, it 
was noted that the extent of vertical integration varied considerably across groups 
within the same country.  This suggested that ‘...group and industry-factors play[ed] a 
role which is sometimes more important than country-specific institutional factors’ 
(Khanna and Yafeh 2007, p. 342). 
 
Finally, the involvement of business groups in the financial sector (e.g. banking sector, 
insurance sector, et cetera) is very complex to assess fully.  Theoretically, it is thought 
to be related to transaction costs, level of financial development, the quality of 
institutions and government regulations per country.  Unfortunately, in practice there is 
scant evidence to prove any of these theses.  Nonetheless, the existing empirical 
literature seems to suggest that the main reason for business groups to get involved in 
the financial sector is to compensate for the financial and institutional 
underdevelopment. 
 
Concerning control and ownership, the two main types of controlled structures that 
business groups present when there is a concentration of ownership are: the vertically 
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 The reasoning behind this argument is that diversified business groups set up in emerging economies 
with poorly developed capital markets are more able to obtain financing from the business group’s 
internal capital market than from external capital providers (e.g. domestic bank or international financial 
institutions).  This might be the result of severe informational problems. 
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controlled and the horizontal control structures.  In general, the vertically-controlled 
structure is regarded as pyramid, which at the same time is closely associated with the 
practice of expropriation of minority-shareholders rights by majority shareholders
84
, 
who usually have a disproportionally larger control rights with respect to their 
investments.  On the other hand, the horizontally-controlled structure refers to the 
network of control via cross-shareholdings.  In other words, a horizontally controlled 
structure is developed when a (closed) group of shareholders are members in all/most 
of the board of directors of the affiliated companies, so that they will have preferential 
control positions in them.  It is of note that although this dichotomous classification of 
controlling structures used by business groups has been theoretically identified, in 
practice this classification has demonstrated some flaws.  Some examples of these 
failures are: the scarcity of company information available to map these structures; the 
limited disclosure of this type of information; and the fact that business groups often 
use both structures at the same time, which makes it very difficult to define a clear cut-
off between them.  Finally, the extent of involvement of inside (e.g. family control) or 
outside shareholders varies wildly across countries and between companies, as has 
been already discussed in detail at the beginning of this chapter, in section 1 
‘Ownership Structure’. 
 
With respect to the interaction with society or social welfare perspective, Khanna and 
Yafeh (2007) explained that the role of business groups is ambiguous since they 
interact with the different economic and institutional conditions of the environments 
that encourage their existence and prevalence.  Preliminary literature mainly 
highlighted the negative side of business groups; that is, their preference to carry out 
rent-seeking activities and enhance monopoly power.  On the other hand, recent 
literature is pointing out that BGs sometimes make up for underdeveloped or non-
existent institutions, helping to generate/expand social welfare.  Hence, business 
groups can be either “paragons or parasites”.  Empirically, Khanna and Rivkin’s 
(2001) analysis
85
 reported some striking results revealing that business group 
profitability was larger the greater the proxies for capital market development.  
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 This expropriation practice is known as tunnelling. 
85
 Khanna and Rivkin (2001) carried a cross-country correlation analysis to explore the relation between 
the domestic Institutions and the performance of BGs.  This analysis controlled for inefficiencies in 
capital and labour markets, general level of development, informational failures, and corruption and 
bureaucratic influence via eleven different proxies. 
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Furthermore, they found no evidence supporting the business groups’ rent-seeking 
argument.  In other words, there was no evidence of correlation between the proxies of 
business group’s importance and inefficiencies in markets other than capital markets.  
Building on the argument regarding the kind of relationship between business groups 
and society, Khanna and Yafeh (2007) identified that business groups do not only 
respond to their environment, but also shape and influence it.  This dynamic effect of 
business groups on their economic environment is sometimes socially welfare-
enhancing, and sometimes not.  It is of note that there is very scarce econometric 
evidence on this point; however, some historical evidence in different countries is 
supportive of this view.  A case in point is the economic rebound of the Mexican 
economy after its financial crisis in 1995 (Castañeda 2002, 2005 and 2007), which is 




2.3.3 Other Perspectives 
 
Since business groups are a common phenomenon worldwide, different schools of 
thought have explored the possible reasons for their formation, prevalence and 
survival.  A review of the main approaches is as follows. 
 
The capability for repeated industry-entry build between entrepreneurs and companies 
was proposed as the origin of business groups in emerging economies by Guillén 
(2000), who discussed that this industry entry capability could be rather a positive skill 
worth preserving as long as asymmetric foreign trade and investment conditions 
prevail. 
 
Colpan and Hikino (2010) argued that the commonest forms of business groups are 
horizontally diversified and pyramidal BGs, and that these two different types of BGs 
ought to have different reasons for being formed.  Hence, different approaches for their 
analysis should be used.  An economic perspective may be used for diversified BGs 





, government policies, and internal competitive resources 
and capabilities; whilst a corporate finance perspective may be better suited for 
pyramidal BGs as ownership and control appears to be the main reason for them. 
 
Under an economics perspective, Colpan and Hikino (2010) suggested that causal 
exogeneity or the primacy of environmental factors, and endogeneity or the dynamics 
of intra-group structure and processes are the two main factors driving the reasons for 
business groups to be formed as diversified groups.  In other words, causal exogeneity 
is involved when market imperfections and government policies are the conditions 
functioning as instrumental mechanisms driving their formation and development.  A 
common example is the case of unfulfilled demand as result of an immature market 
and a government directive to artificially create and secure demand.  On the other 
hand, endogeneity is implicated when the internal competitive resources and 
capabilities of the affiliated companies are the drivers of the formation of diversified 
BGs.  That is to say, the skills needed for repeated industry-entry patterns, such as 
contact capabilities and project-management; or the trans-product capability at 
business level, which refers to the building of shareable knowledge across the group, 
which may become a source of sustainable advantage even in competitive markets 
refer to endogeneity (Guillén 2000 and Colpan and Hikino 2010). 
 
From a corporate finance perspective, it has been discussed that a critical issue in the 
formation of vertical pyramidal business groups is the separation of ownership and 
control, which often results in excessive control rights in contrast with the investments.  
Further, control pyramids might be considered as one of the most important control 
mechanisms used by business groups, which are widely observed in different degrees 
in many developed and emerging economies (Khanna and Rivkin 2001, Khanna and 
Yafeh, 2007, Langlois 2009 and Colpan and Hikino, 2010). 
 
Colpan and Hikino (2010) argued that the main benefits from pyramidal business 
groups might be tunnelling practices and the extraction of private benefits.  By 
tunnelling practices they distinguished two main types of activities.  The first practice 
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 According to Colpan and Hikino (2010, p. 41) transaction costs are ‘...theoretical costly when markets 
and their supporting institutions, such as regulatory systems, contract enforcing mechanisms, and rules 
for information disclosure and transparency are immature and weak.’ 
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derives from the standard Jensen and Meckling (1976) argument of controlling 
shareholders extracting at least part of the income generated by the companies within 
the pyramid.  The second tunnelling practice associates business groups as ‘...private 
mechanisms of “planned industrialisation comprising a simultaneous planning of 
several complementary industries”’ (Colpan and Hikino 2010, p. 46).  Taking into 
account this second practice, one could argue that pyramidal business groups are 
important in emerging economies as they can help to promote different industries 
when their economies lack mature markets and adequate supporting institutions.  This 
should be the case as long as in the long-run their entrenchment cost does not surpass 
the short-run societal cost ‘... ensuing from the eventual transfer of income from 
minority shareholders through profit tunnelling, the less-than-optimal development of 
capital markets, and the exercise of economic power by a few wealthy business 
families ...’ (Colpan and Hikino 2010, p. 46).  It is of note that historical developments 
in the USA and the United Kingdom resulted in the legal and regulatory impossibility 
of harbouring this class of controlling business groups in their economies (Colpan and 
Hikino, 2010). 
 
Regarding the private benefits from pyramidal business groups, Colpan and Hikino, 
(2010) explained that since this singular form of BGs remain widespread in mature 
market economies equipped with strong legal and market institutions supporting the 
functioning of capital markets; controlling shareholders may also (or only) extract 
private benefits in terms of social, political and economic gains from invisible assets 
like group reputation and prestige, political connections, et cetera. 
 
A sociological perspective acknowledging goals like ‘... institutional legitimacy, 
political power and social fitness’ for the creation and continuing existence of business 
groups was noted by DiMaggio and Powell in 1983 (cited in Khanna and Rivkin 2001, 
p. 50).  This perspective has as its main subject of study the behaviour of individuals 
instead of companies; therefore, business groups are considered networks of social 
significance.  This sociological perspective argues that individuals value social fitness 
as much as an economic gain.  Consequently, individuals might prefer to do business 
within their closest social groups in order to maximise their economic gains through 
the minimisation of transaction costs.  In other words, for any individual, his/her 
family members, friends and other close members are the hierarchy of preference to do 
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business with as result of the trust between them.  It is thus believed that the use of 
these social ties diminishes costs, such as those related to agency conflicts, contractual 
disputes and information asymmetries, among others.  Further, the variation in 
structure of business groups reinforces the importance of the non-economic functions 
of business groups (Granovetter 2005, cited in Khanna and Yafeh 2007). That is to 
say, the structures of BGs reflect not only the standard economic factors but also other 
equally important factors for groups to be formed and prevail, such as inheritance 
customs, kinship structure, national ideology, prestige and pride. 
 
Alternatively, Langlois (2009) mentioned that business groups and political institutions 
are so closely related that in some contexts they are thought to be and/or behave as the 
same thing.  In particular, pyramidal business groups have been regarded as the 
natural or default form of a business organisation as the State is the natural form of 
territorial government through history (North, Wallis and Weingast 2009, cited in 
Langlois 2009).  The reasoning behind the natural state theory elucidates the State not 
as a monopolist person with the ability to enforce his/her power, but as a ‘... relatively 
stable coalition of elites who limits access to the resources of society in order to create 
credible incentives to cooperate rather than fight among themselves’ (Langlois 2009, 
p. 24).  This framework may be easily transferable to the modus operandi of business 
groups as they represent ‘... a self-enforcing coalition with its own rules, norms and 
mechanisms of enforcement’ (Langlois 2009, p. 29). 
 
Moreover, the political economy literature on groups leads us to think that in most 
countries the appearance of the business group phenomenon was strongly influenced 
by government policies and/or directives.  Some examples of these policies are: Import 
Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) in Latin America, export orientated growth in East 
Asia, social democracy in Scandinavia and defence contracting in Israel (Schneider 
2009). 
 
Schneider (2009, p. 4) explained that ownership (the allowed ownership) is the key 
governmental method of supporting business groups’ growth.  In other words, the 
political advantage of BGs is due to ‘... their towering size87 in their domestic 
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 By towering size is meant the proportion of the domestic economy from which BGs benefit due to the 
diverse economic sectors they belong to and to the pyramidal structure established, which allows owners 
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economies, [...] and the capacity to get and use economic and political information, 
especially through privileged access
88
 to the policy making process.’  Conversely, 
government policies like reserving particular economic sectors for state enterprises or 
multinational companies (MNCs) and restricting the access to banks are regulations 
that set the ultimate boundaries for groups’ expansion. 
 
In addition, it has been suggested that the nature of business groups’ relations with 
governments ought to change when BGs reach their maturity, if they develop some 
entrenchment problems at this stage.  That is to say, even when governments assisted 
the formation and development of BGs, when these groups reach an important 
economic and/or political power, their relation ought to vary considerably from a 
protégé status to a sector that loses the government favour (Khanna and Yafeh 2007).  
Schneider (2009) proposed however an alternative theory which argues that business 
groups could not developed a pure economic or political entrenchment problem since 
empirical evidence shows a high turnover among major BGs.  In this regard, for 
example in Latin America, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Argentina and Peru are characterised 
by high rates of BGs turnover.  Further, when analysing the common variables in this 
group, a radical reform enacted variable was shown as a strong candidate for a decisive 
short-term life span of a business group, as happened in the case of Mexico in the 
1990’s decade (Schneider 2009).  Moreover, Schneider (2009) suggested that when the 
nature of the relationship between BGs and government changes, they both adjust their 
interaction in order to maintain some advantages, as both parties benefit from this 
relationship.  For instance, according to Colpan and Hikino (2010), business groups 
often evolve into diversified BGs when a government policy moves on and targets 
different industries (probably in more advanced fields), so that the original business 
groups collaborating with the government on developmental schemes end upgrading 
their capabilities and diversifying their portfolios.  On the other hand, some examples 
of government benefits from this relationship are: business groups are a strategic 
communication and coordination means of governments and also important 
contributors to their political campaigns and parties.  Finally, historical evidence 
                                                                                                                              
to use smaller amounts of their own capital to control vast assets and significant shares of economic 
activity (Schneider 2009). 
88
 It is of note that this access does not mean that BGs write or veto policies, but they are an important 
party with privileged knowledge in this process.  Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that although 
substantial, these advantages must not be overestimated or regarded as guarantee of longevity.  There is 
a high turnover of BGs between countries. 
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collected by Khanna and Yafeh (2007) confirmed that government support is an 
important factor in the formation of business groups in many environments, and that 





2.4 The Case of Mexico: Economic-Financial Environment and 
Corporate Governance Practices 
 
Initial research describes Mexico as an emerging market, with clear information 
asymmetries and high levels of inflation, country risk and volatility, despite its success 
in the trade liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation processes.  However, the 
latest research provides striking insights pointing out the healthy potential of Mexico 
to become an economy that could rival the Group of Seven (G-7) in terms of its 
capability to develop into a source of sustained growth and global demand in sizeable 
markets, a situation increasingly hard to find nowadays in developed economies.  This 
potential has been acknowledged via its categorisation as a member of the N-11
89
 
(Next Eleven) countries (Wilson and Stupnytska 2007 and O’Neill et al. 2010). 
 
 
2.4.1 The Economic and Political Generalities of Emerging Markets and 
Latin America 
 
2.4.1.1 Emerging Markets 
Emerging markets have proved to be a fertile ground for the global investor, 
regardless of their consideration as new markets.  Furthermore, their financial 
importance is growing so fast that even the definitions for this term show to some 
extent their evolution.  In this sense, it is possible to categorise the available definitions 
into two different groups: the first one comprising the most general or loose statements 
that cannot be applied to all emerging markets; and the second group, which provides a 
good understanding of the main characteristics of these markets, explaining their 
diversity. 
 
To illustrate the differences between these two groups, five definitions are presented.  
The first, second and third correspond to the first group that fails to offer an accurate 
                                            
89
 The N-11 comprises the following countries: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, The Philippines, South Korea, Turkey, and Vietnam. 
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picture of the emerging markets; whereas the fourth and fifth belong to the second 
group, which brings a clear insight into these markets. 
 
(1) ‘A euphemism for the world’s poor countries, also known, often optimistically, 
as emerging economies’ (Economist.com cited by Fraser 2010, p. 4); 
 
(2) ‘[a] financial market of a emerging country, usually a small market with a 
short operating history’ (Investorwords 2011); 
 
(3) ‘... the emerging markets economies are emerging economies that are, 
nonetheless, attractive from the point of view of foreign investment, both portfolio 
and direct investment’ (Blázquez and Santiso 2004, p. 297); 
 
(4) ‘[a] market with a relatively short and uncertain history of open market 
relations and foreign investment.  Emerging market is characteristic of a country 
or state that has previously had a centrally planned and isolated economy.  In 
emerging market nations such economic conditions were generally due to long 
standing one-party political and socioeconomic systems.  Depending on its nature 
and commitment to becoming a free-market economy, one emerging market may 
be different from another’ (Investorglossary 2011); and 
 
(5) ‘...countries that are restructuring their economies along market-oriented lines 
and offer a wealth of opportunities in trade, technology transfers, and foreign 
direct investment’ (Li 2011). 
 
Until now, there has been no agreement on which would be the best criterion to define 
a country as an emerging market.  However, one of the most commonly used is related 
to the Gross National Product (GNP) per capita, proposed by the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC).  Nonetheless, a key flaw of this criterion is that its computation 
may mask important variations within a country, that is to say, the GNP per capita 
could misrepresent the reality of countries with clearly different income strata per area, 
such as China or India, by giving an average GNP of the whole country.  Nevertheless, 
due to the diversity of these definitions, some common features of these markets have 
been identified, which while they are not requirements per se, have been found in most 
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of the emerging markets to different extents.  These features are: (i) fast-growing 
economies; (ii) low levels of income per capita; (iii) relatively immature capital market 
infrastructure; (iv) weak property rights; (v) relatively under-developed institutions 
(mainly legal, judicial and regulatory); (vi) tenuous adherence to capitalist principles; 
(vii) varying political models; (viii) restrictions on foreign investors; (ix) some freedom 
of foreign exchange and fund repatriation; and (x) inherently risky (Fraser 2010 and Li 
2011). 
 
The term emerging market was used for first time in 1986 by the International Finance 
Corporation
90
 (IFC) in the launching of the Emerging Market Growth Fund Inc., which 
aimed to ‘...seek long term capital growth through investments in securities of 
emerging countries’ (Heyman 1999, p. 10).  After the creation of this fund, emerging 
markets received more attention from investors in spite of their basic understanding of 
this kind of markets.  The first comprehensive Emerging Markets Index was launched 
by Morgan Standard and Capital International (MSCI)
91
 in 1988, while the first 
Emerging Market Index by the IFC was published in 1993; afterwards, other emerging 
markets indexes appeared alongside.  It could be said that the introduction of these two 
indexes brought a common framework for investors, boosting their interest in these 
markets, and consequently, their performance.  The enhanced performance of 
emerging markets can be easily realised.  A clear example is the behaviour of the 
MSCI Emerging Markets (EM) Index, which moved from about one percent of the 
global equity opportunity set in 1988 when it was formed by only eight countries
92
, to 
14% in 2010 when 21 countries
93
 were included. 
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 The International Finance Corporation is a member of the World Bank that invests in the private 
sector.  The term emerging market was attributed to Antoine Van Agtmael, who being an executive of 
the IFC coined the emerging market’s term in 1981. 
91
 MSCI is a worldwide leading provider of investment decision support tools.  Some of the products 
and services offered include: indices, portfolio risk and performance analytics, and governance tools 
from a number of internationally recognised brands such as Barra, RiskMetrics and ISS. 
92
 The eight countries included in the first MSCI Emerging Markets Index were: Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, The Philippines and Thailand. 
93
 As of December 2010, the MSCI Emerging Markets Index comprised the following 21 emerging 
market countries: Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, The Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, The Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, 
Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey. 
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During the first half of the nineties the return generated by emerging markets was quite 
remarkable: 20.9 percent
94
 per annum from 1990 to 1994. However, the second half of 
that decade reminded investors that those amazing returns were the result of the high 
risk inherent in the emerging countries, among other things.  Further, that risk was 
materialised into the different financial crises that crumbled all the markets, such as the 
Tequila crisis in 1994, the Asian Financial crisis during 1997-1998, and the Russian 
Ruble crisis in 1998.  Nonetheless, once the financial markets overcame these crises, 
emerging markets outperformed their functioning, showing some stabilisation and 
producing even healthier returns.  In fact, some countries such as Mexico started to 
show signs of a sustained economic growth along with some improvement in their 
financial market performance, a situation that led to questions being raised as to the 
appropriateness of their classification as emerging markets.  As a consequence, by the 
end of 2001 Goldman Sachs coined the acronym BRIC
95
 to refer to Brazil, Russia, 
India and China; and in 2005, the acronym N-11 (the Next Eleven).  The latter 
comprises the “following” eleven emerging economies that in the long-term could be 
as influential as the BRIC, but as a source of global demand and sustained growth.  
Those eleven countries are: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, The Philippines, South Korea, Turkey and Vietnam. 
 
The purpose of introducing these two acronyms was to point out the emerging 
economies which, according to Goldman Sachs projections, have a potential to be 
comparable to or even greater than the main developed economies when assessed by 
their weight in the global economy, like their contribution in global growth, and their 
share in global GDP, global trade and FDI, among others.  For instance, Wilson and 
Stupnytska’s work (2007) revealed that in 2006, twelve percent of global GDP was 
contributed by the BRIC and seven percent by the N-11.  Furthermore, to assess the 
probability and the speed with which emerging economies might be comparable to the 
main developed economies (e.g. G-7), Goldman Sachs developed a model of growth
96
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 This datum was taken from Fraser’s work (2010) page 11. 
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 In April 2011, Goldman Sachs altered this acronym into BRICS in order to include South Africa 
(Investopedia 2012). 
96
 This model is structured under the approach of ‘conditional convergence’ in growth research, which 
proposes that lower-income countries tend to catch-up with richer ones, when the right conditions are in 
place. In order words, for this convergence (projections) to become reality it is crucial to maintain the 
required growth conditions.  Additionally, this model offers a simple method to project the speed of 
growth in the size of the economies in a clear and comparable way, while looking to achieve 
longitudinal empirical validity with the implementation of a statistical measurement tool, the GES score, 
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which can be described, in simple terms, as ‘... a function of growth in the labour 
force, capital accumulation and a process of convergence in technology with the 
developed markets that drives productivity with growth performance’ (Wilson and 
Stupnytska 2007, p. 8).  Further, with the aim of giving more accuracy and statistical 
validity to these projections, Goldman Sachs also elaborated a measure for the growth 
of the economic conditions and a measure for the financial development.  The former 
measure, called Growth Environment Score
97
 (GES), helps the generation of the 
assumptions on the speed with which productivity catch-up would take place and is 
formed by the observations/measurements of thirteen components
98
 (variables) across 
the following five key areas: (i) macroeconomic stability, (ii) macroeconomic 
conditions, (iii) human capital, (iv) political conditions, and (v) technology.  On the 
other hand, the financial development score assesses whether the current domestic 
financial architecture provides adequate support to the macro-fundamentals in the N-
11 countries, mainly by analysing the relationship between the underlying domestic 
financial market development and income.  This financial score is made up of seven 
financial indicators, which are: (i) liquid liabilities as a percentage of GDP; (ii) 
offshore bank deposits as a percentage of domestic bank deposits; (iii) total bank assets 
as a share of central bank assets; (iv) private credits from banks as a percentage of 
GDP; (v) stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP; (vi) outstanding private 
and public debt securities as a percentage of GDP; and (vii) currency outside the bank 
system as the share of base money.  All of these financial indicators suggested a 
positive relationship with income per capita (O’Neill et al. 2010). 
 
The aim in the formation of these two groupings, the BRIC and the N-11, was to 
distinguish a country/group of emerging countries that had the potential to develop its 
or their economy or economies to the size of those of the main developed countries.  
However, their effects as a political alliance or a formal trade union have clearly 
                                                                                                                              
which aims to provide a systematic way of comparing progress in key areas across different countries 
over different periods of time (O’Neill et al. 2005 and 2010). 
97
 The reason behind this score is that strong growth is best achieved with a stable and open economy, 
healthy investment, high rates of technology adoption, a healthy and well educated work force, and a 
secure and rule-based political environment (O’Neill et al. 2005). 
98
 The composition of the five areas which allocate the thirteen different components is as follow. 1. 
Macroeconomic Stability comprises: (i) inflation, (ii) government deficit, and (iii) external debt.  2. 
Macroeconomic Conditions includes (iv) investment and (v) openness of the economy.  3. Human 
capital is formed by: (vi) education and (vii) life expectancy.  4. Political Conditions encompass: (viii) 
political stability, (ix) rule of law and (x) corruption; whilst 5. Technology, (xi) personal computers, (xii) 
telephones and (xiii) Internet. 
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influenced the world economy.  In other words, the remarkable impact of the BRIC on 
the global economy has proved to be the result not only of its rapid growth
99
, but also 
of the scale and seismic shift in the pattern of global activity
100
, which is clearly 
materialised in their being increasingly important counterparts to the US current 
account deficit.  In this regard, the investment bank pointed out that the BRIC should 
not be thought of as emerging markets in the classical sense since they were and are 
still critical and integral to an ever-growing globalized world, while O’Neill et al. 
(2005) stressed that in the global economy, ‘... optimal economic policymaking cannot 
be undertaken without including all of the BRIC countries at the highest level’ (p. 4).  
In other words, the inclusion of the BRIC group in the global economic policy-making 
process is particularly important because they have proved to have the scale and the 
trajectory to challenge the main economies not only in economic and financial terms, 
but also political terms, if that was the case. 
 
On the other hand, the N-11, although unlikely to rival the BRIC as a grouping in 
scale, is a group that could potentially have an impact similar to that of the BRIC 
countries in rivalling the G-7 at least in terms of new economic growth, if doing so in 
absolute terms was not possible.  The selection criteria for the N-11 was to trace the 
countries that would have the potential (i.e. population and demography) and the 
growth conditions (e.g. resource-wealth and sub-regional dominance to some extent) to 
become comparable to the current major economies or to the BRIC themselves. 
 
It is clear that although the N-11 has the potential to become an important driver of the 
global economy (e.g. as a source of sustained growth), the influence that this group 
could exert into the global economy is less dramatic than that of the BRIC group.  This 
is because the levels of income per capita and integration into the global economy that 
the N-11 already have are higher than the levels reached by the BRIC.  In other words, 
albeit the BRIC at present (since the acknowledgement of its economic and financial 
potential as a grouping) is a larger grouping with a greater share in the global GDP 
than the N-11, the N-11 is a higher income grouping, more urbanised and more open to 
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 According to O’Neill et al.’s (2005) findings, the BRIC between 2000 and 2005 contributed around 
28 percent of global growth in US dollars, and 55 percent in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). 
100
 For example, as of November 2005, the BRIC group contributed around 15 percent of the global 
trade and held more than 30 percent of the world reserves; and over the last two years, they all had 
appreciated their real exchange rates, and outperformed their stock markets, with Brazilian, Russian and 
Indian indices up by around 150 percent during this 2-year period (O’Neill et al. 2005). 
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trade than the BRIC.  In this regard, Wilson and Stupnytska’s research (2007) showed 
that, as of 2006, the average income of the N-11 was US dollars 3,069; whereas it was 
US dollars 2,359 for the BRIC.  The percentages of the share of trade in GDP were 
60.4 and 48.9, whilst the percentages of urbanisation were 46.8 and 40.5 for the N-11 
and the BRIC, respectively. 
 
Finally, it seems that their ongoing unfamiliarity to the financial markets as a group 
along with their diversity, have made them a very appealing investment product.  
Further, since the N-11 is a larger group with a rich diversity, the assessment of the 
potential for growth of each member is as significant as their performance as a group.  
Therefore, it seems that some of the importance of the N-11 grouping might rely on 
their investing opportunities for both companies and investors due to their potentially 
large, fast-growing markets, with rising incomes and activity. 
 
2.4.1.2 Latin America 
In order to have a better understanding of the political economy of Mexico, it is 
befitting to understand the main features of Latin America, the geo-politic region 
formed by 20 countries
101
 to which Mexico belongs.  Latin America (LA) could be 
described as a land rich in opportunities because of its abundant natural resources, both 
agricultural and industrial, but delineated by contradictions due to the partially-
fulfilled promises of economic and financial growth.  Furthermore, the interaction 
between its politics (i.e. populism) and economics seems to have worsened its 
economic-financial history, which has been reflected in diverse currency crises, bank 
failures and hyperinflation. 
 
According to Fraser (2010), Latin America is a region that has long suffered from deep 
inequalities that were aggravated by the rise of a powerful export oligarchy during the 
second half of the nineteenth century.  In those days, the general principles of 
capitalism seemed to have failed here as the Latin American countries could only have 
been considered as capitalist economies in terms of their looking for profits by the 
selling of goods in the markets, but nothing else.  Hence, the sources of success needed 
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Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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to come from other means, and in this case, political connections and monopolistic 
strangleholds on industry were widely used.  This situation enhanced the concentration 
of wealth in a few small groups of people.  Suddenly, populism became the most 
favoured political model in this region, with most of the populist episodes probably 
arising because of the desire of a hostile group to recover some kind of ownership over 
the society and government. (Fraser 2010). 
 
According to Williamson (2009, pp. 247-248) populism can be defined as ‘... the 
phenomenon whereby a politician tries to win power by courting mass popularity 
with sweeping promises of benefits and concessions to large interest-groups, 
usually drawn from the lower classes.  Populist leaders lack a coherent 
programme for social change or economic reform, but try to manipulate the 
existing system in order to lavish favours on underprivileged sectors in return for 
their support’. 
 
Even though populism has taken diverse forms in different places and times, it has 
been closely associated with the Latin America’s political history since every Latin 
American country has experimented with populism, to some extent, as its political 
model. 
 
Populism, like any other governmental regime, exerts a direct influence on the 
economy and markets of the countries that apply it.  In general, Latin American 
populist regimes have brought instability since they have frequently needed to incur 
deficit spending because of the tapping for the policies devised in order to achieve 
electoral victory.  In other words, as democratic governments are indebted to the 
groups which made their political victory possible, Latin American populist 
governments (LAPGs) have thus needed to cater specially for the disadvantaged social 
classes, incurring in this way high levels of monetary growth (inflation) and debt, 
mainly from foreign governments and/or institutions.  As a matter of fact, it can be 
said that there has been a risky linkage between Latin American populist governments 
and debt.  This is because of the struggle to reconcile social welfare promises with the 





Some examples of this struggle are the financial crises of 1982 and 1994, 1999 and 
2001, which originated in Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, respectively, but which 
spread worldwide.  The financial crisis of 1982 will now be discussed to highlight the 
interrelationship between LAPGs and debt and the impact of this crisis in the global 
economy.  The financial crisis of 1982 started in the August of that year with Mexico 
announcing its inability to meet the debt servicing of its foreign debt, which amounted 
to US$80 billion.  It is worth mentioning that the financial-economic conditions of 
Mexico in 1982 were rather precarious due to: (1) the high interest rate payment of its 
foreign debt; (2) the sharp decline of one of its main sources of income named 
revenues from exporting oil; and (3) the global recession initiated in the United States 
of America in the same year.  After this announcement, investors realised that the 
insolvency problem was not exclusive to Mexico, but rather a common problem across 
all LA as the real level of indebtedness of the whole region amounted to US $332 
billion
102
 by the end of 1982.  Furthermore, at the same time another 40 countries had 
missed servicing their debt.  Investors, therefore, became aware of the possibility of a 
systemic collapse happening, which was caused to a great extent by an ill-boosted 
Eurodollar market flooded with petrodollars
103
, which at the time, were the main 
financing source of the global Latin American debt. 
 
Because of the magnitude and extent of this financial crisis, governments and 
international organisations applied diverse strategies to avert a global financial 
collapse, which included the financial recovery of Latin America.  However, at the 
beginning of this crisis policymakers failed to recognise that this was a solvency rather 
than a liquidity crisis.  Therefore, the first rescue-policies generally focussed on 
increasing the current flow of money of the collapsed economies by means of injecting 
them with more money and giving some advice regarding the implementation of 
certain austerity measures, such as increasing taxes and tariffs and decreasing their 
financial spending.  These measures were inadequate as they were unable to regenerate 
the economic growth of the collapsed economies.  In 1985, the United States 
department of Treasury (US Treasury) proposed a new recovery plan named ‘The 
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104’, which also failed to solve the debt crisis.  The Baker Plan believed in 
sustained growth as the only feasible solution for debtor countries to overcome this 
crisis.  It was therefore designed to reactivate the economy of 15 seriously indebted 
countries by channelling 29 billion dollars as new lending which was jointly subsidised 
by commercial banks and multilateral institutions in lieu of specific structural reforms, 
such as: tax cuts, the reduction of trade barriers, and the privatisation of state 
companies.  Nevertheless, the Baker Plan did not provide the whole financing; and the 
lending actually given worsened the debt burden of the debtor countries (Fraser 2010 
and Ruggiero 1999).  In 1989, the United States of America announced ‘the Brady 
Plan
105’, which acknowledged the necessity to decrease the levels of debt in order for 
emerging countries to be able to reactivate their economies and to service the 
remainder of their debts at the same time.  The Brady Plan was designed as a voluntary 
program that offered different measures for debt restructuring, including: 
 
‘...swaps, debt exchanges, debt buybacks and, most importantly, debt forgiveness.  
By 1994, 18 countries saw $60 billion of debt forgiven under the Brady plan, 
representing nearly $200 billion in bank claims.  Most deals forgave about 30 to 
35 percent of a country’s debt’ (Fraser 2010, p. 62). 
 
It was not until the Latin American debt level decreased that the region could have 
some free money in circulation to consume and invest, and therefore, to foster its 
economic growth.  However, the populist governments of this region found it rather 
hard to maintain the prescribed financial measures, e.g. to decrease their governmental 
spending; compromising in this way the economic growth and development of their 
nations. 
 
Moreover, having in mind that inflation is one of the main adverse consequences of 
excessive debt; uncontrolled monetary growth might result in significant levels of 
inflation as inflation is a function of the money supply (liquidity) with respect to the 
economic demand for money, as Fraser (2010) mentioned.  Since LAPGs have been 
largely favoured with the votes of the lower social classes, at least at the beginning of 
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 The Baker Plan was named after its creator, James A. Baker, who in 1985 was the secretary of the 
US Department of Treasury. 
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 The Brady Plan was named after its creator, Nicholas Brady, the secretary of the US Department of 
Treasury in 1989. 
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these governments, their ruling was endowed with the necessity to disburse recurrent 
and substantial cash-handouts to fulfil their campaign-promises throughout the ruling 
period.  Nonetheless, although it is expected that the priority of governments is the 
pursuit of the prosperity of the country rather than the pleasing of the sectors that 
helped their political victory, it appears that for LAPGs the accomplishment of their 
populist policies has been more important than the appropriate attainment of their core 
duties.  Because of this misallocation of resources, LAPGs have frequently resorted to 
asking for aid in foreign debt.  However, a word of caution is needed when resorting to 
indebtedness since its help to alleviate financial-economic problems in the short-term 
might lead to inflation in the long-term, when its level is not carefully controlled.  
Therefore, the conversion of debt from a temporary-recovery solution into a macro-
economic problem generally arises because of the non-backup of the excess of cash-
flow money injected into the economy with its corresponding growth in the total 
domestic output.  In this sense, it is remarkable that all the Latin American countries 
have experienced high levels of inflation.  For instance, Brazil was one of the countries 
with the most outrageous hyperinflation episodes, from 1980 to 1994 when its inflation 
increased more than a hundredfold per annum, that is, a total of 166 billion percent 
over this 15-year period (Fraser 2010).  Furthermore, two common problems inflicted 
on economies by inflation are: (1) the decline in real prices, including real income, 
which reduces consumption power and hinders investment; and (2) the distortion of the 
price signals between producers, business and consumers, such as the disguise of an 
increase of the price of a good because of the inflation-related adjustments with an 
augment of the real demand of that good, or vice versa, which worsens the inflation 
levels.  Nevertheless, one might not overlook the fact that low controlled levels of 
inflation could be sometimes considered as beneficial, despite the fact that inflation in 
itself is detrimental to any economy and generates instability: the higher the levels of 
inflation, the more unstable an economy becomes. 
 
Finally, governments also influence markets by devising the rules of their functioning, 
by regulating property rights and wealth redistribution, and by setting the basis for law 
enforcement.  The main relation between politics and markets in LA appears to be 
wealth redistribution, which seems biased since the winners and losers look as if they 
have been stimulated by the populist governmental motivations rather than by the pure 
market forces, as should occur in any democratic system.  Further, from a broader 
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perspective, it seems that Latin American markets have as one of their key features to 
be very volatile and with profound market cycles, a result of the features of the Latin 
American populist governments, viz. ‘...undisciplined fiscal spending, runaway 
inflation, and lack of property rights...’ (Fraser 2010, p. 53).  For instance, based on 
annual returns, the Latin American stock markets have been 30 percent more volatile 
than the stock market of all emerging economies as a whole
106
 since 1988. 
 
 
2.4.2 Mexico and its Political Economy 
 
Having discussed some of the political and economic features of Latin America, partly 
as an element of the geo-political and cultural background of Mexico, this 
investigation will now focus on the exploration of the key facts that laid the 
foundations of the current political economy of Mexico. 
 
It is fair to say that during the last two decades of the twentieth century, Mexico 
experienced the most dramatic changes in the economic-financial and political arenas, 
which framed its current political economy.  These changes responded to domestic and 
international factors that cannot be completely separated from each other due to their 
interplay.  This investigation, nonetheless, attempts to look at them individually, 
whenever possible, in order to ease the understanding of their role and influence. 
 
Bearing this in mind and borrowing the line of thought used in Fraser’s work (2010), 
one might consider as the principal domestic drivers: the Financial Crisis of 1982 and 
the inflationary spiral experienced during the mid-1980s, along with the ‘tragic events 
of 1994’107, viz. the magnicide of Mr. L. D. Colosio Murrieta and the uprising of the 
State of Chiapas; whilst globalisation, as the main leading international factor that 
triggered the urgency to re-evaluate the Mexican political economy.  Figure 2.1 below, 
offers a detailed picture of the role and interaction among these factors when the 
modelling of the modern political economy of Mexico took place. 
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 There is not a specific event to which one can refer to as the turning point of the political arena; 
however, the tragic events of 1994 had clear social and economic consequences which made it 
inevitable that some changes in the political economy took place as it will be explained later in this 
section starting on page 75. 
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As a result of this reassessment, and following the Washington Consensus
108
 
recommendations, the Mexican government implemented an extensive scheme of 
policy reforms that involved its budget, the money supply, the exchange rate, trade, 
liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation, among other, from which Mexico 
excelled in the last three; that is, liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation. 
 
All these policies shared the goal of accelerating the recovery from the 1982 financial 
crisis
109
 in the short-term, whilst achieving an economic stabilisation that would assist 
the Mexican economy to develop into a free-market economy thereafter.  Nevertheless, 
this attempt to regain financial and economic control and to become a free-market 
economy was challenged even further by the levels of inflation experienced during the 
second half of the 1980s.  Inflation (in this case better defined as hyperinflation due to 
its extreme levels) was clearly an important macro-economic problem as it averaged 
90 percent per year, reaching its peak at 132 percent in 1987.  Nonetheless, from the 
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 The Washington Consensus is a ten-policy reform agenda created by the economist John Williamson 
in 1989.  This consensus summarises the ten lowest common denominator of policy advice agreed by 
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the US Treasury Department, for the financial 
recovery of the distressed Latin American countries.  Those ten standard policy-reform points addressed 
are: (i) fiscal discipline; (ii) the reordering of public expenditure priorities; (iii) tax reform; (iv) the 
liberalisation of interest rates; (v) a competitive exchange rate; (vi) trade liberalisation; (vii) the 
liberalisation of inward flows of foreign direct investment (FDI); (viii) privatisation; (ix) deregulation, 
focused on the abolishment of entry and exit barriers; and (x) the securing of property rights 
(Williamson 2004). 
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early 1990s onwards, Mexico started to show good signs of economic stabilisation as a 
result of the free-market policy reforms previously mentioned and the implementation 
of a strategic program that coordinated wages and prices in order to curb inflation, 
which was successfully decreased to 20 percent by 1990 (Fraser 2010). 
 
It is worth noting that the emphasis of the Mexican government on pursuing its 
economic development through the implementation of a policy reform scheme heavily 
orientated towards a free-market economy and the looseness of the government 
intervention, particularly to international trade, responded to the advice and pressure
110
 
of the developed neo-liberal economies and the International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs) based in Washington, D.C. (e.g. the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank (WB), and the US Treasury Department).  These openly favoured a 
market-orientated rather than the old import-substitution economic philosophy
111
 from 
the 1980s onwards (Shafaeddin 2006). 
 
As expected, these free-market policies converged into the general economic reform of 
Mexico with outstanding outcomes towards the process of trade liberalisation.  For 
instance, with the liberalisation reforms numerous trade barriers were removed, 
opening Mexico to worldwide trading as is reflected by the diverse commercial 
agreements signed with countries from North America, Latin America, the European 
Union, Japan and Israel.  The deregulation and the privatisation reforms resulted in the 
withdrawal of the direct government intervention from approximately 3,000 economic 
sectors, of which the financial sector clearly failed to succeed.  Although it could be 
argued that some important advances were reached with the liberalisation of the 
financial system, such as: (i) the elimination of interest rate controls, (ii) the removal 
of some restrictions on the convertibility of the Mexican currency (viz. the Mexican 
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 It is considered as a pressure since the implementation of these policy prescriptions most of the time 
are one of the conditions to be fulfilled for receiving economic rescue, such as loans from the 
International Monetary Fund and/or the World Bank. 
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According to Shafaeddin (2006), it could be argued that the key argument that led the change from 
the previously dominant economic philosophy named import-substitution to a free-market orientated 
philosophy was to promote exports and private investment through a liberalisation in imports and a 
decrease in the intervention of the government in the economy.  In other words, trade openness would 
lead to industrialisation, in the sense of ownership of high technology, improved skills and knowledge 
enhanced by trade and development.  A noteworthy point here is that this philosophy assumes 
competitive and well functioning markets, but overlooks the fact that government performance might be 
prone to fail, with even larger probabilities when the government favours a populist regime. 
73 
 
peso), and (iii) the decrease of the required reserve ratio
112
; this process overlooked the 
need for establishing a proper regulatory framework for the Mexican banking system.  
All in all, the free-market reforms carried out might seemed to have “paved the way” 
for Mexico to become an open-market economy.  However, they were not sufficient to 
put the country on a clear path to economic stabilisation and sustained growth, the 
Tequila Crisis of 1994 being a major setback from which Mexico, nevertheless, 
recovered strikingly fast. 
 
In general, a banking crisis provokes uncertainty or even panic among investors.  In 
emerging markets, however, uncertainty worsens as investors are not only concerned 
with losing their assets, but also purchasing power since most of the time there is a 
devaluation of the country’s currency.  Furthermore, the more volatile emerging 
markets are, the higher their political risk is reflected on their markets.  For instance, at 
the beginning of the 1990s, investors were so wildly optimistic about Mexican liberal 
market reforms and its economic prospects that they failed to realise the structural 
inefficiencies existing in the Mexican banking system, which were about to originate a 
new credit crisis: the Tequila Crisis.  Nonetheless, ‘the tragic events of 1994’ were 
strong enough to cause panic among investors, which sent markets into a tailspin. 
 
The episode known as the Tequila Crisis took place in December 1994, when the 
Mexican banking system collapsed and left the country enduring the most severe 
devaluation of its currency.  The Tequila Crisis was a banking crisis that had its seeds 
in the misuse of the excessive money injected into the Mexican economy via its 
financial markets as result of the unsuccessful liberalisation of the financial sector.  It 
was however, detonated by the political events known as ‘the tragic events of 1994’, 
which took place during the first quarter of that year.  During the first years of the 
1990s, Mexico experienced an overflow of money, due to overconfident investors in 
the performance of the Mexican financial markets and the loans granted by the US 
banks.  This excess of money caused Mexican banks to become international lenders.  
For instance, in 1992 three out of the 25 most profitable banks in the world were 
domiciled in Mexico, and one year after (1993) this number escalated to seven (Fraser 
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 In general, the reserve ratio can be defined as the amount of money that a bank must have set aside as 
collateral with the central bank for a given level of deposits.  This ratio is established by the central bank 
of each country. 
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2010).  However, although the banking sector had been recently liberalised and 
privatised, it had maintained important structural inefficiencies such as the lack of an 
efficient regulatory framework, which was openly reflected in (i) the absence of a 
central credit bureau to help lenders evaluate a borrower’s credit worthiness and (ii) 
minimal regulatory oversight.  This lack of a proper regulatory framework made the 
Mexican banking sector more prone to incur adverse selection, triggering its collapse. 
 
In addition to the incomplete financial liberalisation reform, panic among investors 
was sowed, unleashing an exorbitant repatriation of capital flight because of the 
evident overvaluation of the Mexican peso.  Since 1991, the Mexican peso was 
restricted to a band against the US dollar with its lower end set to decline by a small 
amount everyday in order to allow for a gradual depreciation.  Even worse, the 
Mexican exchange rate was continuously hitting the higher end of this band, 
demonstrating its overvaluation.  As an urgent measure to recover from these massive 
capital outflows, while defending the Mexican peso and fighting to suppress the 
coming financial crisis, the Mexican government used the national money reserves.  
These reserves, however, were not enough to handle this situation for very long and 
left the Mexican government in need of additional sources of financing.  Billions of 
short-term bonds indexed to US dollars (i.e. tesobonos) were issued for this end, but 
this strategy left Mexico increasingly vulnerable to a liquidity crisis.  On 20 December 
1994, Mexican authorities widened the trading band of the Mexican peso by 
approximately 15 percent.  Unfortunately this devaluation was not large enough to 
reassure investors, so the other alternative was to float the peso freely, which 
subsequently sunk immediately.  With the Mexican peso plummeting and thus the 
value of the debt escalating severely, investors rushed to cash their bonds so worsening 
the problem.  Paradoxically, the prompt economic recovery that Mexico achieved 
despite the magnitude of this banking crisis was astonishing, as the Mexican economy 
not only rebounded within one year, but grew steadily afterwards, averaging an annual 
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 Castañeda’s research (2002 and 2007) provides other macroeconomic indicators that showed how the 
Mexican economy improved from 1994 to 2000.  For instance: the current account deficit dropped 4.1 
percentage points during this period, ending in 2.9 in 1999; (2) internal savings as a share of GDP rose 
5.6 percentage points, reaching 20.3 percent by the end of 1999; and inflation was curtailed from 52 
points to less than ten points from 1995 to 2000. 
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In this regard, Castañeda (2002, 2005 and 2007) contends that the two key factors 
which facilitated this recovery were the organisational structure of Mexican 
companies, viz. business groups also called networks, and the existence of an active 
internal capital market.  Castañeda’s research (2002, 2005 and 2007) documented that 
the Mexican economy was in a state of financial collapse in 1995 and it transformed 
into a state of steady economic recovery in 1996, this trend remaining until 2000, 
which is the last year encompassed by his research.  The economic recovery was 
shown by the steady output growth that Mexico experienced from 1996 to 2000.  
These works demonstrated that, contrary to common expectations, during the financial 
crisis and afterwards (i.e. from 1995 to 2000) there was a decrease in the financial 
constraints of the Mexican listed companies.  Castañeda (2002, 2005 and 2007) 
explicated this paradoxical evidence as a shift of the asymmetric information arisen in 
a context of financial disarray due to the utility of the organisational structure of 
business groups and the existence of active internal capital markets.  The econometric 
evidence
114
, nevertheless, only proved that a business group affiliation and/or a 
banking tie helped to decrease the cash-flow/cash-stock sensitivity to investment 
before the banking crisis, whereas afterwards these affiliations and/or ties did not 
register any significant effect on investments. 
 
Moreover, the finding that Mexico experienced growth (meaning financing for real 
investment and production) during the late 1990s (despite the banking crisis of 1995 
which allowed only limited new-issues of financial instruments through domestic 
money and capital markets) suggested that Mexican business groups helped to 
ameliorate
115
 the financial constraints of their company members, rather than looking 
for the maximisation of the profits of each company individually.  In this way they 
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 Castañeda analysed the financial behaviour of the non-financial companies listed in the Mexican 
Stock Exchange from 1990 to 2000 by testing the relationship between investment and cash-stock of 69 
companies which formed the balanced-panel sample.  These companies were divided into two 
categories: network or business group companies and independent companies.  The period analysed –
1990 to 2000– was also divided into two main periods: the liberalisation period from 1990 to 1994, and 
the financial-paralysis period from 1995 to 2000.  The latter period was subdivided into two sub-
periods: the banking crisis sub-period from 1995 to 1996 and the steady recovery sub-period from 1997 
to 2000.  Because of the limited observations, particularly when macroeconomic indicators were tested, 
(e.g. the existence of internal markets backing the reduction of the cash-constraints during the period of 
financial paralysis) this research was not able to prove econometrically all the theories suggested, 
however it provided a deep qualitative theoretical analysis of all those hypotheses. 
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 Two common ways of assisting a constrained member are: (1) allocating the available funds of the 
business group (retained earnings) to cash-constrained companies with growth potential; and (2) 
facilitating their individual participation in capital markets (e.g. precluding that cash-constrained 
companies will be financing rationed) by acting as collateral, reputation hedge and risk-sharing. 
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modified the common role of asymmetric information
116
.  In other words, the 
organisational structure of companies as business groups or networks might have 
facilitated the diminishment of the conflicts of interest between lenders and borrowers 
due to the exercise of control rights of the parent company of these groups.  
Furthermore, business groups might have contributed to the reactivation of the 
economy by supplying or reallocating funds to the companies that were cash-
constrained and/or unable to access international markets (Castañeda 2002, 2005 and 
2007). 
 
It is noteworthy to point out that the use of business groups as an organisational 
structure of firms is controversial as this type of structure can either support or harm an 
economy (Castañeda Ramos 1999 and Khanna and Yafeh 2007).  A simplistic view in 
this regard would contend that an economy might be favoured when business groups 
substituted for missing outside institutions in pro of a better market functioning; or 
might be harmed when business groups were used as a means to carry activities like 
exploiting or rent-seeking usually performed by majority shareholders.  In Mexico 
capital markets are still incomplete, property rights flawed, and the law enforcement 
weak.  In other words, it is an economy facing very large agency costs.  It is possible 
that owners/managers were encouraged to use their business groups not only to 
stabilise aggregate profits, but also to generate internal capital markets.  This might 
have helped to lessen the financial constraints of some of their affiliates. 
 
As mentioned previously, economics and politics cannot be isolated from each other 
since a change in one affects the other.  Therefore, at the time that Mexico was 
incorporating the processes of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation into this 
new political economy, it was also restructuring its way of doing politics by embracing 
a democratic transition process.  It can be said that this transition process commenced 
in the 1980s not as a single ‘... idea, a preconceived scheme, or the project of any 
particular party[.]’; but rather as a complex quest of the modern Mexican society for a 
formula which might politically represent equally the interest of all its constituencies, 
while fighting for both their individual and collective rights (Woldenberg 2002).  It 
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 In general it would be expected that the information gap between lenders and borrowers might be 
widened in a context of severe financial disruption, where banking institutions failed and triggered the 
collapse of the formal capital markets. 
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could be argued that although the ultimate outcome of democracy was achieved by 
Mexico in 2000, when the result of the electoral process transformed the old populist 
authoritarian “one-party” system into a democratic “multi-party” electoral system, 
there are still significant issues to be addressed.  These include poverty and new 
challenges to successes such as learning how to legislate effectively (i.e. governability 
and good governance) under plural conditions.  Nonetheless, the achievement of 
political democracy fostered key changes in the political features of the Mexican 
political system.  One of the most important of these is the decrease of the excessive 
power traditionally granted to the executive (i.e. president), which is commonly known 
as hyper-presidentialism, by redistributing and dispersing that political power at all 
three political levels: legislative, judicial and executive.  Another is the assurance of 
the legitimacy of the vote and the fact that a democratic plural-party system would 
only be reached through voting.  In fact, voting is a powerful instrument of change and 
the fundamental means for opposition forces to have a real opportunity (Molinar 
2002). 
 
According to Woldenberg (2002), the nature of the Mexican democracy transition 
process was electoral as the main changes that lead this process started within the 
electoral realm and spread rapidly to the other areas.  First, there was the 1977 political 
reform that allowed the official registration of other parties.  Then there was the 
creation of the Electoral Federal Institute (IFE, by its Spanish acronym) in 1990, in 
order to organise and monitor the elections, and corroborate the legitimacy of election 
outcomes.  Further there was the establishment of a particular entry into the annual 
federal budget to transfer federal resources directly to the states and municipalities, 
this as a result of the privatisation of the Bank of Mexico, which gave it its autonomy 
from government, among others (Molinar 2002). 
 
Due to this novel political environment, a new class of politicians entered the Mexican 
political arena.  These politicians were characterised by having been educated at the 
best American universities and held the strong belief that economic stability was 
achieved through: low inflation, stable budgets, deregulated markets and free trade, in 
other words, through the use of liberal economics and its tenets rather than the 
principles of the populist regime applied previously.  However, despite the advantages 
that a democratic regime offered, its transition process was rather a long and 
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multifaceted journey that witnessed two dreadful episodes known as ‘the tragic events 
of 1994’, which highlighted the need for Mexico to evolve into a democratic country. 
 
The tragic events of 1994 refer to the southern revolt generated by the state of Chiapas 
on 1 January 1994 and the magnicide of Mr. Luis D. Colosio Murrieta on 23 March of 
the same year.  Mr. Colosio Murrieta was the official candidate from the long-ruling 
party Partido Revolucionario Institucional
117
 (PRI), and at the time of his death he was 
in the midst of his electoral campaign for the presidential elections of July 1994.  It is 
worth mentioning that these two incidents have been considered as the detonators of 
the Tequila Crisis, even though the inefficiencies of the Mexican banking system were 
its main cause (Fraser 2010 and Masoni 2011). 
 
The armed uprising of the state of Chiapas took place on the same day that the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force.  It was led by the 
Zapatista Liberation Army (or EZLN by its Spanish acronym)
118
.  It has been 
described as the outbreak of a long and complex conflict in the context of historical 
socio-economic injustice.  The state of Chiapas, located at the south part of Mexico, 
was once considered unattractive or not profitable due to its lack of natural mineral 
resources such as gold, silver and precious stones.  However, it has recently been 
recognised as one of the most resource-rich
119
 states of Mexico (viz. petroleum).  The 
characteristic feature of Chiapas is its ethnographic composition, which has been 
retained as its current population a high percentage of pure ethnic groups.  
Nevertheless, the conservation of these ethnic groups has made Chiapas fight against –
and ultimately endure– severe exploitation, the cultural demise of its ethnic groups and 
the denial of their land rights by the ruling institutions and political parties.  This has 
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petroleum, hydroelectric power and Mayan archaeological remains.  During the 1980s, Chiapas 
commenced the exploitation of petroleum, which ranked it as the fourth largest producer of crude oil 
and natural gas among the Mexican states, which are 31 plus a federal entity that is the seat of the 




been occurring since the Spanish colonial period beginning in 1522 when the Aztec 
Empire was conquered and dismantled by Hernán Cortés (Schmal 2004).  Chiapas can 
be thus considered as a Mexican state where social and economic inequity has been 
emphasised during the last centuries, which is a paradox given its high contribution to 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
 
In 1983 the EZLN commenced its formal involvement in the Chiapas conflict aiming 
to make public the socio-economic inequities existing in this State, with the plea that 
the Mexican government would work to improve the general situation of Chiapas.  The 
EZLN arose as a guerrilla group, but acted in a rather peaceful way, mainly via sit-ins 
and marches.  These actions however were dismissed by the Mexican government, so 
on the 1 January 1994 the EZLN declared war on the Mexican government and 
occupied four county seats in the state of Chiapas.  At that time, its demands were: ‘... 
work, land, housing, food, health, education, independence, liberty, democracy, 
justice, and peace’ (First Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, cited in Sipaz 2000).  
After 12 days of war, the Mexican government unilaterally declared a ceasefire and 
started its dialogue with the EZLN but did not seem very keen to reach a satisfactory 
compromise for both parties as the Mexican government had underestimated the social 
and political influence that the Chiapas conflict might exert onto both, the Mexican 
economy and the international appreciation of this affair.  According to Sipaz (2000), 
on 19 December 1994, the EZLN seized 38 county seats declaring them rebel 
autonomous municipalities by penetrating the siege imposed by the Mexican Army.  
From that moment the Mexican government became aware of the real magnitude of 
the effects of the Chiapas conflict.  However, it was too late to halt its pervasive effects 
on the Mexican economy, which was already polluted with fear and rumours of 
political instability.  Consequently, this conflict came to be one important unleashing 
factor of the Tequila Crisis of 1994. 
 
Nonetheless, reflecting on the performance of the recent democratic political regime, it 
could be said that this regime also worked hard to bring democracy into the making-
policy processes.  The first and clearest example of this was the solution offered to end 
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the Chiapas conflict in 2000
120
: the amendment to Article II of the Mexican 
Constitution so that it grants diverse rights (mainly human and land rights) to Mexican 
indigenous people.  The 2000 solution to the Chiapas conflict was the first national 
issue addressed by a multiparty Congress that did work in favour of all its 
constituencies by analysing and reforming a presidential proposal.  This opened a new 
window for real and unprecedented change that was rapidly realised by domestic and 
international observers.  For example, Stavenhagen (2002, p. 7) after assessing the 
performance of the Mexican democratic political regime and its performance, pointed 
out that Mexico was swiftly evolving by 
 
‘... strengthening democratic governance not only thorough transparent elections 
but also by managing constitutional, institutional and legislative processes in a 
formally democratic manner’. 
 
In recognition of the remarkable economic recovery and the stable economic growth 
achieved after the financial crisis of 1994, along with the level of democracy (e.g. 
political democracy) reached by 2000, during the first years of the twenty-first century 
Mexico was publicly acknowledged as a solvent and low-risk country by different 
financial credit-rating agencies.  For instance, Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch 
IBCA assigned Mexico an investment-grade rating
121
 on its long-term foreign currency 
debt in 2000 and 2001 (Blázquez and Santiso 2004).  This appraisal meant that Mexico 
succeeded in rectifying important socio-economic deficiencies, such as: the 
consolidation of Mexican exports, which was achieved by swapping its reliance from 
oil to manufacturing exports, the latter being relevant in volume and less volatile in 
price; a healthier financing of the Mexican external sector by increasing its founding 
from FDI rather than tapping from international debt; and the practice of political 
democracy which in 2000 materialised as the decoupling of its economic and the 
political cycles.  Further, Blázquez and Santiso (2004) identified that in addition to 
these accomplishments, a structural reform with special attention to tax revenues was 
important for Mexico to foster sustainable economic growth.  Alternatively, 
Shafaeddin (2004) argued that in order for Mexico to attain sustained economic 
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 As it has been previously mentioned, the presidential elections of July 2000 were won for the first 
time by the National Action Party (PAN, by its Spanish acronym), a right wing party which ousted the 
PRI from the Mexican presidency after 70 years of continuous rule. 
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 According to Blázquez and Santiso (2004) financial assets that are ranked with an investment-grade 
rating are considered to be low risk as they are associated with a low default probability. 
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growth, it would be necessary to implement an accurate industrial policy whose aim 
would be the upgrading and productivity enhancement of all industry sectors rather 
than only the labour-intense and resource-base industries, such as textiles and clothing.  
His research denoted that although Mexico experienced significant growth in the 
exportation of manufactured products (i.e. non-oil exports), this growth of exports was 
not associated with an increase in its GDP because of the lack of manufacturing added 
value.  In other words, in order to reach sustained economic growth, Mexico needs to 
upgrade its export structure in such a way that it enhances the growth of both value 
added and GDP at a similar rate to that of exports. 
 
Notwithstanding the lack of an accurate industrial policy (as Shafaeddin 2006 pointed 
out) or maybe because the lack of it, the trade liberalisation policy implemented by 
Mexico seemed to be the key factor driving the most striking results in the Mexican 
economy during the first years of the twenty-first century.  Because of this 
liberalisation policy, Mexico shifted its main source of income from exporting 
petroleum to exporting manufactured goods.  In other words, Mexico consolidated its 
worldwide exporter status, decreasing the volatility of its export income and attracting 
more foreign direct investment (FDI).  Besides fostering the economic growth of the 
country, largely financed Mexico’s current account deficit, this also contributed 
towards its solvent and low-risk country status (Blázquez and Santiso 2004).  Some 
benefits that this status brought to the Mexican economy were: lower interest rates 
charged on public debit, higher market rates of return, more FDI, and last but not least, 





In regards to the external factors, Mexico have been described as  
    ‘...not only the main champion of trade liberalization, but also a champion of 
economic reform in general, including capital account liberalization and 
privatization’ (Shaffaeddin 2006, p. 47);  
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 For example, the Mexican economy was practically unaffected by the financial crisis of Argentina 
and Turkey according to Blázquez and Santiso (2004). 
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Or as a keen pioneer in the world’s globalisation process when defining globalisation 
as ‘...the process of increasing interaction, both between and within countries, of 
ideas, information, capital, goods and services, and people’ (Heyman 1999, p. 5). 
 
Furthermore, Mexico was ‘... the most important country in the globalization thrust of 
the Spanish Empire which began in 1492, and the most important country to declare 
independence from Spain in 1810.  Its 1910 revolution was a precursor of the Russian 
Revolution of 1917’, as Heyman (1999, p.16) denoted.  Nonetheless, it could be fairly 
argued that the appearance of emerging markets might be the aspect of globalisation 
with most relevance to the Mexican economic and financial environment. 
 
After World War II, Mexico remained as an active member of the globalisation 
process by becoming a member of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, which were founded in 1945.  During the late 1970s and as result of the oil 
boom, Mexico was one of the most important recipient countries of ‘petrodollars’ (by 
means of its foreign debt), detonating in this way the financial crisis of 1982.  
Nevertheless, Mexico was also the first country to emerge from this crisis due to the 
implementation of the Brady Plan in 1989. 
 
It was during the 1980s that the process of globalisation spread widely and came to be 
represented by the ideas of free market clearly supported by the main developed 
countries (e.g. The United States of America and The United Kingdom), as previously 
discussed.  Consequently, during this time Mexico implemented a key set of economic 
and financial policies pursing its economic development and growth through the 
processes of liberalisation, deregulation, internationalization and privatisation.  Some 
of the main actions to achieve this process were as follows.  In 1986 Mexico signed its 
entrance to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) –precursor of the 
current World Trade Organisation (WTO) – and began the deregulation of the Foreign 
Direct Investment, which was further intensified in 1989, 1993 and in 1999 when the 
FDI in services was liberalised completely.  In 1989 Mexico also opened its first 
foreign portfolio capital establishing the Nafin Trust.  On 1 January 1994 the North 
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was implemented.  In April of that same 
year Mexico became a member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD).  In July 2000 an Economic Partnership, Political Coordination 
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and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and Mexico entered into 
force.  Finally, in January 2005 a free trade agreement between Mexico and Japan was 
implemented (Fraser 2010, Heyman 1999, and Shafaeddin 2006). 
 
In conclusion, Mexico can be thought to be the champion of the emerging countries in 
transforming its political economy by implementing a comprehensive policy-reform 
scheme that included most of the recommendations made by the neo-liberal countries 
and advocates of the Washington Consensus.  These reforms targeted the whole 
economy, but focused mainly on the trade liberalisation process.  Consequently, 
Mexico can also be considered as one of the most globalised emerging markets, with 
sophisticated financial markets, both inside and outside of Mexico, and a significant 
foreign participation in them.  For example, by the end of 2000, Mexico was the eighth 
largest exporter in the word and the second trading partner of The United States of 
America (Castañeda 2002). 
 
Further, according to the assessment carried by Wilson and Stupnytska (2007) and 
Wilson et al. (2010), Mexico along with Korea and Turkey were categorised as one of 
the three biggest economies of the N-11.  This classification means that Mexico is 
considered to be an economy where ‘... incomes and development levels are already 
quite high, growth conditions are in relatively good shape and the challenge is, 
[therefore,] to maintain and improve the conditions that will allow them to complete 
the catch-up with the world’s richest economies’ (Wilson and Stupnytska 2007, p.14).  
Moreover, Wilson and Stupnytska (2007) carried an economic analysis driven by the 
factors
123
 comprised in the GES with data as of 2006, and their results demonstrated 
that Mexico stood above the mean of the rest of the emerging economies on all the 
factors apart from investment.  Mexico, when its performance was assessed in terms of 
the five areas into which these 13 factors are grouped, ranked particularly well on 
human capital and macroeconomic stability but poorly in macroeconomic conditions 
and technology.  Further, the findings from a financial analysis carried by O’Neill et 
al. (2010) who used data as of June 2010 to test the financial development score, 
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 The GES is divided into five different areas which include thirteen economic factors altogether.  The 
detailed classification of this score is as follows. 1. Macroeconomic Stability comprises: (i) inflation, (ii) 
government deficit, and (iii) external debt.  2. Macroeconomic Conditions includes (iv) investment and 
(v) openness.  3. Human capital is formed by: (vi) education and (vii) life expectancy.  4. Political 
Conditions encompass: (viii) political stability, (ix) rule of law and (x) corruption; whilst 5. Technology, 
(xi) personal computers, (xii) telephones and (xiii) Internet. 
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highlighted the fact that Mexico is not only one of the three biggest economies of the 
N-11, but is already also financially more developed than the smaller N-11 economies.  
However, it underperformed for its current level of financial development.  This 
underperformance suggested that Mexico has not fully exploited its potential to 
become even stronger in terms of the size, depth and efficiency of its financial markets 
yet.  Finally, it is also important to mention that country-specific factors are highly 
likely to drive countries’ outperformance/underperformance.  For instance, the 
underperformance of Mexico could be the result of its relative higher exposure to 
global financial markets and, particularly, to the fact that its monetary and financial 
aggregates may be depressed due to the overshooting of the Mexican Peso relative to 
the US Dollar. 
 
 
2.4.3 Corporate Governance Practices in Mexico 
 
After analysing the roots and key components of the current political economy of 
Mexico, this last section examines the main features of the corporate governance 
policies and practices in Mexico.  It discusses the key improvements achieved towards 
better corporate governance practices and points out the main challenges that remain. 
 
Although corporate governance is currently a widely investigated area, it was not until 
the first years of the twenty century that a little knowledge regarding the corporate 
governance practices in Mexico started to emerge.  This delay was probably due to the 
great difficulty in obtaining relevant corporate information, a complication that 
worsens when comparability was also sought between that corporate information. 
 
Initial research contended that the corporate governance system of Mexican companies 
was representative of the insider model.  According to Nestor and Thompson (2000, 
cited by Husted and Serrano 2002, p. 338) the corporate governance systems among 
the main OECD countries were structured following either the internal model or the 
external model.  The particularity of the internal model is that its corporate governance 
body is mainly formed and directed by insider members, such as the bank-centred or 
the family-centred systems like those of Japan or Germany and most Latin American 
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countries respectively.  In contrast, the external model is characterised by having a 
corporate governance body composed mainly of outside members or investors like the 
ones of the USA and the UK.  This statement looks appropriate when analysing the 
main features of the corporate governance system in Mexico, which Husted and 
Serrano (2002, pp. 338-339) summarised as: ‘... (a) concentrated equity ownership, (b) 
de facto subordination of shareholders interests, (c) a weak emphasis on minority 
interest protection in securities law and regulation and (d) relatively weak 
requirements for disclosure’.  Furthermore, Husted and Serrano (2002) pointed out the 
peculiar practice of most publicly traded Mexican companies of appointing a chairman 
as the leading member of the Board of Directors (BOD) (which under Mexican law is 
the body responsible of the governance of the companies) instead of combining its 
functions with the ones of the chief executive officer (CEO), as most companies from 
the rest of the world do.  This situation highlights the fact that the Mexican corporate 
governance system is a family-centred one.  It grants preferential treatment to the 
founder-family members in the corporate voting-processes, as the chairman position is 
often a post held for life (even after retirement) given to the founder shareholders, 
leaving in this way the CEO position usually to a younger member of the family. 
 
Other common practices that depicted the corporate governance system of large 
Mexican companies until the last years of twentieth century are the following.  
Mexican BODs were integrated mainly by large/majority shareholders rather than by a 
balanced mix of internal and external members appointed proportionately by majority 
and minority-shareholders.  This situation prevented the monitoring of minority 
shareholders’ interests.  There was an extensive use of pyramids and dual-class shares 
by majority investors
124
, a situation that not only helped the concentration of 
ownership but ultimately deepened the discrepancy between control rights and cash-
flow rights.  Cross-shareholding and exchange of positions in the BOD among 
associated entrepreneurs were also frequent practices that fostered the participation of 
majority shareholders in the decision-making process of the related companies, besides 
monitoring and reinforcing their political and economic alliances (Babatz Torres 1997, 
Castañeda Ramos 1999, La Porta et al. 1999, Husted and Serrano 2002).  It could be 
argued that the overlap between majority shareholders, the members of the BOD and 
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 In the case of Mexico, majority investors are commonly the founder-family members or close groups 
of investors, as chapter 5 will demonstrate. 
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the CEO could be favourable since it might help to diminish some agency problems by 
keeping their interests aligned.  Nevertheless, in the case of Mexico it seems more 
likely that the main reason for this overlapping practice was so that majority/large 
shareholders could benefit from the unequal distribution of cash-flow rights and 
control rights between shares and the lack of representation of minority-shareholders’ 
rights.  This reduced the cost of capital
125
 for them at the expense of companies’ value. 
 
Additionally, since the early nineties, large Mexican companies started the issuing of 
American Depository Receipts (ADRs), Ordinary Participation Certificates (CPOs, by 
its Spanish acronym) and neutral funds
126
 in order to tap foreign financial markets, 
benefiting from the fact that these financial instruments only entitle cash-flow rights.  
It is important to explain that by law, limited and/or no-voting shares are not allowed 
to be issued by Mexican companies.  Nevertheless, because of the enactment of the 
Foreign Investment Law (FIL) in 1993, that spirit of the law was violated allowing 
companies trading in the Mexican stock exchange to issue up to 25 percent of their 
total stock as limited or no-voting shares.  The FIL aimed to distinguish between 
domestic and foreign investment in order for the Mexican strategic economic sectors to 
be protected from being controlled by foreign investors.  To this end, the FIL divided 
the publicly traded companies into three different categories; (i) companies in strategic 
sectors where foreigners could not invest at all, such as petroleum and the other 
hydrocarbons, electricity, generation of nuclear energy, radio and television, 
motorways, sea and air transport, and banks among others; (ii) companies where 
foreign investors could own less than 49 percent of the total capital stock (i.e. 
automotive parts, secondary petrochemicals, and mining activities among others); and 
(iii) the rest of the companies which allowed foreign investors to own up to 49 percent 
of the total capital stock (Mexico 1993).  Even though this law was not enforced until 
1993, the Mexican government had long since been concerned by the need for external 
sources of financing, so that starting in 1989 it tried to foster foreign financial 
investment through the creation of “neutral” investment mechanisms such as the 
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 Since in Mexico there is a pronounced divergence from the one-vote-one-share rule –the majority 
shareholders being the main keepers of the voting capital stock– the issuing of dual-class shares allows 
majority shareholders to invest small amounts of money and actually control the company, transferring 
in this way the risk of the capital (projects) to minority shareholders, who are the ones holding most of 
the non-voting capital stock.  
126
 It is noteworthy that both financial figures benefit controlling shareholders since their titles usually 
have to be voted as the majority does. 
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CPOs, the ADRs and the neutral funds.  These three financial instruments were known 
as neutral investment stock since they grant only cash-flow rights in order for foreign 
investors to be allowed to acquire additional Mexican stock without surpassing the 
limits established by the regulations of foreign investment (Babatz Torres 1997).  All 
in all, one could argue that the issuing of dual-class shares is a common practice of 
Mexican publicly traded companies.  However, before 1990 this practice was used as a 
strategy to compensate for the lack of a good corporate governance system (i.e. 
concentrated ownership), whereas after 1990 it was used to depart from the one-share-
one-vote rule to expropriate the voting rights from foreign investors. 
 
It is important to notice that afterwards, the Mexican government realised that the 
ultimate implication of the allowance regarding the issuing of limited or no-voting 
rights shares was flawed as it helped entrench current large shareholders (who happen 
to be family/founder shareholders) by easing their ownership concentration while 
deepening the voting power.  Therefore, the Mexican government tried to reverse this 
allowance by limiting the instances when a company can issue limited and no-voting 
shares via the amendments to the Stock Market Law (LMV) enacted in 2005.  
However, this limitation could not be applied immediately to the current large publicly 
traded companies. 
 
Last but not least, it could be said that there is no market for corporate control in 
Mexico as the stocks traded represent only a small part of the total capital of 
companies and the majority of them are non-voting right stock (Husted and Serrano 
2002, Lopez-de-Silanes 2002 and Chong et al. 2009).  Following the legal approach, a 
small and narrow financial market, such as that of Mexico, can be explained as the 
result of poor and weak legal and enforcement systems.  In other words, in countries 
that offer vague protection to investors and creditors, the development of their 
financial markets is restrained due to the reluctance of minority shareholders to pay 
high prices for stock granting rights that have a high probability of being expropriated, 
and also because of the unwillingness of creditors to lend money at low interest rates 
due to the uncertainty of recovering their investment (La Porta et al. 1999, Lopez-de-




In Mexico, corporate governance is directly legislated though two principal bodies of 
law, the Mercantile Companies Law (LGSM by its Spanish acronym) enacted in 1934 
–also known as the Business Corporation Act– and the Stock Market Law (LMV by its 
Spanish acronym) enacted in 1975 –also known as the Securities Exchange Act.  The 
former is the main and the most general law that deals with most areas of any limited 
liability company including its incorporation, the issuing of shares, the share-
ownership rights, the rights and duties of the board of directors and auditors, and the 
general procedures for merges and liquidation.  The Stock Market Law and the general 
rulings issued by the National Banking and Securities Commission establish particular 
provisions for companies which are publicly traded on the Mexican Stock Exchange 
(MSE or BMV by its Spanish acronym).  Finally, there is a code of Best Corporate 
Practices issued in 1999 by the board of Mexican leading entrepreneurs, aiming to 




Research on legal systems
128
 proposes that the degree of protection of investors and 
creditors and the level of legal enforcement can be determined through the origin of 
the legal system of the countries.  Empirical evidence has demonstrated that countries 
whose legal systems are similar to common-law offer stronger legal protection and a 
higher level of law enforcement than those offered by countries whose legal systems 
are drawn from the civil-law (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998 & 2000; Lopez-de-Silanes 
2002 and Chong et al. 2002).  The Mexican legal system happens to follow the 
patterns of the French civil-law system, which has been demonstrated empirically to be 
of the family
129
 of the civil-law origin countries that grant the lowest levels of 
investors and creditors’ protection and law enforcement.  Empirical evidence from 
Mexico supports these findings as Mexico has shown to offer poor rights not only to 
investors but also to creditors, besides having a poor level of legal enforcement (La 
Porta et al. 1999, Kappler and Love 2002, Lopez-de-Silanes 2002 and Chong et al. 
2009).  Furthermore, Babatz Torres (1997) Castañeda Ramos (1999) and Husted and 
Serrano (2002) research found that Mexican corporate governance legislation suffered 
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 Section 4 of Chapter 3 of this thesis provides a detailed assessment of the content and implications of 
the aforementioned laws and their amendments. 
128
 A comprehensive examination of the legal systems research was already offered in the Section 2.1.2 
Ownership Structure and Legal and Regulatory Systems of this chapter. 
129
 The civil-law tradition which derives from Roman law has three different families: (i) the French 
family that is based on the Napoleonic Code of 1984; (ii) the German family based on the Bismarck’s 
Code of 1804; and (iii) the Scandinavia family which is the less similar to the civil law but different 
from the other two civil-law families (Lopez-de-Silanes 2002). 
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from lack of disclosure standards of corporate information, weak protection of 
minority-shareholders rights and some encouragement of issuing dual-class of shares 
in the form of non-voting shares for foreign investors. 
 
According to Babatz Torres (1997 p. 2), any corporate governance legislation ‘...aims 
at solving agency problems [e.g. the separation of ownership and control problem] 
through rules and active court involvement that ensures [at least] a minimum degree of 
protection of interest of outside investors’.  Therefore, countries with loose investor 
and creditor rights should look to define and closely comply with good corporate 
governance practices in order to ameliorate the mis-functioning of their legal systems 
and consequently provide a fair and trustful business environment which would foster 
their economic growth.  In fact, it has demonstrated that there is a positive relationship 
between the firm-level of good corporate governance practices and the valuations of 
the companies, their performance, and the payout ratio of dividends (Kappler and Love 
2002, Lopez-de-Silanes 2002 and Chong et al. 2009). 
 
Mexico, being aware of its lax law system and its weak level of legal enforcement, 
launched a complex policy-reforms process aiming to achieve macroeconomic stability 
and economic development.  The first aim was attained by the end of the last decade, 
but in order to reach economic development it is necessary to start an institution-
building process which will develop Mexican financial institutions and its legal 
infrastructure to support business, in addition to creating regulatory mechanisms 
compatible with the best world practices (Lopez-de-Silanes 2002 and Chong et al. 
2009).  According to Coffee (1999, cited by Lopez-de-Silanes 2002 p.15) to achieve a 
successful institution-building process, it is necessary to implement a set of reforms 
that will share the same aim but will be approached under two different perspectives: 
the legal convergence and the functional convergence.  In the words of Lopez-de-
Silanes (2002, p. 15), the main difference between legal and functional convergence is 
the following: 
 
‘Legal convergence refers to the changes in the rules and in enforcement 
mechanisms toward some desirable standard... Alternatively, functional 
convergence refers to more decentralized, market-based changes, which do not 
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require legal reform per se, but still bring more firms and assets under the 
umbrella of effective legal protection of investors’. 
 
It is important to note that these reforms are not substitutes but complements.  
Therefore, both types of reforms need to be applied at the same time to build the 
institutions and mechanisms needed to set up a self-sustainable capital market.  In this 
sense, it is clear that Mexico needs to improve the protection offered to outside 
investors and creditors at both levels, nationally (viz. the legal system) and the 
individually e.g. at company level.  Borrowing Coffee’s approach, Mexico is dealing 
with the functional convergence by listing Mexican stock in Stock Exchanges that 
perform under more protective legal systems such as the USA or the U.K., while 




It is of note that the process of reforming the Mexican corporate legislation has faced 
significant objections from controlling shareholders.  According to Lopez-de-Silanes 
(2002) there are two possible reasons for this opposition.  First, for controlling 
shareholders an improvement in the investor’s rights might mean a reduction in control 
and in the private benefits they used to obtain from companies.  Second, controlling 
investors might not favour the development of Mexican capital markets, as large 
Mexican companies seemed to be able to finance their investment projects through 
either internal cash flows or loans provided by their tied banks.  Fortunately, despite 
the opposition, and as the slow and difficult as a serious legal reform process can be, 
Mexico has started the process of reforming its corporate legislation.  A successful 
example is the amendments implemented to the LMV in 2005. 
 
Further, it could be said that Mexico is demonstrating its real interest in becoming a 
developed economy with standards close to those of the best economies.  An example 
of its commitment is the issuance and implementation of the code of Best Corporate 
Practices, which made Mexico the first Latin American country with such regulations.  
The main deficiencies in the corporate governance practices overcome by the 
implementation of this code are: the balanced composition of the BOD; the 
specification of the independent nature of the audit committee which ensures the 
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 These reforms are thoroughly explored in next chapter; chapter 3 section 3.4.1 ‘Corporate 
Governance Legislation in Mexico’. 
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objectivity of judgment of its members; the establishment of a committee of 
compensation and evaluation; and the disclosure requirement of compensation 
schemes for executives.  However, there still many areas that require improvement like 
the need to define the responsibilities of the directors or the continuing vagueness in 
the disclosure requirements.  It is worth mentioning that the market has already noticed 
the improvements in corporate governance practice at company level, rewarding those 
companies with higher valuations, less expensive financing and better opportunities for 







2.5  Summary 
 
Existing research documents that corporate ownership structures are different in 
developed and emerging economies. It demonstrates that corporate financing decisions 
influence the cash-flow rights and control rights of the securities issued by companies 
differently; and that corporate ownership and capital structures can be decisive 
mechanisms to increase company value and investors’ wealth, when chosen wisely.  
An optimal selection of these structures, however, is proving to be rather complex to 
determine since numerous factors are involved and concern not only the legal and 
economic generalities of the country where the company operates (external factors), 
but also the particularities of the company itself (internal factors).  These external 
factors are: the type/tradition of corporate governance; the origin of legal and 
enforcement systems; the economic development of the country, its markets and 
institutions; and the culture and the psychology of investors.  The internal factors are: 
the private benefits of control, corporate charter provision and corporate governance 
practices. 
 
The realization that separation of ownership and control ought to give rise to conflicts 
of interest between the interested parties led scholars like Grossman, Hart, Harris, 
Raviv and Stulz to analyse the effects of the differences in cash-flow rights and voting 
rights.  Grossman and Hart (1988) point out that a voting-security structure can be 
used as a mechanism for shifting corporate control.  Further, the assignment of voting-
rights might help to determine the ‘type of party’ (private benefit party or security-
benefit party) that will have control.  Harris and Raviv (1988) argue that governance 
rules affect company value since they can influence the proportion of private benefits 
to be extracted from the winner contestant in a takeover bidding process.  Finally, 
Stulz (1988) discusses the proposition that the proportion of voting rights held by 
managers might alter the market valuation of companies. 
 
In 1999 a legal and enforcement system approach was pioneered by La Porta et al.  
They propose that ownership structure might act as a substitution mechanism when 
low degrees of protection for investors and creditors and weak law enforcement are 
present, as only large shareholders can safely expect to receive a return on their 
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investment.  Further, according to this approach, French-civil law origin countries (i.e. 
most emerging countries) present the lowest levels of protection to shareholders and 
creditors, and the lowest levels of law enforcement.  Alternatively, Gilson (2005) 
offers a different view for the legal approach contending that law in terms of its 
functionality could offer a better framework to classify ownership structures into 
efficient and inefficient controlling shareholders systems.  Further, he emphasises that 
the analysis of the effects of private benefits of control in corporate ownership patterns 
may offer a more complete explanation of these patterns as these benefits incorporate 
the effects of the particulars of each country. 
 
Initial empirical research on ownership suggests that corporations are widely-held in 
the USA between their investor and that managers were in charge of the administration 
of those companies (Berle and Means 1932, cited by La Porta et al. 1999, p. 471).  
However, contemporary empirical evidence does not support this view, demonstrating 
instead that concentrated ownership structures exist in most countries and that 
shareholders are active in corporate governance.  Furthermore, controlling structures 
exist in several large companies, except to those with efficient legal and enforcement 
systems, particularly the USA and the United Kingdom.  Moreover, for the most part, 
families are the ultimate controlling shareholder with control rights in excess of their 
investments, and also are often involved in the management of companies (La Porta et 
al. 1999).  In the case of emerging countries empirical evidence supports the 
theoretical assumptions regarding their expected ownership patterns, showing highly 
concentrated ownership structures owned mainly by family groups and a great 
divergence from the one-share one-vote rule achieved mainly through the use of 
pyramids and/or cross-share holdings, the issuance of dual-class of shares, and/or the 
application of super majority rules. 
 
Borrowing the spirit of Bebchuck’s model (1999) and considering previous 
assumptions regarding the determinants and patterns of ownership structure in 
emerging markets, the findings regarding the importance of a voting-security structure 
to allocate control, along with the findings regarding Mexico and its economic-
political background and governance practices, I develop a game-theoretical model of 
‘Separation of Control Rights and Cash-Flow Rights in Emerging Economies, Theory 
and Mexican Evidence’ presented in chapter 3. 
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On the capital structure account, ever since the transcendental irrelevance model 
published by Modigliani and Miller in 1958, advances on this field have identified 
additional determinants of capital structure such as: taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency 
costs, information asymmetry costs, product market, and patterns of ownership, among 
others (Modigliani and Miller 1963, Jensen and Meckling 1976, Miller 1977, Ross 
1977, Myers and Majluf 1984, and Harris and Raviv 1991).  Moreover, alternative 
theories, such as the Static Trade-Off theory, the Market Timing Theory, the 
Signalling theory, the Pecking Order theory, and the Agency theory framework have 
been also elaborated to explain the optimal capital structure by explicating the 
behaviour of these determinants on the different corporate financial choices.  
Nonetheless, there is not yet a theory complex enough be able to account for all the 
factors behind the possible optimal capital structure.  This is because, firstly, it has 
been recognised that in addition to determinants identified already, there are other 
determinants related to country particulars (e.g. inflation, country risk and culture) and 
firm-specifics (e.g. accounting practices, corporate governance practices and 
organisational structure) that also need to be addressed.  The second reason is that 
those country and company determinants can generate very particular influences in the 
corporate financial decisions, particularly when emerging countries are analysed (Glen 
and Singh 2004 and Booth et al. 2001). 
 
Initial empirical evidence on capital structure came mostly from studies of the 
determinants of corporate debt ratios of American companies.  Soon after empirical 
research with a broader scope and samples emerged, leading to the investigation of the 
corporate financing choices of issuing debt and equity and carry out cross-country 
analyses.  Leading investigations like those carried by Rajan and Zingales (1995), Boot 
et al. (2001) and Glen and Singh (2004) verify that the same key determinants 
identified in the USA companies apply to companies operating in countries of similar 
economic development (viz. the G-7) and in emerging markets, respectively.  Rajan 
and Zingales’ (1995) evidence documents that, on average, the G-7 companies hold 
similar levels of leverage and that their financing choices are influenced by the same 
determinant in a predicted way.  Boot et al. (2001) and Glen and Singh (2004) 
demonstrate that capital structure decisions are affected by the same determinants in 
both developed and emerging countries, although the behaviour of some of those 
determinants in emerging countries is different from the one expected (e.g. sign and/or 
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size of the coefficients).  Further, there are persistent differences across countries 
revealing the importance of country factors. 
 
Bringing together the previous theoretical predictions of capital structure and 
following the framework and methodologies used by Rajan and Zingales (1995) and 
Booth et al. (2001) I firstly investigate empirically the effects of well-known firm-
specific determinants in capital structure of the Mexican publicly traded companies in 
chapter 5 ‘Empirical Research: Determinants of Capital Structure of Mexican Publicly 
Traded Companies’.  Secondly, the effects of market power were tested.  I conclude 
the chapter with the analysis of the effects of separation of ownership and control in 
capital structure. To this end, my theoretical findings regarding ownership structure, 
corporate governance practices, business groups and the economic-financial 
background of Mexico were incorporated. 
 
Preliminary research on business groups closely associates business groups with 
emerging markets as a result of their ownership patterns, organisational structures and 
governance practices.  New literature has, however, demonstrated that business groups 
are also an efficient answer in contexts where there is/are: informational and 
institutional failures; capital, labour and managerial inefficient markets; technology 
borrowing and economies of scale (Castañeda 2007, Khanna and Yafeh 2007, Langlois 
2009 and Schneider 2009). 
 
Additionally, it has been also documented that business groups are predominant in 
emerging economies, but that they do also exist in developed countries.  The two 
organisational forms of these groups are horizontal diversification and pyramidal 
structures, although frequently they combined both (Colpan and Hikino, 2010).  
Further, business groups in emerging markets are predominantly set up as diversified 
groups with clear patterns of family-controlled structures, often exercised through 
pyramids and other mechanisms (dual-class shares and/or cross-share holding, et 
cetera.) that enable control rights in excess of cash-flow rights.  Moreover, pyramidal 
business groups remain widespread in mature market economies that are equipped 
with strong legal and market institutions supporting the functioning of capital markets.  
Therefore, besides or even without the existence of a direct economic benefit from 
profit tunnelling, controlling shareholders may also extract private benefits in terms of 
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social, political and economic gains from invisible assets like group reputation and 
prestige, political connections, et cetera (Colpan and Hikino, 2010). 
 
Alternatively, a sociological perspective argues that business groups are formed 
because the use of social ties bound by trust diminishes costs, such as those related to 
agency conflicts, contractual inefficiencies and information asymmetries.  Further, 
Khanna and Yafeh (2007, p. 348) notice that business groups are ubiquitous in 
emerging markets and the majority are family controlled; a fact that evinces “... 
business groups are networks whose prevalence facilitates the creation of trust, which 
makes up for incomplete contracts and imperfect rule of law”. 
 
The game-theoretical model presented in chapter 4 ‘Mexican Business Groups, 
Empathy and Market Crashes’ models the theoretical arguments provided regarding 
the positive side of business groups in interaction with empathy.  This model is close 
to the spirit of Castañeda’s (2007) model, benefiting from my findings regarding the 
Mexican economic-politico features and governance practices.  It offers a novel 
theoretical and numerical analysis of the role of empathy in the creation of a business 
group. 
 
Focussing on Mexico, earlier literature has depicted it as an emerging country 
endowed with problems of high foreign debt and inflation (as result of the LAPGs) and 
with immature markets, inefficient legal and enforcement systems, agency and 
informational asymmetry problems and poor governance practices.  However, 
contemporary literature has documented the drastic changes carried in its economic 
and political arenas from the early 1990s, which have resulted, among other things, in 
the consolidation of Mexican exports; a healthier financing of Mexican external sector 
by increasing its founding from FDI rather than tapping from international debt; and 
the practice of political democracy which in 2000 materialised as the decoupling of its 
economic and the political cycles. 
 
Moreover, new research analysis provides promising insights identifying the potential 
of Mexico to evolve into an economy comparable to those of the G-7 in terms of a 
source of sustained growth and global demand.  Further, it has been pointed out that 
Mexico, together with the BRIC countries and Korea, should not be considered as 
97 
 
standard emerging markets because of their influence on the global economy.  In the 
words of O’Neill (2007, p. 5) ‘... Mexico, the four BRIC countries and Korea should 
...[be] regard[ed]... as a critical part of the modern globalised economy, and they are 
just as central to its functioning as the current G7 is’.  
 
Finally, Mexico is demonstrating its ongoing commitment to pursing economic 
development and political democracy, not only by having been immersed in a complex 
politico-economic policy reform process (which went beyond macroeconomic 
stability), but also by commencing the institution-building process which lately has 
been considered as a key factor in consolidating economic development (Lopez-de-
Silanes, 2002 and Chong et al., 2009).  It is expected, therefore, that the institution-
building process will enable the Mexican economy to overcome the deficiencies of its 
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As discussed in the literature review Chapter, researchers have identified that corporate 
ownership structures are quite different in developed and developing economies.  For 
instance, Castañeda Ramos (1999) provides evidence of considerable separation of 
cash-flow rights and control rights accruing to inside and outside equity-holders in 
publicly listed firms in Mexico.  Insiders use mechanisms such as dual voting rights, 
majority rules and pyramids to maximise their control rights while holding minimal 
cash-flow rights.  In contrast, there is a much closer alignment of cash-flow rights and 
control rights in developed countries such as the UK or US. 
 
In this chapter, a game-theoretic model is developed aiming to explain these features.  
I argue that factors in emerging markets, such as large private benefits of control, 
extreme risk, low investor protection, inefficient capital markets, and governments 
sympathetic to incumbent management at the expense of outside investors, all 
contribute to insiders’ incentives to create a separation of cash flow and control rights.  
Finally, some evidence from Mexico is presented supporting the results. 
 
 
3.1 Review of Literature 
 
An emerging area of research in international corporate finance analyses the effects of 
the various legal and corporate governance systems around the world on capital market 
development, and firms’ financing choices and ownership structures.  For example, La 
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Porta and his co-authors have studied the effects of the legal system and shareholder 
protection on the development of capital markets (1997), dividend policies around the 
world (2000), the concentration of equity ownership (1999), and the relationship 
between investor protection and corporate governance (2000). 
 
Some researchers (for example Bebchuk 1999, Castañeda Ramos 1999, Burkart and 
Panunzi 2006) have identified that corporate ownership structures appear to be quite 
different in developed and developing economies.  For instance, Silva et al. (2006) and 
Carvalhal Da Silva and Câmara Leal (2006) agree that an important feature of the 
ownership structure in emerging markets may be their high concentration of ownership 
and control.  Hence, there is a clear departure of the rule one-share one-vote and an 
intensive use of indirect ownership mechanisms (e.g. pyramids, cross-holding shares 
and non-voting shares, among others) to leverage control. 
 
Castañeda Ramos (1999) identifies that there is considerable separation of cash-flow 
rights and control rights accruing to inside and outside equity-holders in publicly listed 
firms in Mexico, with a high concentration of control rights in insiders’ hands.  
Insiders use mechanisms such as dual voting rights, majority rules and pyramids to 
maximise their control rights while holding minimal cash-flow rights.  In contrast, 
there is a much closer relationship between cash-flow and control rights in developed 
countries such as the UK or US. 
 
The main focus of this model is to analyse this phenomenon in emerging markets, with 
particular reference to Mexico.  According to Bebchuk (1999), ‘the incidence of 
concentrated and dispersed ownership varies greatly around the world. This is the 
case even among countries in a similar stage of economic development.  Whereas 
dispersed ownership is the dominant form in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, control blocks are dominant in the countries of continental Europe.’ 
 
Early capital structure research ignored control rights, instead focussing on cash-flow 
rights associated with securities such as debt and equity.  For example, in Jensen and 
Meckling’s (1976) capital structure model, a leverage-increasing change in the 
financial structure of the firm increases the manager’s equity-stake.  This increase in 
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his cash-flow rights reduces his incentives to divert company funds towards his own 
private benefits, hence aligning his interests with those of outside equity-holders. 
 
Recently, it has been recognised that the financial structure affects both cash-flow 
rights and control rights.  An increase in a manager’s equity stake may increase his 
value-adding incentives as he has more of the cash-flow rights (as in Jensen and 
Meckling 1976), but it may also enable him to increase his control rights, since equity 
confers voting rights.  This may reduce corporate control, and may enable the manager 
to become entrenched, which may induce value-reducing behaviour.  Miguel et al. 
(2005) find a quadratic relation between the performance of Spanish firms and their 
level of ownership concentration, its break points being 35 and 70 percent.  Silva et al. 
(2006) find in Chilean firms a cubic relationship between ownership concentration, 
performance and business affiliation131, with break points at 21 and 76 percent.  It is of 
note that these values are consistent with the critical values of ownership stated in 
Chilean law. 
 
A company’s corporate charter establishes governance rules, such as the allocation of 
voting rights to equity-holders and the majority required to oust an incumbent in the 
face of a take-over threat.  In terms of the former, a company may establish a structure 
in which all share-holders have equal voting rights (a ‘one-share one-vote’ rule), or 
they may issue dual classes of shares, with differential voting rights.  Indeed, in 
Mexico, firms are legally allowed to issue at most 25 percent of their total capital as 
non-voting equity.  In terms of majority rules, the charter may establish a simple 
majority (the rival in a take-over bid simply requires more than 50% of the votes to 
succeed), or it may establish a super-majority rule (such as the rival requires more than 
75% of the votes).  Hence, these charter provisions affect the disciplining role of the 
market for corporate control by determining the ease with which hostile take-overs 
may be successful. 
 
Seminal theoretic approaches to the differences in cash-flow and control rights have 
been provided by Grossman and Hart (1988) and Stultz (1988).  They consider the 
effect of dual class of shares and supermajority rules on managerial ownership 
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 Business affiliation is analysed in terms of family ties and interlocking of directorates. 
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structure and incentives in the face of take-over threats.  Recently, Bebchuk (1999) 
considers managerial incentives to retain a controlling block of equity in the face of 
take-over threats. 
 
There has been some theoretical work (e.g. Grossman and Hart 1988, Harris and Raviv 
1988, Stultz 1988, Israel 1992 and Bebchuk 1999) examining the effects of corporate 
charter provisions on corporate control and performance.  For example, both Grossman 
and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988) consider the optimality of simple 
majority and one-share one-vote rules.  In both papers, a conflict of interest exists 
because the corporate insiders enjoy both cash-flow and private benefits from running 
the firm, while the outside equity-holders only enjoy the income benefits.  The 
corporate charter rules affect the bid price that a rival would be willing to pay, which 
in turn affects the value of corporate securities.  Harris and Raviv provide two major 
results; the simple majority rule plus one share-one vote is an optimal governance 
scheme since the better management team is always elected.  However, this does not 
generally result in maximum security values. In Grossman and Hart’s (1988) analysis, 
the optimality of simple majority and one-share one-vote rules depends on the relative 
levels of private benefits enjoyed by the incumbent and the rival from controlling the 
firm. 
 
Stultz (1988) develops a model that considers the effects of the incumbent’s equity 
stake (and hence his share of the votes) on the premium offered by a bidder in a take-
over contest.  He establishes a non-monotonic (inverted U-shaped) relationship 
between the manager’s equity stake and firm value.  Stultz assumes a simple majority 
rule, and one-share one-vote. 
 
Bebchuk (1999) considers a risk-averse incumbent’s equity-issuance decision at Initial 
Public Offer (IPO), in the face of a future take-over threat form a rival.  Risk-aversion 
means that the incumbent would wish to issue a large amount of equity, and reduce his 
equity stake as much as possible.  However, placing large amounts of equity in 
outsiders’ hands creates a ‘contestable’ structure, in which the incumbent is subject to 
a large take-over threat.  Therefore, the incumbent may wish to retain a certain amount 
of equity to reduce the take-over threat.  Throughout most of his analysis, Bebchuk 
(1999) considers a simple majority rule, together with one-share one-vote.  The 
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implication is that, if the incumbent wishes to create a block on control, he retains 50% 
of the equity. 
 
In the framing of this model, the existing theoretical literature on the differences 
between financial and ownership structure is developed.  I am particularly interested in 
the effects of a society’s legal systems and financial development on the differences 
between cash-flow rights and control rights.  This analysis is motivated by the work of 
Castañeda Ramos that demonstrates that Mexican corporate structures are 
characterised by a high inside control structure with a much lower equity structure.  
These companies achieve this through dual classes of shares, majority rules, and 
pyramids.  Further, it is argued in general that developing countries appear to have this 
structure, while cash-flow rights and control rights are much more aligned in 
developed countries. 
 
I develop a game-theoretic model with the aim of examining the conditions under 
which there is separation of ownership and control.  In particular, I consider four  main 
factors, as follows: a) the degree of managerial risk-aversion, b) the level of private 
benefits of control, c) the alignment of the ‘social planner’s’ interests with the 
incumbent management or the investors, and d) the efficiency or inefficiency of the 
financial market (or rationality/irrationality of investors). 
 
This model is closest in spirit to Bebchuk’s (1999) analysis.  However, I provide the 
following developments.  First, in Bebchuk’s model, the risk-averse incumbent wishes 
to sell of his equity, but may have an incentive to maintain the minimum equity stake 
in order to block control.  In contrast, although I also consider a risk-averse incumbent, 
he may wish to increase his equity stake to commit to the investors that he will exert 
high effort.  I demonstrate that this depends on his degree of risk-aversion.  Second, 
Bebchuk only considers a simple 50/50 voting rule, and, for most of his paper, he 
focuses on a single-class of shares.  Although he discusses the possible effects of dual 
voting stock, he does not analyse this.  A major contribution of this researcher model is 
that I consider the effects of the voting rule and the duality of stock (in terms of voting 




The rest of the chapter is organised as follows.  In the next section, I present the model.  
In section 3, I provide a numerical example. In section 4, I present evidence from 




3.2 The Model 
 
I consider a game with the following players: a risk-averse incumbent manager who 
initially runs a firm and wishes to take his firm public in an IPO, a rival manager who 
launches a hostile take-over bid, a social planner, and a large number of atomistic, 
price-taking outside investors.  Corporate governance relating to the corporation is 
affected in two ways in this model.  First, the corporate charter specifies an 
exogenously given majority rule required for outside equity holders to win in a voting 
contest against the incumbent.  Second, the social planner allows the incumbent to 
issue a certain proportion of outside equity as the non-voting variety. 
 
The incumbent initially owns all of the equity
132
.  At IPO, he decides how much of the 
equity to retain, and how much voting and non-voting equity to issue to outsiders.  
Subsequently, a rival appears who instigates a hostile take-over battle.  The incumbent 
is interested in the firm due to both the cash flow rights and the private benefits of 
control. 
 
The timeline of the game is as follows: 
 
Date 0: 
The policy-maker sets a proportion ]1,0[  that the incumbent is allowed to issue as 
non-voting equity to outside equity-holders (the balance must be issued as voting 
equity).  The corporate charter contains an exogenously given majority rule, specifying 
the proportion of votes
133
 ]1,0[  that a rival would require in order to capture the 
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 For simplicity, I assume that there is no debt; that is, the firm is all-equity.  Hence, I abstract from 
capital structure decisions. 
133
 I initially take the exogenously given majority rule as a general, unspecified proportion between zero 
and unity, with the social planner choosing the proportion of non-voting equity allowed.  In section 2.1 
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firm.  I assume that the voting equity held by the incumbent and the outside equity-
holders have the same votes per share (the single-class assumption). 
 
Date 1: 
The incumbent decides how much of the equity 1  to issue at IPO, and how much 
 to retain. 
 
Date 2: 
The incumbent exerts effort in running the business.  The effort level affects the 
probability of success as follows; ].1,0[
2
1  ep    In the case of success, the project 
achieves income .0R   In the case of failure, the project achieves an income of zero. 
 
Date 3: 
A rival appears and launches a hostile take-over battle.  This consists of a voting 
contest where the incumbent votes against the outside equity-holders regarding the 
take-over.  If the rival wins the take-over battle, he will subsequently generate an 
expected cash-flow .RRr    Therefore, if the structure is such that the rival can win the 
vote, he will win, and the incumbent will be ousted, regardless of the success or failure 
of the incumbent’s project. 
 
Date 4: 
Payoffs occur, and the manager who is in charge at date 3 receives private benefits of 
control equal to .B  
 
 
3.2.1 Contestable versus Non-Contestable Structure 
 
The social planner’s choice of non-voting equity ],1,0[  the exogenously given 
majority rule ]1,0[ , and the incumbent’s choice of equity to retain  and issue 
,1   combine to determine the contestability of the structure.  Following Bebchuk 
(1999), I define a non-contestable structure (NCS) as one where the incumbent cannot 
                                                                                                                              
and in the numerical section, I discuss why I have analysed it in this way.  Furthermore, in the numerical 
section, I ‘pin down’ the majority rule at 50%. 
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be ousted by the rival.  I define a contestable structure (CS) as one where the 
incumbent can be ousted by the rival. 
 
The incumbent votes for himself.  Outsiders vote for the rival regardless of whether the 
project succeeds or fails (since ).RRr    Given ],1,0[  and ]1,0[ , I define a 
critical value ]1,0['  such that the following holds; 
 
Lemma 1: 
If ],',0[    the structure is contestable (CS).  If ],1,'[  the structure is non-
contestable (NCS). 
 
Lemma 1 states that, given the majority rule and the non-voting equity allowance, if 
the incumbent holds a low level of equity (and hence issues a high level to outsiders), 
he faces a contestable structure (and therefore will be ousted).  If he holds sufficiently 
high equity, the structure is non-contestable, and he cannot be voted out.  I analyse '  
in more detail later. 
 
At this point, it is worth analysing why I have chosen to model the majority rule as 
exogenously given, with the social planner choosing the non-voting equity allowance.  
Further, I will discuss the social planner’s incentives. 
 
The main idea here is that the majority rule may be clear, transparent and highly 
visible to investors.  On the other hand, other aspects of corporate control structures, 
such as duality of voting stock, non-voting equity, pyramids, and cross-holdings, are 
much more complex and opaque. 
 
Furthermore, most corporate control structures around the world use either a simple 
majority rule ;5.0(   that is, the investors require more than 50% of the votes to 
capture the firm) or a super-majority rule ;75.0(   that is, the investors require more 
than 75% of the votes to capture the firm).  I argue that this suggests that there may be 
some focal point, or societal norm, associated with the choice of the highly-visible 
majority rule.  In particular, the simple majority rule )5.0(   may be viewed by 




In this model, I consider the incentives of the planner when deciding on the corporate 
control structure.  I assume that she
134
 balances the wealth of the incumbent and the 
outside investors when making her decision.  In particular, I consider a case where she 
may favour the incumbent over the investors, such that she would like to set an NCS 
structure to enable the incumbent to retain control.  
 
In modelling the social planner’s choices, I assume that the observable majority rule is 
set by societal norms (throughout the formal model, I consider a general majority rule 
]1,0[ , but in the numerical example, I assume that the societal norm has set the 
majority rule at .5.0 ).  On the other hand, she has leeway over the choice of the 
more opaque non-voting equity, due to investor irrationality. 
 
 
3.2.2 Solution of the Game 
 
I now proceed to solve the game by backward induction.  First, I take as given the 
contestability of the corporate structure (NCS or CS; as described in lemma 1), which 
is determined by the exogenously given majority rule, the non-voting equity allowance 
chosen by the social planner at date 0, and the incumbent’s date 1 equity choice, and I 
solve for the incumbent’s optimal date 2 effort level.  Then I move back to solve for 
the incumbent’s optimal date 1 equity issuance, given the contestability of the 
structure.  Finally, I solve for the social planner’s choice of the non-voting equity 
allowance. 
 
3.2.2.1 The Incumbent’s Date 2  Effort Stage 
First, I take as given that ;'   that is, the risk-averse incumbent has issued equity 
such that the structure is NCS, given the majority rule and non-voting equity 




1 VBXVarePRM    (1) 
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where the first term is the incumbent’s equity stake in the expected firm value, the 
second term is his cost of effort, the third term represents his risk-aversion, the fourth 
term is his private benefits, and the last term is the cash received from outside equity 
holders for their stake in the firm, given that they expect the firm to be worth .V   In an 
efficient market, investors pay a fair price, and .PRV   
 
Since the date 3 outcome has a binomial distribution, ).1()(
22 PPRXVar   
Therefore, substituting for P  and ),(XVar  the incumbent’s payoff becomes: 
 
 


























For example, if ,0  the incumbent is risk-neutral, and I have the standard optimal 
effort level under risk-neutrality
135
 .2/* Re   
 
Next, take as given that ;'   that is, the incumbent has issued equity such that the 
structure is contestable.  Since the incumbent is voted out for sure, it is optimal for him 
to exert zero effort. 
 
 
3.2.2.2 The Incumbent’s Date 1 Equity Issue Stage 
Consider the NCS structure ( ).'    Having solved for the incumbent’s optimal date 
2 effort level for given equity stake, I now move back to date 1 to solve for the 
incumbent’s optimal equity retention and issuance.  I substitute the optimal effort level 
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 See, for example, Fairchild (2004, 2006). 
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(3) into equation (2).  Noting that, in an efficient market with competitive rational 
investors, the investors pay a fair price for their investment (i.e. they invest at zero 




































Note that, when ,0  the incumbent is risk-neutral, and the first-term of (4) equals 















 .   Therefore, when ,0  the incumbent maximises his payoff by 
selecting .1*    The intuition is as follows.  The incumbent issues equity, and then 
exerts effort.  Hence, there is a moral hazard problem, due to the incumbent’s 
incentives to shirk (i.e. exert low effort).  Further, since the outside investors pay a fair 
price, the incumbent suffers from his own moral hazard, since, if the investors expect 
shirking, they will not pay very much for the equity.  This is termed the incumbent’s 
commitment problem.  He would like to commit to exert a high effort, since then 
investors would pay more for their equity.  However, he cannot commit to this, since 
he issues equity first, and then exerts effort. 
 
The incumbent’s retention of equity forms a type of commitment device to exert high 
effort, and therefore the outside holders pay more for their equity.  When the 
incumbent is risk-neutral, the commitment problem implies that the incumbent’s 
payoff is unambiguously increasing in his equity stake, and therefore, he maximises 
his payoff by holding all of the equity: .1*   
 
Therefore, under the NCS, the commitment problem drives the incumbent to increase 
his equity stake.  However, as identified by Bebchuk (1999), risk-aversion drives the 
incumbent to reduce his equity stake, and issue more outside equity (Bebchuk does not 
consider the commitment problem). Therefore, when considering the incumbent’s 
equity decision, I may analyse a trade-off between managerial commitment and risk-




Examination of equation (4) enables us to define two critical values of the risk-
aversion parameter, ,'  and ,'''    such that the following holds: 
 
Lemma 2: Under the NCS structure, the incumbent’s payoff (4) has the following 
properties; 







 ].1,0[  That is, the 
incumbent’s payoff is increasing in his equity stake.  Therefore, the incumbent 
optimally chooses 1*  . 















 ].1,1ˆ[     That is, the incumbent’s payoff is an inverted-U 
shape, increasing in his equity stake initially, reaching a maximum at ,ˆ  and 
then decreasing. 







 ].1,0[  That is, the 
incumbent’s payoff is decreasing in his equity stake.  If the incumbent prefers 
the NCS structure, he will optimally choose '.*     If the incumbent prefers 
the CS structure, he will choose .0*   
 
Lemma 2a) states that the incumbent’s payoff under the NCS structure is 
unambiguously increasing in the incumbent’s equity stake, for all equity levels 
between 0% and 100%, for low levels of risk aversion (including risk neutrality).  This 
is because the commitment effect dominates; the higher the incumbent’s equity stake, 
the more effort that he commits to exert, and the higher the share price that outside 
shareholders are prepared to pay.  This drives the incumbent to maximise his equity 
stake.  In lemma 2b), there is a trade-off between the commitment effect and risk-
aversion.  In lemma 2c), high risk aversion dominates, and the incumbent’s payoff 




I will be analysing the incumbent’s incentives to choose a CS or NCS structure.  I note 
that, when ],',0[   the solution is trivial.  Since the incumbent is mildly risk-
averse, the commitment effect dominates, and the incumbent optimally chooses 
.1*    Therefore, the structure is NCS. When ],'','[   (i.e. medium risk 
aversion) the analysis of the model is very complex.  From this point on, I focus on the 
case of high risk-aversion, that is, I assume; 
 
A.1:  '.'   
 
At this point, is worth recalling that I am particularly interested in analysing why 
corporate structures in some capital markets are characterised by a separation of cash-
flow rights and control rights, while in other regimes, cash-flow rights and control 
rights are much more aligned.  Lemma 1 reveals that one ingredient may be the degree 
of risk-aversion.  In low-risk markets, the incumbent may be prepared to hold more 
equity (and therefore control rights and cash-flow rights may be closely aligned), while 
in highly volatile markets, the incumbent may wish to minimise his equity stake, while 
remaining in control (inducing a separation of control rights and cash-flow rights).  
Hence, this may be the case why emerging markets are characterised by this 
separation. 
 
By focussing on extreme risk aversion, this analysis is similar to Bebchuk’s (1999) 
model.  That is, because risk-aversion dominates, the incumbent wishes to minimise 
his equity stake.  If he prefers the CS structure, he will set .0*    If he prefers the 
NCS structure, he will minimise his equity stake to ,'*    such that he has just 
enough voting equity for the structure to be non-contestable, as defined in lemma 1.  I 
proceed to analyse his choice between NCS and CS. 
 
Next, take as given that the incumbent has set the CS structure ( ).'    Hence, he is 
voted out for sure.  Therefore, I have already established that his optimal date 1 effort 
level is zero effort.  Therefore, the incumbent’s date 0 expected payoff is: 




I assume that, if the incumbent is voted out, he retains any equity that he has.  
Therefore, since he exerts zero effort, and since his equity stake is risky, his optimal 
equity stake, under the CS structure will be .0*    Given that risk-neutral outside 




Under the CS structure )'(   , the incumbent’s optimal equity stake is .0*    Since 
risk-neutral outside equity-holders pay a fair price for their equity, the incumbent’s 
payoff under the CS structure becomes  
 .1 rM R  (6) 
 
Given the majority rule and the non-voting equity allowance (which determines ),'  
the incumbent’s date 1 equity choice determines whether the structure is contestable 
)'(   or non-contestable ).'(     In order to decide between the CS and NCS 
structure, the incumbent compares (4) and (6).  Figure 3.1 below presents a 


























Note to Figure 3.1: Due to high risk aversion, the incumbent’s payoff under the NCS structure is 
downward-sloping. Therefore, under NCS, the incumbent would like to minimise his equity 
stake.  If the incumbent holds less than ,'  the structure is CS, in which case the incumbent 
prefers to sell all of his equity, .0*   If the incumbent holds more than ,'  the structure is 
NCS.  The exogenously given majority rule, plus the social planner’s choice of the non-voting 
equity allowance, determines '.  Assume that the planner prefers the NCS structure.  If 
,' C   then the incumbent will not choose the NCS structure (that is, by holding equity at 
least equal to )' , since his payoff under the NCS structure is lower than under the CS 
structure.  The incumbent will prefer to sell all of his equity. If ,' C   the incumbent 
maximises his payoff by minimising his equity stake such that the structure remains NCS, that is, 
he optimally chooses  '.*    
 
Under the assumptions that the social planner a) prefers the NCS structure, and b) aims to 
maximise the firm value under the NCS structure (which implies that she wishes to force the 
incumbent to maximise his equity stake under the NCS structure), the planner optimally chooses 
the non-voting equity such that .' C    
 
In the numerical example provided, .3.0'  C  With a majority rule of 50%, the social 
planner optimally allows the incumbent to issue 57% of outside equity as non-voting equity.  The 
incumbent then optimally retains 30% of the equity, and issues 70% to outsiders.  The incumbent 
and the outsiders then have equal votes, and the incumbent wins the voting contest. 
 
 
The above diagram reveals that the incumbent’s private benefits from running the 
company have a crucial effect on the incumbent’s optimal choice control structure, and 













The incumbent’s payoff under the CS structure is horizontal at .rR   Since I am 
focussing on the case where risk-aversion dominates ),''(    the incumbent’s NCS 





NCSM     Therefore, I may state the following; 
 
Proposition 1: The Effect of Private Benefits on the Incumbent’s Equity Issuance 
Choice: 




   )()( 11 CSNCS MM   ].1,0[  (that is, the payoff under 
the NCS structure starts below the payoff under the CS structure, and, since it 
is downward sloping, remains below for the entire equity interval).  Therefore, 












  there exists a critical equity stake, ,0C  where 
).()( 11 CSNCS MM   Hence, when ),,0[
C   )()( 11 CSNCS MM  , 
and when ,C   ).()( 11 CSNCS MM   (that is, the lines cross at ).
C  
Therefore, 
i.) If  ,' C  the incumbent optimally chooses ,'*    and the 
structure is NCS. 
ii.) If  ,' C   the incumbent optimally chooses ,0*   and the 
structure is CS. 
 
Note that the incumbent’s incentives are driven by his private benefits.  When private 




 , he prefers to set the CS structure.  When private 




  he prefers to set the NCS structure.  Further, from the 
figure 3.1 I observe that, as private benefits increase, such that )(1 NCSM  shifts 




I have already noted that high risk-aversion may be one factor that drives a separation 
of cash-flow rights and control rights.  Proposition 1 highlights a second factor: high 
private benefits.  
 
 
3.2.2.3 Social Planner’s Date 0 Choice of Governance Rules 
Finally, I move back to date 0 to determine the social planner’s optimal choice of non-
voting equity ].1,0[   Given the majority rule136 ],1,0[  the social planner’s choice 
determines '.  
 
Thus far, I have identified two factors that drive the separation of cash-flow rights and 
control rights: a) the incumbent’s high risk-aversion, and b) high private benefits of 
control.  In this section, I add the two final ingredients: c) alignment of social planner’s 
and incumbent’s incentives, and d) investor irrationality. 
 
I need to specify the social planner’s objectives.  First, I consider whether she is 
aligned with investors (she focuses on maximisation of firm value) or the incumbent 
(she focuses on the incumbent’s wealth). 
 
Second, I consider the effect of investor rationality/irrationality on the social planner’s 
choice of non-voting equity ].1,0[   I consider two cases.  In the first case, investors 
are fully rational, in that they understand the effects of the majority rule and the non-
voting equity.  In the second case, they exhibit a level of irrationality.  They can 
observe the majority rule, but they do not understand the effect of non-voting equity. 
 




   Therefore, proposition 1b) applies.  Therefore, 
the social planner’s choice of ]1,0[  determines whether the structure is NCS or CS, 
and therefore affects the incumbent’s optimal choice of equity. 
 
                                            
136
 In the numerical example, I fix the majority rule at .5.0  
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Denote the total number of shares in the company as ,N  the number of shares held by 
the incumbent manager as ,MN  and the number of shares held by the outsiders as .EN   
Therefore, the total number of shares are .EM NNN    Hence, the cash-flow rights 
are given by ,
N
N M  and .1
N
NE   
 
Denote the total number of votes as .v  Hence, ).1(  EM NNv   The outsiders 
win the vote if   




N M  and ,1
N
N E  this may be re-written as  
 
 )].1)(1([)1)(1(     (8) 
 
Lemma 1 defined a critical level of managerial equity '  such that the structure 
switches from CS to NCS.  Hence, '  is such that (8) becomes an equality. That is, 
 
 )].1)('1('[)1)('1(    (9) 
 
Hence, the social planner’s choice of   affects ' .  Proposition 1 (and Figure 3.1) 
reveals that, if ,' C  the incumbent chooses ,'*    and the structure is NCS.  If 
,' C  the incumbent chooses ,0*   and the structure is CS. 
 
 
3.2.2.3.1 Investors are fully rational. 
In order to consider the social planner’s optimal choice of , I define the social 
planner’s payoffs under the NCS and CS structures respectively;  
 
 
,)1()()( YVNCSSP    (10) 
 
 
.)( rSP RCS   (11) 
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Hence, I have defined the social planner’s payoff as a weighted average of the value of 
the firm and the incumbent’s private benefits under the NCS and CS systems.  A 
justification for this formulation is that the social planner may be ‘under pressure’ 
from investors and from the incumbent.  For high ,  the social planner favours the 
investors, while for low ,  the social planner favours the incumbent.  
 
The social planner prefers the NCS structure if (10) > (11); that is if the weight   that 














Given that she prefers NCS, I state two objectives for the social planner as follows.  
She wishes to a) minimise the non-voting equity   such that the structure remains 
NCS, and b) maximize firm value given the NCS. 
 
I justify these assumptions as follows.  Firstly, I assume that the pressure placed on the 
social planner by outside investors is increasing in the non-voting equity, driving her to 
minimise the level of this parameter.  Secondly, the pressure placed by outside 
investors is reducing in the value of the firm under the NCS, driving her to maximise 
firm value under the NCS. 
 
If the social planner prefers the NCS structure, she will choose  such that (9) is an 
equality (this minimises the non-voting equity   required to provide an NCS structure, 
provided that the incumbent has chosen ).'    Further, I set C '  in (9).  This 
ensures that the incumbent optimally chooses ,* C   therefore ensuring that the 
structure is NCS while maximising the firm value under NCS. 
 
Therefore, setting C '  in (9), and solving for * , I obtain 
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That is, as the incumbent’s private benefits increase (shifting the NCS payoff in 
diagram 1 upwards), C  shifts to the right, and the non-voting equity   required is 
reduced.  The intuition is that, as the incumbent’s private benefits increase, he is 
prepared to hold more equity in order to retain control (in spite of his risk-aversion).  
Therefore, the social planner does not need to provide so much protection in the form 
of non-voting equity. 
 
 
3.2.2.3.2 Investors are irrational (that is, investors understand  , but do not 
understand non-voting equity). 
 
As a final ingredient in the separation of control rights and cash-flow rights, I consider 
investor irrationality
137
.  In this model, irrational investors do not understand the 
effects of non-voting equity (or do not realise that non-voting equity can be issued by 
the incumbent) Therefore, they view that 0  in equation (9).  Therefore, they view 
the critical equity level at which the structure switches from CS to NCS as '' , 
satisfying .)''1(     However, since 0*   (from equation 13), the true critical 
value is '.''     Therefore, if the social planner chooses 0*   according to (13), 
the incumbent chooses '.''*   C   Therefore, the structure is NCS, but the 
outside investors believe it to be CS.  Therefore, the social planner’s payoffs under 
NCS and CS are: 
 
 
.)1()( YRNCS rSP     (14) 
 
 
.)( rSP RCS     (15) 
 
                                            
137
 In order to focus my analysis, the investor irrationality is purely in terms of the date 0 control 
structure.  The ‘pressure’ that they exert on the social planner (in relation to equations 14 and 15) occurs 
at date 0, when the planner establishes the structure.  At date 1, the investors become rational, 
understand the structure (NCS or CSD) and pay a fair price for their shares. 
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Therefore, the social planner always chooses 0*   according to (13).  That is, due to 
investor irrationality, the social planner is not afraid to provide a defence mechanism 
(non-voting equity) for the incumbent. 
 
This model has identified several factors that might induce a separation of cash-flow 
and control rights, as follows; 
 
a) High risk aversion/ high volatility.  This induces the manager to reduce his 
equity stake.  Since he wishes to retain control, he wishes to use devices such 
as non-voting equity (modelled here), and dual class of shares, pyramids, cross-
holdings (not modelled here). 
 
b) High private benefits.  In societies where the legal system enables managers to 
take high private benefits from the firm, one may observe separation of 
ownership and control.  This may tie in with weak investor protection. 
 
c) Social planner sympathetic towards incumbents.  In such systems, the social 
planner may facilitate devices to allow the separation of ownership and control 
(such as non-voting equity).  Again, this may tie in with weak investor 
protection. 
 
d) Irrational investors.  If investors do not understand the separation of ownership 
and control, it becomes easier for the social planner to facilitate it. 
 
I may argue that a) – d) reflect the features of emerging, civil law countries, such as 
Mexico. I now turn to the evidence that demonstrates that Mexico is characterised by 








3.3 Numerical  Example 
 
In order to clarify the factors, identified by this model, that drive the separation of cash 
flow and control rights, I now present a numerical example.  Examination of the figure 
3.1 Graphical analysis of Proposition 1 will facilitate this analysis. 
 
Let us assume that, due to societal norms of fairness, the majority rule is .5.0   I 
introduce the four factors, one by one.  First, the incumbent is highly risk averse.  
Therefore, his NCS payoff is downward sloping, as in Figure 3.1. Hence, he wishes to 
minimise his equity stake. 
 




  Therefore the 
NCS and CS payoffs cross at .C  Let these payoffs be such that .3.0C  
 
Third, the social planner’s weights in equations (10) and (11) are such that she prefers 
the NCS, even when investors are fully rational.  That is, the planner favours the 
incumbent over the investors.  From equation (13), her optimal choice of the non-
voting equity proportion allowed is .57.0*   
 
Therefore, the incumbent’s optimal equity stake is .3.0*  C   He issues outside 
equity of .7.0*1    The non-voting equity is )7.0(*  0.4.  The voting equity is 
.3.0)7.0*)(1(    Hence, the incumbent’s proportion of votes equals the outside 
equity holders’ proportion of votes, and the structure is NCS. 
 
Finally, I introduce irrational investors.  They observe the majority rule .5.0   
However, they do not understand the non-voting equity allowance.  Since the 
incumbent holds ,3.0C  they believe that the structure is CS.  Hence, the social 
planner can choose the non-voting equity proportion 57.0*  in order to generate an 






3.4 Evidence from Mexico  
 
3.4.1 Corporate Legislation in Mexico 
 
To understand the practices of corporate governance of any nation it is necessary to be 
aware of its underlying legal and enforcement framework, as well as any discretionary 
document or guideline issued for that purpose, such as codes of best practice.  In the 
case of Mexico, the Mercantile Companies Law (LGSM)
138
 and the Stock Market Law 
(LMV)
139
 address most of the legal framework in this regard.  In addition, there is a 
Code of Best Corporate Practices (CMPC)
140
 issued by the Board of Mexican Leading 
Entrepreneurs and memorandums issued by the National Banking and Securities 
Commission (CNBV)
141
, which also deal with important aspects of the corporate 
governance of Mexican companies. 
 
The LGSM has the highest hierarchy to rule trading companies; thus this law is the 
most general law governing all types of trading companies.  In general, this law copes 
with the incorporation, operation, dissolution and liquidation of companies; the 
establishment of the property rights of investors; the management and the surveillance 
organs; and the disclosure of the financial information.  The LMV governs publicly 
traded companies (PTC) in Mexico, in terms of obligations and legal requirements 
needed to be fulfilled to register, update, suspend and cancel any issuance of stock in 
Mexican stock markets.  The LMV aims to encourage an efficient, fair and clear 
Mexican stock market, which consolidates the current regime applicable to PTCs to 
improve their corporate governance practices.  This law also aims to promote the 
access of medium-sized companies to Mexican stock markets.  The CMPC provides 
some guidance to enhance corporate governance practices.  The objectives of this code 
are to attain transparent management practices by improving the function of the Board 
of Directors and making corporate information more useful, prompt and reliable.  It is 
worth mentioning that compliance with this code is voluntary, although PTCs must 
declare their degree of adherence to these practices. 
                                            
138
 By its Spanish acronym. 
139
 By its Spanish acronym. 
140
 By its Spanish acronym. 
141
 By its Spanish acronym. 
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Core principles of the LGSM establish that shares are freely transferable; grant equal 
cash flow and voting rights; and state that each share entitles its holder to one vote.  
Nevertheless, this law also mentions that it is possible for companies to specify in their 
corporate charter different classes of shares with particular rights per class, such as 
“shares of limited voting rights”142 or “privileged shares”143 (Mexico 2006, Arts.112-
113).  Further, shareholders possessing shares of “limited rights” have the same rights 
as the minority shareholders to oppose to the agreements of the Assembly of 
Shareholders and to verify the financial statements and all the books of the company 
(Mexico 2006, art.113).  It is of note that the LMV, as a further provision 
complementing the LGSM, states for Public Trading Companies
144
 (PTCs) that they 
can only issue common shares.  However, this law points out that the CNBV, at its own 
discretion, can allow the issuance of non-common shares as long as the Commission 
considers that these shares do not exceed 25 percent of the total capital that is publicly 
held at the time of the public offer.  Further, the CNVB could increase this percentage 
when the shares issued are part of a scheme of convertible shares that will become 
common shares in a period of 5 years at most.  Finally, it also established that shares 
with no voting rights will not account for the quorum required to hold a shareholders’ 
meeting, whereas shares with limited or restricted voting rights account only for the 
meetings in which their holders are allowed to participate (Mexico 2005, Art.54). 
 
The LGSM recognises the Assembly of Shareholders (ASH) as the highest corporate 
governance organ of any company (Mexico 2006, Art.178).  This Assembly has the 
authority to approve and ratify all the acts and operations of the company in its 
meetings
145, which can be ordinary or extraordinary.  Ordinary shareholders’ meetings 
might be held at least once per year within the four months following the ending of 
each fiscal year.  In general, these meetings will deal with issues regarding the 
operation of the company, i.e. its management, surveillance and financial results 
                                            
142
 Shares of “limited voting rights” are not allowed to vote in ordinary shareholders’ meetings, rather 
they can be voted in the extraordinary shareholders’ meetings that discuss the particular matters 
specified in the corporate provisions. 
143
 These shares are usually limited voting shares with preferred dividends.   
144
 A traded company is considered to be public when trades its shares in Mexican stock markets 
(Mexico 2005).  PTCs in Mexico are primarily governed by the LMV; nevertheless, when the LMV 
issues no provisions in a specific regard, the LGSM has to be obeyed (Mexico 2005, Art.22). 
145
 The LGSM also permits corporate charters to specify that when shareholders agree on any resolution 
with the totality of the votes, it would not be necessary to hold any meeting as long as the resolution is 
ratified in writing (Mexico 2006, Art. 178). 
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(Mexico 2006, Art.181).  Alternatively, extraordinary shareholders’ meetings can be 
held at any time of the year
146
 and will tackle issues affecting the corporate structure.  
Some examples of these issues are: increasing or reducing the capital of the company; 
merger or take-over; issuing preferred shares; and amending their bylaws among 
others (Mexico 2006, Art.182).  To be legally allowed to hold an ordinary meeting, at 
least half of the total capital needs to be present at the meeting.  To validate a 
resolution, the agreement of the majority of votes present in that meeting is necessary.  
Extraordinary meetings require the presence of three quarters of the total capital
147
 and 
their resolutions are validated with the agreement of the majority of the total capital 
(Mexico 2006, Arts.189-190).  In other words, Mexican law establishes that to 
deliberate take-over issues, 75 percent of the shareholders need to be present, and at 
least 50 percent of the voting capital needs to agree any resolution to be valid (that is a 
majority rule). 
 
Furthermore, for PTCs the LMV allows entering into shareholders agreements issues 
dealing with: non-compete provisions, option rights, sale and transfer of shares, 
exercise of pre-emptive rights and pooling vote provisions.  Finally, this law permits 
PTCs to include take-over defence provisions as long as they are approved in an 
extraordinary shareholders’ meeting with at least 95 percent of the votes; they do not 
exclude any shareholders from their economic benefits; and the possibility of take-over 
is not completely eliminated (Mexico 2005, Art.48). 
 
The LGSM states that management of Mexican companies is ‘… the responsibility of 
one or more temporary and revocable directors who may or may not be executives of 
the company’ (Mexico 2006, Art.142).  When two or more directors are appointed, a 
Board of Directors (BOD) will be constituted.  To have the right to appoint a director 
to the Board, this law requires shareholders to possess at least 25 percent of the total 
capital.  However, this percentage is reduced to ten percent for PTCs (Mexico 2006, 
Art.144).  Further, the CMPC suggests that shareholders owning at least two percent of 
                                            
146
 Either the BOD or the statutory auditors can call for a shareholders meeting.  Shareholders with 33 
percent of the total capital or more are allowed to ask the BOD or statutory auditors for a shareholders’ 
meeting. 
147
 However, it is possible for companies to establish a higher quorum to hold an extraordinary meeting.  
This will be specified in their corporate charter.  
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the total capital could be members of the BOD (Consejo Cordinador Empresarial 
(CCE) 1996).  According to the CMPC, the BOD should be composed of five to fifteen 
proprietary directors, it being desirable not to have any substitute members
148
.  Three 
different classes of directors should constitute the Board: outside directors, owning 
directors and related directors.  Outside directors are those selected by their 
professional prestige, experience and capacity.  Owning directors can be either any 
significant
149
 shareholder or the individuals that direct those significant shareholders.  
Related directors are those that do not fall into any of the two previous categories 
(CCE 1999).  It is advised that outside and owning directors would represent altogether 
at least 40 percent of the total members of the Board.  At the same time, outside 
directors should be at least 20 percent of the total board members.  To reach any 
resolution, the LGSM requires that the BOD celebrates a Session
150
 and deliberates 
over the resolution.  A resolution will be valid when the majority of the attending 
members favour it.  However, this law also allows the Board to validate any resolution 
reached with a no Session when the agreement was unanimous and the resolution 
ratified in writing (Mexico 2006, Art.143). 
 
As an amendment of the LGSM, the LMV states that the management of PTCs and 
their controlling companies, when this is the case, is the duty of both the BOD and the 
CEO (Mexico 2005, Art.23).  According to the LMV, BODs of PTCs must be 
composed of not less than five and not more than 21 proprietary directors, at least 25 
percent of them being outsider directors.  It is allowable to designate a substitute 
director for each proprietary member
151
.  When a PTC is part of a business network or 
a consortium, no external auditor
152
 of any of these companies can be appointed to be a 
member of the Board if he/she had performed that auditing role within the 12 months 
previous to such appointment (Mexico 2005, Art.24).  In other words, only recently 
                                            
148
 In the case that substitute members were elected, they would be proposed by the proprietary member 
to whom he/she would only substitute (CCE 1999). 
149
 By significant shareholders is meant those investors that posses two percent or more of the total 
capital of the company (CCE 1999). 
150
 To be able to celebrate a Session, it is required that at least half of the members of the Board of 
Directors attend that Session (Mexico 2006, Art. 143). 
151
 In the case of outside proprietary directors, their substitute members might also be outside directors. 
152
 The LMV also establishes that the chief executive officer, relevant employees or statutory auditors of 
any company of the business network or of the consortium cannot be members of the Board of 
Directors. Further, no individual, shareholder, client, supplier, debtor or creditor who has a significant 




active auditors are banned from being part of the board of directors of the companies 
of the business network; otherwise, cross-shareholdings are allowed.  Moreover, the 
LMV highlights the fact that the BOD’s performance should encourage the creation of 
the value of the company.  Therefore, it is expected that the members of the board will 
provide a diligent, honest, confidential and loyal service to the company.  Additionally, 
it is required that any member of the board experiencing a situation of conflict of 
interests will reveal it and avoid participating, deliberating and voting on that issue 
(Mexico 2005, Art.34). 
 
Finally, the LMV states that overall rights of shareholders are: to have free access to 
information and documents related to the items in the shareholders’ meeting agenda at 
least 15 days in advance of the day of such a meeting; to prevent the discussion of 
different issues under the same category in the agenda; and to be represented by 
someone else in the shareholders’ meetings (Mexico 2005, Art.49).  Shareholders 
possessing voting shares
153
 that represent 10 percent of the capital of the company or 
more are allowed to appoint or revoke a director to the BOD; to ask the chairman of 
the BOD or the chairman of the auditing or the inter-corporate practices committees to 
call for a shareholders’ meeting; and to postpone a shareholders’ meeting for three 
days when they consider that there is not enough information to cast a vote on an item 
of the agenda.  Further, shareholders possessing voting shares that represent 20 percent 
of the capital of the company or more can judicially oppose the resolutions of a 
shareholders’ meeting where they have the right to vote (Mexico 2005, Arts.50-51). 
 
Among the duties of shareholders, the LMV establishes that if an investor or group of 
investors want to acquire (directly or indirectly) at least 30 percent of the common 
shares of a company, they must do so via a tender offer (Mexico 2005, Art.98).  This 
offer have to last for at least 20 working days, be extended to all classes of shares and 
grant the same payment without regard to the sort of shares acquired.  The investor or 
group of investors, who directly or indirectly acquire at least 10 percent but at most 30 
percent of the shares of a company, is required to publicise this situation on the next 
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 Voting shares are those that allow shareholders to participate in the decision-making process of the 
publicly traded companies by casting votes.  Examples of these shares are ordinary shares, shares of 
limited voting rights and special shares. 
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working day following the acquisition.  In the case of a group of investors, they must 
disclose the individual ownership percentages (Mexico 2005, Art.109). 
 
In conclusion, notwithstanding the fact that Mexico is a country whose legislation is 
framed under the French civil-code patterns (thus it has lax laws and weak 
enforcement levels), the Mexican government aims to enhance the economic 
development of the country by diversifying the current financing sources.  This 
economic development is thought to be achieved by achieving better corporate 
governance practices; facilitating the access for medium Mexican companies to the 
Mexican stock markets; strengthening the investor’s rights; and improving provisions 
related to violations and sanctions, among others.  However, although some 
deficiencies have been resolved, there are still others to be overcome, e.g. even though 
status proscribe equal cash-flow and voting rights, with one-share-one-vote, there is 
provision for up to 25% of non-voting equity (consistent with this model). 
 
 
3.4.2 Empirical evidence 
 
In this section, I present empirical evidence of ownership structure from a small 
sample of Mexican publicly traded companies.  
 
I collected and analysed some corporate information regarding corporate charter 
provisions and ownership structure from 4 out of the 35 companies that form the 
Mexican Stock Exchange Index that is the Prices and Quotations Index (IPC).  This 
information was mainly extracted from the Bylaws and the Annual Report (2005) 
submitted to the Mexican Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV) and to the 
American Stock Exchange Commission (SEC).  The evidence from this sample 
suggests that these publicly traded companies are large business groups built into 
complex networks with multiple subsidiaries around the world.  These companies are 
not only managed but also owned and controlled by their founder families.  
Furthermore, there is an extensive use of dual classes of shares which allows majority-
voting rights to be reached while investing minimal amounts of capital.  This is 
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consistent with my model, and may suggest that the incumbents in Mexican companies 
exhibit extreme risk aversion in the face of high economic volatility. 
 
The main findings of this analysis are similar to those presented by Castañeda-Ramos 
(1999) regarding the business network structure used by large publicly traded 
companies.  The importance of business networks structures may be, for ownership 
purposes, the facilitation of the use of pyramids which encourage achieving controlling 
positions by investing moderate amounts of capital.  In this sample, companies B and 
C start their network with two main subsidiaries, while company D begins with ten.  
However, both cases finish with an endless number of sub-subsidiaries located around 
the world. 
 
Regarding the management and control of these companies, the evidence suggests that 
the founders and their families are actively involved in the management and control of 
these companies.  That is to say, in most companies their founders became the 
honorary lifetime chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD), while one of their direct 
descendents acts as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the same company.  Thus, 
the controlling decisions remain within the families of the founders.  Moreover, 
because of the structure of business groups of these companies, the directors of the 
board can sit on the board of most of the companies of the business group, besides 
having cross-holding shares in all of them.  These facts help the members of the 
founder families to have a privileged position in the decision-making process of the 
whole group, even though they could not be deemed as main holders because of their 
capital invested, but how this could happen?  It seems to be the case that the aim of 
using dual classes of shares is to reduce the capital invested into companies while 
maintaining a controlling position, consistent with the highly risk-averse incumbents in 
my model. 
 
In this sample, companies issue diverse classes of shares granting particular rights to 
their investors.  However, despite the variety of shares, all of them can be categorised 
into three different groups defined as common shares, shares of limited voting rights 
and shares with no voting rights.  In general, common shares are the only sort of shares 
that entitle equal cash-flow rights and voting rights per share.  In contrast, shares of 
limited voting rights grant their holders preferred dividends but diminished voting 
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rights, and shares with no voting rights only entitle cash-flow rights.  It is noteworthy 
that common shares are, most of the time, reserved for the founders and their families. 
 
For example, company A issues two different capital instruments which are common 
shares and Certificates of Ordinary Participation
154
 (CPO), and has as main groups of 
investors the founder families, foreign investors, and domestic investors.  In this case, 
the founder families could be considered as the controlling shareholders of the 
company.  This is because although these families only own 47.70 percent of the total 
capital, the percentage of their voting rights rises to 73.17 as the rights of CPOs, which 
account for 25.47 percent, are added to their threshold since foreign investors are not 
allowed to exercise their right to vote.  
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 CPO can be considered as a variety of shares of limited voting rights as they only allow their holders 
to vote as a block in the same way as the majority shareholders of their class. 
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Table 3.1  Types of shares company A 
 
Corporate Charter provisions regarding the types of shares that can be issued 
Class I Shares that constitute the fixed amount of capital, which cannot be withdrawn. 
Class II Shares that constitute the variable amount of capital, which can be withdrawn. 
Series  A 
Common Shares:  They will represent at least 75% of the total capital and will 
grant one vote per share, except in special assemblies 
Series  L 
Voting shares of limited rights:  These shares in conjunction with the class C 
shares cannot represent more than 25% of the total capital.  These shares can 
only vote in the special meetings held for this sort of shares and in the 
extraordinary shareholders meetings. 
Series  C 
Shares without voting rights:  Holders of these shares cannot vote in the 
shareholders’ meeting, but in the special meetings held for this sort of shares. 
CPOs  
Titles representative of provisional rights on profits or specified assets. The 
fiduciary institution in charge of these titles will vote all the titles in the same 
way as the majority shareholders. 
 
This table has been drawn up with information from the company bylaws. 
 
 
Table 3.2  Ownership structure of Company A 
 
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
Class of Shares No. of shares 
Percentage Percentage Real 
Capital Voting % Voting  
Class I   Series A                 
Shares (no par value) 
580,549,200 100.00% 100.00%  
TOTAL SHARES 580,549,200 100.00% 100.00   
     
Founder families 276,927,496 47.70% 47.70% 73.17% 
CPOs 147,878,765 25.47% 25.47% 0.00% 
Others domestic 
investors 
155,742,939 26.83% 26.83% 26.83% 
TOTAL 580,549,200 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
The table above reflects the ownership structure of Company A as of April 2006. 
 
Company B issues three series of shares, of which two are common shares (series A 
and Series AA) and the other one are shares of limited voting rights.  Company B also 
has three main investors, and they are represented by a domestic company, a foreign 
company and other Mexican investors.  Some founders of company B control the 
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domestic company, which owns 40.46 percent of the total capital of Company B.  This 
means that those founders indirectly control company B, as they own 40.46 percent of 
the total capital that actually represents 66.29 percent of the total votes.  A noteworthy 
fact is that shares of limited voting rights account for 67.74 percent of the total capital, 
which might significantly reduce the quantity of common shares needed to achieve 
majority positions. 
 
Table 3.3  Types of shares of company B 
 
Corporate Charter provisions regarding the types of shares that can be issued 
Series AA 
Common Shares:  These shares will represent at least 20 percent and at most 51 percent of 
the total capital.  These shares will not represent less than 51 percent of the total common 
shares.  Only Mexican investors can buy this class of shares.  These shareholders are 
allowed to vote in ordinary and extraordinary shareholders' meetings, granting one vote per 
share. 
Series  A 
Common Shares:  These shares will represent no more than 19.6 percent of the total 
capital and no more of 49 percent of the total common shares.  These sorts of shares are of 
free subscription and holders are allowed to vote in ordinary and extraordinary 
shareholders' meetings, granting one vote per share. 
Series  L 
Shares of limited voting rights:  These shares in conjunction with the shares Series A 
cannot represent more than the 80 percent of the total capital.  This kind of shares are of 
free subscription, which means that Mexican investors, companies or foreign entities can 
posses them.  These shareholders can only vote in the special meetings held for this sort of 
shares and will grant a preferred dividend. 
 
This table has been drawn up with information from the company bylaws. 
 
 
Table 3.4  Ownership structure (Summary) of Company B 
 
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
Class of Shares No. of shares 
Percentage Percentage 
Capital Voting 
Series AA 10,910,000,000 30.18% 93.55% 
Series A 752,000,000 2.08% 6.45% 
Series L*                                                                                     
Except on limited 
matters for which L 
shares have vote 
24,491,000,000 67.74% 0.00% 
TOTAL SHARES 36,153,000,000 100.00% 100.00% 
 





Company C also has its capital issued in three different series of shares of which only 
one series represents common shares and the other two are shares of limited voting 
rights.  Besides the fact that shares of limited voting rights
155
 increase the absolute 
value of votes per common shares, the founder families of this company decided to put 
their shares altogether into a trust and vote them as a block.  As result of these two 
facts, these founder families became the controlling holders of this company with only 
37.08 percent of the capital, representing 71.75 percent of the total votes. 
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 Holders of shares of limited voting rights are not allowed to vote in ordinary shareholders’ meeting, 





















VOTES Shares owned 























7,587,000,000 20.99% 65.06% 144,000,000 0.40% 1.23% 6,898,000,000 19.08% 0.00% 40.46% 66.29% 
Foreign 
Company 
2,870,000,000 7.94% 24.61% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 7.94% 24.61% 
Other Mexican 
holders 
453,000,000 1.25% 3.88% 608,000,000 1.68% 5.21% 17,593,000,000 48.66% 0.00% 51.60% 09.10% 
TOTAL 10,910,000,000 30.18% 93.55% 752,000,000 2.08% 6.45% 24,491,000,000 67.74% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
  30.18%   2.08%   67.74%  100.00% 100.00% 
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Table 3.6  Types of shares of Company C 
 
Corporate Charter provisions regarding the types of shares that can be issued 
Series  B 
Common Shares:  These shares will represent at least 51 percent of the total capital.  
Holders of these shares are allowed to vote in ordinary and extraordinary shareholders' 
meetings, granting one vote per share. 
Series  L 
Shares of limited voting rights:  These shares can represent up to 25 percent of the total 
capital.  Holders of these shares are allowed to vote in extraordinary shareholders' 
meetings that discuss the limited matters described below *. 
Series D 
Shares of limited voting rights:  These shares can represent, individually or with L 
shares, up to 49 percent of the total capital.  These shares will have a non-accumulative 
dividend equivalent to 125 percent of the decreed dividends to B Shares. Holders of these 
shares are allowed to vote in extraordinary shareholders' meetings that discuss the matters 
described below *. 
Sub-series  
DB 
Shares of limited voting rights:  These shares can represent the rest of the series D. 
Sub-series  
DL 
Shares of limited voting rights:  These shares can represent up to 25 percent of the series 
D shares.   
*  D shares have the right to vote in the following matters: a transformation of the Company; any 
merger when Company C would not survive or when the business purpose of the other company 
would differ from that of Company C; change of the nationality; dissolution and liquidation; and 
cancellation of the register of these shares.  Furthermore, this class of shares has the right to appoint 
two directors, and their alternates, to the BOD. 
 




Table 3.7  Ownership structure (Summary) of Company C 
 
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
Class of Shares No. of shares  % Capital % Votes 
Series B 3,082,140,090 51.68% 100.00% 
Sub-series DB 1,440,785,180 24.16% 0.00% 
Sub-series DL 1,440,785,180 24.16% 0.00% 
TOTAL SHARES 5,963,710,450 100.00% 100.00% 
 






Table 3.8  Ownership structure of Company C 
 
Shareholders 






% shares / 
total capital 
% votes per 
total capital 
Shares owned 
% shares / 
total capital 
% votes per 
total capital 
Shares owned 
% shares / 
total capital 
% votes per 
total capital 
Trust "Voto" 2,211,344,965 37.08% 71.75% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 37.08% 71.75% 
Co. C Employees 13,488,169 0.23% 0.44% 7,226,098 0.12% 0.00% 7,226,098 0.12% 0.00% 0.47% 0.44% 
Other Investors 823,412,903 13.81% 26.72% 1,407,876,286 23.61% 0.00% 1,407,876,286 23.61% 0.00% 61.02% 26.72% 
               
Executive Manager A 4,480,268 0.08% 0.15% 8,884,936 0.15% 0.00% 8,884,936 0.15% 0.00% 0.37% 0.15% 
Executive Manager B 2,497,034 0.04% 0.08% 4,992,068 0.08% 0.00% 4,992,068 0.08% 0.00% 0.21% 0.08% 
Executive Manager C 23,133,925 0.39% 0.75% 4,251,650 0.07% 0.00% 4,251,650 0.07% 0.00% 0.53% 0.75% 
Executive Manager D 1,717,115 0.03% 0.06% 3,434,230 0.06% 0.00% 3,434,230 0.06% 0.00% 0.14% 0.06% 
Executive Manager E 2,065,711 0.03% 0.07% 4,119,912 0.07% 0.00% 4,119,912 0.07% 0.00% 0.17% 0.07% 
TOTAL 3,082,140,090 51.68% 100.00% 1,440,785,180 24.16% 0.00% 1,440,785,180 24.16% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
            
  51.68%   24.16%   24.16%  100.00%  
 




Finally, it seems that company D presents the extreme case in discrepancy between 
cash-flow rights and voting rights.  Company D has its capital issued in two different 
classes of shares: common shares and shares of limited voting rights.  Each of these two 
classes is divided into two different series of shares, and each class represents around 
the half of the capital.  However, it could be argued that there is only one potential 
controlling owner in this company.  This is because first, the main founders of the 
company established a trust for their shares, allowing other investors to buy shares from 
this trust.  Second, most of the common shares are sold as CPOs instruments.  Third, 
there are outstanding shares of limited voting rights.  All these make it plausible that the 
investor who owns the majority of the common shares of this trust will benefit from the 
votes corresponding to the thresholds of the other investors of the trust.  Further, he/she 
will also add the votes of the thresholds of the investors of CPOs of common shares.  In 
other words, investor “A”, owning around 15 percent of the total capital, is the 
beneficiary of almost 72 percent of the total votes of Company D.  This is because 
investor “A” owns the majority of the common shares of the trust, which gives him/her 
the votes of the rest of the investors of this trust, and the votes of the thresholds of the 
CPOs’ investors of A shares, which account for an additional 40 percent of votes. 
 
Table 3.9  Types of shares of Company D 
 
Corporate Charter provisions regarding the types of shares that can be issued 
Series  A 
Common Shares:  Holders of A Shares have the right to vote on all matters subject to 
shareholder approval at any general shareholders’ meeting.  Besides requiring approval by a 
majority of all Shares entitled to vote together on a particular corporate matter, certain 
corporate matters must be approved by a majority of the holders of A Shares voting separately. 
These matters include mergers, dividend payments, spin-offs, changes in corporate purpose, 
changes of nationality and amendments to the anti-takeover provisions of our bylaws. 
Series  B 
Common Shares:  Holders of B Shares have the right to vote on all matters subject to 
shareholder approval at any general shareholders’ meeting.  B shareholders have the right to 
vote at special meetings of B Shares, on any matter subject to approval at such a meeting.  
Under Mexican law, non-Mexicans may not own B Shares directly or exercise any voting 
rights in respect of B Shares, but they may hold B Shares indirectly through the CPO Trust, 
which will control the voting of the B Shares.  
Series D 
Shares of limited voting rights:  Holders of D Shares are entitled to receive a cumulative fixed 
preferred annual dividend. They are also entitled to vote on the following matters at 
extraordinary general meetings: transformation from one type of company to another; any 
merger (even if we are the surviving entity); extension of the business life of the company; 
dissolution before the prescribed duration; any change in the corporate purpose; a change in the 
nationality; and the cancellation from registration of the D Shares with any Mexican or foreign 
stock exchange in which such shares or securities are registered. 
Series  L 
Shares of limited voting rights: Holders of L Shares are entitled to vote at extraordinary 
general meetings on the following matters: transformation from one type of company to 
another; any merger in which the company is not the surviving entity; and the cancellation 
from registration of the L Shares or the securities that represent the L Shares with the special 
section of the NRS.    
 





Table 3.10  Ownership structure (Summary) of Company D 
 
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
Class of Shares No. of shares  % Capital % Votes 
Series A 123,478,023,925 33.98% 67.61% 
Series B 59,162,448,976 16.28% 32.39% 
Series D 90,372,213,365 24.87% 0.00% 
Series L 90,372,213,365 24.87% 0.00% 
TOTAL SHARES 363,384,899,631 100.00% 100.00% 
 





Table 3.11  Ownership structure of Company D 
 
Shareholders 







































TRUST 54,649,375,593 15.04% 29.92% 1,526,458,516 0.42% 0.84% 2,428,456,730 0.67% 0.00% 2,428,456,730 0.67% 0.00% 16.80% 30.76% 71.67% 
Foreign 
Company A 
3,435,215,250 0.95% 1.88% 3,022,989,420 0.83% 1.66% 4,809,301,350 1.32% 0.00% 4,809,301,350 1.32% 0.00% 4.42% 3.54% 0.00% 
Foreign 
Company B 
3,266,224,500 0.90% 1.79% 2,874,277,560 0.79% 1.57% 4,572,714,300 1.26% 0.00% 4,572,714,300 1.26% 0.00% 4.21% 3.36% 0.00% 
Other CPOs 
Investors 
62,127,208,582 17.10% 34.02% 51,738,723,480 14.24% 28.33% 78,561,740,985 21.62% 0.00% 78,561,740,985 21.62% 0.00% 74.57% 62.34% 28.33% 
TOTAL 123,478,023,925 33.98% 67.61% 59,162,448,976 16.28% 32.39% 90,372,213,365 24.87% 0.00% 90,372,213,365 24.87% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
  33.98%   16.28%   24.87%   24.87%  100.00%   
                
TRUST                
Investor A 52,991,825,693 14.58% 29.01% 67,814,604 0.02% 0.04% 107,886,870 0.03% 0.00% 107,886,870 0.03% 0.00% 14.66% 29.05%  
Other investors 1,657,549,900 0.46% 0.91% 1,458,643,912 0.40% 0.80% 2,320,569,860 0.64% 0.00% 2,320,569,860 0.64% 0.00% 2.13% 1.71%  
Total   54,649,375,593 15.04% 29.92% 1,526,458,516 0.42% 0.84% 2,428,456,730 0.67% 0.00% 2,428,456,730 0.67% 0.00% 16.80% 30.76%  
 





In conclusion, this evidence proposes that the business group structure used by these 
large Mexican publicly traded companies offers them two main advantages, to 
participate (with a privileged role) in the management and decision-making process of 
the entire business group, and to benefit from the use of dual classes of shares.  Dual 
classes of shares can be considered as a financial strategy which helps the founders and 
their families to have the majority of the voting rights with moderate capital 
investments.  Finally, as expected, dual classes of shares might benefit major owners at 
expense of minority investors. 
 
 
3.5 Conclusions and Final Remarks 
 
I have analysed the factors that may be responsible for inducing a separation of cash 
flow rights and control rights in developing economies.  Employing a game-theoretic 
model, I have focused on two control mechanisms (viz. the majority rule and non-
voting equity).  I demonstrate that (a) high risk-aversion induces an incumbent 
manager to wish to minimise his equity stake; (b) high private benefits imply that the 
incumbent would wish to retain control (therefore, he wishes to maximise his control 
rights while minimising his equity stake); (c) a social planner sympathetic to the 
incumbent will facilitate the NCS structure by allowing him to issue non-voting equity, 
and (d) investor irrationality (whereby investors do not understand the control 
structure) makes the NCS structure even easier to achieve. 
 
I argued that the emerging Mexican financial market may be characterised by these 
factors.  Indeed, my empirical evidence agrees with the findings of Castañeda Ramos 
(1999) that shows that the corporate structure of large Mexican companies features a 
large discrepancy between cash flow and control rights.  Common practices that can be 
considered as characteristic features of corporate governance of these firms are as 
follows.  Firstly, there is an extensive use of pyramids and dual classes of shares by 
inside investors, which may produce the pronounced discrepancy of control and cash-
flow rights.  Further, large Mexican companies also issue American Depository 





.  Finally, cross shareholding and exchange of positions in the boards of 
directors among associated entrepreneurs are also frequent practices. 
 
This model provides a basis for further research investigating empirically the effects of 
separating control rights from cash-flow rights in the financing policies of the Mexican 
publicly traded companies.  Recalling Jensen and Mecklings’ (1986) argument 
regarding the agency costs from aligning managers’ and investors’ interests and 
recalling also my findings which agree with those of Castañeda Ramos (1999), Babatz 
Torres (1997) and Husted and Serrano (2002), I should expect to find a positive 
correlation between family control and levels of debt.  This should be the case as there 
are no interests to align since owners and managers are the same people.  However, 
taking into account that Mexican corporate legislation somehow still allows the 
issuance of dual-class shares, that the legislation system is lax at protecting minority 
investors’ rights and that Mexican companies have a diversity of multi-right securities, 
I expect to find a negative correlation between family control and debt.  This negative 
correlation may support the argument of Hagelin et al. (2006) suggesting that family-
controlled firms may favour multi-voting right equity issuances to both maintain 
control and to reduce business risk.  I also expect to find moderate levels of debt. 
 
Further, I anticipate that all the effects are better reflected in short-term debt levels 
than in total or long term-term debt levels as emerging economies have been 
demonstrated to be substantially financed through trade-credit via suppliers and 
creditors (Booth et al. 2001 and Glen and Singh 2004). 
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It is noteworthy that both financial figures benefit controlling shareholders since their titles usually 






Mexican Business Groups, Empathy and Market Crashes 
 
 
As discussed previously in the Literature Review Chapter, corporate organisational 
structures and the associated corporate governance mechanisms vary around the world.  
Scholars have identified that these variations may depend crucially on local legal 
systems, the degree of investor and creditor protection, market imperfections and 
national culture. 
 
One development that has occurred markedly in some countries is the creation, 
evolution and prevalence of business groups.  However, such networks are few or even 
non-existent in other countries (Colpan and Hikino, 2010).  Langlois (2009) argues 
that business groups are informational mechanisms that fill the gaps created by the 
needs of the particular macroeconomic environment (i.e. emerging economies or 
developed economies) where they operate.  Scholars, such as Castañeda (2002, 2005 
and 2007), Khanna and Yafeh (2007), Langlois (2009), Schneider (2009) and Colpan 
and Hikino (2010) notice that business groups are more prominent in developing 
countries, which are endowed with emerging capital and product markets, weak legal 
systems and poor investor protection. 
 
The focus of this chapter is on business groups in Mexico.  Mexico is characterised by 
the factors required for the development of such groups, i.e. inefficient legal and 
enforcement systems and developing markets.  Furthermore, Mexico is of interest as 
Castañeda (2005 and 2007) demonstrated that Mexican business networks have served 
to protect corporations from recent macro-economic crashes. 
 
This chapter addresses the following research questions.  Why are business networks 
so prevalent in developing economies, such as Mexico?  How do the factors identified 
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contribute to their formation?  How do they serve to provide protection to network 
members during economic downturns? 
 
In order to answer these questions, a game-theoretic approach is developed in which 
firms first decide whether to form a business group.  Next, they borrow from the 
banking sector in order to finance production.  Following the analysis of Castañeda 
(2007), these firms may face normal economic conditions or they may face an 
economic crash.  This investigation analyses the conditions for the group to form in the 
first place and how the group may protect its members in the case of a negative 
economic shock. 
 
In addition to the economic factors affecting business groups, this model features the 
following major development, which is the consideration of behavioural factors 
affecting the network.  In particular, I focus on the possibility of empathy/trust 
between members.  This model demonstrates that such behavioural ‘other-regarding’ 
preferences may be crucial in understanding the effect of cultural differences on 
business network-formation. 
 
The remainder of the Chapter is organised as follows.  Section 1 presents a survey of 
relevant literature.  Section 2 presents the model and derives the results.  Section 3 
discusses the policy implications of this analysis.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
This researcher wishes to mention that the terms ‘business groups’ and ‘business 
networks’ are used interchangeably throughout this chapter. 
 
 
4.1. Literature Review 
 
Business groups have been defined as ‘... an economic coordination mechanism in 
which legally independent companies utilize the collaborative arrangements to 




At present, there is no consensus with respect to the ultimate economic and social 
effect of business groups.  Some scholars agree with the idea that they are detrimental 
to economies, whereas others perceive them as a solution to institutional and market 
failures. 
 
According to Khanna and Rivkin (2001 p. 46), the detrimental argument explains that 
business groups exist as ‘...a response to market failures157 that arise in the particular 
institutional contexts of emerging economies’, but hardly to promote an efficient 
functioning of markets.  For example, Castañeda-Ramos (1999) mentioned that 
business groups in Mexico were considered as the product of poor legal systems where 
minority investors and creditors were protected inadequately, if at all, and the law-
enforcement systems were flawed.  Further, Castañeda-Ramos (1999) also pointed out 
that business groups may enhance rent extraction problems as their structural 
organisation usually facilitate the use of dual-class shares (via pyramids and/or cross-
shareholding), favouring concentrated ownership structures which do not follow the 
one-share one-vote rule. 
 
On the other hand, the fostering/beneficial concept argues that business groups can be 
beneficial not only to their affiliated members but also to society, enhancing social 
welfare when these groups ‘... fill the voids left by the missing institutions that 
normally underpin the efficient functioning of product, capital and labour markets’ 
(Khanna and Rivkin 2001, pp. 46-47).  For instance, business groups facing financing 
problems because of their poor disclosure practices and minimal legal protection for 
minority shareholders and creditors’ rights, and/or having the need for institutions to 
be created to regulate a venture capital sector may overcome these problems by 
‘transferring capital within the group and by underwriting security issues with the 
entire group’s reputation’ (Khanna and Rivkin 2001 p. 49).  Further, business groups 
can also help to solve certain inefficiencies of product and input markets.  They also 
can help in the process of the cross-border transfer of technology and capital by putting 
their reputation at stake.  In both of these two cases, the well-known business 
reputation might substantially decrease the risk of opportunistic behaviour against 
investors, creditors and lenders occurring.  For example, in the first case, through the 
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 Khanna and Rivkin’s  (2001) research explores the most common failures of diverse markets such as: 
capital, labour, product and technology markets, among others. 
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business group commitment to honour the terms of the contract signed (e.g. quantity 
and quality of the products); whilst in the second, by the guaranteed avoidance of the 
expropriation of intellectual property because of the risk of losing their reputation 
(Khanna and Rivkin 2001). 
 
Furthermore, Castañeda (2005 and 2007) demonstrated that under particular 
circumstances, such as national financial disarray, business groups might prefer to 
overcome the financial constraints by acting as affiliated companies rather than 
individual profit centres, and by initiating internal markets by channelling financial 
funds to the firms that are not able to get them outside the group. 
 
4.1.1 Business Groups in Mexico 
 
According to Hoshino (2010), Mexican business groups can be defined as:  
‘... a large scale business entity [...] that consists of a large group of companies 
that are under the common control of an owner family.  Group companies form a 
hierarchical shareholding structure with a holding company at its apex that is 
generally listed on stock exchanges’ (p. 424). 
 
Further, Khanna and Yafeh (2007) noticed that family ties are the fundamental element 
in Mexican business groups.  For example, the largest industrial groups in certain 
regions are still run by their family founders who started them with strong 
governmental support around the 1850s. 
 
Mexican business groups, according to Castañeda-Ramos (1999) and Babatz (1999), 
are similar to the typical business groups of emerging economies, but particularly 
those of Latin America.  The essential features being the following; (i) the ownership 
and control of these business groups belongs to families or closed groups of investors; 
(ii) it is a common practice to issue dual-class shares and financial instruments with 
no-voting rights, besides the use of pyramids and cross-shareholdings; (iii) there are 
horizontal and vertical links between the companies forming the business group, which 
allow them to take advantage of economies of scale or scope, reduced transaction 
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costs, monopolistic profits and diversification of risk; and (iv) banks or financial 
institutions are often part of the business group. 
 
According to Hoshino (2010), business groups emerged and flourished in Mexico 
during the period when the economic policy of import substitution industrialisation 
(ISI) was enforced.  Mexican business groups were the means designed and used by 
Mexican capitalists to compensate/substitute for the underdeveloped Mexican 
economic environment reflected in its market institutions, and the shortage of capital 
and human resources.  A detailed account of these preferential governmental 
policies/directives is offered by Khanna and Yafeh (2007, p. 354). 
 
‘Until the mid 1980s, the government supported business groups by protecting 
many sectors through tariffs and trade restrictions, as well as by granting 
discretionary concessions (for example, in media, mining and other sectors), as 
well [as] direct and indirect subsidies to certain goods and industries (e.g. sugar).  
Groups also enjoyed monopolies, state-induced consolidation and certain 
protection from FDI’. 
 
Further, Schneider (2009) argues that besides the numerous market advantages that 
business groups get from their relationship with governments, they also benefit from 
having a level of participation in politics
158
.  The most general but powerful advantage 
is the access to and use of economic and political information, which at the same time 
facilitates coordination and communication for governments.  For instance, thorough 
Latin America it is a common practice to convene, formally or informally, the heads of 
the largest business groups when policy makers need information or cooperation.  This 
interaction offers business groups’ owners ample opportunity to present their views 
and gain substantial advantage in terms of information on policy making.  In the case 
of Mexico, there is a council which all major business group owners belong to, the 
Consejo Mexicano de Hombres de Negocios
159
 -CMHN- (Mexican Council of 
Businessmen).  This council meets once a month with a government minister and at 
least once a year with the President (Schneider 2009). 
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 Business groups through their participation in politics have access to the policy-making process.  
Nevertheless, this does not mean that BGs can dictate or veto policies (Schneider 2009). 
159
 This council (CMHN) has around 40 members affiliated only by invitation.  The CMHN explicitly 
excludes MNCs and smaller firms (Schneider 2009). 
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It is of note that these advantages, although substantial, are not a guarantee of 
longevity/continuity for business groups. However, the capability of GBs to adapt to 
the different environments in which they operate might be more of a guarantee.  This is 
reflected in the variety of levels of involvement that business groups select with 
respect to politics, to seek rents, to follow government policies and to prosper through 
politics. 
 
Analysing the role of business groups in helping Mexico recover from the financial 
crisis that occurred in the second half of the 1990s, Castañeda (2007) developed a 
theoretical model that provides a rationale for the phenomenal recovery that occurred 
in Mexico after 1995.  The ensuing banking crisis resulted in new lending to 
businesses being curtailed as aggregate demand fell considerably, and as annual GDP 
growth fell to -10% by mid 1995.  Furthermore, Castañeda (2007 pp. 1-3) noted that: 
 
 ‘...real outstanding debt granted by commercial banks to the non-financial 
private sector diminished by 72% between 1995 and the first semester of 2000’.  
[However,] ‘...not only did the economy rebound within a year, but also grew 
steadily afterwards, averaging an annual rate slightly above 5% from 1996 to 
2000.  [...] Hence, the macroeconomic upturn is a striking phenomenon that 
deserves further explanation.’ 
 
Castañeda’s (2007) model suggests that the organisational structure of the Mexican 
business groups was able to protect the non-tradable firms from the effects of the 
severe financial/banking crisis, by ameliorating moral hazard problems within those 
groups as long as affiliated firms surrendered their control rights.  Moreover, business 
groups might also have participated in the formation of internal capital markets 
through internal financing arrangements. 
 
 ‘According to a survey of 500 firms carried out by Mexico’s central bank for the 
1998-2001 period, the credit granted by commercial banks was less than half the 
credit provided by suppliers since 1999.  Adding up trade credit and direct 
financing from affiliates in the business group, 55-70% of the total credit was 




4.2 The Model 
 
This model considers businesses operating in a developing economy.  These 
businesses are cash-constrained, and must borrow from the banking sector in order to 
produce goods for sale in the product market.  Furthermore, the firms are aware that 
they may face good economic conditions, or they may face an economic crash.  The 
firms firstly decide whether to form a business network at cost.  Forming the network 
creates a degree of empathy between the participants, which may serve to protect them 
from future economic stress.  Thus, the decision to form the network is affected by the 
cost of forming the network, the level of empathy created, and the firms’ expectation 
of future economic conditions. 
 
Following the firms’ decision to form the network, the economic conditions are 
revealed.  Following that, they borrow from a bank (if the bank is prepared to provide 
finance), in order to finance production.  Next, if the bank has provided finance, the 
firms exert effort in production.  Finally, their projects succeed or fail. 
 
This analysis is simplified by focussing an economy consisting of two risk-neutral 




The firms decide whether to form a business network (at cost ),0K  or stay in 
isolation.  I assume that both firms must invest K  in order for the network to form.  If 
only one firm, or if neither firm, invests, the network is unable to form. 
 
If they form a network, empathy is created.  This is operationalised in the model as an 
enhancement to success revenue (see date 3 below), due to the assistance that they 
provide to each other. 
 
Date 1: 
Economic conditions are revealed, represented as },{ gbk  respectively, bad 
conditions (economic crash), and good (normal) conditions.  Whether they formed the 
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network or not, each firm approaches a (different) bank },{ baj (that is firm )(BA
borrows from bank ))(ba  to borrow the required finance 0I  at bank sj'  loan rate 
.0jr   The banking sector is competitive, and therefore each bank sets its loan rate 
such that the bank lends at zero expected NPV (that is, each bank ‘breaks-even’ in 
present value terms). 
 
Date 2: 
If a firm is able to obtain finance, it then produces goods for sale in the product market 
(the ‘production project’).  Each firm’s project may succeed (with probability )p or fail 
(with probability ).1 p   Project success depends on a firm’s efforts: specifically, the 
probability of success is ,ik ep   where ie  represents firm si'  effort level, and k  
represents the firm’s ability.  Furthermore,   ;bg    that is, each firm’s success-
creating ability is higher when the economy is good than when it is bad. 
 
Date 3: 
Each firm’s project succeeds, providing income ,0)1(  kiR  or fails (providing 
zero income), with .BA RR    Therefore, firm A is superior to firm B, since, in the case 
of success, it produces a higher income.  I note that k  represents the enhancement to 
each firm’s success income upon forming the network, due to empathetic information-
sharing and cross-firm assistance in the network.  If the network is not formed, .0k   
Furthermore, I assume the following: 
 ;0 g .0 b  (A:1) 
 
That is, in the good (normal) state of the economy, the network is unable to add 
empathetic value (the rationale for this is as follows: in the good state, the firms are 
able to create high income in the case of success in the absence of network benefits.  
Therefore, the network is unable to add further value).  In this model, it is particularly 
in the case of the bad realisation of the economy that the empathetic relationship 
created by the network is translated into value creation.  I demonstrate subsequently 
that, due to assumption A.1, this model predicts that there is a greater likelihood of 
networks forming when countries face a higher probability of economic turmoil (such 
as emerging economies). 
147 
 
I proceed to solve the game by backward induction. 
 
 
4.2.1 Date 2 Effort Levels 
 
First, taking as given a) the firms’ date 0 network-forming decision, b) the date 1 
revelation of economic conditions (good or bad), and c) that the firms have been able 
to borrow from the bank to finance production at date 1.  I proceed to solve for their 
optimal date 2 effort levels at the production stage. 
 
The firms exert effort to maximise the following payoffs: 
   2)1)(1( AAkAAA erRP   (1) 
 
  2)1)(1( BBkBBB erRP   (2) 
 
Where ., BkBAkA ePeP    
 
Recall that each firm’s ability to affect the probability of success is affected by the 













  , I obtain their optimal effort levels.  I then substitute 
these effort levels into (1) and (2) to obtain the firms’ expected payoffs: 
 
Lemma 1: Given the date 0 network-forming decision, and that the firms have been 
able to obtain bank finance at date 1, their optimal effort levels
160














































  (4) 
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 Henceforth, I drop the subscript ik  on the ability parameter   in order to avoid cluttering the 
notation.  I re-introduce the subscript later when it is need it. 
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4.2.2 Date 1: Banks’ lending decision 
 
I now move back to date 1 to consider the banks’ lending decision.  Banks decide a) 
whether to provide a loan, and b) if so, the loan rate. 
 
I assume that the banking sector is competitive, which implies that they lend at zero 
NPV.  Therefore, each bank’s loan rate satisfies the equation: 
 
 
0)1(1  IrRP AkAAb  (5) 
 
0)1(2  IrRP BkBBb  (6) 
 
Substituting the firms’ optimal effort levels from lemma 1 into the probability 
functions, I obtain: 
 


























Substituting (7) into (5) and (6) respectively, I am able to solve to obtain each bank’s 
equilibrium loan rate.  I observe that this involves solving a quadratic in the loan rate.  
Thus there are two possible loan rates (high and low) that satisfy the quadratic.  Due to 
bank (Bertrand) competition, the loan rate is competed down to the lower root of the 
quadratic.  Hence: 
 
Lemma 2:  Given the banks’ rational expectation of the effect of the loan rate on 
firms’ subsequent behaviour at the date 2 production stage, the competitive banking 




































Examination of (8) and (9) reveals that loan rates exist satisfying (5) and (6) (that is, 






IR kik    (10) 
 
If condition (10) is satisfied, the firm is able to obtain bank finance.  Substituting (8) 






























































If condition (8) is not satisfied, then there is not a loan rate that satisfies (3) and (4).  
The bank is not prepared to lend (it is unable to find a loan rate at which it breaks 
even), and the firm’s payoff is zero. 
 
 
4.2.3 Firms’ date 0 network-forming decision. 
 
I now move back to date 0 to consider the firms’ decision to form the network at cost 
.0K   At this stage, the firms have an expectation of the future economic conditions, 
and the effect on their ability to obtain bank loans, and the effect on the loan rate. 
 
At date 0, the probabilities of the good, medium and bad states of the economy are ,q  
,r  and rq 1  respectively. 
 
I make the following assumptions in the case that the network is not formed (so that no 
empathy is created: ).0k  
  .8
2222




BbAb RIR    (A:3) 
 
Given condition (10), these assumptions imply that, when the network is not formed, 
then a) when the economy turns out to be good (normal conditions), both firms are 
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able to obtain bank finance for production, b) when the economy turns out to be bad 
(economic downturn), only firm A is able to obtain bank finance. 
 
In order for empathy to be created in the network, both firms must be able to obtain 
finance.  Furthermore, recall that, in assumption A:1, I assumed that empathy can only 
be created in the ‘bad economic condition’ case: (recall that ;0 g  
).0 B   Thus, I only need to consider the effect of empathy on the banks’ 
lending decision in the bad case. 
 
From A:3, I note the following.  If economic conditions turn out to be bad, the bank 
will only lend to firm A in the absence of the network.  Banks will lend to both firms if 
the network is created, but only iff   .8)1()1( 2
22222 IRR BbAb     I define 
a critical level of empathy '  such that .8)1( 2
22
IRBb     Therefore, in the case of 
bad economic conditions, if the firms form a network, banks will lend to both firms iff 














Therefore, I am able to state the following results: 
 





'   
Network forms 








Both firms (but zero 
empathy-enhancement) 
 
Both firms (but zero 
empathy-enhancement) 
    
Bad 
 
Only firm A  
receives bank 
finance 




)(   
 
 




I consider the following.  Each firm can form the network at cost 0K  each (both 
firms need to invest this in order for the network to form).  If only one expends it, the 
network does not form. 
 
When deciding whether to form the network, the firms are aware that the good and bad 
states occur with respective probabilities ,q  .1 q   The firms’ decision to form the 
network can be considered in the following normal form game. 
 
A\B Invest in network Do NOT Invest in network 
Invest in Network 1,   2 3,   4 
Do NOT Invest in Network 5,  6 7+, 8 - 
 
 
Case 1: '.   
 
From table 4.1, if the network forms, empathy is sufficiently high that both firms 
obtain bank finance, and success revenue is enhanced by the empathy parameter.  The 
firms’ payoffs from the various combinations of choices in the normal form game are 
as follows: 
 .)/()1()0/()( KbqgqE AAA    (G1) 
 .)/()1()0/()( KbqgqE BBB    (G2) 
 .)0/()1()0/()( KbqgqE AAA   (G3) 
 .0).1()0/()( qgqE BB   (G4) 
 ).0/()1()0/()( bqgqE AAA   (G5) 
 .0).1()0/()( KqgqE BB   (G6) 
 ).0/()1()0/()( bqgqE AAA   (G7) 
 .0).1()0/()( qgqE BB   (G8) 
 
 
Where, in each payoff, the terms in brackets represent })0,{/},{(  bgk : that is 
the firm’s payoff given the economic conditions and the level of empathy 
enhancement, given the formation, or non-formation, of the network.  These payoffs 




In order to solve for the equilibrium, I need to consider each firm’s best responses, as 
follows: 
 (G2)   (G4) iff  .)/()1( Kbq B     (C1) 
 (G1)   (G5) iff  .)]0/()/()[1( Kbbq AA    (C2) 
 
Furthermore, I note that (G8) > (G6) for sure, and (G7) > (G3) for sure.  That is, if a 
firm is not expecting the other to invest in the network, that firms’ best response is also 
not to invest (since both firms are required to invest in order for the network to be 
created).  This is marked on the normal form game.  Thus, one equilibrium of the game 
is {DI, DI} for any level of empathy. 
 
Next, I assume that );/()0/()/(  bbb BAA   that is, the payoff-enhancement 
to investing in the network, given that the other firm has invested, is larger for firm A 
than firm B.  I support this assumption with our subsequent numerical analysis. 
 
Thus, I am able to state the following: 
 
Proposition 1: When '   (network-empathy is sufficiently large that both firms are 
able to obtain bank-finance in the bad economic state after the network forms): 
 
a) If ;))/()(1())0/()/()(1( Kbqbbq BAA    ,  the multiple 
equilibria are {I, I} and {DI, DI}. I assume that the firms coordinate on {I, I}. 
 
b) If  ));/()(1())0/()/()(1(  bqKbbq BAA   B’s dominant 
strategy is not to invest. A’s best response is not to invest. Therefore, the 
equilibrium is {DI, DI}  
 
c) If  ));/()(1())0/()/()(1(  bqbbqK BAA   each firm’s dominant 
strategy is not to invest. Therefore, the equilibrium is {DI, DI}. 
 
Therefore, the firms’ network-forming decision is affected by a) the cost of forming 
the network, b) the level of empathy-enhancement in the bad economic state, and c) 
the probability of the bad state occurring. 
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Next, consider the case where '.    In this case, only firm B is able to obtain 
finance in the medium state, even if the network is formed.  Thus it is trivial to note 
that each firm’s dominant strategy is not to invest.  Thus: 
 
Proposition 2: In the case that ,'   only firm A can obtain bank finance, even if the 
network is formed.  Therefore, the firms do not invest in the network in equilibrium 
{DI, DI}, regardless of the cost of forming the network ,K  the level of network 
empathy in the bad state ,  and the probability of the bad state ).1( q  
 
I draw propositions 1 and 2 together in the following diagram. 
 
 





This diagram demonstrates the following.  On the horizontal axis, I have the critical 
empathy parameter '  (see equation 13) at which the bank switches from not lending 
to lending to firm B in the bad state of the economy.  Thus, to the left of the vertical 
line (region A), the bank will not lend to firm B, even if the network forms.  Therefore, 








'  1  
 
Region C  
Network formed 
Region B 
 No network 
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To the right of the vertical line, if the firms have formed a network, the bank will lend 
to firm B in the bad state of the economy.  Hence, regions B and C represent 
proposition 1.  The downward sloping line represents the critical probability of the bad 
economy occurring, such that, if the actual bad-state probability is below (above) this 
critical level, the firms do not (do) form the network.  Hence, region B represents 
proposition 1): b) and 1: c), while region C represents proposition 1: a). 
 
I now consider the critical bad-state probability in more detail.  From proposition 1, I 
note that this critical probability satisfies: 
 













Note that, as empathy increases, B’s payoff increases, and, therefore, the critical bad-
state probability decreases (as in the diagram).  Furthermore, as the cost of forming the 




4.2.4 Equilibrium Payoffs and Welfare 
 
In this section, I analyse the combined effects of network empathy, bad state 
probability, and network forming costs on the firms’ equilibrium expected payoffs and 
welfare.  In order to do so, I proceed using numerical examples to exemplify this 
analysis.  I consider the following parameter values: 
 
,800AR ,500BR  ,7g   ,3b   ,30I  ].1,0[  .000,20  
 
I note that (given my parameter values) in the case of network formation in the bad 
state of the economy, the critical level of empathy (see equation 11) at which the bank 




I consider several possibilities for the probability of success and failure.  That is, I 
consider: 
,0q  ,25.0q  ,5.0q  ,75.0q  .1q  
 
Furthermore, I consider several levels of network-forming costs as follows: 
,10K  ,20K  ,30K  ,40K  .50K  
 
In the appendix A at the end of this thesis, I consider these cases in detail.  In this 
section of the chapter, it seems sufficient to consider the following.  The equilibrium 
formation of the network is driven by firm B’s expected payoff enhancement from 
forming the network, compared with the costs of forming the network (see 
propositions 1 and 2, and the diagram).  Therefore, given the parameter values in this 
example, I obtain the following: 
 
Table 4.2  Firm B's Payoff Gain from Network Formation: 
 
Empathy 
Bad Economic State probability 1 – q 
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 
0.1 0 0 0 0 0 
0.2 0 0 0 0 0 
0.3 0 0 0 0 0 
0.4 0 0 0 0 0 
0.5 0 0 0 0 0 
0.6 0 5.96 11.92 17.88 23.85 
0.7 0 8.92 17.85 26.77 35.70 
0.8 0 11.61 23.22 34.83 46.44 
0.9 0 14.30 28.60 42.89 57.19 
1 0 17.06 34.12 51.18 68.23 
 
 
Note that, in all cases, forming the network provides no payoff-enhancement in the 
good state of the economy.  Furthermore, for empathy values up to the critical empathy 
level ,5.0'  banks will not lend to firm B in the bad state, even if the network forms. 
Therefore, for this low interval of empathy, there is no enhancement to B’s income, 




For empathy values greater than ,5.0'  banks will lend to both firms in the bad state 
in the case of network formation.  Now, firm B’s expected payoff enhancement from 
forming the network depends on the probability of the bad economic state occurring 
(since there is no payoff-enhancement from forming the network if the good economic 
state occurs).  Thus, reading down the columns of the table (from the empathy level 
),5.0'  firm B’s expected payoff enhancement from network formation is increasing 
in the level of empathy.  Reading across the table, its expected payoff enhancement is 
increasing in the probability of the bad state (forming the network as a protection 
against the bad economic state becomes more attractive as the probability of the bad 
state occurring increases). 
 
Given the empathy level, and the probability of the good and bad states occurring, firm 
B makes its network-forming decision by comparing the expected payoff-enhancement 
levels in the table with its costs of forming the network.  I consider this in the 
following diagram.  
 





The upward sloping lines represent firm B’s payoff gain from forming the network 
(from table 4.2), which are increasing in empathy.  The higher lines represent the 
higher probability of the bad economic state.  Note that the lines begin at .5.0'   
This is because, to the left of ,5.0'  the bank is unwilling to lend to firm B in the 
bad economic state, and so network formation does not increase B’s payoff. 
 
The horizontal lines represent the cost K of forming the network.  By considering the 
level of empathy, the level of cost, and the probability of the bad state, I can observe 
whether the network forms.  For example, if the probability of the bad state is zero (the 
economy is good for sure), the ‘payoff gain’ line runs along the x-axis (there is no gain 
to firm B from forming the network: see table 4.2).  Hence, the network will not form 
for any positive level of forming-cost. 
 
If ,5.0  and if ,10K then, for bad state probability ,25.0q  the network will not 
form for empathy levels between 0.5 and 0.75, but it will form for empathy levels 
beyond 0.75.  However, if ,20K  the network will not form for any empathy level if 
.25.0q  
 
I leave the reader to consider firm B’s network-forming decision for other 
combinations of empathy, bad state probability, and network- forming cost. 
 
 
4.3 Welfare Effects and Policy Implications 
 
Finally, I employ the numerical analysis provided to consider the combined effects of 
empathy, bad state probability, and network- forming cost on welfare.  I define total 
welfare as the sum of the firms’ and banks’ expected payoffs: 
 
BAjiBAW    
 
Noting that the competitive banks’ payoffs are ,.0 ji   welfare simplifies to the 
sum of firm A’s and firm B’s expected payoffs: 
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.BAW   
 
I focus on the case where .20K   Now, from my previous analysis of firm B’s 
forming decision (and particularly analysing the previous graph), I am able to produce 
the following graph: 
 




The highest line represents the case where the good state occurs for certain ).1( q   
Therefore, the network does not form.  Lower lines represent decreasing probability of 
the good state, such that formation of the network becomes increasingly welfare-
improving, and increasingly attractive to firm B.  As the probability of the bad state 
increases, firm B forms the network at lower critical levels of empathy above 0.5, 
given B’s forming costs .20K   For example, the third line down represents 
).5.01(  qq   Due to B’s forming costs, B only forms the network if .7.0   The 
line below that represents bad state probability ).75.01(  q  Now, forming the 
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network adds more welfare, and is more attractive to B, so B forms the network for 
.6.0  
 
The lowest line represents :11  q  the bad state occurs for sure.  Now, forming the 
network increases welfare by the greatest amount, and is most attractive to firm B.  
Therefore, firm B now forms the network for .5.0  
 
The graph emphasises that expected welfare is greater for higher levels of the good 
state probability (naturally).  As the good state probability reduces, the expected level 
of welfare reduces, but this is offset by formation of the network at higher levels of 
empathy.  Thus, networks become more important in bleak economic conditions, 
providing the network is capable of creating the sufficient empathy required to offset 
the cost of empathy formation. 
 
 
4.4 Conclusions and Final Remarks 
 
I have investigated the general features of business networks, their practices and the 
factors promoting their formation.  Bringing together this knowledge, I rationalised the 
main reasons for companies selecting to build a business network. 
 
Inspired by the theoretical approach of Castañeda (2007), I developed this game-
theoretic model to assess the interaction between empathy and economic gains under 
two possible economic scenarios, viz. good state of economy and bad state of 
economy.  One can notice that Castañeda’s (2007) model focuses on the positive side 
of network creation.  Castañeda’s (2007) model addressed BGs’ positive side through 
analysing the effects of control rights; in other words, there would be a formation of 
business groups if control rights were high enough and the affiliated company was 
willing to surrender them.  
 
In this model the positive side is investigated via the analysis of the behavioural and 
cultural aspect of empathy. The analysis of the negative nature of business network 
formation is, however, left for future research. 
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By elaborating this game-theoretic model, I focus this analysis on the interaction of 
empathy/trust versus economic gains under two possible economic scenarios (viz. 
good state of economy and bad state of economy). 
 
I demonstrate that: (1) empathy ‘generation’ has a cost; (2) empathy enhances the 
payoff of affiliated companies; (3) there is a greater likelihood of networks forming 
when countries face a higher probability of economic turmoil; and (4) if the economy 
is in a good state, there is no payoff-enhancement from forming a network since firms 
are able to create high incomes. 
 
I argue that the firms’ network-forming decision is affected by: (1) the cost of forming 
the network; (2) the probability of the bad state occurring; and (3) the level of 
empathy-enhancement in the bad economic state.  I also argue that there is a critical 
value where firms are unable to benefit from forming the network, as one of them will 
not be able to receive financing and so empathy will not be formed.  Further, if this 
value is surpassed, the empathy cost is greater than the expected payoffs, leaving 
companies worse off when forming networks.  However, when empathy is above this 
critical value, the probabilities of the good and bad states affect the payoff 
enhancements due to the network synergy.  I note that as the probability of a good state 
of economy increases, the empathy enhancement reduces at each level of empathy.  
Thus, networks become less important as the probability of a good state of the 
economy increases. 
 
These results support the view that business groups are structural organisations that 
can also help to ameliorate the inefficiencies in markets and institutions.  These results 
agree with the findings of Castañeda’s (2007) model regarding the preference of 
business groups to support the network by acting as affiliated companies instead of 
individual entities when a situation of financial disarray occurs.  Additionally, from a 
political perspective, these findings also seem to backup the literature survey insights 
in relation to the origin and purpose of the Mexican business groups.  As Khanna and 
Yafeh (2007) indicated, Mexican business groups arise in Mexico as a result of ISI 





This model investigates the positive side of business network creation via the analysis 
of the behavioural and cultural aspect of empathy.  I would like to believe the 
development of this approach is the main contribution of this model, as the behavioural 
line of research is as yet incipient.  Further, the survey of the Mexican business 
groups’ features and practices may also provide new insights to the current literature. 
 
With the analysis of the negative side of business groups in the previous chapter, both 
facets of business groups (the positive and the negative) have already been explored 
and theoretically modelled.  Additionally, both chapters find evidence that Mexican 
business groups behave or have behaved both as detrimental and as welfare-enhancer 
agents. The empirical verification of what practice/behaviour is more common is 
addressed in the next chapter. 
 
It is worth recalling that the model presented in this chapter has identified that one of 
the main conditions which will bring to the fore the positive side of BGs is the strong 
probability of economic turmoil.  Because of this and since the data used for the 
empirical analysis does not include any period of financial crisis, I expect to find only 
evidence regarding the features of their organisational structure.  For example, 
dispersion of cash-flow rights and voting rights; majority shareholders, high 




Chapter  5 
 
Empirical  Research: 
Determinants of Capital Structure  
of Mexican Publicly Traded Companies  
 
 
The literature review chapter presented a comprehensive survey of the existing 
literature regarding ownership structure, capital structure, business networks and 
Mexico and its business legislation and best corporate governance practices.  Chapter 3 
investigated the main factors at work in the separation of the cash-flow rights and 
control rights in ownership structures in emerging economies; and how this separation 
affects the corporate financing decisions by developing a theoretical model.  Chapter 4 
assessed how the interaction between empathy/trust and economic gains influences 
companies to form a business group also by the elaboration of a game-theoretic model.  
 
According to Castañeda Ramos (1999) large Mexican companies can be considered as 
business groups because they organise themselves into a business network or 
consortium that usually comprises a bank or other financial institution.  Such networks 
have vertical and horizontal links and are owned and controlled by families or a closed 
group of investors.  Although the efficiency of horizontal diversification could be 
arguable (see for example Jensen 1986), it seems that for the Mexican business groups, 
both horizontal and vertical links allowed them to take advantage of economies of 
scale or scope, to reduce transaction costs, to earn monopolistic profits and to diversify 
risk by undertaking production in different economic activities (Castañeda Ramos 
1999). 
 
This chapter builds on previous knowledge by empirically examining the capital 
structure of Mexican publicly traded companies.  This chapter commences by 
investigating the applicability of two core capital structure models, viz. Rajan and 
Zingales’ 1995 model and Booth et al.’s 2001 model, to the capital structure of 
Mexican companies.  After testing for those key general well-known capital structure 
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determinants, I will attempt to make previous results more descriptive of capital 
structure of Mexican publicly traded companies by including the variables for 
consolidation and liquidity.  Since this study analyses the effects of the capital 
structure determinants on debt levels, it is important to have a real individual measure 
of that matter (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).  Finally, with the aim of providing a more 
complete account of the capital structure of Mexican publicly traded companies, this 
chapter concludes by analysing the interactions between market power and capital 
structure, and corporate ownership structure and capital structure. 
 
To carry out this study, corporate financial data from the Mexican companies listed 
over the period 2000 to 2007 is used.  Since the empirical work that has been carried 
out on emerging markets can be considered as incipient, a major contribution to this 
chapter is the study of Mexico, an emerging country that has only been superficially 
studied due to the scarcity of available information and the complexity of obtaining 
complete or ‘sensitive161’ corporate data. 
 
The Mexican Stock Exchange (MSE or BMV by its Spanish acronym: Bolsa Mexicana 
de Valores
162
) could be considered as one of the smallest in the world because of the 
number of listed companies, which has not been larger than 260 since its second 
foundation
163
.  Nonetheless, despite this small number of listed companies, the BMV 
was the second largest in Latin America and ranked among the top ten of the emerging 
markets in terms of market capitalisation (US $92bn), as of December 1998 (Heyman 
1999).  In addition, the Mexican stock market produced some of the highest returns in 
the world from 1976 to 1998.  For example, ‘[t]he price index (Índice de Precios y 
Cotizaciones -IPC) rose 28 times in dollar terms, i.e. at an annual average compound 
growth rate of 16.5%, compared to an equivalent rate for the [Down Jones Industrial 
Average] DJIA of 10.7% over the same period’ (Heyman 1999 p.167).  Below, Figure 
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 By sensitive corporate data, this researcher meant the information that discloses a full picture of 
important corporate issues, practices or events.  For example, all the types of stock issued by companies, 
including both the capital rights and the voting rights provided by each class of stock. 
162
 The names Bolsa Mexicana de Valores (BMV) and Mexican Stock Exchange (MSE) are used 
interchangeably throughout the body of this thesis. 
163
 According to the BMV (2010) and Heyman (1999), the first Stock Exchange in Mexico was founded 
in 1886 having a great reliance on mining companies.  However, because of some operational issues and 
the worldwide mining crisis, this Stock Exchange had not recorded a single transaction by 1896, when it 
was forced to close (in April 1886).  In 1907 a new Stock Exchange was formed, and it was not until 
1975 that the first Securities Market Law (Ley del Mercado de Valores) was issued, acknowledging the 
importance of the securities market in the economic development of Mexico. 
164 
 
5.1 ‘Listed Companies and Market Capitalization of the Mexican Stock Market’ 
presents more detailed information contrasting the total number of Mexican listed 
companies against the stock market capitalization, in US dollars and as a percentage of 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Mexico, over the period 1998 to 2007.  These 
data may lead us to the conclusion that the Mexican listed companies could be 
experiencing a process of financial strengthening (sometimes reflected in their network 
or business-group affiliations) due to the fact that the number of listed companies 
keeps decreasing, but their participation in the GDP remains increasing. 
 
 
Figure 5.1  Listed Companies and Market Capitalization of the Mexican Stock Market 
 
Source, The World Bank. 
 
The main contributions of this empirical chapter can be summarised as follows.  
Firstly, to draw a model depicting the capital structure of the Mexican publicly traded 
companies, as a result of: (1) documenting the extent of the applicability of some well-
known determinants of the capital structure of developed markets (DMs), such as asset 
tangibility, company size, profitability and market to book ratio, to the corporate 
capital structure of Mexican publicly traded companies; and (2) testing the 
appropriateness of characteristic factors of emerging markets (EMs) like business risk 
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and effective tax rate to explain the corporate capital structure of these companies.  
Secondly, to explore the effects of the use of either individual accounts or consolidated 
accounting
164
 as financial accounting report practices, on the financing policies of the 
Mexican publicly traded companies.  Thirdly, to study the interplay between capital 
structure and product market according to the approach of corporate strategies 
including competitive behaviour.  Fourthly, to investigate the interaction between the 
corporate capital structure and the ownership structure and control of the Mexican 
listed companies by analysing key characteristics like: type of majority owner (family 
owners or general public), issuance of financial instruments that allow the 




5.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
Capital Structure is a very polemic and complex subject of corporate finance that has 
been intensively researched during the last decades.  Broadly speaking, capital 
structure can be defined as the proportion of financing from debt and from equity 
capital.  Its relevance might lie in the idea of being able to maximise the value of 
companies and/or to increase the wealth of its owners; this through the selection of the 
optimal corporate financing policies (Ross et al. 2007).  Therefore, the main question 
driving the research in this field is whether it is possible to identify ‘the optimal 
composition’ of the company’s capital (i.e. a target level of debt under the Static 
Trade-Off theory or a preference source of financing under the Pecking Order theory) 
so that the value of the company and the investors’ wealth will be maximised. 
 
A revision of the empirical evidence on capital structure has shown that the corporate 
financial decisions have been based on some firm-characteristic factors which can, at 
the same time, be explained under diverse capital structure theories.  This might be 
because of the overlap between the factors to be tested for each of the theories.  
However, the degree of applicability of some cross-sectional investigations in this field 
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 Consolidated accounting could be defined as the process ‘...of adjusting and combining financial 
information from the individual financial statements of a parent undertaking and its subsidiary 
undertakings to prepare consolidated financial statements that present financial information for the 
group as a single economic entity’ (Bnet, 2010). 
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may be arguable due to their debatable econometric robustness.  Consequently, it 
seems that the assessment of the predictions of each theory at a time may provide more 
accurate and solid results than the analysis of all the theories together. 
 
Furthermore, this evidence also suggested that factors such as tax codes, bankruptcy 





, are thought of as important determinants not only to the corporate 
capital structure in developed countries, but also to the capital structure of developing 
countries (e.g. Glen and Singh 2004 and Booth et al. 2001).  As a matter of fact, it 
seemed that the effects exerted by country features and/or institutions on the capital 
structure of developing countries may outweigh the effects of the other determinants 
(e.g. Booth et al. 2001, Li et al. 2006, and Wiwattanakatang 1999). 
 
Most of the empirical research has focussed on the features of developed countries.  
For instance, early empirical research was largely based on US data.  Later, during the 
1990s, it started to be complemented by data from a single developed country, and 
afterwards with evidence of small groups of developed countries
167
.  Empirical 
research of emerging countries emerged over the last decade
168
, whereas research on 
Latin America is even newer.  So far, little research has been carried on Mexico maybe 
because this country has proved to be challenging in terms of data availability.  
Nevertheless, Castañeda Ramos (1999), Babatz Torres (1997), Husted and Serrano 
(2002) and Ruiz-Porras and Steinwascher (2007), have investigated the features of the 
capital structure and corporate governance practices in Mexico during the late 90s.  
Hence, my work can be considered as a development of the previous research.  
Moreover, this study may provide some avenues for further exploration because of its 
early stage of development. 
 
 
5.1.1 Definition of the Variables 
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 This is with special emphasis on ownership structure and corporate control thereof. 
166
 Please see Section 2.2.1 of the Literature Review Chapter for a brief explanation regarding Capital 
Structure. 
167
 For instance, Rajan and Zingales 1995 and Wald 1999. 
168
 Some investigations in this regard are: Booth et al. 2001, Glen and Singh 2004, Hagelin et al. 2006, 
Pandey 2001 and Wiwattanakatang 1999, among others. 
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The composition of each variable seems to be one of the main difficulties in every 
empirical investigation.  Nonetheless, the attempt to find universal variables to carry 
out empirical research may weaken its validity since the variables ought to reflect the 
nature and purpose of the research in itself, as well as the particularities and the 
availability of the related data (e.g. country-specifics and firm-factors).  For instance, 
in the case of capital structure research, it has been suggested that for examinations 
focused on agency problems of debt, a measure concerning the past corporate 
financing choices such as the ratio of debt to firm value may be appropriated.  
However, for other investigations related to transferring control issues under a 
financial distress scenario, a proxy embodying present cash-flows, e.g. interest 
coverage, should be more accurate (Rajan and Zingales 1995). 
 
The variable composition problem thus is not an exception in any research on capital 
structure.  Nevertheless, there are some well-known proxies suggested by previous 
investigations in this area. To follow, a brief summary of these is given. 
 
Measures of Leverage 
In its broadest meaning, leverage refers ‘…to the extent to which a firm relies on debt’ 
as part of its financial policies (Ross et. al. 2008, p. 250).  It could be said then that a 
proxy for leverage should reflect the effects of past financing decisions and ‘…the 
relative claims on firm value held by equity and debt’ (Rajan and Zingales 1995, p. 
1427). 
 
Rajan and Zingales’ study (1995) differentiated between three proxies for measuring 
leverage, which were ‘stock’ leverage, ‘financial’ leverage and leverage.  The ‘stock’ 
leverage variable was estimated as the ratio between total liabilities and total assets.  
They suggested that this variable shows the amount of assets left for the shareholders 
after paying all the liabilities, but not the risk of the company going into bankruptcy.  
Further, this variable could overstate the amount of leverage when some of the 
accounts included in the liabilities group, e.g. payable accounts and pension liabilities, 
were used for transaction purposes rather than financing.  The ‘financial’ leverage 
variable, calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets, possibly overcomes this 
flaw.  However, it may fail to account for the fact that some asset accounts are offset 
by non-debt accounts.  In other words, this proxy may exclude or ignore the effects of 
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trade credit practices, i.e. the level of accounts receivable and accounts payable, which 
could be a particular of the belonging sector/industry.  Finally, the leverage variable 
computed as the ratio of total debt to net assets, where net assets were calculated as 
total assets minus account payables and other liabilities, could seem more accurate.  
Nonetheless, it could be argued that this proxy may still be affected by factors other 
than financing.  A case in this point may be assets held against legal employment 
obligations or deferred taxes. 
 
Booth et al.’s (2001) study estimated two different measures of leverage: total book-
debt ratio and long-term debt ratio.  Total book-debt ratio was the ratio of total 
liabilities divided by total liabilities plus net worth, while long-term debt ratio was the 
ratio of long-term liabilities divided by long-term liabilities plus net worth.  The long-
term debt ratio was also computed at market values, when possible, where net worth 
was substituted by average equity market value.  In a slightly different way, Jung et al. 
(1999) and Hagelin et al. (2006) calculated leverage as the long-term debt divided by 
total assets. 
 
Tangibility of Assets 
The proportion of tangible assets in a company may proxy for both the agency costs 
and the probability of financial distress.  Therefore, according to the view of the Static 
Trade-Off Model and the Agency-Cost framework, there may be two different reasons 
to expect a positive effect on the level of leverage as a result of a high proportion of 
tangible assets.  Firstly, high proportions of tangible assets might enhance the 
corporate ability to issue secured debt (due to its collateral usage), while reducing the 
information revealed about future profits.  Secondly, tangible assets may tend to retain 
more of their value in liquidation, which may encourage higher levels of debt.  
However, it has been proposed that a negative relationship could also be expected in 
companies having close relationships with their creditors (Berger and Undell 1995).  
The reasoning behind this is that these companies would probably need to provide 
lesser collateral for their debt than the collateral provided by companies without such 
ties.  This is because creditors may perform a more informed monitoring, which may 




Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Booth et al. (2001) calculated the tangibility of assets 
as the ratio of fixed assets to total asset. 
 
Growth / Investment Opportunities 
This variable could present either a positive or a negative correlation with leverage.  
Generally speaking, a negative correlation should be expected due to agency costs 
effects, whilst a positive relation may hold when considering information asymmetries.  
That is to say, both the agency costs of debt and the agency costs of equity may cause a 
negative correlation between growth opportunities and leverage, whereas the 
information asymmetry costs may produce a positive correlation. 
 
In general, the agency costs of debt imply that levered companies may be unable to 
pursue the investment policy that would maximise the value of an all-equity firm 
because of the possibility of financial distress; whereas the agency costs of equity are 
mainly materialised into the managerial discretion costs, which may tempt managers to 
seek equity financing for unprofitable investment projects.  Consequently, these two 
cases encourage low levels of debt financing.  However, it is worth noting that when 
the management and the shareholder interests coincide, and the management purses 
growth objectives, external common equity would be valuable for companies with 
strong investment opportunities (see for example: Booth et al. 2001, Jung et al. 1996, 
Jensen and Meckling 1976, and Myers 1983). 
 
On the other hand, when considering the informational costs from asymmetries, 
corporate financing options would follow the hierarchy established in the Pecking-
Order Theory when there would be a certainty regarding the value of the corporate 
investment opportunities.  Furthermore, in the case that equity is issued, that issuance 
would not be very informative of the value of the assets.  In contrast, equity financing 
must not be an option if the investment opportunities were uncertain or worthless since 
these would increase the agency costs, which were considered to be smaller than the 
information asymmetry costs (Jung et al. 1996). 
 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Jung et al. (1996), Booth et al. (2001) and Hagelin et al. 
(2006) controlled for the corporate growth opportunities using the market-to-book 
variable.  The first two researchers estimated this variable as the ratio of the market 
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value of assets to the book value of assets, while Booth et al. (2001) and Hagelin et al. 
(2006) calculated it as the equity market value divided by the net worth. 
 
Firm Size 
Booth et al. (2001) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) mentioned that the corporate size 
variable might proxy for factors such as survival, the agency costs of both debt and 
equity, and the information asymmetry costs.  Hagelin et al. (2006) suggested that size 
may proxy for firm age.  Therefore, assuming that the larger companies would be in a 
more stable productive stage and be more diversified, a positive relationship between 
the size of the company and its level of leverage should be expected.  This is because it 
is less probable that these companies would go into bankruptcy.  However, when 
considering that larger companies would have a better management, which may align 
shareholders and managers interests and improve the information disclosure policies, a 
negative correlation between firm size and leverage should be predicted since these 
companies may favour equity financing.  Finally, presuming that size proxies for firm 
age, a negative relationship should be expected taking into account that older firms 
may have less dynamism. 
 
The variable size has been estimated as the natural logarithm of net sales
169
 (see for 
example: Rajan and Zingales 1995 and Booth et al. 2001), or as the natural logarithm 
of total assets (Hagelin et al. 2006). 
 
Profitability 
In most cases, a negative correlation between leverage and profitability should be 
predicted, although a positive relation may also be possible to find.  For example, the 
Pecking-Order theory explains that because of information asymmetries, the market 
might interpret equity issuances as bad corporate news.  Therefore, profitable 
companies must firstly exhaust their internal funds, and after look for secured external 
financing in an attempt to reduce the costs of informational asymmetries.  Conversely, 
the cash-flow framework proposes that under an effective market for corporate control, 
profitable companies may be lead to use more debt financing.  Further, debt-holders 
may be eager to lend money to companies with current cash-flows. 
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Profitability has been calculated as the cash-flow from operations normalized by the 
book value of assets. See for example Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Booth et al. 
(2001).  Hagelin et al. (2006) computed this as the return on capital employed. 
 
Taxes 
It has been argued that debt financing would be preferred over equity financing 
because of the gain generated from the deductibility of interest payments (tax-shields), 
as they are not taxed.  Under this assertion, a positive correlation between leverage and 
taxes should be predicted, which is in line with the Static Trade-Off Model 
assumptions.  Moreover, Rajan and Zingales (1995) identified that taxes (corporate 
taxes) in aggregate level might have some explanatory power when empirically tested 
for differences in capital structures, as long as personal taxes are also brought into the 
analysis.  It is to be borne in mind that this explanatory power might be highly 
sensitive to the marginal tax rate of investors.  Booth et al. (2001) commented on the 
difficulties of defining a tax variable for individual companies since the marginal value 
of the tax shield should be either zero or positive for all companies.  They therefore 
suggested that an average tax rate may work better because it would include the impact 
of tax loss carry-forwards and the use of corporations as a conduit for income flows. 
 
Jung et al. (1996) calculated taxes as tax payment divided by the book value of total 
assets for the year of the preceding issue, whilst Booth et al. (2001) estimated an 
average tax rate per country from income before taxes and income after taxes. 
 
Business Risk 
Business risk can be thought of as a variable for controlling the costs of financial 
distress.  According to the view of both the Static Trade-Off Model and the Agency-
Cost framework, business risk was expected to be negatively related to leverage as its 
increase might enhance the probability of financial distress.  Booth et al. (2001) 
estimated the probability of financial distress as the variability of the return on assets 
over the available time period.  A drawback to this proxy is that it was estimated as a 
single value for all years.  In order to overcome this problem, Chang et al. (2009) used 
four different indicators as proxies of business risk, which were: the standard deviation 
of the percentage change in operating income (OI), the coefficient of variation of 
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return on assets (ROA), the coefficient of variation of return on equity (ROE), and the 
coefficient of variation of OI divided by total assets (TA). 
 
Liquidity  
Free cash flow can be understood as the cash flow ‘... in excess of that required to fund 
all projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost 
of capital’ (Jensen 1986 pp.2).  Hagelin et al. (2006) controlled for the amount of free 




Consolidation of the financial statements might be an important factor to be accounted 
for in the analysis of the corporate financial policies.  This is because companies 
reporting under unconsolidated or separate/individual financial statements may be able 
to look less levered than they would actually be
170
.  ‘Companies with unconsolidated 
balance sheets report an affiliate’s net assets… as a long term investment on their 
balance sheets.  Hence these firms would [incorrectly] appear to have lower leverage 
than otherwise identical firms who report consolidated balance sheets’ (Rajan and 
Zingales 1995, p. 1426). 
 
To the best of my knowledge, the consolidation of the financial statements has not 
been included in any of the previous econometric models as a variable to be analysed.  
However, bearing in mind that its application may produce significant accounting and 
consequently financial differences, as previously explained, consolidation was 
included into the model as a binary variable which took zero as a value when the 
company accounts were not consolidated and one when they were. 
 
 
5.2 Data and Sample Selection 
 
Accounting and financial secondary data from the annual financial statements were 
employed to carry the empirical testing of the capital structure, which comprised the 
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first stage of this testing.  These secondary data were collected from the financial 
statements and the corporate profile of every non-financial company listed in the 
Mexican Stock Exchange over the period 2000 to 2007 inclusive.  Financial companies 
such as banks and insurance companies were eliminated from this sample because their 
business might bias the purpose of this investigation.  As Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
pointed out, leverage practices of financial companies may actually be externally 
regulated (e.g. the minimum amount of capital required by the central bank to this type 
of companies in order to be allowed to operate).  In addition, their debt-like liabilities 
may not be similar/comparable to the debt issued by non-financial companies. 
 
The annual financial statements, which consisted of balance sheets, income statements 
and cash-flow statements were mainly retrieved from the ISI Emerging Markets 
database.  The ISI Emerging Markets database was one of the most complete databases 
devoted to emerging markets providing access to ‘hard-to-get’ accounting and market 
information of companies located in 80 different emerging markets
171
 (ISI Emerging 
Markets 2009).  A second source used to retrieve the annual financial statements was 
the Infosel Financiero
172
 database.  The market-stock price data was gathered either 
from the Infosel Financiero database or from the Annual Financial Facts and Figures 
Reports issued by the Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV) since the ISI Emerging 
Markets database failed to provide it.  It is noteworthy to remember that accounting 
and financial information tend to vary between countries in both, content and 
frequency.  This variance may be more noticeable between emerging countries since 
this information depends not only on the general accounting practices followed by 
each country, but also on their financial market regulations and their corporate 
governance practices.  In the case of the Mexican companies, the earliest public 
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 According to the ISI Emerging Markets database, it provides information of almost 80 different 
emerging markets located in five continents that are Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe and Latin America.  
A list of the countries comprised, by continent, is as follow.  From Africa: Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, 
Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sub-Saharan other, Tunisia, 
United Arab Emirates and MENA other countries.  From Asia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, China, 
Hong-Kong, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, The 
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.  Australia.  From Europe: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Kosovo,  Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine.  Finally, from 
Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay, Venezuela and Central America.  (ISI Emerging Markets 2009). 
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 Infosel Financiero is a Mexican database that provides most kinds of financial information in real-
time, with a complete national and wide international coverage (Infosel 2009).  
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financial information corresponded to 1998, but this information was very scarce and 
only available for a few companies.  Nevertheless, the public disclosure of corporate 
information has become a more regular practice for Mexican listed companies from 
2000 onwards. 
 
The sample size of this analysis comprised 624 observations, which were the result of 
78 different companies observed during eight consecutive years, est. id from 2000 to 
2007 inclusive.  These 78 companies are shown below in Table 5.1‘Sample Companies 
for the analysis of the Capital Structure Determinants’, which also presents their ticker 
and the sector to which they belong.  The 624 observations were organised in a panel 
or longitudinal form to carry their statistical analysis.  The sampling selection criterion 
applied was to include all non-financial companies listed in the BMV that had both 
their annual financial statements and their market stock price publicly available for the 
uninterrupted period of eight years running from 2000 to 2007.  As of October 2007, 
132 companies were listed in the BMV.  Of these, 111 were non-financial companies 
and only 87 companies had their annual financial statements published throughout the 
eight-year period mentioned in either (or both) the ISI Emerging database or the 
Infosel Financiero database.  Of those 87 companies, only 78 had at the same time the 
market price of their stock publicly available.  Hence, the sample of this empirical 
investigation (denoted as the ‘original sample’ henceforth) was formed by those 78 
non-financial companies listed in the BMV that had both their accounting and financial 
information publicly available over the eight-year period running from 2000 to 2007, 
inclusive.  However, it is important to mention that since one of these companies 
(TLEVISA) was a remarkable outlier, all the analyses performed in this section were 
carried under the following four scenarios: (1) with the row data and the original 
sample; (2) with the data transformed (e.g. some variables were converted to their 
natural logarithm in aid of controlling the outliers effects) and the original sample; (3) 
with the row data and the original sample apart from TLEVISA; and (4) the 
transformed data and the original sample apart from TLEVISA.  All these four 
scenarios yielded similar results, maybe because there was only one potential outlier 
and the econometric software used (STATA) somehow resolved this issue by itself.  
Therefore, this researcher opted to discuss only the results obtained under the third 
scenario (row data and original sample excluding TLEVISA) because it was 
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considered the fairest approximation of the non-financial Mexican publicly traded 
companies at that time. 
 
Table 5.1. Sample Companies for the analysis of the Capital Structure Determinants 
 
This table presents the ticker, the company name and the sector of the 78 Mexican publicly 
traded companies listed in the Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV by its Spanish acronym) 
forming the sample for the capital structure testing.  The denomination of the industrial sectors 
presented corresponds to the ‘new scheme’ classification used by the BMV since March 2009.  
The different sectors used under this classification scheme are as follow; materials, industrials, 
consumer discretionary & services (CDS), consumer staples, health care and 
telecommunication services. 
 
  TICKER NAME OF THE COMPANY SECTOR 
1 ACCELSA ACCEL, S.A. DE C.V. Industrial 
2 ALFA ALFA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Industrial 
3 ALSEA ALSEA, S.A.B. DE C.V. CDS 
4 ARA CONSORCIO ARA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Industrial 
5 ARISTOS CONSORCIO ARISTOS, S.A.B. DE C.V. CDS 
6 ASUR GRUPO AEROPORTUARIO DEL SURESTE, S.A.B. DE C.V. Industrial 
7 BACHOCO INDUSTRIAS BACHOCO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
8 BAFAR GRUPO BAFAR, S.A. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
9 BEVIDES FARMACIAS BENAVIDES, S.AB. DE .C.V. Health Care 
10 BIMBO GRUPO BIMBO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
11 CEL GRUPO IUSACELL, S.A. DE C.V. Telecom Services 
12 CEMEX CEMEX, S.A.B. DE C.V. Materials 
13 CERAMIC INTERNACIONAL DE CERAMICA, S.A. DE C.V. Industrial 




CIE CORPORACION INTERAMERICANA DE 
ENTRETENIMIENTO, S.A.B. DE C.V. 
 
CDS 
16 CMOCTEZ CORPORACION MOCTEZUMA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Materials 
17 CMR CMR, S.A.B. DE C.V. CDS 
18 CNCI UNIVERSIDAD CNCI, S.A. DE C.V. CDS 
19 COLLADO G COLLADO, S.A. DE C.V. Materials 
20 COMERCI CONTROLADORA COMERCIAL MEXICANA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
21 CONTAL GRUPO CONTINENTAL, S.A.B. Consumer Staples 
22 CONVER CONVERTIDORA INDUSTRIAL, S.A.B. DE C.V. Materials 
23 CYDSASA CYDSASA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Materials 
24 DERMET DERMET DE MEXICO, S.A. DE C.V. Materials 
25 EDOARDO EDOARDOS MARTIN, S.A.B. DE .CV. CDS 
26 EKCO EKCO, S.A.B. CDS 
27 ELEKTRA GRUPO ELEKTRA, S.A. DE C.V. CDS 
28 FEMSA FOMENTO ECONOMICO MEXICANO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
29 FRAGUA CORPORATIVO FRAGUA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Health Care 
30 GCARSO GRUPO CARSO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Industrial 
31 GCC GRUPO CEMENTOS DE CHIHUACHUA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Materials 
32 GCORVI GRUPO CORVI, S.A.B. DE C.V. CDS 
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  TICKER NAME OF THE COMPANY SECTOR 
33 GEO CORPORACION GEO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Industrial 
34 GEUPEC GRUPO EMBOTELLADORAS UNIDAS, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
5 GIGANTE GRUPO GIGANTE, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
36 GISSA GRUPO INDUSTRIAL SALTILLO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Industrial 
37 GMACMA GRUPO MACMA, S.A. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
38 GMARTI GRUPO MARTI, S.A.B. CDS 
39 GMD GRUPO MEXICANO DE DESARROLLO, S.A.B. Industrial 
40 GMEXICO GRUPO MEXICO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Materials 
41 GMODELO GRUPO MODELO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
42 GMODERN GRUPO LA MODERNA, S.A.B. DE .C.V. Consumer Staples 
43 GOMO GRUPO COMERCIAL GOMO, S.A. DE C.V. CDS 
44 GPH GRUPO PALACIO DE HIERRO, S.A. DE .C.V. CDS 
45 GRUMA GRUMA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
46 HERDEZ GRUPO HERDEZ, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
47 HILASAL HILASAL MEXICANA, S.A.B. DE C.V. CDS 
48 HOGAR CONSORCIO HOGAR, S.A.B. DE C.V. Industrial 
49 IASASA INDUSTRIA AUTOMOTRIZ, S.A. DE C.V. CDS 
50 ICA EMPRESAS ICA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Industrial 
51 ICH INDUSTRIAS CH, S.A.B. DE C.V. Materials 
52 KIMBER KIMBERLY-CLARK DE MEXICO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
53 KOF COCA-COLA FEMSA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
54 LAMOSA GRUPO LAMOSA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Industrial 
55 LIVEPOL EL PUERTO DE LIVERPOOL, S.A.B. DE C.V. CDS 
56 MASECA GRUPO INDUSTRIAL MASECA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
57 MEDICA MEDICA SUR, S.A. DE C.V. Health Care 
58 MEXCHEM MEXICHEM, S.A.B. DE C.V. Materials 
59 MINSA GRUPO MINSA, S.A. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
60 NUTRISA GRUPO NUTRISA, S.A. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
61 PARRAS COMPAÑIA INDUSTRIAL DE PARRAS, S.A. DE C.V. CDS 
62 PE&OLES INDUSTRIAS PEÑOLES, S.A.B. DE C.V. Materials 
63 POSADAS GRUPO POSADAS, S.A. DE C.V. CDS 
64 QUMMA GRUPO QUMMA, S.A. DE C.V. Telecom Services 
65 RCENTRO GRUPO RADIO CENTRO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Telecom Services 
66 SAB GRUPO CASA SABA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Health Care 
67 SANLUIS SANLUIS CORPORACION, S.A. DE C.V. CDS 
68 SIMEC GRUPO SIMEC, S.A.B. DE C.V. Materials 
69 SORIANA ORGANIZACION SORIANA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
70 TEKCHEM TEKCHEM, S.A.B. DE C.V. Materials 
71 TELECOM CARSO GLOBAL TELECOM, S.A.B. DE C.V. Telecom Services 
72 TELMEX TELEFONOS DE MEXICO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Telecom Services 
73 TLEVISA GRUPO TELEVISA, S.A.  Telecom Services 
74 TMM GRUPO TMM, S.A. Industrial 
75 TVAZTCA TV AZTECA, S.A. DE C.V. Telecom Services 
76 VALLE JUGOS DEL VALLE, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
77 VITRO VITRO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Materials 
78 WALMEX WAL-MART DE MEXICO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
 




The idea to analyse listed companies aimed at reaching the largest possible sample 
with quality accounting and financial information available.  Further, the achieved 
sample seemed to provide a reasonable picture of the Mexican companies listed in the 
BMV over the period 2000 to 2007 as it captured about 60 percent of the total listed 
companies or 71 percent when the companies from the financial sector were excluded.  
Further, this sample technically comprised companies from six out of the seven active 
sectors
173
, which accounted the financial sector as an active sector.  The representation 
of each sector (as a percentage) ranged from the lowest 50 percent corresponding to 
the industrial sector to the highest 100 percent to the health care sector. 
 
Since March 2009, the BMV has employed a new scheme for the sector classification 
of the companies listed there.  This new classification scheme –which followed two 
well-known international industry classification systems named the Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS)
174
 and the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB)
175– 
consists of four different levels.  The levels correspond to ten different sectors, 24 sub-
sectors, 77 business lines, and 186 sub-business lines.  The allocation of a company to 
a specific sector, subsector, business line and sub-business line depended mainly on 
the main source of its revenues.  The ten different sectors comprised by this new 
classification scheme were: energy, materials, industrials, consumer discretionary and 
services (cds), consumer staples (cs), health care, financial services, information 
technology, telecommunication services, and utilities.  From these ten sectors, seven 
were active since the energy sector, the utilities sector and the information technology 
sector had no companies listed at the time of this research.  The percentage of 
representation per sector ranged from a minimum of 50% corresponding to the 
industrial sector, to a maximum of 100% corresponding to the health care sector, 
achieving an overall coverage of 70.91%.  The telecommunications services sector had 
                                                 
173
 There were four sectors not represented in this sample, one active (with companies listed) and three 
with no companies listed under them.  The active sector not represented was the financial sector, which 
was excluded because of its business nature, which may introduce some flaws into the analysis if it were 
included.  The other three sectors not included because they did not have any company actively listed 
were: energy, information technology and utilities. 
174
 The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) system was jointly developed by Morgan 
Stanley Capital International (MSCI) and Standard & Poor's (S&P) in 1999 (MCSI Barra, 2009).  As of 
May 2009, the GICS structure comprised ten different sectors, 24 industry groups, 68 industries and 154 
sub-industries. 
175
 The Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) was developed in 2005 by Dow Jones Indexes and 
FTSE Group.  This classification system is categorised into four levels, which are: industry, super-
sector, sector and sub-sector.  As of May 2009, the ICB comprises ten industries, 19 super-sectors, 41 
sectors and 114 sub-sectors (ICB 2009). 
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a contribution of 58%; whereas the consumer staples sector reached 84 percent.  The 
population of these sectors, excluding the health care sector
176
, fluctuated between 12 
to 26 companies, with an average of 21 companies. Figure 5.2  Distribution of the 
sampled companies per sector’ below plots the total companies listed in the BMV, as 
of March 2009, and the companies included in this sample, showing their relative 
percentage of contribution per sector. 
 
 
Figure 5.2  Distribution of the sampled companies per sector 
 
This graph contrasts the total companies listed in the Mexican Stock Exchange as of March 
2009, with the companies forming the sample of this investigation distributed by sector.  This 
comparison (presented in both, number of companies and percentage) evidences that a fair 
representation of the universe of Mexican listed companies at that date was achieved since 
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 The health care sector was composed of four companies and all of them were part of this sample. 
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Finally, 24 from these 78 companies were deemed highly-traded companies, and 
therefore, they were part of the sample of the Price and Quotation Index
177
 (IPC) of the 
BMV valid from February 2006 to January 2007 (Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, 2006). 
 
 
5.3 Empirical Testing 
 
In order to explore the extent of the applicability of the main determinants of the 
capital structure of both developed markets (DMs) and emerging markets (EMs) with 
those of the capital structure of the Mexican publicly traded companies, the 
frameworks of Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Booth et al. (2001) were developed first 
by using financial information from the 78 Mexican listed companies depicted in Table 
1 over an eight-year period running from 2000 to 2007.  Their findings were compared 
with the results from my research work.  After this point, Booth et al. model’s was 
replicated and two more variables were included into it namely, liquidity and 
consolidation, which this researcher believes might capture important behaviour 
related to the financing policies of the Mexican publicly traded companies. 
 
As a contribution to this investigation, the empirical testing of the capital structure of 
the Mexican publicly traded companies has been carried out using three different 
measures of debt (est. i.e. total debt, long-term debt and short-term debt) measured at 
both book and market values.  The main reason for using these three different 
measures of debt is to have a better understanding of the corporate capital structure of 
the Mexican publicly companies. It also makes it possible to test the argument 
regarding emerging markets being more prone to reflect the effects of the financing 
policies of their companies in the short term. 
 
As was explained earlier, the discussion of the results corresponds to the statistical 
analysis of the un-transformed data of 77 companies (TLEVISA excluded) over the 
eight-year period. 
 
                                                 
177
 The Price and Quotation Index (IPC) is the main indicator of the overall performance of the Mexican 
Stock Exchange (MSE).  Its sample is calculated of a balanced weighted selection of 35 shares 
representative of all the shares listed on the MSE from various sectors across the economy, and is 
revised twice a year.  Weight is determined by market capitalization.  (Wikipedia 2010). 
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5.3.1 General Determinants of the Capital Structure  
 
5.3.1.1 The Rajan-Zingales (1995) Framework 
 
Unlike previous studies, Rajan and Zingales’ investigation (1995) found that the level 
of leverage (adjusted debt to adjusted capital) across the G-7
178
 countries was very 
similar (ranging from 33% to 39% at book values, whereas from 17% to 36% at 
market values), with only the United Kingdom and Germany being relatively less 
levered with medians of 16% and 18% at book values and 11% and 15% at market 
values, respectively.  Furthermore, they showed that four company features namely 
tangibility of assets, the market-to-book ratio, firm size, and profitability (measured as 
the return on assets -ROA-) acted as important determinants of the corporate capital 
structure across the G-7 countries. 
 
By running diverse within-regressions between leverage and the four company factors 
mentioned previously as four-year average (1987-1990) regressors, Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) found that these factors were similarly correlated with leverage across the G-7 
countries.  In other words, tangibility and size
179
 were, in general, positively correlated 
to leverage, whereas market-to-book ratio and profitability were negatively correlated.  
The sign and significance of their findings can be observed below in Table 5.2 ‘ Sign 
and Significance of the Capital Structure determinants’. 
 
Finally, Rajan and Zingales (1995) stressed the fact that their findings might not be 
considered as a spurious outcome result of the covered sample
180
 or the used data since 
they transformed the data by recording some accounting adjustments
181
 in order to 
make it comparable across the seven countries. 
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 The countries forming the G-7 are: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The United States of 
America and The United Kingdom. 
179
 Except for Germany and France which presented a negative correlation to leverage when measured at 
market values 
180
 Their final sample covered between 30 and 70 percent of the companies listed in every country, 
representing more than 50 percent of the market capitalization in each country. 
181
 Rajan and Zingales carried the following four accounting adjustments to the accounting data of the 
G-7 countries (except the United States of America (USA)) in order to make all the accounting data 
comparable across the seven countries.   
(1) Cash and short-term investments were offset by an equivalent amount of debt and removed from 
the balance sheet.  This was because they were considered and treated as excess liquidity. 
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(2) The value of intangible assets was subtracted from the book value of equity and from the assets 
accordingly.  This was done as a result of the likelihood that the value of U.S.A. assets may be 
overstated with respect to the other countries because of the wave of acquisitions of the 1980s. 
(3) A large fraction of liabilities were reclassified as shareholders’ equity since it could be argued that 
a large fraction of German liabilities were composed of dubious provisions for future liabilities, 
which were rather equity. 
(4) Deferred taxes were added to the book value of equity since they were considered as a component 
of shareholders’ equity. 
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Table 5.2.  Sign and Significance of the Capital Structure determinants 
 
This table contrasts the sign and significance of the Capital Structure determinants 
(independent variables) found by Rajan and Zingales (1995) for the G-7 countries with the 
sign and significance of these determinants for Mexico.  Section A displays the results of the 
regressions when leverage is measured at book values.  Section B presents the results from the 
regressions when leverage is at market values.  Panel A depicts the results of each of the G-7 
countries. Panel B presents the results of Mexico after running a panel liner regression using 
three different methods: Pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Random-Effects (RE) and 
Fixed-Effects (FE) methods.  The first column of Panel B displays the outputs using pooled 
OLS in order for the results of this investigation to be comparable with those from Rajan-
Zingales (1995) framework.  The second column shows the results from the random effects 
method (RE) and fixed effects method (FE) for book and market values, respectively. 
 
The capital structure determinants are computed as follows: tangibility is the ratio of fixed 
assets to the book value of total assets; market-to-book is the ratio of the book value of assets 
less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity all divided by the book value of 
assets; size is the natural logarithm of net sales; and profitability to is the earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by book value of assets or return on assets (ROA).  Rajan 
and Zingales’ findings are result from a four-year period (1987 to 1990), whereas Mexico 
results comprise an eight-year period (2000 to 2007) data. 
 
 
Panel  A Panel  B  























































































 Tangibility *** + *** + ** + ** + + *** + *** + ** - - 
Market-to-book *** - - *** - ** - - *** - *** - *** + *** + 
Size *** + *** + *** - + + *** + *** + *** + ** + 








 Tangibility *** + *** + * + + ** + *** + + + + 
Market-to-book *** - *** - *** - ** - * - ** - *** - *** - *** - 
Size *** + *** + *** - - + + *** + + * - 
ROA *** - *** - + - - ** - *** - *** - *** - 
*, **, and ***, significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively   
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For the sake of comparison, the first three of the four accounting adjustments carried 
out by Rajan and Zingales (1995) were computed into the accounting information of 
the 78 Mexican listed companies included in the original sample.  The accounting 
adjustment about deferred taxes was not applied to avoid a possible duplication of 
effect as the Mexican accounting principles had some explicit provisions in this regard. 
 
After computing these adjustments, Rajan and Zingales’ (1995) work was replicated as 
a general pooled model with cluster-robust standard errors.  This was done firstly 
without controlling for industry effects and later controlling for these effects using 
dummy variables.  The main assumption of a pooled model is that the regressors are 
exogenous.  In other words, it assumes that the average values of the variables and the 
relationships between them are constant over time and across all of the cross-sectional 
units in the sample (Brooks 2008). 
 
Rajan and Zingales’ model, thus could be represented as follows, 
 
    leverage it = α + β1 tangibilityit + β2 sizeit + β3 roait + β4 mk-bk ratioit + uit........models (1) and (5) 
 
where leverage is any of the two ratios (total book-debt or total market debt) for the 
firm i at time t.  Letting γ denote the sum of all the dummy variables controlling for the 
industry sectors, the previous model can be re-written as: 
 
    leverage it = α + β1 tangibilityit + β2 sizeit + β3 roait + β4 mk-bk ratioit +  
Σ γ dummy sectorsit + uit..........................................................models (3) and (7) 
 
However, some of the flaws of pooled models may be overcome by using either of the 
two broadest classes of panel estimators approaches, namely fixed effects (FE) models 
or random effects (RE) models.  FE models and RE models decompose the error term 
(uit) into the individual-level effects (αi) and the idiosyncratic error (εit).  In the simplest 
form, both approaches (FE and RE models) propose different intercept terms for each 
cross-sectional unit, with the relationships between the explanatory and explained 
variables assumed to be the same both cross-sectionally and temporally.  An important 
difference between these two approaches may be the fact that under the RE model, the 
intercepts for each cross-sectional unit are assumed to arise from a common intercept 
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(α) that is the same for all cross-sectional units and over time, plus a random variable 
that accounts for the unobserved effects being independent of the observed variables.  
That is to say, in both types of models (FE and RE) the individual-level effects (αi) are 
random.  However, in FE models the αi are permitted to be correlated with the 
regressors, allowing a limited form of endogeneity.  In contrast, in RE models it is 
assumed that the αi is purely random, which implies that αi is uncorrelated with the 
regressors (Brooks 2008 and Colin, Cameron and Trivedi 2009) 
 
To determine whether a FE model or a RE model is most appropriate for modelling 
this theoretical conceptualisation, the Hausman test and the Hausman and 
Sigmamore
182
 test are carried out.  The Hausman, and Hausman and Sigmamore tests, 
which have as null hypothesis that a RE estimator is fully efficient (e.g. individual 
effects are random), indicated in this case that RE are consistent and efficient for 
leverage measured at book values.  However, FE are more suitable for leverage at 
market values since random effects are efficient but inconsistent.  These models were 
applied to both cases, that is when the regression is run without controlling for industry 
effects and when it controls for the industry effects. 
 
Secondly, the model is also replicated as a panel regression with fixed effects (FE) and 
with random effects (RE).  This is done firstly without controlling for industry effects 
and later, controlling for these effects using dummy variables as previously done. 
 
Under FE and RE, Rajan and Zingales’ model could be mathematically expressed as: 
 
  leverage it = αi + β1 tangibilityit + β2 sizeit + β3 roait + β4 market-book ratioit + 
 εit .............................................................................................models (2) and (6) 
 
where leverage is any of the two ratios (total book-debt or total market debt) for the 
firm i at time t.  Letting γ denote the sum of all the dummy variables controlling for the 
industry sectors, the previous model can be re-written as: 
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 According to Colin Cameron and Trivedi (2009) the Hausman and Sigmamore test might be 
considered as a robust version of the Hausman test because the former specifies that the covariance 




  leverage it = αi + β1 tangibilityit + β2 sizeit + β3 roait + β4 market-book ratioit +  
 Σ γ dummy sectorsit  + εit...........................................................models (4) and (8) 
 
In general, as Table 5.2.  ‘Sign and Significance of the Capital Structure determinants’ 
and  
 
Table 5.3 ’Regression Results.’ show, three out of those four company factors named: 
size, profitability (measured as ROA) and market-to-book ratio, are highly-
significantly correlated to leverage at both book and market values.  However, 
tangibility is only significantly correlated to leverage when leverage is measured at 
book values and the model is run as a pooled regression with robust errors for clusters.  
Further, profitability is the only determinant that keeps its negative sign and its highly 
correlated coefficient under both types of leverage (viz. book leverage and market 
leverage).  In contrast, size and market-to-book ratio shows a positive correlation at 
book values, but a negative correlation at market values. 
 
 
Table 5.3  Regression Results  –Rajan-Zingales (1995) Framework– 
 
This table presents the regression results between the four company factors proposed by Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) and leverage measured at book values (panel A) and market values (panel 
B).  The dependent variable is leverage which is adjusted debt to adjusted debt plus book or 
market value (respectively) of adjusted equity.  The four regressors are as follows: tangibility 
is the ratio of fixed assets to the book value of total assets; market-to-book is the ratio of the 
book value of assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity all divided 
by the book value of assets; size is the natural logarithm of net sales; and profitability to is the 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by book value of assets or return on assets 
(ROA).  All the variables (regressand and regressors) correspond to the period 2000 to 2007.  
Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. 
 
The estimated models are as follows,  
leverageit = α + β1 tangibilityit + β2 sizeit + β3 roait + β4 mk-bk ratioit + uit...............................  models (1) and (5) 
leverageit = α + β1 tangibilityit + β2 sizeit + β3 roait + β4 mk-bk ratioit + Σ γ dummy sectorsit + uit..models (3) & (7) 
leverageit = αi + β1 tangibilityit + β2 sizeit + β3 roait + β4 mk-bk ratioit + εit................................ models (2) and (6) 




Panel  A Panel  B 
Book leverage Market leverage 
  
OLS rob RE OLS rob RE OLS rob FE OLS rob FE 
tangibility 
-0.1773** -0.0312 -0.1678** -0.0319 -0.0357 0.0485 -0.0256 0.0485 
(0.0858) (0.0408) (0.0842) (0.0407) (0.0810) (0.0416) (0.0832) (0.0416) 
size 
0.0295* 0.0200* 0.0369*** 0.0245** 0.0056 -0.0273* 0.0099 -0.0273* 


















(0.3115) (0.1098) (0.2648) (0.1092) (0.2155) (0.1097) (0.2277) (0.1097) 
mk-bk 
ratio 









(0.0293) (0.0107) (0.0182) (0.0107) (0.0277) (0.0111) (0.0293) (0.0111) 
consumer 
disc serv 
  0.1299** 0.1218**   0.0988* 0.0000 
  (0.0568) (0.0612)   (0.0509) (0.0000) 
health care   0.1198* 0.1305   0.0637 0.0000 
  (0.0628) (0.1019)   (0.0506) (0.0000) 
industrial 
  0.0742 0.0792   0.0984* 0.0000 
  (0.0669) (0.0663)   (0.0566) (0.0000) 
material 
  0.1220* 0.1128*   0.1350** 0.0000 
  (0.0643) (0.0644)   (0.0546) (0.0000) 
telecomm 
  0.3381*** 0.3446***   0.2472*** 0.0000 
  (0.0706) (0.0862)   (0.0593) (0.0000) 
_cons 
0.1494 0.2221 -0.0586 0.0600 0.6384*** 1.0722*** 0.4798*** 1.0722*** 
(0.2203) (0.1577) (0.1844) (0.1668) (0.2093) (0.2131) (0.1797) (0.2131) 
N 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 
r2 0.1929  0.3084  0.4482 0.3321 0.5092 0.3321 
r2_o  0.1699  0.2809  0.3987  0.3987 
r2_b  0.2073  0.3401  0.4218  0.4218 
sigma_u  0.1941  0.1798  0.1824  0.1824 
sigma_e  0.1242  0.1242  0.1178  0.1178 
rho  0.7095  0.6769  0.7057  0.7057 
theta  0.7794  0.7627     
Standard errors in parentheses       
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** 
p<0.01 
      
 
It seems remarkable that the sign of these two factors (size and market-to-book ratio) is 
not the one theoretically expected when compared with Rajan and Zingales’ (1995) 
general findings, although size yields similar results to that displayed by Germany.  
Nevertheless, as noted by these researchers and by Booth et al. (2001) among others, it 
is important to bear in mind that country specifics such as the macro-economic 
environment (e.g. level of economic development) and corporate governance practices 
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(such as data availability and the market for corporate control) may outweigh the 
effects of the company factors tested. 
 
[The understanding of] ‘...between-country differences and the review of 
institutions is important because they may affect the within-country cross-
sectional correlation between leverage and factors such as firm profitability and 
firm size.  This may help us identify the true economic forces underlying factors.’ 
(Rajan and Zingales 1995, p. 1422) 
 
For example, it could be possible that when leverage is measured at book values, size 
may be an inverse proxy for the expected costs of bankruptcy.  This may imply that 
larger companies may issue higher levels because of their lower probability of default.  
However, when size was correlated to leverage measured at market values, it could be 
that due to some corporate governance effects (such as information disclosure) picked 
by this proxy, the issuance of equity, rather than debt, may be favoured for bigger 
companies.  In the case of the market-to-book ratio, one may expect -from a theoretical 
stand- a negative correlation between this factor and leverage.  This may be either 
because of the cost of financial distress (proxy for the underinvestment costs 
associated with high leverage) or because of the effects of attempting to time the 
market by issuing equity when the company value (market-to-book ratio) is perceived 
to be high.  The positive correlation find at book values could respond to the fact that 
bank financing is not widely open in Mexico
183
, so only a few companies (the biggest 
ones) may have access to this kind of financing.  In contrast, when leverage is 
measured at market values, companies may be more interested in the advantages of 
timing the market than the benefits from raising debt comprise. 
 
After having verified that at least three of the four company factors (e.g. size, 
profitability and market-to-book ratio) suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1995), as key 
determinants of the capital structure in DMs, also work as important determinants for 
the corporate capital structure of the Mexican listed companies, the company factors 
proposed by Booth et al. (2001) are assessed in order to test if they might also work as 
key determinants of the capital structure of the Mexican publicly traded companies. 
                                                 
183
 The time scope of the macro-economic analysis of Mexico is based on the eight-year period 2000 to 
2007, which is the time of the financial data employed in this empirical analysis. 
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5.3.1.2 The Booth et al. (2001) Framework 
 
Booth et al. (2001) were one of the pioneer researchers to seek to establish whether 
capital structure theory was portable across developing countries using a sample 
formed by ten developing countries
184
, Mexico being one of them, over a period of 11 
years (1980 to 1990) when data was available.  One of the driving ideas behind this 
study was that the institutional structures per country could have an important effect on 
the already well-known capital structure determinants.  For this reason, Booth et al. 
(2001) extended Rajan and Zingales’ (1995) model by including a tax rate and a 
business risk variable.  Booth et al.’s (2001) findings suggested that the capital 
structure of developing countries was determined by the same stylised company factors 
existing in developed countries. However, their results showed persistent differences 
across countries, indicating that specific country factors were also at work.  In other 
words, Booth et al.’s (2001) results documented that not only are corporate size, asset 
tangibility, profitability (ROA) and the market-to-book ratio significantly correlated 
with debt when calculated as total book-debt and long-term debt at book and markets 
values, but so are business risk and tax rate. 
 
It is of note that although the evidence was mixed, since approximately a half of the 
sampled countries showed one sign, and the other half the opposite one, profitability 
and the market-to-book ratio exhibited very peculiar behaviour.  On the one hand, 
profitability was the only variable that exhibited the same sign (negative) in all the 
countries apart from Zimbabwe.  However, the market-to-book ratio yielded the 
opposite from that theoretically expected (i.e. positive) in six of the seven countries 
that had the data available to be included in the regression analysis.  These results 
seemed to highlight the importance of the agency and information asymmetry 
problems in emerging countries, as well as a low level of development in their bond-
market. 
 
Table 5.4  ‘Sign and Significance of the Capital Structure determinants’ below 
contrasts the signs and significant of the coefficients of the regression analysis 
performed by Booth et al. in 2001(section A) with the signs and significant of the 
                                                 
184
 The ten countries forming this sample were: Brazil, India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey and Zimbabwe. 
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coefficients obtained from replicating Booth et al.’s methodology with data of the 
Mexican publicly traded companies (section B). 
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Table 5.4  Sign and Significance of the Capital Structure determinants 
This table displays the sign and significance of the Capital Structure determinants proposed by Booth et al. in 2001 when correlated with each of the three different measures of 
leverage: (1) total book-debt (TB), (2) long-term book debt (LT-B) and (3) long-term market-debt (LT-M) using a fixed-effects (FE) estimator.  The sign and significance of these 
determinants when replicated using data of Mexico from 2000 to 2007 are displayed in Section B of this Table.  For the sake of the comparison between Booth et al.’s findings and this 
researcher’s results, the third row of Section A and the second row of Section B discloses Mexico results when running a panel pooled regression (OLS) (Booth et al. results and this 
researcher’s results, respectively) while the second row of Section A and the first row of Section B presents Mexico results from running a panel regression with FE. 
 
The capital structure variables (regressors) are calculated as follows: tangibility is the ratio of total assets minus current assets divided by total assets; market-to-book is the equity 
market value divided by net worth; size is the natural logarithm of sales divided by 100; profitability is the earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets; tax rate is 
the percentage from earnings before and earnings after tax; while business risk is the variability of return on assets. The business risk column does not present results for any country 














  size tangibility ROA risk market-book-ratio tax rate 








Brazil + - n/a *** - - n/a *** - ** - n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a - - n/a 
Mexico *** + *** + n/a *** - - n/a *** - *** - n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a ** - - n/a 
Mexico, ols - + n/a *** + ** + n/a *** - *** - n/a *** + ** + n/a n/a n/a n/a *** - ** - n/a 
India + + - *** - ** + * ** + *** - *** - *** - n/a n/a n/a *** + *** + *** - - *** - *** - 
South Korea *** + *** - + + ** * + *** + *** - *** - *** - n/a n/a n/a ** + *** + *** - ** + * + ** + 
Jordan + *** + *** + + *** + ** + *** - * - - n/a n/a n/a ** + + ** * - + + + 
Malaysia *** + *** + *** + + *** + *** + *** - *** - *** - n/a n/a n/a *** + + *** - ** - - - 
Pakistan + + + - + ** + *** - - - n/a n/a n/a - *** - - ** - - * - 
Thailand + n/a n/a *** + n/a n/a **- n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a *** + n/a n/a * + n/a n/a 
Turkey + - ** + + + + ** - + - n/a n/a n/a + + *** - - ** - + 





MEXICO - - *** - + *** + *** + *** - - *** - + - ** - - *** + ** - + * + + 
MEXICO, ols *** + *** + + * - ** + ** + *** - * - *** - *** - *** - - + * + * - + + + 
*p<0.10   ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01   Significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.         




Booth et al. (2001) concentrated on analysing, whenever possible
185
, the total book-
debt and the long-term debt at book and market values to empirically validate the 
capital structure theory in emerging markets.  They proposed that developing markets 
might have substantially lower amounts of long-term debt than developed countries, 
this as result of their dependency on trade credit (i.e. short-term debt).  Further, Booth 
et al.’s (2001) findings showed a pronounced difference between these two ratios (total 
book-debt and long-term debt) among the sampled countries. Table 5.5 ‘Debt ratios’ 
displays a summary of these results.  
 
Table 5.5  Debt ratios 
 
The results of this investigation elaborating on Booth et al.’s (2001) methodology are 
presented in the first row of this table, while Booth et al.’s (2001) outcomes are displayed from 
row 2 to row 12.  The four different measures of debt are defined as follows.  Total book-debt 
ratio is total liabilities divided by total liabilities plus net worth, while long-term book-debt 
ratio is total liabilities minus current liabilities divided by total liabilities minus current 































MEXICO This Investigation 78 2000 - 2007 47.99% 48.04% 30.76% 33.04% 
Mexico 
Booth et al. (2001) 
99 1984 - 1990 34.70% n/a 13.80% n/a 
Brazil 49 1985 - 1991 30.30% n/a 30.30% n/a 
India 99 1980 - 1990 67.10% n/a 34.00% 34.70% 
Jordan 38 1983 - 1990 47.00% n/a 11.50% 18.60% 
Malaysia 96 1983 - 1990 41.80% n/a 13.10% 7.10% 
Pakistan 96 1980 - 1987 65.60% n/a 26.00% 18.90% 
South Korea 93 1980 - 1990 73.40% n/a 49.40% 64.30% 
Thailand 64 1983 - 1990 49.40% n/a n/a n/a 
Turkey 45 1983 - 1990 59.10% n/a 24.20% 10.80% 
Zimbabwe 48 1980 - 1988 41.50% n/a 13.00% 26.30% 
n/a: Not available.  
 
                                                 
185
 Total book-debt was computed for all the ten countries forming this sample, whereas because of lack 
of financial data, total market-debt was not available for Brazil and Mexico.  Long-term book debt was 
calculated for all these countries except Thailand, while long-term market-debt was not available for 
Brazil, Mexico and Thailand. 
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It is worth noticing that, according to these findings, Mexico was considered to be a 
country with low debt displaying ratios equal to 34.7 and 13.8 in total book-debt and 
long-term book-debt, respectively.  These ratios supported Booth et al.’s EMs’ trade 
credit dependency argument.  Nonetheless, when elaborating on Booth et al.’s (2001) 
methodology using Mexican data over the period 2000 to 2007, both debt ratios 
increased, particularly the long-term book-ratio whose mean augmented more than 
twice to reach 30.76%.  The growth in the long-term book-debt ratio could be a 
feasible result of the advance in the macro-economic conditions achieved by Mexico at 
the time of this investigation, when compared to the Mexican macro-economic 
environment from 1984 to 1990. 
 
Following the analytical approach used to examine Rajan and Zingales’ (1995) work at 
the beginning of this section, the assessment of Booth et al.’s (2001) research starts by 
testing their model as a pooled regression with cluster-robust standard errors, firstly 
without controlling for industry effects, and later, controlling for these effects using 
dummy variables.  Booth et al.’s model, thus could be expressed as follows, 
 
    leverage it = α + β1 sizeit + β2 tangibilityit + β3 roait + β4 riskit + β5 mk-bk ratioit +  
β6 tax rateit + uit..........................................................models (2), (6) and (14) 
 
where leverage is any of the three ratios (viz. total book-debt, long-term book-debt or 
long-term market-debt) for the firm i at time t.  Letting γ denote the sum of all the 
dummy variables controlling for the industry sectors, the previous model can be re-
written as: 
 
    leverage it = α + β1 sizeit + β2 tangibilityit + β3 roait + β4 riskit + β5 mk-bk ratioit +  
β6 tax rateit +Σ γ dummy sectorsit + uit.........................models (4) (8) and (16) 
 
After this, the Hausman test and the Hausman and Sigmamore test are carried out to 
determine whether FE or RE models are most appropriate for these models.  The 
results of these tests indicate that the FE model is more suitable for total and long-term 
debt at both book and market values because RE are efficient but inconsistent.  The 
model is then specified and run as a panel regression with a FE estimator, firstly 
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without controlling for industry effects, and later, controlling for the industrial effects 
using dummy variables. 
 
Under FE, Booth et al.’s model could be expressed as: 
 
  leverage it = αi + β1 sizeit + β2 tangibilityit + β3 roait + β4 riskit + β5 mk-bk ratioit +  
β6 tax rateit  + εit ..................................................models (1), (5) and (13) 
 
Letting γ denote the sum of all the dummy variables controlling for the industry 
sectors, the previous model can be re-written as: 
 
  leverage it = αi + β1 sizeit + β2 tangibilityit + β3 roait + β4 riskit + β5 mk-bk ratioit +  
          β6 tax rateit + Σ γ dummy sectorsit + εit..........................models (3), (7) and (15) 
 
In general, from Table 5.6 ‘Regression Results’ it appears that the pooled models yield 
more significant-correlated coefficients than the FE models do when debt is measured 
at book values.  Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that the error term is 
better specified under the FE model (according to the Hausman and Hausman and 
Sigmamore tests performed).  Therefore, special attention is given to FE models’ 
results.  The FE regressions find that the industry sectors effects are time-invariant for 
all the measures of leverage used, therefore all the sector variables yield a zero 
coefficient with no significant correlation. 
 
Some uniform results are obtained from these models.  For example: profitability and 
business risk show to be negatively correlated with debt in both models (FE and 
pooled models), except in the case of the total book-debt regression with risk.  The 
profitability coefficients are highly correlated with total book-debt and long-term 
market-debt; whilst the risk coefficients are highly correlated with long-term market-
debt, under the FE model.  Further, tangibility shows a positive correlated coefficient 
in all models, apart from when leverage is measured in terms of total book-debt, and it 
is highly correlated for long-term debt measured at booth book and market values.  
This evidence may lead us to think that Mexican publicly traded firms have 
experienced a trade-off between a target level of debt and the effects of the information 
asymmetry and agency problems.  It seems that more profitable firms prefer to use less 
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debt, this without overlooking their target level of debt, which is denoted by the 
importance of their corporate levels of risk and asset tangibility.  Further, the fact that 
tangibility shows to be highly negative-significant correlated with long-term debt but 
not with total debt, may reflect the reliance of these firms on short-term trade, as Booth 
et al. (2001) pointed out. 
 
Surprisingly, under the FE model, size is negatively correlated to debt but only highly 
significantly correlated when leverage proxy for long-term market-debt.  On the hand, 
tax rate shows a positive correlation only significant for long-term book-debt.  
Moreover, mixed evidence is displayed by the market-to-book ratio, which shows to be 
positively and negatively correlated with total book-debt (under the pooled and FE 
models, respectively).  It is highly significantly correlated (positively) with long-term 
debt measured at book values, and negatively when measured at market values.  These 
findings may reinforce the assumption that the agency and the informational 
asymmetry costs are very important in the financial decisions of emerging markets.  In 
other words, larger companies (which are expected to have better information 
disclosure policies and therefore less informational problems) may experience lower 
expected costs of financial distress, which may enable them to tap the bond-market 
more easily.  Additionally, some country factors appeared to have also influenced 
these findings since the shift on the correlated sign of the market-to-book ratio, when 





Table 5.6  Regression Results  –Booth et al. (2001) Framework– 
 
This table shows the correlation of the total book-debt (Panel A), long-term book-debt (Panel B), and long-term market-debt (Panel C) –each as 
dependent variable– against the six company factors suggested by Booth et al. (2001).  Total book-debt is calculated as total liabilities divided by total 
liabilities and net worth.  Long-term debt is total liabilities less current liabilities divided by total liabilities less current liabilities plus net worth whilst 
long-term market-debt substituted the net worth by the average equity market value. 
 
The six regressors are computed as follows: tangibility is the ratio of total assets minus current assets divided total assets; market-to-book is the equity 
market value divided by net worth; size is the natural logarithm of sales divided by 100; profitability to is the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) 
divided by total assets; tax rate is the percentage from earning before and earnings after tax; while business risk is the variability of return on assets. 
 
All the variables (regressand and regressors) correspond to the period 2000 to 2007.  Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. 
 
The estimated models are the following, 
leverageit = α + β1 tangibility it + β2 sizeit + β3 roait + β4 riskit+ β5 mk-bk ratioit + β6 tax rateit + uit.....................................................................models (2), (6) and (14) 
leverageit = α + β1 tangibility it + β2 sizeit + β3 roait + β4 riskit+ β5 mk-bk ratioit + β6 tax rateit + Σ γ dummy sectorsit + uit.................................models (4), (8) and (16) 
leverageit = αi + β1 tangibility it + β2 sizeit + β3 roait + β4 riskit+ β5 mk-bk ratioit + β6 tax rateit + εit....................................................................models (1), (5) and (13) 







Table 5.6 (Cont.)  Regression Results  –Booth et al. (2001) Framework– 
 
Panel A Panel B 
 
Total book debt ratios Long-term book debt ratios 
 
FE OLS rob FE OLS rob FE OLS rob FE OLS rob 
size -0.3872 3.4266*** -0.3872 4.0230*** -1.4477 2.8846*** -1.4477 3.4196*** 
 
(0.9145) (1.0843) (0.9145) (0.9575) (1.1004) (0.9822) (1.1004) (0.8473) 
tangibility 0.0549 -0.1305* 0.0549 -0.1407 0.2971*** 0.1044** 0.2971*** 0.1131* 
 
(0.0459) (0.0768) (0.0459) (0.0854) (0.0552) (0.0519) (0.0552) (0.0602) 
ROA -0.4222*** -1.0844*** -0.4222*** -1.0461*** -0.1415 -0.3418* -0.1415 -0.2516 
 
(0.0910) (0.2300) (0.0910) (0.1947) (0.1095) (0.1779) (0.1095) (0.1789) 
risk 0.4897 -4.0322*** 0.4897 -4.2365*** -0.4468 -3.7074*** -0.4468 -4.6675*** 
 
(1.0249) (1.1609) (1.0249) (1.3042) (1.2332) (1.1214) (1.2332) (1.3515) 
mk-bk ratio -0.0035 0.0091 -0.0035 0.0055 0.0155*** 0.0165* 0.0155*** 0.0162** 
 
(0.0022) (0.0120) (0.0022) (0.0095) (0.0026) (0.0088) (0.0026) (0.0065) 
eff tax rate 0.0007 0.0002 0.0007 0.0019 0.0077* 0.0104 0.0077* 0.0105 
 
(0.0036) (0.0067) (0.0036) (0.0055) (0.0043) (0.0094) (0.0043) (0.0091) 













































_cons 0.5367*** 0.1609 0.5367*** -0.0091 0.3337** -0.1557 0.3337** -0.3306*** 
 
(0.1401) (0.1568) (0.1401) (0.1384) (0.1686) (0.1429) (0.1686) (0.1218) 
N 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 









































Standard errors in parentheses 
      
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 




Table 5.6 (cont.)  Regression Results  –Booth et al. (2001) Framework– 
 
Panel C Panel D 
 
Total market debt ratios Long-term market debt ratios 
 
FE OLS rob FE OLS rob FE OLS rob FE OLS rob 
size -4.8647*** 0.3289 -4.8647*** 0.7150 -4.7245*** 0.3370 -4.7245*** 0.6868 
 
(1.3540) (1.5037) (1.3540) (1.3180) (1.6588) (1.4156) (1.6588) (1.2090) 
tangibility 0.3045*** -0.0329 0.3045*** -0.0393 0.5001*** 0.1907** 0.5001*** 0.1998** 
 
(0.0679) (0.0948) (0.0679) (0.1121) (0.0832) (0.0763) (0.0832) (0.0909) 
ROA -0.9524*** -1.6714*** -0.9524*** -1.6279*** -0.6674*** -0.9820*** -0.6674*** -0.8945*** 
 
(0.1348) (0.2170) (0.1348) (0.2255) (0.1651) (0.2567) (0.1651) (0.2703) 
risk -3.6550** -3.5659 -3.6550** -4.0398 -3.6528** -2.8576 -3.6528** -3.9649 
 
(1.5175) (2.7633) (1.5175) (2.6459) (1.8590) (3.3954) (1.8590) (2.9025) 
mk-bk ratio -0.0209*** -0.0305** -0.0209*** -0.0327** -0.0101** -0.0254* -0.0101** -0.0250* 
 
(0.0032) (0.0132) (0.0032) (0.0131) (0.0040) (0.0134) (0.0040) (0.0128) 
eff tax rate 0.0053 0.0083 0.0053 0.0102 0.0084 0.0134 0.0084 0.0141 
 
(0.0053) (0.0094) (0.0053) (0.0092) (0.0065) (0.0132) (0.0065) (0.0131) 













































_cons 1.2000*** 0.6825*** 1.2000*** 0.5364*** 0.8636*** 0.3143 0.8636*** 0.1597 
 
(0.2074) (0.2233) (0.2074) (0.1962) (0.2541) (0.2093) (0.2541) (0.1831) 
N 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 









































Standard errors in parentheses 
      
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 




5.3.2 Capital Structure Model of Mexican publicly traded companies 
 
After contrasting the results from leading capital structure investigations to the results 
from Mexico, a general model for the Mexican publicly traded companies is specified.  
It is worth noticing that my replication of the previous two models (viz. Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) and Booth et al. (2001)) had two aims.  One was to study the 
behaviour of their determinants and to document their applicability to the capital 
structure of Mexican publicly traded companies.  The second was to have/produce 
more ‘comparable-basis’ evidence of the possible evolution/changes, if any, of the 
effects of those determinants in the capital structure of Mexican publicly traded 
companies.  All this aimed at helping a better understanding of the factors behind the 
financing decisions of these companies. 
 
In this section, the new-specified capital structure model is an elaboration on the Boot 
et al.’s (2001) proposed model for emerging markets.  To this end, two variables 
namely liquidity and consolidation are included with the aim of controlling for the 
particularities of Mexican publicly traded companies. 
 
The stylised firm-specific variables used in this model are: size, tangibility, 
profitability (ROA), growth opportunities (market-to-book ratio), risk, effective tax 
rate, liquidity and consolidation.  The first four variables have been widely tested for 
both emerging and developed economies (Rajan and Zingales 1995, Jung et al. 1996, 
Wald 1999, Wiwattanakantang 1999, Booth et al. 2001, and, Glen and Singh 2004, 
among others).  The fifth and the sixth variable are expected to have a higher effect on 
emerging economies, whilst the seventh and eighth are selected considering the 
features of the Mexican companies.  Table 5.7 summarises the calculation of these 
variables, and contrasts them with those used by Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Booth 






Table 5.7  Specification of Dependent and Control Variables 
Variables 
 
Rajan and Zingales, 
1995 
























Adjusted debt to 
(Adjusted debt plus book 




Adjusted debt to 
(Adjusted debt plus 




Total book-debt ratio: 
Total liabilities divided by 




ratio: (total liabilities 
minus current liabilities) 
divided by (total liabilities 
minus current liabilities 
plus net worth). 
 
Long-term market-debt 
ratio: (total liabilities 
minus current liabilities) 
divided by (total liabilities 
minus current liabilities 
plus average equity 
market value). 
 
Total book-debt ratio: 
Total liabilities divided by 




ratio: (total liabilities 
minus current liabilities) 
divided by (total liabilities 
minus current liabilities 
plus net worth). 
 
Short-term book-debt 
ratio: (current liabilities 
divided by (current 
liabilities plus net worth). 
Note: 
For Market values net 





Tangibility of Assets 
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Natural logarithm of net 
sales   
 
 
Natural logarithm of 
sales multiplied by 100. 
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Average tax rate:  
Income before taxes to 
income after taxes. 
 
 
Average tax rate:  
Income before taxes to 






Book value of current 
assets divided by book 








Binary variable taking 
values of zero or one 
depending on whether or 
not the account of the 
companies is 





The choice of these variables also responds to the availability of Mexican corporate 
information and to the objectives of this model in itself. 
 
The main three objectives of this model are: first, to test whether the main 
determinants of the capital structure of developed markets apply to emerging markets.  
Secondly, to investigate whether country/firm-specific determinants might outweigh 
the effects of the common determinants in the financial policies of the Mexican 
publicly traded companies.  Ultimately, to bring about some understanding of the 
financing policies of these companies. 
 
The data used to estimate this model is organised as a balanced panel of 616 
observations.  As was explained previously in Section 4.2, these observations belong 
to 77 companies during the eight-year period from 2000 to 2007 inclusive. 
 
 
Figure 5.3  Sources of domestic credit, financing by international capital markets and 
inflation percentages of Mexico. 
 
 

























































Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of  GDP) Domestic credit to private sector (% of  GDP)

























































Mean 0.4783 0.4856 0.3044 0.3338 0.3204 0.3470 
0.154
2 
0.4843 0.0821 1.4658 0.0132 0.2371 1.0914 2.1176 0.5000 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.1779 0.2471 0.1697 0.2335 0.1802 0.2464 
0.017
8 
0.2088 0.0697 2.2396 0.0042 0.9251 0.7924 1.8581 0.5004 










Maximum 1.1918 0.9955 0.8068 0.9762 1.1971 0.9945 
0.192
8 
0.9858 0.3620 17.3055 0.0419 13.1772 4.9234 13.4734 1.0000 
25th Percentile 0.3623 0.2833 0.1705 0.1458 0.2026 0.1413 
0.142
4 
0.3462 0.0340 0.4938 0.0136 0.1334 0.6394 1.0666 0.0000 
Median 0.4820 0.4734 0.2849 0.2726 0.2898 0.2828 
0.154
7 
0.5214 0.0788 0.9743 0.0141 0.2927 0.9257 1.5474 0.5000 
75th Percentile 0.6002 0.6906 0.4159 0.5026 0.4207 0.5150 
0.167
2 
0.6357 0.1193 1.8257 0.0154 0.3846 1.3798 2.2316 1.0000 

















































total book debt 1 
              
total mkt debt 0.5805* 1 
             
long-term bk debt 0.6586* 0.3362* 1 
            
long-term mkt debt 0.4042* 0.8574* 0.5556* 1 
           
short-term bk debt 0.8526* 0.5238* 0.2263* 0.1675* 1 
          short-term mkt 
debt 0.5246* 0.9297* 0.0918* 0.6800* 0.6476* 1 








        
tangibility 
-
0.1693* 0.0771* 0.0396 0.2338* 
-
0.2824* -0.0155 -0.0262 1 













* 0.0009 1 
      








* -0.1237* 0.3349* 1 
     
risk -0.0569 -0.0211 
-
0.0782* -0.0262 -0.0287 0.0037 0.0082 0.0169 
-
0.0898* 0.0019 1 
    
eff tax rate -0.0014 -0.0301 0.0993* 0.0221 -0.0332 -0.0483 
0.1122
* 0.0681* 0.1061* 0.0576 -0.0548 1 













* -0.1858* 0.5674* 
0.6978




































* 0.0165 1 





For the sake of comparability, this model will be tested following the same 
methodology previously carried out.  However, bearing in mind that it has been 
documented that the pooled ols method could fail to account for time invariant 
heterogeneity, causing the parameter to be biased and inconsistent, one-way FE and 
RE estimations are used to test this model, which can be expressed as follows: 
 
  leverage it = αi + β1 sizeit + β2 tangibilityit + β3 roait +  β4 mk-bk ratioit +β5 riskit +   
β6 tax rateit +  β7 liquidityit +β8 consolidationit +  εit  
 
where leverage is any of the six ratios (total debt, long-term debt or short-term debt 
valued at either market price or book value) for the firm i at time t.  
 
In order to control for the effects industry sector, I will allow γ to denote the sum of all 
the dummy variables controlling for them, so that the previous model can be re-written 
as: 
 
  leverage it = αi + β1 sizeit + β2 tangibilityit + β3 roait +  β4 mk-bk ratioit +β5 riskit +   
β6 tax rateit +  β7 liquidityit +β8 consolidationit + Σ γ dummy sectorsit  + εit  
 
In order to identify whether a FE model or a RE model is most appropriate for 
modelling this theoretical conceptualisation, the Hausman and the Hausman and 
Sigmamore tests are carried out.  In this case, the aforementioned tests revealed that 
the RE estimator is preferred to the FE estimator (i.e. no rejection of the null 
hypothesis) for all the measures of leverage but for total-book debt ratio. 
 
Finally, the results from the previous regressions are contrasted with those results from 
the regressions but with a robustness test.  The statistical software used to estimate 
these equations is STATA 10.  The robustness option in this software provides an 
estimation of standard errors by cluster-robust approximation.  All these results are 






Table 5.10  Regression Results  –General Capital Structure Model– 
 
This table shows the correlation of the total debt ratio, long-term debt ratio, and short-term debt ratio at book and market values.  All of these measures 
act as the dependent variable, one at a time, whilst the eight company factors proposed are: size, tangibility, profitability, growth opportunities, risk, 
effective tax rate, liquidity and consolidation. 
 
The leverage measures are calculated as follows: total book-debt equals total liabilities divided by total liabilities and net worth.  Long-term book-debt 
is total liabilities less current liabilities divided by total liabilities less current liabilities plus net worth, and short-term book debt is current liabilities 
divided by total liabilities and net worth.  The difference between book-ratios and market-ratios is that market-ratios use the average of equity market 
value instead of that of net worth. 
 
The eight regressors are computed as follows: size is the natural logarithm of sales divided by 100; tangibility is the ratio of the book value of real 
estate and plant divided total assets; profitability is the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets; market-to-book ratio is the 
equity market value divided by net worth; business risk is the variability of return on assets; tax rate is the percentage from earning before and 
earnings after tax; liquidity is the book value of current assets divided by book value of current liabilities; and consolidation is a binary variable which 
took zero as a value when the company accounts were not consolidated and one when they were. 
 
All the variables (regressand and regressors) correspond to the period 2000 to 2007.  Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. 
 
The estimated models are the following, 
leverageit =α + β1 sizeit + β2 tangibilityit + β3 roait + β4 mk-bk ratioit + β5 riskit + β6 tax rateit + β7 liquidityit + β8 consolidationit + εit....... 
              ....models (1), (2), (5), (6), (9), (10) 
leverageit =α + β1 sizeit + β2 tangibilityit + β3 roait + β4 mk-bk ratioit + β5 riskit + β6 tax rateit + β7 liquidityit + β8 consolidationit + Σ γ dummy sectorsit + εit.... 






Table 5.10  Regression Results (Cont.)  –General Capital Structure Model– 
 
 
Total book debt  Long-term book debt  Short book debt  
 
FE FE, vce FE FE, vce RE RE, vce RE RE, vce RE RE, vce RE RE, vce 
Size -1.8746** -1.8746 -1.8746** -1.8746 1.9613*** 1.9613** 2.4476*** 2.4476** -0.0006 -0.0006 0.0905 0.0905 
 
(0.9478) (1.8909) (0.9478) (1.8909) (0.7282) (0.9870) (0.7096) (0.9533) (0.6102) (1.0402) (0.6362) (1.0527) 
Tangibility -0.1392*** -0.1392 -0.1392*** -0.1392 0.0531 0.0531 0.0664 0.0664 -0.2942*** -0.2942*** -0.2890*** -0.2890*** 
 
(0.0452) (0.0989) (0.0452) (0.0989) (0.0453) (0.0921) (0.0447) (0.0887) (0.0388) (0.0702) (0.0399) (0.0739) 
ROA -0.3617*** -0.3617*** -0.3617*** -0.3617*** -0.2616** -0.2616* -0.2513** -0.2513* -0.3218*** -0.3218** -0.3275*** -0.3275** 
 
(0.0834) (0.1201) (0.0834) (0.1201) (0.1022) (0.1424) (0.1015) (0.1438) (0.0896) (0.1475) (0.0898) (0.1473) 
mk-bk ratio -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 0.0183*** 0.0183*** 0.0180*** 0.0180*** -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.0036 -0.0036 
 
(0.0022) (0.0066) (0.0022) (0.0066) (0.0026) (0.0045) (0.0026) (0.0045) (0.0023) (0.0071) (0.0023) (0.0072) 
Risk 0.9740 0.9740 0.9740 0.9740 1.0149 1.0149 0.7462 0.7462 -0.6066 -0.6066 -0.6275 -0.6275 
 
(1.0658) (1.1670) (1.0658) (1.1670) (1.3379) (1.3671) (1.3344) (1.3808) (1.1772) (1.2531) (1.1794) (1.2517) 
eff tax rate 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0077* 0.0077 0.0077* 0.0077 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0012 
 
(0.0034) (0.0022) (0.0034) (0.0022) (0.0044) (0.0056) (0.0044) (0.0058) (0.0039) (0.0028) (0.0039) (0.0028) 
Liquidity -0.0379*** -0.0379*** -0.0379*** -0.0379*** -0.0088* -0.0088** -0.0089* -0.0089** -0.0532*** -0.0532*** -0.0524*** -0.0524*** 
 
(0.0041) (0.0084) (0.0041) (0.0084) (0.0046) (0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0040) (0.0085) (0.0040) (0.0086) 
Consolidation -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0460*** -0.0460*** -0.0462*** -0.0462*** 0.0123 0.0123 0.0124 0.0124 
 
(0.0076) (0.0137) (0.0076) (0.0137) (0.0094) (0.0125) (0.0094) (0.0126) (0.0083) (0.0135) (0.0083) (0.0136) 

































































_cons 0.9336*** 0.9336*** 0.9336*** 0.9336*** -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.1614 -0.1614 0.6091*** 0.6091*** 0.5593*** 0.5593*** 
 
(0.1504) (0.2826) (0.1504) (0.2826) (0.1159) (0.1535) (0.1202) (0.1542) (0.0970) (0.1558) (0.1078) (0.1626) 
N 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 
r2 0.1925 0.1925 0.1925 0.1925 
        
r2_o 0.2206 0.2206 0.2206 0.2206 0.1925 0.1925 0.3124 0.3124 0.4967 0.4967 0.5173 0.5173 
r2_b 0.2268 0.2268 0.2268 0.2268 0.2266 0.2266 0.3941 0.3941 0.5807 0.5807 0.6067 0.6067 
R2_w 
            
sigma_u 0.1436 0.1436 0.1436 0.1436 0.1237 0.1237 0.1093 0.1093 0.0995 0.0995 0.0990 0.0990 
sigma_e 0.0710 0.0710 0.0710 0.0710 0.0924 0.0924 0.0924 0.0924 0.0815 0.0815 0.0815 0.0815 
rho 0.8035 0.8035 0.8035 0.8035 0.6417 0.6417 0.5831 0.5831 0.5987 0.5987 0.5964 0.5964 
theta 
    
0.7446 0.7446 0.7136 0.7136 0.7219 0.7219 0.7207 0.7207 
Standard errors in parentheses 
           
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 







Table 5.10  Regression Results (Cont.)  –General Capital Structure Model– 
 
 
Total market debt  Long-term market debt  Short market debt  
 
RE RE, vce RE RE, vce RE RE, vce RE RE, vce RE RE, vce RE RE, vce 
size -0.8548 -0.8548 -0.5576 -0.5576 0.3732 0.3732 0.7196 0.7196 -1.3390* -1.3390 -1.2057 -1.2057 
 
(0.8297) (1.3272) (0.8256) (1.2271) (0.9358) (1.2965) (0.9062) (1.1834) (0.8027) (1.3030) (0.8204) (1.2349) 
tangibility 0.0124 0.0124 0.0288 0.0288 0.2135*** 0.2135** 0.2376*** 0.2376** -0.1062** -0.1062 -0.0952* -0.0952 
 
(0.0512) (0.0950) (0.0511) (0.0966) (0.0601) (0.0941) (0.0590) (0.0926) (0.0508) (0.0963) (0.0515) (0.0994) 
ROA -1.0281*** -1.0281*** -1.0267*** -1.0267*** -0.8298*** -0.8298*** -0.8092*** -0.8092*** -0.9230*** -0.9230*** -0.9217*** -0.9217*** 
 
(0.1142) (0.1637) (0.1135) (0.1605) (0.1408) (0.2147) (0.1390) (0.2138) (0.1166) (0.1682) (0.1164) (0.1667) 
mk-bk ratio -0.0166*** -0.0166 -0.0170*** -0.0170 -0.0068* -0.0068 -0.0074** -0.0074 -0.0164*** -0.0164 -0.0165*** -0.0165 
 
(0.0029) (0.0115) (0.0029) (0.0115) (0.0036) (0.0099) (0.0036) (0.0098) (0.0030) (0.0104) (0.0030) (0.0104) 
risk 3.1586** 3.1586* 2.9599** 2.9599* 4.0393** 4.0393* 3.6762** 3.6762* 2.7212* 2.7212 2.6114* 2.6114 
 
(1.4927) (1.7326) (1.4880) (1.6904) (1.8546) (2.3242) (1.8408) (2.2137) (1.5311) (1.8520) (1.5298) (1.8234) 
eff tax rate 0.0042 0.0042 0.0043 0.0043 0.0071 0.0071 0.0072 0.0072 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 
 
(0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0061) (0.0075) (0.0061) (0.0077) (0.0050) (0.0042) (0.0050) (0.0043) 
liquidity -0.0357*** -0.0357*** -0.0358*** -0.0358*** -0.0105* -0.0105* -0.0112* -0.0112* -0.0482*** -0.0482*** -0.0483*** -0.0483*** 
 
(0.0052) (0.0068) (0.0051) (0.0065) (0.0062) (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0058) (0.0052) (0.0083) (0.0052) (0.0081) 
consolidation -0.1089*** -0.1089*** -0.1083*** -0.1083*** -0.1279*** -0.1279*** -0.1266*** -0.1266*** -0.0847*** -0.0847*** -0.0843*** -0.0843*** 
 
(0.0105) (0.0167) (0.0105) (0.0166) (0.0131) (0.0193) (0.0131) (0.0191) (0.0108) (0.0171) (0.0108) (0.0169) 

































































_cons 0.8076*** 0.8076*** 0.6629*** 0.6629*** 0.2822* 0.2822 0.1150 0.1150 0.8131*** 0.8131*** 0.7222*** 0.7222*** 
  (0.1321) (0.2199) (0.1401) (0.2152) (0.1488) (0.2017) (0.1532) (0.1957) (0.1277) (0.2072) (0.1390) (0.2057) 
N 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 
r2 
            r2_o 0.4927 0.4927 0.5575 0.5575 0.2802 0.2802 0.3897 0.3897 0.5315 0.5315 0.5660 0.5660 
r2_b 0.5312 0.5312 0.6113 0.6113 0.2826 0.2826 0.4512 0.4512 0.6014 0.6014 0.6434 0.6434 
R2_w 
            sigma_u 0.1429 0.1429 0.1316 0.1316 0.1501 0.1501 0.1322 0.1322 0.1321 0.1321 0.1273 0.1273 
sigma_e 0.1025 0.1025 0.1025 0.1025 0.1291 0.1291 0.1291 0.1291 0.1059 0.1059 0.1059 0.1059 
rho 0.6600 0.6600 0.6222 0.6222 0.5746 0.5746 0.5117 0.5117 0.6088 0.6088 0.5910 0.5910 
theta 0.7540 0.7540 0.7344 0.7344 0.7090 0.7090 0.6735 0.6735 0.7273 0.7273 0.7178 0.7178 
Standard errors in parentheses 
          * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 




5.3.3 Further Determinants of the Capital Structure of Mexican 
Publicly Traded Companies 
 
 
5.3.3.1 Capital Structure and Market Power Interaction 
 
After analysing the behaviour of some of the well-known capital structure 
determinants suggested for Emerging Markets (EM) and for Developed Markets (DM), 
the effects of product market structure are also assessed in the capital structure choices 
of the Mexican publicly traded companies.  To this end, Pandey’s (2004) main 
arguments, which can be considered a result of the interaction of market conditions, 
agency problems and bankruptcy cost, are tested 
 
It has been documented that corporate capital structure is modified by product market, 
as this affects the competitive behaviour and strategies of companies.  Furthermore, it 
has been suggested how, in favourable economic conditions, oligopolistic companies 
might chose to maximise their output as a competing strategy in order to optimise their 
profitability.  This theory seems to hold also in unfavourable economic conditions due 
to the limited liability status of shareholders who passed the adverse outcomes onto 
lenders.  Accordingly, it is expected that oligopolistic companies ‘..., in contrast to 
firms in competitive markets, would employ higher levels of debt to produce more 
when opportunities to earn higher profits arise’ (Pandey 2004, p. 79) 
 
Since this analysis is a further investigation of the determinants of capital structure of 
Mexican publicly traded companies already discussed in previous sections, I employ 
the general capital structure model already written, and include an approximation of 
Tobin’s q variable to account for the effects of product market.  It is worth mentioning 
that market-to-book value variable is not included for this analysis as it might cause 
correlation to Tobin’s q variable.  The variables included in this model, therefore, are: 
size, tangibility, profitability (ROA), risk, effective tax rate, liquidity, consolidation, 





Market Power proxy Variable 
Market Power can be analysed under two different perspectives: (1) the characteristics 
of inputs and product, and (2) the product market competition strategy (Harris and 
Raviv 1991).  The most common strategic variables considered to carry both types of 
analysis have being product price and product quantity. 
 
The most common proxies used for analysing product market effects are the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, the Lener Index and Tobin’s Q.  The latter is becoming 
popular due to the degree of detail in the information needed to build any of the 
previous indexes (Pandey 2004).  This study follows the clear and simple methodology 
provided by Chung and Pruitt (1994) to build a fairly accurate proxy of Tobin’s Q 




Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the sum of market value equity plus liquidating 
value of the firm’s preferred stock plus long-term debt and net current assets to the 
book value of total assets.  This approximation of Tobin’s Q assumes that the 
replacement values of a firm’s plant, equipment and inventories are equal to their book 
values (Chung and Pruitt 1994). 
 
 
5.3.3.1.1 Empirical Testing 
 
To keep the same methodology employed in the previous sections, I estimate this 
model using FE and RE estimations.  The new variable included is Tobin’s q ratio 
linear, squared and cubic; therefore, the model can be express as follows:  
 
    leverage it = αi + β1 sizeit + β2 tangibilityit + β3 roait + β4 riskit + β5 liquidityit + β6 tax rateit  
 + β7 tobin’s qit + β8 (tobin’s q)
2
it + β9 (tobin’s q)
3
it +β10 consolidationit  + εit 
 
where leverage is any of the six ratios (total debt, long-term debt or short-term debt 




In order to control for the effects industry sector, I will allow γ to denote the sum of all 
the dummy variables controlling for them, so that the previous model can be re-written 
as: 
 
      leverage it = αi + β1 sizeit + β2 tangibilityit + β3 roait + β4 riskit + β5 liquidityit + β6 tax rateit  
 + β7 tobin’s qit + β8 (tobin’s q)
2
it + β9 (tobin’s q)
3
it +β10 consolidationit +               
Σ γ dummy sectorsit  + εit  
 
In order to identify whether a FE model or a RE model is most appropriate for 
modelling this theoretical conceptualisation, the Hausman and the Hausman and 
Sigmamore tests are carried out.  In this case, the aforementioned tests revealed that 
the FE estimator is preferred for the three book leverage ratios and for long-term 
market debt.  The RE estimator is more accurate for testing this model against the total 
market value and short-term market value. 
 
Finally, the results from the previous regressions are contrasted with those results from 
the regressions but with a robustness test.  The statistical software used to estimate 




Table 5.11.  Regression Results  –Market Power Interaction– 
This table shows the correlation of the total debt ratio, long-term debt ratio, and short-term debt ratio at book and market values.  All of these measures act as 
the dependent variable, whilst the ten company factors proposed are: size, tangibility, profitability, risk, effective tax rate, liquidity, consolidation, tobin’s q, 
tobin’s q squared and tobin’s q cubic. 
 
The leverage measures are calculated as follows: total book-debt equals total liabilities divided by total liabilities and net worth.  Long-term book-debt is total 
liabilities less current liabilities divided by total liabilities less current liabilities plus net worth, and short-term book debt is current liabilities divided by total 
liabilities and net worth.  The difference between book-ratios and market-ratios is that market-ratios use the average of equity market value instead of that of 
net worth. 
 
The eight regressors are computed as follows: size is the natural logarithm of sales divided by 100; tangibility is the ratio of the book value of real estate and 
plant divided total assets; profitability to is the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets; business risk is the variability of return on 
assets; tax rate is the percentage from earning before and earnings after tax; liquidity is the book value of current assets divided by book value of current 
liabilities; consolidation is a binary variable which took zero as a value when the company accounts were not consolidated and one when they were; and 
Tobin’s q the ratio of the sum of market value equity plus liquidating value of the firm’s preferred stock plus long-term debt and net current assets to the book 
value of total assets. 
 
All the variables (regressand and regressors) correspond to the period 2000 to 2007.  Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. 
 
The estimated models are the following, 
leverageit = α + β1 sizeit + β2 tangibilityit + β3 roait + β4 liquidityit + β5 riskit + β6 tax rateit + β7 consolidationit + β8 tobins’qit + β9 tobins’q
2
it +                                                  
β10 tobins’q
3
it + εit...............................................................................................models (1), (2), (5), (6), (9), (10) 
     leverageit =α + β1 sizeit + β2 tangibilityit + β3 roait + β4 liquidityit + β5 riskit + β6 tax rateit + β7 liquidityit + β8 tobins’qit + β9 tobins’q
2
it + β10 tobins’q
3
it +Σ γ dummy 
sectorsit + εit... .......................................................................................................models (3), (4), (7), (8), (11), (12) 
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Table 5.11  Regression Results (Cont.)  –Market Power Interaction– 
 
Total book debt Long term book debt Short  term book debt 
 
FE FE, vce FE FE, vce FE FE, vce FE FE, vce FE FE, vce FE FE, vce 
size -1.3594 -1.3594 -1.3594 -1.3594 0.8502 0.8502 0.8502 0.8502 -1.6700* -1.6700 -1.6700* -1.6700 
 
(0.8847) (1.7070) (0.8847) (1.7070) (1.1354) (2.7186) (1.1354) (2.7186) (0.8572) (1.5632) (0.8572) (1.5632) 
tangibility -0.1669*** -0.1669 -0.1669*** -0.1669 0.2316*** 0.2316 0.2316*** 0.2316 -0.3592*** -0.3592*** -0.3592*** -0.3592*** 
 
(0.0406) (0.1040) (0.0406) (0.1040) (0.0521) (0.1581) (0.0521) (0.1581) (0.0394) (0.1093) (0.0394) (0.1093) 
ROA -0.2465*** -0.2465* -0.2465*** -0.2465* -0.3879*** -0.3879** -0.3879*** -0.3879** 0.0091 0.0091 0.0091 0.0091 
 
(0.0820) (0.1269) (0.0820) (0.1269) (0.1052) (0.1563) (0.1052) (0.1563) (0.0794) (0.1102) (0.0794) (0.1102) 
risk 0.4556 0.4556 0.4556 0.4556 1.8544 1.8544 1.8544 1.8544 -0.7272 -0.7272 -0.7272 -0.7272 
 
(1.0073) (1.0622) (1.0073) (1.0622) (1.2927) (1.4770) (1.2927) (1.4770) (0.9759) (1.1114) (0.9759) (1.1114) 
eff tax rate 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0083** 0.0083 0.0083** 0.0083 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 
 
(0.0032) (0.0023) (0.0032) (0.0023) (0.0041) (0.0065) (0.0041) (0.0065) (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0029) 
Q ratio -0.1719*** -0.1719*** -0.1719*** -0.1719*** 0.3087*** 0.3087*** 0.3087*** 0.3087*** -0.3542*** -0.3542*** -0.3542*** -0.3542*** 
 
(0.0208) (0.0398) (0.0208) (0.0398) (0.0267) (0.0786) (0.0267) (0.0786) (0.0201) (0.0444) (0.0201) (0.0444) 
Q2 ratio 0.0795*** 0.0795*** 0.0795*** 0.0795*** -0.1411*** -0.1411*** -0.1411*** -0.1411*** 0.1595*** 0.1595*** 0.1595*** 0.1595*** 
 
(0.0117) (0.0206) (0.0117) (0.0206) (0.0150) (0.0391) (0.0150) (0.0391) (0.0114) (0.0237) (0.0114) (0.0237) 
Q3 ratio -0.0108*** -0.0108*** -0.0108*** -0.0108*** 0.0181*** 0.0181*** 0.0181*** 0.0181*** -0.0204*** -0.0204*** -0.0204*** -0.0204*** 
 
(0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0025) (0.0058) (0.0025) (0.0058) (0.0019) (0.0037) (0.0019) (0.0037) 
liquidity -0.0325*** -0.0325*** -0.0325*** -0.0325*** -0.0113** -0.0113 -0.0113** -0.0113 -0.0402*** -0.0402*** -0.0402*** -0.0402*** 
 
(0.0040) (0.0069) (0.0040) (0.0069) (0.0052) (0.0083) (0.0052) (0.0083) (0.0039) (0.0089) (0.0039) (0.0089) 
consolidation 0.0062 0.0062 0.0062 0.0062 -0.0394*** -0.0394*** -0.0394*** -0.0394*** 0.0301*** 0.0301*** 0.0301*** 0.0301*** 
 
(0.0076) (0.0126) (0.0076) (0.0126) (0.0097) (0.0140) (0.0097) (0.0140) (0.0074) (0.0110) (0.0074) (0.0110) 


































































_cons 0.9358*** 0.9358*** 0.9358*** 0.9358*** -0.0445 -0.0445 -0.0445 -0.0445 1.0114*** 1.0114*** 1.0114*** 1.0114*** 
  (0.1391) (0.2406) (0.1391) (0.2406) (0.1784) (0.4550) (0.1784) (0.4550) (0.1347) (0.2443) (0.1347) (0.2443) 
N 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 
r2 0.2849 0.2849 0.2849 0.2849 0.2502 0.2502 0.2502 0.2502 0.5150 0.5150 0.5150 0.5150 
r2_o 0.2772 0.2772 0.2772 0.2772 0.0929 0.0929 0.0929 0.0929 0.5407 0.5407 0.5407 0.5407 
r2_b 0.2757 0.2757 0.2757 0.2757 0.0443 0.0443 0.0443 0.0443 0.5487 0.5487 0.5487 0.5487 
R2_w 
            sigma_u 0.1387 0.1387 0.1387 0.1387 0.1436 0.1436 0.1436 0.1436 0.1070 0.1070 0.1070 0.1070 
sigma_e 0.0669 0.0669 0.0669 0.0669 0.0859 0.0859 0.0859 0.0859 0.0649 0.0649 0.0649 0.0649 
rho 0.8111 0.8111 0.8111 0.8111 0.7364 0.7364 0.7364 0.7364 0.7314 0.7314 0.7314 0.7314 
theta 
            Standard errors in parentheses           
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01           
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Table 5.11  Regression Results (Cont.)  –Market Power Interaction– 
 
Total market debt Long-term market debt Short term market debt 
  RE RE, vce RE RE, vce FE FE, vce FE FE, vce RE RE, vce RE RE, vce 
size 0.8012 0.8012 1.1056* 1.1056 2.4661 2.4661 2.4661 2.4661 0.5163 0.5163 0.7339 0.7339 
 
(0.6400) (1.0135) (0.6430) (0.9730) (1.6176) (2.9528) (1.6176) (2.9528) (0.5550) (0.8131) (0.5713) (0.8127) 
tangibility -0.0607 -0.0607 -0.0513 -0.0513 0.2854*** 0.2854* 0.2854*** 0.2854* -0.2164*** -0.2164*** -0.2115*** -0.2115*** 
 
(0.0389) (0.0759) (0.0390) (0.0743) (0.0743) (0.1629) (0.0743) (0.1629) (0.0346) (0.0618) (0.0352) (0.0620) 
ROA -0.4601*** -0.4601*** -0.4591*** -0.4591*** -0.6616*** -0.6616*** -0.6616*** -0.6616*** -0.3035*** -0.3035*** -0.3029*** -0.3029*** 
 
(0.0929) (0.1374) (0.0925) (0.1368) (0.1498) (0.2256) (0.1498) (0.2256) (0.0849) (0.1090) (0.0848) (0.1101) 
risk 1.9699* 1.9699 1.8590 1.8590 3.9546** 3.9546 3.9546** 3.9546 1.3543 1.3543 1.3128 1.3128 
 
(1.1597) (1.3517) (1.1556) (1.3342) (1.8417) (2.5876) (1.8417) (2.5876) (1.0626) (1.4098) (1.0604) (1.4012) 
eff tax rate 0.0035 0.0035 0.0034 0.0034 0.0061 0.0061 0.0061 0.0061 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 
 
(0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0058) (0.0077) (0.0058) (0.0077) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0035) 
Q ratio -0.3053*** -0.3053*** -0.3027*** -0.3027*** 0.1257*** 0.1257 0.1257*** 0.1257 -0.4769*** -0.4769*** -0.4767*** -0.4767*** 
 
(0.0240) (0.0819) (0.0239) (0.0809) (0.0380) (0.1070) (0.0380) (0.1070) (0.0220) (0.0789) (0.0220) (0.0777) 
Q2 ratio 0.0238* 0.0238 0.0232* 0.0232 -0.1421*** -0.1421** -0.1421*** -0.1421** 0.1205*** 0.1205*** 0.1212*** 0.1212*** 
 
(0.0135) (0.0421) (0.0135) (0.0416) (0.0214) (0.0572) (0.0214) (0.0572) (0.0124) (0.0401) (0.0124) (0.0394) 
Q3 ratio 0.0038* 0.0038 0.0038* 0.0038 0.0240*** 0.0240*** 0.0240*** 0.0240*** -0.0092*** -0.0092 -0.0092*** -0.0092 
 
(0.0023) (0.0062) (0.0023) (0.0062) (0.0036) (0.0090) (0.0036) (0.0090) (0.0021) (0.0057) (0.0021) (0.0057) 
liquidity -0.0135*** -0.0135** -0.0137*** -0.0137** 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 -0.0233*** -0.0233*** -0.0234*** -0.0234*** 
 
(0.0041) (0.0064) (0.0041) (0.0065) (0.0074) (0.0095) (0.0074) (0.0095) (0.0037) (0.0054) (0.0037) (0.0054) 
consolidation -0.0612*** -0.0612*** -0.0621*** -0.0621*** -0.1082*** -0.1082*** -0.1082*** -0.1082*** -0.0406*** -0.0406*** -0.0416*** -0.0416*** 
 
(0.0085) (0.0130) (0.0085) (0.0129) (0.0139) (0.0227) (0.0139) (0.0227) (0.0078) (0.0130) (0.0078) (0.0131) 


































































_cons 0.7361*** 0.7361*** 0.6112*** 0.6112*** -0.1132 -0.1132 -0.1132 -0.1132 0.7877*** 0.7877*** 0.7061*** 0.7061*** 
  (0.1009) (0.1624) (0.1079) (0.1609) (0.2542) (0.4952) (0.2542) (0.4952) (0.0874) (0.1251) (0.0957) (0.1306) 
N 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 616 
r2 
    
0.3663 0.3663 0.3663 0.3663 
    r2_o 0.7022 0.7022 0.7359 0.7359 0.3186 0.3186 0.3186 0.3186 0.7839 0.7839 0.7984 0.7984 
r2_b 0.7269 0.7269 0.7678 0.7678 0.2904 0.2904 0.2904 0.2904 0.8237 0.8237 0.8397 0.8397 
R2_w 
            sigma_u 0.1088 0.1088 0.1020 0.1020 0.1567 0.1567 0.1567 0.1567 0.0902 0.0902 0.0882 0.0882 
sigma_e 0.0795 0.0795 0.0795 0.0795 0.1224 0.1224 0.1224 0.1224 0.0734 0.0734 0.0734 0.0734 
rho 0.6518 0.6518 0.6219 0.6219 0.6210 0.6210 0.6210 0.6210 0.6021 0.6021 0.5914 0.5914 
theta 0.7498 0.7498 0.7343 0.7343 
    
0.7238 0.7238 0.7180 0.7180 
Standard errors in parentheses 
          * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
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Figure 5.4  Market Power and Debt at Book values 
 
 













































































































































































































































































































total markt debt long-term markt debt short-term markt debt
-0.8: Minimum 4.9: Maximum1.09: Average
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5.3.3.2 Capital Structure and Corporate Ownership Analysis 
 
As previously discussed in the literature review chapter, corporate capital structures 
reflect the financing policies selected by managers.  In general, there are three main 
sources of financing for a new project, which are: (1) retained earnings, (2) debt 
instruments, or/and (3) new capital stock.  These three different sources, besides 
forming the corporate capital structure, evidence the ownership structure of the 
company.  This is because sources 1 and 3 (i.e. retained earnings and new shares) 
represent the ownership of the shareholders, whilst source 2 (or debt instruments) is 
the ownership of debt-holders. 
 
 
5.3.3.2.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
Important corporate ownership literature has investigated the relationship between 
ownership structure and control, ownership structure and private benefits and 
ownership structure and corporate performance.  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (1999) documented that the most common ownership pattern around the word 
is the concentrated ownership structure.  Further, this concentrated structure is often 
also a controlling structure exerted by founder families.  Grossman and Hart (1988) 
have shown that deviations from the pattern one-share-one-vote are optimal in 
protecting large private benefits of control.  Shleifer and Vishny (1986) pointed out 
that one of the most important costs that large shareholders can impose on the firm, 
due to their typically poorly diversified portfolio, is excessive risk aversion or risk 
avoidance.  Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) discussed the trade-off between and 
external professional manager’s skills and the resulting agency costs associated with an 
outside manager.  Hagelin et al. (2006) suggested that for family-controlled firms there 
may be a trade-off between negative entrenchment effects, stemming from the use of 
dual-class shares and the implementation of costly risk-management programs.  
Regarding corporate performance, Anderson and Reeb (2003) documented how 
founding-family ownership enhanced firm performance.  Furthermore, Villalonga and 
Amit (2006) have shown that founding-family ownership only improves performance 
as long as the founder is active in the firm.  They also documented that dual-class 
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shares, pyramids and voting agreements reduce the founder premium.  Finally, Faccio, 
Lang and Young (2001) found that family firms in Western Europe and East Asia 
often rely on devices that separate voting rights from cash-flow rights.  They also 
found that in Western Europe family firms increase dividends to inhibit the families’ 
propensity to expropriate minority shareholders’ rights. 
 
This researcher would like to believe this empirical study can contribute to existing 
literature by providing some evidence on how the voting structure of the direct 
ownership of Mexican publicly traded companies may influence the corporate 
financing policies of these companies.  To carry out this study, Mexican publicly 
traded companies were classified either as family controlled or institutionally 
controlled, depending on the nature of the ultimate controller.  Using the majority rule 
as a criterion, fifty percent or more was the proportion of voting rights needed to be 
considered the ultimate controller.  The variables incorporated to test ownership and 
control in the financing choices are: family control, votes, discrepancy of capital and 
votes (votes/capital), dual shares & ADRs, CPOs, outside block, and the interaction 
between family control and control are included.  
 
It is of note that this investigation focuses on the direct ownership of the companies 
due to the scarcity of publicly available corporate information needed to trace the 
ultimate shareholder by working out the indirect ownership. 
 
 
5.3.3.2.1.1 Definition of the Variables 
 
Family-Controlled or Institutional-Shareholder Controlled Firms 
The two main types of ownership patterns are dispersed-held ownership and 
concentrated ownership structures.  It has been argued that the first one typifies better 
the structure patterns presented in developed economies, whilst the second is a key 
feature of emerging economies.  For example, preliminary research proposed that the 
ownership and control of companies might go together, becoming more dispersed as 
countries reach better levels of development and globalization in their markets (e.g. 
Berle and Means 1932, cited by La Porta et al. 1999, p. 471).  However, contemporary 
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evidence has shown that concentrated-held ownership is the predominant corporate 
structure around the world, and that it often results in controlling structures owned by 
founder families (see for example: La Porta et al., 1999 and Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986).  Consequently, two main types of shareholders can be identified: family 
shareholders and institutional shareholders
186
.  In this sense, it may be considered that 
a company is controlled by a family, if a family, a group of families or a close group of 
individuals hold shares with a percentage of voting rights allowing them to influence 
the key corporate decisions.  Conversely, a company is institutionally controlled when 
there is no evidence of any family or close group of individuals having shares granting 
a significant percentage of voting rights which allow them to affect the corporate 
decisions. 
 
To identify the type of ownership and control structure of a company, Hagelin et al. 
(2006) distinguished between family-controlled firms and institutional-shareholders 
controlled firms by using a binary variable that took a value of one when the company 
was considered to be controlled by a family, and zero when controlled by institutions. 
 
Similarly, in this study the family control variable is a binary variable that takes the 
value of one when a family or a close group of individuals hold fifty per cent or more 
of the total voting rights of the company stock.  It takes the value of zero otherwise.  I 
expect to find a negative relationship between family-controlled firms and levels of 
debt since family-controlled companies would prefer to issue dual-class shares and/or 
neutral investment securities rather than debt. 
 
Differential Voting-Rights Securities 
Existing literature has documented that the issuance of shares with differential voting-
rights favours the formation of controlling structures and tunnelling practices (La Porta 
et al. 1998, Khanna and Yafeh 2007, Castañeda Ramos 1999).  Alternatively, Hagelin 
et al., (2006) and Anderson and Reeb, (2003) proposed that the issuance of shares with 
differential-voting rights in family-controlled companies
187
could help in alleviating the 
                                                 
186
 In this argument institutional shareholders might be thought to act as owners who protect and guard 
their rights and the rights of the people they represent (e.g. minority rights). 
187
 According to Hagelin et al. (2006), the corporate level of risk might be decreased mainly because the 
issuance of shares with differential-voting rights may substitute the issuance of debt. This allows 
controlling shareholders to invest less capital in the company while retaining the control of the company 
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level of corporate risk by decreasing the corporate level of debt to issue.  Hence, a 
negative correlation should be expected between securities with differential voting 
rights and leverage; that is to say, between dual-class shares & American Depositary 
Receipts (ADRs) and leverage; as well as between Certificates of Ordinary 
Participation (CPOs) and leverage. 
 
Dual-Class Shares & American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) 
Hagelin et al.’s study controlled for the issuance of dual class of shares through a 
binary variable that equalled to one when companies issued dual-class shares, and to 
zero when they did not.   
 
This investigation incorporates in this variable the control for the usage of ADRs
188
. I 
controlled for these two equity instruments/securities together because both had the 
same effect in terms of cash-flow rights and voting rights, in the companies sampled.  
In this analysis, either dual-class shares or the shares that were traded by means of 
ADRs granted the same cash-flow rights as the common shares to their shareholders, 
but no voting rights as most of these ADRs were traded over-the-counter market 
(OTC).  I calculated this variable as a percentage of the total amount of dual-class 
shares and the shares traded under ADRs with respect to the total outstanding shares. 
 
Certificates of Ordinary Participation (CPOs) 
An Ordinary Participation Certificate, or CPO by its Spanish acronym, is a type of 
equity security, viz. a certificate of common shares, which can be used by Mexican 
listed companies to publicly trade their common shares. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
besides having some free cash-flow for other investments.  This may diversify their own portfolio and 
decrease their risk-aversion. 
188
 An American Depositary Receipt (ADR) is a receipt representing the ownership in the shares of a 
non-USA company trading in North-American financial markets.  Generally speaking, ADRs are traded 
under an ADR program set up between the issuer company and a financial depositary.  ADRs programs 
can be either type I, type II or Type III.  The Type I program is the less regulated by the USA Security 
Exchange Commission (SEC) but only can trade on the over-the-counter (OTC) market.  Program Type 
II requires a file registration statement of the issuer company under the US SEC and periodicals reports.  
The shares trade under this ADR program can be traded in any US Stock Exchange (i.e. NYSE, 
NASDAQ or AMEX).  Finally, type III ADR program is the most regulated as the issuer company is 
required to adhere to stricter rules that are similar to those followed by US companies.  This might be 
because issuer companies setting this type of program are looking to raise capital rather that trade their 
current issued stock. 
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I incorporated this variable due to the heavy use of this security by the companies 
sampled.  I explicitly separated these from the dual-class shares and ADRs because, 
besides having a very discrete difference in the effect on the allocation of voting rights, 
it has been suggested that the issuance of CPOs reflects a pyramidal organisational 
structure of Business Groups.  I hope to find some evidence that may give some lead to 
being able to identify the nature of the business group, in terms of positive or negative, 
as was discussed previously in chapter 4. 
 
Discrepancy between Cash-Flow Rights and Voting-Rights 
According to Hagelin et al.’s (2006) investigation, it could be argued that family-
controlled companies may issue differential voting-rights shares as a substitute for 
debt, while keeping for themselves the higher voting-shares in order to preserve the 
control of the company with a smaller investment.  Following this reasoning and the 
methodology they employed, to test the effects of differential-voting rights shares just 
described, I calculate three variables, viz. capital, votes and the ratio of votes and 
capital (votes/capital).  I am assuming that family-controlled companies would show a 
higher votes/capital ratio than that of companies institutionally controlled.  Further, for 
family-controlled companies a negative correlation between the vote-capital ratio and 
the level of debt is also expected. 
 
Capital 
This proxy denotes the controlling shareholder’s fraction of equity capital in the 
company with respect to the total outstanding shares. 
 
Votes 
This proxy is equal to the controlling shareholder’s fraction of voting rights in the 
company with respect to the total outstanding shares. 
 
Votes-Capital Ratio 
This variable aims to measure the discrepancy between cash-flow rights and voting 







It has been argued that the presence of an outside voting-block may ameliorate 
minority-shareholders rights’ expropriation as the result of its monitoring.  Hence, 
corporate financing decisions may be indirectly affected by its presence.  Hagelin et al. 
(2006) calculated this variable as a binary value that was equal to one if there was one 
(or more) outside shareholder possessing at least 10 percent or more of the voting-
shares of the company, and to zero otherwise.  I followed the criterion of 10 percent of 
the voting-shares to acknowledge the existence of an outside-voting block, and 
computed this variable as the percentage of the voting-rights granted by the shares held 
by the outside-block with respect to the total outstanding shares.  I surmised a negative 
correlation between outside-voting block and debt. 
 
 
5.3.3.2.2 Data and Sample Selection 
 
For this particular stage of the analysis, the primary source of information were some 
corporate filings such as the annual reports, company’s bylaws and the acts of the 
annual ordinary and annual extraordinary shareholders meetings, gathered from either 
the Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV) website or the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (EDGAR 2009). 
 
The ownership structure subset has a sample of 35 (out of 105) non-financial companies 
listed in the BMV, which publicly provided their corporate information for an 
uninterrupted period of six years, from 2001 to 2006.  The sampling selection criterion 
applied to this subset is to include all non-financial companies being part of the IPC 
CompMx Index of the BMV, valid during October 2006 to March 2007, that disclosed 
their corporate ownership structure in detail, e.g. the stock participation of the major 
shareholders with the specification of the class of shares, over the uninterrupted period 
from 2001 to 2006.  This information has been extracted from diverse annual corporate 
filings, such as the annual reports, company’s bylaws and the acts of the annual 
ordinary and extraordinary shareholders meetings available from the BMV and/or the 
EDGAR database.  The IPC CompMx Index is formed by 60 companies representing 
the three different segments into which the BMV is divided by its size, viz. large 
capitalization segment, medium capitalization segment and small capitalization 
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segment.  The companies that are chosen to be representative of each segment are the 
ones having the highest trading volumes in the BMV and the largest market 
capitalization value over the last six months with respect to the sector they represent 
(Bolsa Mexicana de Valores 2009).  As of October 2007, from the 60 companies 
forming the IPC CompMx Index, only 35 disclosed their corporate ownership structure 
throughout the period of six years.  A graphical representation of these 35 companies is 
presented in Figure 5.6 Distribution of the sub-sampled companies per sector below. 
 
 
Table 5.12  Sample Companies for the Ownership and Capital Structure testing. 
 
The following table presents the ticker, the company name and the sector of the 35 Mexican 
publicly traded companies listed in the Mexican Stock Exchange (MSE) forming the sample 
for the ownership and capital structure testing.  From the six active sectors comprised by the 
“new scheme” used by the MSE since 2009, only five were used to allocate these companies.  
These sectors were; materials, industrials, consumer discretionary and services (CDS), 
consumer staples, and telecommunication services. 
 
  TICKER NAME OF THE COMPANY SECTOR 
1 ALFA ALFA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Industrial 
2 ALSEA ALSEA, S.A.B. DE C.V. CDS 
3 ARA CONSORCIO ARA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Industrial 
4 ASUR GRUPO AEROPORTUARIO DEL SURESTE, S.A.B. DE C.V. Industrial 
5 BACHOCO INDUSTRIAS BACHOCO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
6 BIMBO GRUPO BIMBO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 




CIE CORPORACION INTERAMERICANA DE 
ENTRETENIMIENTO, S.A.B. DE C.V. 
 
CDS 
9 CMOCTEZ CORPORACION MOCTEZUMA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Materials 
10 CONTAL GRUPO CONTINENTAL, S.A.B. Consumer Staples 
11 ELEKTRA GRUPO ELEKTRA, S.A. DE C.V. CDS 
12 FEMSA FOMENTO ECONOMICO MEXICANO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
13 GCARSO GRUPO CARSO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Industrial 
14 GCC GRUPO CEMENTOS DE CHIHUACHUA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Materials 
15 GEO CORPORACION GEO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Industrial 
16 GIGANTE GRUPO GIGANTE, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
17 GISSA GRUPO INDUSTRIAL SALTILLO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Industrial 
18 GMEXICO GRUPO MEXICO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Materials 
19 GMODELO GRUPO MODELO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
20 GRUMA GRUMA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
21 ICA EMPRESAS ICA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Industrial 
22 ICH INDUSTRIAS CH, S.A.B. DE C.V. Materials 
23 KIMBER KIMBERLY-CLARK DE MEXICO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
24 KOF COCA-COLA FEMSA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
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  TICKER NAME OF THE COMPANY SECTOR 
25 LAMOSA GRUPO LAMOSA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Industrial 
26 LIVEPOL EL PUERTO DE LIVERPOOL, S.A.B. DE C.V. CDS 
27 POSADAS GRUPO POSADAS, S.A. DE C.V. CDS 
28 SIMEC GRUPO SIMEC, S.A.B. DE C.V. Materials 
29 SORIANA ORGANIZACION SORIANA, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
30 TELECOM CARSO GLOBAL TELECOM, S.A.B. DE C.V. Telecom Services 
31 TELMEX TELEFONOS DE MEXICO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Telecom Services 
32 TLEVISA GRUPO TELEVISA, S.A.  Telecom Services 
33 TVAZTCA TV AZTECA, S.A. DE C.V. Telecom Services 
34 VITRO VITRO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Materials 
35 WALMEX WAL-MART DE MEXICO, S.A.B. DE C.V. Consumer Staples 
 
Source, Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, as of March 2009. 
 
 
Figure 5.6  Distribution of the sub-sampled companies per sector  
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5.3.3.2.3 Empirical Testing 
 
This empirical testing was carried out with a sample of 35 companies of which 22 were 
classified as family-controlled since theirs founders, a family/group of families or a 
close group of individuals, directly posses the higher percentage of shares with voting-
rights, whereas 12 companies were considered as institutionally controlled since their 
main investor (in terms of direct ownership of shares with voting-rights) was a 
company or group of companies.  Finally, one of these companies was considered to 
be institutionally-controlled the first three years of this sample (i.e. from 2001 to 2003) 
and family-controlled the other last three years, that is from 2004 to 2006.  This 
company was excluded from the analysis so as to be able to use balanced panel data 
techniques. 
 
To keep with the same methodology employed in the previous sections, I will estimate 
the model using FE and RE estimations.  The new variables included measuring 
ownership and control effects are: family control, votes, discrepancy of capital and 
votes (votes/capital), dual shares & ADRs, CPOs, outside block, and the interaction 
between family control and control.  Hence, the model can be expressed as follows:  
 
    leverage it = αi + β1 sizeit + β2 tangibilityit + β3 roait + β4 mk-bk ratioit + β5 riskit + β6 tax rateit  
 + β7 consolidatonit + β8 family controlit + β9 votesit +β10 votes/capitalit   
 + β11 fam cont*majorityit + β12 dual shares & ADRsit + β13 CPOsit   
+ β14 outside blockit + εit 
 
where leverage is any of the six ratios (total debt, long-term debt or short-term debt 
valued at either market price or book value) for the firm i at time t.  
 
In order to control for the industry sector effects I will allow γ to denote the sum of all 
the dummy variables controlling for them, so that the previous model can be re-written 
as: 
 
    leverage it = αi + β1 sizeit + β2 tangibilityit + β3 roait + β4 mk-bk ratioit + β5 riskit + β6 tax rateit  
 + β7 consolidatonit + β8 family controlit + β9 votesit +β10 votes/capitalit   
 + β11 fam cont*majorityit + β12 dual shares & ADRsit + β13 CPOsit   




In order to identify whether a FE model or a RE model is most appropriate for 
modelling this theoretical conceptualisation, the Hausman and the Hausman and 
Sigmamore tests were carried out.  In this case, the aforementioned tests revealed that 
the RE estimator is more accurate for all leverage ratios at book and market values. 
 
Finally, the results from the previous regressions were contrasted with those results 
from the regressions but with a robustness test.  The statistical software used to 
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Table 5.14  Regression Results  –Ownership and Control Interaction– 
This table shows the correlation of the total debt ratio, long-term debt ratio, and short-term debt ratio at book and market values.  All of these measures act as 
the dependent variable, whilst the seven company factors proposed for capital structure are: size, tangibility, profitability, mk-bk ratio, risk, effective tax rate 
and consolidation.  The six factors proposed for ownership and control are: family control, votes, (votes/capital), dual shares & ADRs, CPOs, outside block, 
and the interaction between family control and votes. 
 
The leverage measures are calculated as follows: total book-debt equals total liabilities divided by total liabilities and net worth.  Long-term book-debt is total 
liabilities less current liabilities divided by total liabilities less current liabilities plus net worth, and short-term book debt is current liabilities divided by total 
liabilities and net worth.  The difference between book-ratios and market-ratios is that market-ratios use the average of equity market value instead of that of 
net worth. 
 
The seven regressors for capital structure are computed as follows: size is the natural logarithm of sales divided by 100; tangibility is the ratio of the book 
value of real estate and plant divided total assets; profitability to is the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets; market-to-book ratio 
is the equity market value divided by net worth; business risk is the variability of return on assets; tax rate is the percentage from earning before and earnings 
after tax; and consolidation is a binary variable which took zero as a value when the company accounts were not consolidated and one when they were. 
 
The six regressors for ownership and control are computed as follows: family control binary variable that takes the value of one when a family holds fifty per 
cent or more of the total voting rights of the company stock; votes controlling shareholders voting rights divided by total outstanding shares; (votes/capital) 
votes variable divided by the capital variable; dual shares & ADRs total amount of dual-class shares and ADRs divided by total outstanding shares; CPOs f 
total amount of CPOs divided by total outstanding shares; and outside block is the percentage of the voting-rights granted by the shares held by the outside-
block with respect to the total outstanding shares 
 




Table 5.14  Regression Results(Cont.)  –Ownership and Control Interaction– 
 
Total book debt Long-term  book debt Short term book debt 
  RE RE, vce RE RE, vce RE RE, vce RE RE, vce RE RE, vce RE RE, vce 
size 3.0102** 3.0102* 3.6108** 3.6108** 1.5661 1.5661 2.0406 2.0406 3.2976*** 3.2976** 4.0827*** 4.0827** 
 
(1.3910) (1.7986) (1.4606) (1.6946) (1.4825) (1.9113) (1.5401) (1.6542) (1.2368) (1.5365) (1.3661) (1.6487) 
tangibility 0.0280 0.0280 0.0608 0.0608 0.0851 0.0851 0.1202* 0.1202 -0.0340 -0.0340 0.0052 0.0052 
 
(0.0646) (0.0953) (0.0675) (0.0887) (0.0696) (0.0858) (0.0720) (0.0790) (0.0612) (0.1027) (0.0662) (0.0992) 
ROA -0.6632*** -0.6632*** -0.6719*** -0.6719*** -0.5656*** -0.5656*** -0.5728*** -0.5728*** -0.5161*** -0.5161*** -0.5253*** -0.5253*** 
 
(0.0996) (0.0787) (0.0997) (0.0773) (0.1101) (0.1336) (0.1096) (0.1294) (0.1081) (0.1306) (0.1085) (0.1349) 
mk-bk ratio 0.0120*** 0.0120*** 0.0119*** 0.0119*** 0.0098*** 0.0098*** 0.0097*** 0.0097*** 0.0192*** 0.0192*** 0.0194*** 0.0194*** 
 
(0.0033) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0024) (0.0037) (0.0028) (0.0037) (0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0036) (0.0038) 
risk -1.5774 -1.5774 -1.7068 -1.7068 0.7760 0.7760 0.6476 0.6476 -2.8706* -2.8706** -3.0161* -3.0161** 
 
(1.4662) (1.5425) (1.4723) (1.5516) (1.6248) (1.6938) (1.6240) (1.7065) (1.6189) (1.4496) (1.6300) (1.4195) 
eff tax rate 0.0083 0.0083 0.0092 0.0092 0.0224* 0.0224** 0.0235** 0.0235** -0.0129 -0.0129 -0.0114 -0.0114 
 
(0.0108) (0.0066) (0.0108) (0.0068) (0.0119) (0.0092) (0.0119) (0.0092) (0.0118) (0.0125) (0.0119) (0.0128) 
consolidation -0.0283*** -0.0283*** -0.0301*** -0.0301*** -0.0332*** -0.0332** -0.0348*** -0.0348** -0.0177* -0.0177* -0.0196* -0.0196* 
 
(0.0098) (0.0106) (0.0098) (0.0102) (0.0108) (0.0142) (0.0107) (0.0136) (0.0104) (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0106) 
family control 0.1811** 0.1811** 0.1375 0.1375 0.0807 0.0807 0.0374 0.0374 0.2298*** 0.2298*** 0.1871** 0.1871** 
 
(0.0887) (0.0893) (0.0900) (0.0917) (0.0946) (0.0710) (0.0950) (0.0865) (0.0819) (0.0846) (0.0870) (0.0857) 
votes -0.0221 -0.0221 -0.0137 -0.0137 0.0003 0.0003 0.0064 0.0064 -0.0660 -0.0660 -0.0456 -0.0456 
 
(0.0471) (0.0529) (0.0491) (0.0573) (0.0516) (0.0564) (0.0534) (0.0626) (0.0483) (0.0511) (0.0515) (0.0558) 
votes/capital 0.1391** 0.1391*** 0.1030* 0.1030** 0.0867 0.0867** 0.0403 0.0403 0.1346** 0.1346** 0.1087 0.1087 
 
(0.0605) (0.0516) (0.0625) (0.0462) (0.0663) (0.0371) (0.0685) (0.0378) (0.0622) (0.0669) (0.0671) (0.0672) 
fam com x majority -0.1388** -0.1388*** -0.1028* -0.1028** -0.0865 -0.0865** -0.0403 -0.0403 -0.1366** -0.1366** -0.1111* -0.1111* 
 
(0.0602) (0.0512) (0.0624) (0.0460) (0.0659) (0.0374) (0.0683) (0.0380) (0.0618) (0.0657) (0.0669) (0.0664) 
dual shares & ADRs -0.0778 -0.0778 -0.0899 -0.0899 0.1674 0.1674 0.1389 0.1389 -0.1972** -0.1972 -0.1973** -0.1973 
 
(0.1068) (0.1559) (0.1049) (0.1458) (0.1147) (0.1074) (0.1109) (0.1103) (0.0989) (0.1792) (0.0990) (0.1620) 
CPOs -0.1474 -0.1474 -0.1344 -0.1344 0.0413 0.0413 0.0508 0.0508 -0.1800* -0.1800 -0.1784* -0.1784 
 
(0.1056) (0.1038) (0.1050) (0.1100) (0.1151) (0.0880) (0.1133) (0.0995) (0.1055) (0.1262) (0.1067) (0.1299) 
outside block -0.1382 -0.1382 -0.0943 -0.0943 -0.0342 -0.0342 0.0219 0.0219 -0.2356** -0.2356* -0.1758 -0.1758 
 
(0.1205) (0.1373) (0.1203) (0.1356) (0.1299) (0.1420) (0.1282) (0.1522) (0.1129) (0.1223) (0.1164) (0.1119) 
























































_cons -0.1005 -0.1005 -0.0132 -0.0132 -0.0265 -0.0265 0.1235 0.1235 -0.2963 -0.2963 -0.3765 -0.3765 
  (0.2497) (0.3439) (0.3031) (0.3464) (0.2655) (0.3362) (0.3205) (0.3344) (0.2197) (0.2887) (0.2881) (0.3293) 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
r2 
            
r2_o 0.2843 0.2843 0.4244 0.4244 0.2028 0.2028 0.4262 0.4262 0.3292 0.3292 0.4002 0.4002 
r2_b 0.2930 0.2930 0.4365 0.4365 0.1993 0.1993 0.4444 0.4444 0.3387 0.3387 0.4188 0.4188 
R2_w 
            
sigma_u 0.1472 0.1472 0.1335 0.1335 0.1509 0.1509 0.1339 0.1339 0.1018 0.1018 0.0986 0.0986 
sigma_e 0.0443 0.0443 0.0443 0.0443 0.0496 0.0496 0.0496 0.0496 0.0477 0.0477 0.0477 0.0477 
rho 0.9170 0.9170 0.9009 0.9009 0.9025 0.9025 0.8793 0.8793 0.8203 0.8203 0.8106 0.8106 
theta 0.8781 0.8781 0.8658 0.8658 0.8670 0.8670 0.8505 0.8505 0.8123 0.8123 0.8064 0.8064 
Standard errors in parentheses 
          * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
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Table 5.14  Regression Results (Cont.)  –Ownership and Control Interaction– 
 
Total market debt Long term market debt Short market debt 
  RE RE, vce RE RE, vce RE RE, vce RE RE, vce RE RE, vce RE RE, vce 
size 0.6057 0.6057 1.2904 1.2904 -0.3863 -0.3863 0.3001 0.3001 1.9841 1.9841 2.6616 2.6616 
 
(1.8552) (2.4720) (1.9743) (2.1661) (1.9067) (2.6498) (1.9801) (2.3063) (1.5152) (1.8510) (1.6946) (1.8549) 
tangibility 0.1391 0.1391 0.1990** 0.1990** 0.2529*** 0.2529** 0.3137*** 0.3137*** 0.1158 0.1158 0.1662* 0.1662 
 
(0.0931) (0.1043) (0.0977) (0.0997) (0.0950) (0.1098) (0.0980) (0.1016) (0.0815) (0.1179) (0.0883) (0.1169) 
ROA -1.3499*** -1.3499*** -1.3731*** -1.3731*** -1.2227*** -1.2227*** -1.2442*** -1.2442*** -1.2593*** -1.2593*** -1.2784*** -1.2784*** 
 
(0.1696) (0.1680) (0.1677) (0.1658) (0.1704) (0.1716) (0.1682) (0.1667) (0.1696) (0.1615) (0.1684) (0.1621) 
mk-bk ratio -0.0161*** -0.0161 -0.0158*** -0.0158 -0.0129** -0.0129 -0.0124** -0.0124 -0.0064 -0.0064 -0.0048 -0.0048 
 
(0.0056) (0.0141) (0.0056) (0.0133) (0.0057) (0.0109) (0.0056) (0.0099) (0.0056) (0.0125) (0.0056) (0.0116) 
risk -2.2356 -2.2356 -2.3557 -2.3557 -1.5618 -1.5618 -1.6541 -1.6541 -4.3275 -4.3275* -4.2741 -4.2741* 
 
(2.5537) (2.6341) (2.5436) (2.6684) (2.5592) (2.3865) (2.5508) (2.4339) (2.6381) (2.5570) (2.6297) (2.5747) 
eff tax rate -0.0043 -0.0043 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0015 -0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 -0.0371* -0.0371 -0.0343* -0.0343 
 
(0.0186) (0.0166) (0.0185) (0.0169) (0.0187) (0.0156) (0.0186) (0.0160) (0.0191) (0.0300) (0.0190) (0.0294) 
consolidation -0.0775*** -0.0775*** -0.0800*** -0.0800*** -0.0729*** -0.0729*** -0.0757*** -0.0757*** -0.0578*** -0.0578*** -0.0611*** -0.0611*** 
 
(0.0163) (0.0167) (0.0161) (0.0155) (0.0164) (0.0202) (0.0162) (0.0190) (0.0162) (0.0160) (0.0162) (0.0147) 
family control 0.1376 0.1376 0.0519 0.0519 0.0117 0.0117 -0.0582 -0.0582 0.2137* 0.2137* 0.1473 0.1473 
 
(0.1248) (0.1167) (0.1298) (0.1270) (0.1273) (0.0920) (0.1302) (0.1159) (0.1104) (0.1092) (0.1221) (0.1191) 
votes 0.0643 0.0643 0.0726 0.0726 0.0543 0.0543 0.0594 0.0594 -0.0028 -0.0028 0.0149 0.0149 
 
(0.0746) (0.0928) (0.0782) (0.1005) (0.0755) (0.0850) (0.0784) (0.0948) (0.0694) (0.0706) (0.0745) (0.0820) 
votes/capital 0.0759 0.0759 -0.0166 -0.0166 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0896 -0.0896 0.1170 0.1170 0.0444 0.0444 
 
(0.0962) (0.0805) (0.1031) (0.0924) (0.0974) (0.0512) (0.1034) (0.0732) (0.0892) (0.0926) (0.1015) (0.0952) 
fam com x majority -0.0757 -0.0757 0.0160 0.0160 0.0018 0.0018 0.0882 0.0882 -0.1178 -0.1178 -0.0466 -0.0466 
 
(0.0955) (0.0788) (0.1027) (0.0912) (0.0967) (0.0513) (0.1030) (0.0731) (0.0883) (0.0903) (0.1010) (0.0939) 
dual shares & ADRs -0.2180 -0.2180 -0.2488* -0.2488 -0.0061 -0.0061 -0.0518 -0.0518 -0.3025** -0.3025 -0.3070** -0.3070* 
 
(0.1496) (0.2057) (0.1439) (0.1744) (0.1531) (0.1639) (0.1443) (0.1480) (0.1266) (0.1859) (0.1252) (0.1608) 
CPOs -0.0906 -0.0906 -0.0760 -0.0760 -0.0100 -0.0100 0.0041 0.0041 -0.0674 -0.0674 -0.0783 -0.0783 
 
(0.1622) (0.1522) (0.1594) (0.1536) (0.1647) (0.1394) (0.1598) (0.1468) (0.1457) (0.1681) (0.1466) (0.1768) 
outside block -0.1920 -0.1920 -0.0825 -0.0825 -0.0998 -0.0998 0.0124 0.0124 -0.2397* -0.2397* -0.1416 -0.1416 
 
(0.1706) (0.1761) (0.1701) (0.1952) (0.1747) (0.1685) (0.1706) (0.1983) (0.1418) (0.1229) (0.1484) (0.1423) 
























































_cons 0.3782 0.3782 0.5480 0.5480 0.4347 0.4347 0.6083 0.6083 -0.0101 -0.0101 0.0155 0.0155 
  (0.3290) (0.4640) (0.4211) (0.4617) (0.3384) (0.4598) (0.4223) (0.4593) (0.2673) (0.3688) (0.3729) (0.4061) 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
r2 
            
r2_o 0.4387 0.4387 0.5828 0.5828 0.3064 0.3064 0.5110 0.5110 0.4623 0.4623 0.5322 0.5322 
r2_b 0.4058 0.4058 0.5899 0.5899 0.2299 0.2299 0.4990 0.4990 0.4694 0.4694 0.5598 0.5598 
R2_w 
            
sigma_u 0.1511 0.1511 0.1381 0.1381 0.1588 0.1588 0.1388 0.1388 0.1006 0.1006 0.0982 0.0982 
sigma_e 0.0775 0.0775 0.0775 0.0775 0.0778 0.0778 0.0778 0.0778 0.0770 0.0770 0.0770 0.0770 
rho 0.7919 0.7919 0.7608 0.7608 0.8064 0.8064 0.7608 0.7608 0.6307 0.6307 0.6195 0.6195 
theta 0.7952 0.7952 0.7768 0.7768 0.8039 0.8039 0.7769 0.7769 0.7018 0.7018 0.6952 0.6952 
Standard errors in parentheses 
          * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
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5.3.4 Discussion of the Results 
 
The results of the proposed general model of Capital Structure for the Mexican 
publicly traded companies are displayed in table 4.10.  This model has provided 
evidence that the financing policies of emerging markets are also framed by the main 
factors influencing the financing policies of developed markets. 
 
Table 4.10 shows that the variables profitability and liquidity are strongly negatively 
correlated to all kinds of debt.  This could mean that solvent and profitable Mexican 
companies do tend not to engage in debt practices.  This evidence supports Myers’ 
(1984) Pecking Order theory arguments, and possibly demonstrates that for Mexican 
companies the agency costs of debt and equity are more expensive than the cost of 
having free-cash flows.  This last proposition, although unusual, could apply if 
Mexican companies also had large/majority shareholders acting as CEOs at the same 
time, which is the case.  Therefore to have more evidence on this regard section 5.3.2.2 
will study the interaction between ownership and capital structure. 
 
The behaviour of the variables asset tangibility and company size might suggest that in 
this model they are acting as complements; that is to say, that these variables are 
picking up the same effects although their calculation meant controlling for different 
factors.  Size and tangibility are negatively correlated to debt, but only one of them 
gets the strong correlated coefficient at the time.  According to the Static Trade-Off 
model, Mexican companies are reflecting the wrong sign as they should be expected to 
engage in higher debt due to their asset capacity as collateral.  The market-to-book 
ratio variable is strongly negatively correlated to all terms of debt, when calculated at 
market value, and for long-term debt at book values.  This variable also suggests that 
the agency costs of debt are rather expensive so that profitable firms with growth 
opportunities would have preferred not to achieve their optimal level of development 
because of the possibility of financial distress.  The business risk variable is strongly 
positively correlated to debt at market value.  This result is also opposite to the 
theoretical expected according to the Static Trade-Off model and the agency cost 
framework.  One should expect that the riskier the company, the less in debt they 
would like to be in.  This is because high levels of debt might only worsen their 
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probabilities of default.  However, it could be the case that controlling investors would 
be with the minimum amount of shares needed to maintain their control, so that the 
agency costs of debt might be less expensive than losing the benefits from controlling 
the company.  Finally, the behaviour of the two variables proposed by this researcher 
is the following.  Consolidation was strongly negatively correlated to all market value 
debt, and only strongly negatively correlated to long-term debt at book values.  I 
expected that trend since consolidated accountancy offers a more realistic view of the 
economic situation of the companies.  In addition, since business groups are one of the 
most common organisational structures of Mexican companies, it seems reasonable 
that these large networks will have higher aggregated levels of debt and less collateral 
left free, making creditors willing to charge them premium tax rates for their loans.  
Finally, there was no significant econometric or economic correlation with the tax 
variable. 
 
Bearing in mind that the corporate and financial data used to estimate the general 
model belongs to the largest Mexican publicly traded companies, this researcher is 
aware that these results might only apply to companies similar to the sample.  
Nonetheless, some general conclusions can be drawn since there are particularities of 
the corporate practices, not only regarding the financial-economic-politico 
environment of the country per se, but also regarding factors such as culture in the 
social and behavioural sense. 
 
Finally, it could be said that this investigation has documented, to a certain extent, that 
country and firm level factors are as important, or even more so than the classic capital 
structure determinants in their ultimate effect to the financing policies of Mexican 
publicly traded companies. 
 
These results have left an open avenue for further research, in areas such as the effects 
of time (via a dynamic panel model) and the empirical evidence of the behavioural side 
of finance.  
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It is now acknowledged that there are different ownership patterns around the world 
(e.g. disperse-held ownership, concentrated ownership and controlling ownership) and 
that these ownership patterns, along with the financial structure of companies, play a 
very significant role in the creation (dilution) of the company value.  Further, previous 
research has identified that corporate financing decisions are drastically influenced by 
concentrated ownerships, and that they are more complexly influenced when there is 
separation of ownership and control. 
 
A worldwide picture of the ownership structure of companies reveals that many large 
companies have controlling shareholders, except for those companies based in 
countries with high levels of minority shareholders protection, which are more widely 
held among investors.  Families or the State typically controlled the former companies, 
participating actively in the management of these companies, and typically having 
control over companies in excess of the threshold of their investments (La Porta et al. 
1999). 
 
Additionally, existing evidence on capital structure documents that capital financial 
decisions are affected by the same determinants in developed and emerging countries.  
However, in emerging countries some of these determinants often present unexpected 
behaviour/trends (Booth et al. 2001, Céspedes et al. 2010 and Glen and Singh 2004). 
 
This thesis aimed to investigate the interaction between ownership structure and 
corporate financing decisions in emerging countries.  In doing so, this thesis developed 
two theoretical models in chapters 3 and 4 respectively.  The first model assessed 
important factors inducing the separation of ownership and control in ownership 
structures in emerging countries.  The second model analysed the relationship between 
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empathy and economic gains, to identify important factors promoting the formation of 
business groups in emerging markets.  The empirical investigation in chapter 5 
comprises two sets of analyses.  The first part examined the effects of well-known 
determinants of capital structure on debt. The second part of this investigation 
analysed the effects of control and ownership in financing policies of emerging 
markets.  Thus, the thesis not only contributes in terms of theory to the on-going 
research into ownership and control and business groups, but its empirical findings 
also contribute to the research of capital structure in emerging markets. 
 
The theoretical model in chapter 3 demonstrated that: high-risk aversion induces an 
incumbent manager to wish to minimise his/her equity stake; that high private benefits 
imply that the incumbent would wish to retain control, therefore, he/she wishes to 
maximise his/her control rights while minimising his/her equity stake; a social planer 
sympathetic to the incumbent will facilitate the no contestable structure by allowing 
him/her to issue non-voting equity; and investor irrationality makes the no contestable 
structure even easier to achieve. 
 
These findings agree with previous arguments regarding the features of emerging 
markets and controlling ownership structures.  For example, Grossman and Hart 
(1988) identified that a voting security structure can be used as a mechanism for 
shifting corporate control.  Further, Harris and Raviv (1988) argued that governance 
rules also affect firm value because they influence the proportion of private benefits to 
be extracted from the winner contestant in a takeover bidding process.  Additionally, 
these findings also support the origin of law argument which claims that civil-law 
countries might be prone to having controlling ownership structures due to their 
poor/weak legal and regulatory systems (La Porta et al. 1999).  Further, Bebchuck 
(1999) argued that controlling shareholding structures should be more common in 
countries with large private benefits of control, whereas dispersed ownership structures 
should be more common in countries with small private benefits. 
 
However, it has recently been proposed that pyramidal business groups may be the 
organisational form of companies endowed with lax investor and creditor rights’ 
protection to overcome the inefficiencies of markets and their supporting institutions 
(Khanna and Yafeh 2007, Langlois 2009, Colpan and Hikino 2010, among others).  
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Hence, acknowledging this new evidence, a new theoretical model assessing the 
factors promoting the formation of business groups and their behaviour towards 
economy was developed in chapter 4. 
 
The theoretical model presented in chapter 4 proved that: (1) empathy ‘generation’ has 
a cost; (2) empathy enhances the payoff of affiliated companies; (3) there is a greater 
likelihood of networks forming when countries face a higher probability of economic 
turmoil; and (4) if the economy is in a good state, there is no payoff-enhancement from 
forming a network since firms are already able to create high incomes.  Hence, this 
model argued that the firms’ network-forming decision is affected by: (1) the cost of 
forming the network; (2) the probability of the bad state occurring; and (3) the level of 
empathy-enhancement in the bad economic state. 
 
These results support the view that business groups are structural organisations that 
can help to ameliorate the inefficiencies in markets and institutions.  Further, these 
results agree with the findings of Castañeda’s (2007) model regarding the preference 
of business groups to support the network-formation by acting as a business group 
instead of individual entities when a situation of financial disarray occurs.  Moreover, 
these results are also in line with Khanna and Yafeh’s (2007) argument regarding the 
changing nature of business groups according to the environment where they operate, 
and with Schneider’s (2009) rationale regarding the adaptation capacity of business 
groups and institutions to obtain the best for each other and to coexist at the maximum 
gain for all parties. 
 
In conclusion, these two theoretical models have demonstrated the strong influence of 
economic, legal, cultural and behavioural factors in corporate finance and governance 
practices in emerging markets.  Further, the separation of ownership and control model 
proved that ownership structure affects the financial policies of companies, as is 
reflected in the valuation of companies and the generation of investors’ wealth.  
Further, the business group model demonstrated the wealth-enhancing side of these 
groups, despite a wrongly-stereotyped organisational structure.  Finally, in terms of the 
limitations of these models, the model of ownership and control was framed 
considering an all-equity company; therefore, this model would benefit from changing 
this scenario to one with a debt and equity mix.  Secondly, this model also may benefit 
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from developing the analysis to consider other defensive control mechanisms, such as 
multi-classes of voting equity, stock pyramids, rings, and anti-takeover amendments. 
 
The empirical investigation in chapter 5 was carried out in two stages.  The first part 
investigated the effects of the determinants of capital structure.  To this end, a dataset 
of 78 Mexican publicly traded companies observed during an 8-year period was used.  
The second part of the investigation assessed the interaction of ownership and control 
in the corporate financing structure of 35 Mexican publicly traded companies over a 6-
year period.  The reason for the use of two different dataset is that testing of ownership 
and control will always require very detailed data, which at present is not publicly 
available in Mexico, so this second dataset was ‘hand-made’. 
 
The results of the capital structure analysis revealed that: from the eight control 
variables included (i.e. size, tangibility, ROA, market-to-book ratio, business risk, 
effective tax rate, liquidity and consolidation) ROA and liquidity were always strongly 
negatively correlated to all levels of debt, valued at either book or market values.  
These results suggested that the sampled companies favoured internal financing and 
that firms with more liquid assets tended to avoid the costs of debts.  These arguments 
support the Myers’ (1984) Pecking-Order theory.  Market-to-book value variable (or 
growth opportunities) was negative in general and strongly negatively correlated when 
valued at market value.  This variable also suggested that the agency costs of debt were 
rather expensive, so that profitable firms with growth opportunities preferred not to 
achieve their optimal level of development because of the possibility of financial 
distress.  Consolidation, one the suggested variables, showed a negative sign and was 
strongly correlated when valued at market prices.  I expected this variable to be 
negative since first, most of the sample companies are organised as business groups.  
Secondly, consolidated accounting displays the real amount of debt that the whole 
group already has, so the level of debt they could be engage in should be reduced. 
 
However, an unexpected outcome was the business risk variable.  Business risk 
showed a positive correlation when valued at market price.  This result may suggest 
that companies may not really be affected in cases of financial distress or that they 
have a way to transfer their financial distress costs to others.  It is worth noticing that 
all these explanations respond to the expected or ‘standard’ behaviour of the 
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determinants of capital structure without giving any consideration to country 
particulars.  Hence, since this evidence is from an emerging market, one should 
account for higher levels of debt because of the illiquidity of emerging financial 
markets.  On the other, one should also expect larger information asymmetries and 
longer and more costly processes of bankruptcy and financial distress as result of the 
inefficiency of their legal and enforcement systems. 
 
Finally, the variable business risk was an example of the particularities of the country 
to which this empirical evidence belongs: Mexico.  As noted by Céspedes et al. (2010), 
in Mexico there is a requirement to carry inflation adjustment in corporate financial 
statements.  This accounting practice has several effects such as turning a tax shield 
negative or market and book values smooth. 
 
In the second stage of this analysis, the effects of ownership and control in financial 
policies were studied.  In this regard, Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Céspedes et al. 
(2010) contend that the effect of ownership concentration on capital structure is far 
from obvious.  On the one hand, the presence of large shareholders on the BOD should 
reduce the extent of agency costs between managers and shareholders and facilitate 
equity issuances.  Further, majority shareholders’ undiversified portfolio may increase 
their aversion to debt (Hagelin et al. 2006 and Céspedes et al. 2010).  On the other 
hand, if some of the shareholders are banks, they may force the firms to borrow from 
them, or if bond markets are weak, investors might not be able to get financing from 
them. 
 
The seven control variables used in this part of the analysis were: family control, votes, 
discrepancy of capital and votes, dual shares & ADRs, CPOs, outside block, and 
interaction between family control and votes.  The results of the study are: as expected, 
short-term debt picked/demonstrated the most effects when valued at book value.  This 
supported the argument that trade-credit is an important source of financing in 
emerging markets (Booth et al. 2001 and Glen and Singh, 2004).  Families are 
controlling shareholders of Mexican publicly listed companies.  When families are 
large shareholders, they favoured debt financing maybe because they are afraid of 
losing control and/or the private benefits.  When families are the majority controlling 
shareholder they preferred issue shares.  According to Hagelin et al. (2006) this may be 
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considered as a diversification mechanism.  Since these families know they cannot lose 
control, they decide to issue dual-shares and so diversify their portfolio.  There is also 
some evidence pointing out that when there was an outside block, debt issuance was 
discouraged, which supported the argument regarding the monitoring service that 
outside blocks provide for minority investors and themselves. 
 
In summary, this empirical study documented that country factors and institutions are 
crucial when selecting the capital and ownership corporate structures.  Further, 
ownership and control does have complex and unpredicted effects in the financing 
policies of companies, however, some patterns of behaviour have started to arise. 
 
One limitation of this capital structure analysis was that these results were not tested 
with a dynamic technique.  Hence, to test the effects of time in these results and to 
look for a target level of debt may be an important contribution to future research.  In 
the case of the analysis of the interaction between ownership and control and financial 
policies, to gather more data in order to have more observations would be also an 
important improvement to the present study. 
 
Finally, returning to the argument about Mexico and its trend of economic and political 
development, it is important to recall that Mexico is an emerging economy that is in 
the process of seeking the implementation of policies that help its economy to achieve 
long-term economic development.  Further, the need for Mexico to attain a self-
sustainable capital market is stressed due to its level of integration into the global 
economy, which has intensified the competition between companies for financing. 
 
To reach this end, evidence has demonstrated that strong legal investor and creditor 
protection has proved to be a key factor influencing the level of development of 
financial markets.  Taking into account the agency costs’ model under the legal 
approach, it has been suggested that the degree of separation between ownership and 
control affects the level of access to finance (Chong et al. 2009).  This is so because 
the stock traded represents both the cash-flow and the voting rights endowed to the 
financial instrument traded.  In the light of this situation, Mexico has undergone a 
series of policy-reform processes to achieve macroeconomic stability over the last 
decade and has now started the institution-building process.  The policy reforms 
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focusing on the institution-building processes include the development of financial 
institutions, the development of the legal infrastructure supporting business, and the 
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Appendix  A 
 
Where q is the probability of a good economic state and 1 - q  is the probability of a bad economic state 
 
CASE 1:  q = 1;    1 – q = 0 
If the network is formed:  If network is NOT formed:  
The differences between the network formation and 
the non-network formation are: 
Empathy 








Expected Payoffs Expected 
Welfare Firm A Firm B  Firm A Firm B  Firm A Firm B 
0.1 361.38 121.27 482.65  0.1 361.38 121.27 482.65  0.1 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.2 361.38 121.27 482.65  0.2 361.38 121.27 482.65  0.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.3 361.38 121.27 482.65  0.3 361.38 121.27 482.65  0.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.4 361.38 121.27 482.65  0.4 361.38 121.27 482.65  0.4 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.5 361.38 121.27 482.65  0.5 361.38 121.27 482.65  0.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.6 361.38 121.27 482.65  0.6 361.38 121.27 482.65  0.6 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.7 361.38 121.27 482.65  0.7 361.38 121.27 482.65  0.7 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.8 361.38 121.27 482.65  0.8 361.38 121.27 482.65  0.8 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.9 361.38 121.27 482.65  0.9 361.38 121.27 482.65  0.9 0.00 0.00 0.00 






CASE 2:  q = 0.75;    1 – q = 0.25 
If the network is formed:  If network is NOT formed:  
The differences between the network formation and 
the non-network formation are: 
Empathy 








Expected Payoffs Expected 
Welfare Firm A Firm B  Firm A Firm B  Firm A Firm B 
0.1 279.96 90.95 370.91  0.1 279.96 90.95 370.91  0.1 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.2 279.96 90.95 370.91  0.2 279.96 90.95 370.91  0.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.3 279.96 90.95 370.91  0.3 279.96 90.95 370.91  0.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.4 279.96 90.95 370.91  0.4 279.96 90.95 370.91  0.4 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.5 279.96 90.95 370.91  0.5 279.96 90.95 370.91  0.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.6 303.60 96.91 400.51  0.6 279.96 90.95 370.91  0.6 23.64 5.96 29.61 
0.7 309.25 99.88 409.12  0.7 279.96 90.95 370.91  0.7 29.29 8.92 38.21 
0.8 315.23 102.56 417.80  0.8 279.96 90.95 370.91  0.8 35.28 11.61 46.89 
0.9 321.57 105.25 426.82  0.9 279.96 90.95 370.91  0.9 41.62 14.30 55.92 
1 328.27 108.01 436.28  1 279.96 90.95 370.91  1 48.31 17.06 65.37 
 
 
CASE 3: ,5.0q  .5.01  q  
If the network is formed:  If network is NOT formed:  
The differences between the network formation and 
the non-network formation are: 
Empathy 








Expected Payoffs Expected 
Welfare Firm A Firm B  Firm A Firm B  Firm A Firm B 
0.1 198.54 60.63 259.17  0.1 198.54 60.63 259.17  0.1 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.2 198.54 60.63 259.17  0.2 198.54 60.63 259.17  0.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.3 198.54 60.63 259.17  0.3 198.54 60.63 259.17  0.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.4 198.54 60.63 259.17  0.4 198.54 60.63 259.17  0.4 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.5 198.54 60.63 259.17  0.5 198.54 60.63 259.17  0.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.6 245.83 72.56 318.38  0.6 198.54 60.63 259.17  0.6 47.29 11.92 59.21 
0.7 257.11 78.48 335.60  0.7 198.54 60.63 259.17  0.7 58.58 17.85 76.42 
0.8 269.09 83.85 352.95  0.8 198.54 60.63 259.17  0.8 70.56 23.22 93.77 
0.9 281.77 89.23 371.00  0.9 198.54 60.63 259.17  0.9 83.24 28.60 111.83 
1 295.16 94.75 389.91  1 198.54 60.63 259.17  1 96.62 34.12 130.74 
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CASE 4:    q = 0.25;     1 – q = 0.75 
.If the network is formed:  If network is NOT formed:  
The differences between the network formation and 
the non-network formation are: 
Empathy 








Expected Payoffs Expected 
Welfare Firm A Firm B  Firm A Firm B  Firm A Firm B 
0.1 117.12 30.32 147.43  0.1 117.12 30.32 147.43  0.1 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.2 117.12 30.32 147.43  0.2 117.12 30.32 147.43  0.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.3 117.12 30.32 147.43  0.3 117.12 30.32 147.43  0.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.4 117.12 30.32 147.43  0.4 117.12 30.32 147.43  0.4 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.5 117.12 30.32 147.43  0.5 117.12 30.32 147.43  0.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.6 188.05 48.20 236.25  0.6 117.12 30.32 147.43  0.6 70.93 17.88 88.82 
0.7 204.98 57.09 262.07  0.7 117.12 30.32 147.43  0.7 87.86 26.77 114.64 
0.8 222.95 65.14 288.09  0.8 117.12 30.32 147.43  0.8 105.83 34.83 140.66 
0.9 241.97 73.21 315.18  0.9 117.12 30.32 147.43  0.9 124.85 42.89 167.75 
1 262.05 81.49 343.54  1 117.12 30.32 147.43  1 144.93 51.18 196.11 
 
 
CASE 5:    q = 0;     1 - q = 1 
If the network is formed:  If network is NOT formed:  
The differences between the network formation and 
the non-network formation are: 
Empathy 








Expected Payoffs Expected 
Welfare Firm A Firm B  Firm A Firm B  Firm A Firm B 
0.1 35.70 0.00 35.70  0.1 35.70 0.00 35.70  0.1 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.2 35.70 0.00 35.70  0.2 35.70 0.00 35.70  0.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.3 35.70 0.00 35.70  0.3 35.70 0.00 35.70  0.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.4 35.70 0.00 35.70  0.4 35.70 0.00 35.70  0.4 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.5 35.70 0.00 35.70  0.5 35.70 0.00 35.70  0.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.6 130.27 23.85 154.12  0.6 35.70 0.00 35.70  0.6 94.58 23.85 118.42 
0.7 152.85 35.70 188.54  0.7 35.70 0.00 35.70  0.7 117.15 35.70 152.85 
0.8 176.81 46.44 223.24  0.8 35.70 0.00 35.70  0.8 141.11 46.44 187.55 
0.9 202.17 57.19 259.36  0.9 35.70 0.00 35.70  0.9 166.47 57.19 223.66 
1 228.94 68.23 297.17  1 35.70 0.00 35.70  1 193.24 68.23 261.47 
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In each case, we consider the difference tables to determine the effect of network-forming costs on the decision to form the network.  In each 
case, we note that (consistent with proposition 2), for any empathy below the critical value ( )5.0' , forming the network does not increase the 
payoffs of either firm (as firm B is unable to obtain bank finance in the bad state, and empathy is not enhanced in the good state). 
 
When empathy is above this critical value, the probabilities of the good and bad states affect the payoff enhancements due to the network.  I note 
the following.  As q increases, the empathy enhancement reduces at each level of empathy.  Thus, networks become less (more) important as the 
probability of the good state of the economy increases (decreases). Furthermore, the network benefits are increasing in empathy in every case.  





Appendix  B 
 
Banks’ Expected Payoff and Lending/Loan Rate Decisions. 
 
 





In normal economic conditions both firms are able to obtain bank finance.  The competitive 
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Key to diagram: 
a) Solid curves represent network not formed 
b) Doted curves represent network formed 
 
In bad economic conditions, we observe that in the absence of the network, only Firm A is able 
to obtain bank finance.  Furthermore, Bank B cannot find a loan rate at which it breaks even; in 





















Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Class I  Series A                        
(no par value)
560,133,305 93.36% 100.00%
Class I  Series A                        
(no par value)
563,133,305 93.86% 100.00%
Class I  Series A                        
(no par value)
580,549,200 96.76% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
39,866,695 6.64% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
36,866,695 6.14% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
19,450,800 3.24% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Family 252,059,987 45.00% 77.17% Family 253,409,987 45.00% 71.28% Family 278,663,616 48.00% 76.06%
NAFINSA Trust 180,210,797 32.17% 0.00% NAFINSA Trust 147,981,605 26.28% 0.00% NAFINSA Trust 162,895,302 28.06% 0.00%
Public Float 127,862,521 22.83% 22.83% Public Float 161,741,713 28.72% 28.72% Public Float 138,990,282 23.94% 23.94%
TOTAL 560,133,305 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 563,133,305 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 580,549,200 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 06 31/12/2006 ** Data Annual Rep 05 31/12/2005 ** Data Annual Rep 04 31/12/2004
ALFA,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.








Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Class I  Series A                        
(no par value)
580,549,200 96.76% 100.00%
Class I  Series A                        
(no par value)
588,379,200 98.06% 100.00%
Class I  Series A                        
(no par value)
588,379,200 98.06% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
19,450,800 3.24% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
11,620,800 1.94% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
11,620,800 1.94% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Family 278,663,616 48.00% 76.49% Family 282,422,016 48.00% 73.60% Family 282,422,016 48.00% 73.60%
NAFINSA Trust 165,388,149 28.49% 0.00% NAFINSA Trust 150,625,075 25.60% 0.00% NAFINSA Trust 150,625,075 25.60% 0.00%
Public Float 136,497,435 23.51% 23.51% Public Float 155,332,109 26.40% 26.40% Public Float 155,332,109 26.40% 26.40%
TOTAL 580,549,200 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 588,379,200 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 588,379,200 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 03 31/12/2003 ** Data Annual Rep 02 31/12/2002 ** Data Annual Rep 01 31/12/2001
ALFA,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.







Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series "Unique" Shares            
(no par value)
623,261,196 99.99% 100.00%
Series "Unique" Shares            
(no par value)
136,656,982 98.70% 100.00%
Series "Unique" Shares            
(no par value)
124,222,344 99.66% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
69,724 0.01% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
1,799,929 1.30% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
425,181 0.34% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 623,330,920 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 138,456,911 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 124,647,525 100.00% 100.00%














Trust 4,898,460 0.79% 0.79% Trust 846,085 0.62% 0.62% Public Float 31,475,010 25.34% 25.34%
TOTAL 623,261,196 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 136,656,982 100.00% 100.00% Trust 546,085 0.44% 0.44%
TOTAL 124,222,344 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 06 31/12/2006 ** Data Annual Rep 05 31/12/2005 ** Data Annual Rep 04 31/12/2004
ALSEA,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004
* Mrs. Alicia Martínez Alvarado, Mr. Alberto Torrado Monge and Mr. 
Cosme Alberto, Mr. Alberto and Mr. Armando Torrado Martínez are 
considered to be the main shareholders.
* Mrs. Alicia Martínez Alvarado and Mr. Cosme Alberto, Mr. Alberto and 
Mr. Armando Torrado Martínez are considered to be the main 
shareholders.
* Mrs. Alicia Martínez Alvarado, Mr. Alberto Torrado Monge and Mr. 
Cosme Alberto, Mr. Alberto and Mr. Armando Torrado Martínez are 







Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series "Unique" Shares            
(no par value)
116,769,017 94.60% 100.00%
Series "Unique" Shares            
(no par value)
118,751,417 96.21% 100.00%
Series "Unique" Shares            
(no par value)
120,755,627 98.22% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
6,659,441 5.40% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
4,677,041 3.79% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
2,191,600 1.78% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 123,428,458 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 123,428,458 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 122,947,227 100.00% 100.00%



















Public Float 14,354,385 12.29% 12.29% Public Float 13,931,879 11.73% 11.73% Public Float 22,450,657 18.59% 18.59%
Trust 0 0.00% 0.00% Trust 0 0.00% 0.00% Trust 0 0.00% 0.00%
TOTAL 116,769,017 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 118,751,417 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 120,755,627 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 03 31/12/2003 ** Data Annual Rep 02 31/12/2002 ** D ata A nnual info rm 01 31/12/2001
* Mrs. Alicia Martínez Alvarado, Mr. Alberto Torrado Monge and Mr. 
Cosme Alberto, Mr. Alberto and Mr. Armando Torrado Martínez are 
considered to be the main shareholders.
* Mr. Alberto Torrado Monge and Mr. Cosme Alberto, Mr. Alberto and 
Mr. Armando Torrado Martínez are considered to be the main 
shareholders.
ALSEA,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2003 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2002 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2001
* Mrs. Alicia Martínez Alvarado, Mr. Alberto Torrado Monge and Mr. 
Cosme Alberto, Mr. Alberto and Mr. Armando Torrado Martínez are 








                            Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
1,312,847,496 100.00% 100.00%
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
328,211,874 100.00% 100.00%
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
328,211,874 100.00% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%




















Fam.                                  
Ahumada Russek
480,036,000 36.56% 37.77%
Fam.                                  
Ahumada Russek
168,309,000 51.28% 52.97%
Fam.                                  
Ahumada Russek
168,309,000 51.28% 53.99%
Public Float 790,951,496 60.25% 62.23% Public Float 149,437,874 45.53% 47.03% Public Float 143,417,004 43.70% 46.01%
ADRs 41,860,000 3.19% 0.00% ADRs 10,465,000 3.19% 0.00% ADRs 16,485,870 5.02% 0.00%
TOTAL 1,312,847,496 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 328,211,874 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 328,211,874 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 06 31/12/2006 ** Data Annual Rep 05 31/12/2005 ** Data Annual Rep 04 31/12/2004
Data provided by ARA's Director of Investor Relations Data provided by ARA's Director of Investor Relations
CONSORCIO ARA,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.







Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
328,211,874 100.00% 100.00%
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
328,211,874 100.00% 100.00%
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
328,211,874 100.00% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%



















Fam.                                  
Ahumada Russek
168,309,000 51.28% 53.99%
Fam.                                  
Ahumada Russek
185,750,200 56.59% 59.59%
Fam.                                  
Ahumada Russek
187,749,200 57.20% 60.23%
Public Float 143,417,004 43.70% 46.01% Public Float 125,975,804 38.38% 40.41% Public Float 123,976,804 37.77% 39.77%
ADRs 16,485,870 5.02% 0.00% ADRs 16,485,870 5.02% 0.00% ADRs 16,485,870 5.02% 0.00%
TOTAL 328,211,874 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 328,211,874 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 328,211,874 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 03 31/12/2003 ** Data Annual Rep 02 31/12/2002 ** Data Annual Rep 01 31/12/2001
Data provided by ARA's Director of Investor Relations Data provided by ARA's Director of Investor Relations
CONSORCIO ARA,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.





SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
277,050,000 92.35% 92.35% 255,000,000 85.00% 85.00% 255,000,000 85.00% 85.00%
22,950,000 7.65% 7.65% 45,000,000 15.00% 15.00% 45,000,000 15.00% 15.00%
300,000,000 100.00% 100.00% 300,000,000 100.00% 100.00% 300,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series B-I 0 Series B-I 0 Series B-I 0
Series B-II 22,950,000 Series B-II 45,000,000 Series B-II 45,000,000
Series B-I 0 Series B-I 7,500,000 Series B-I 7,500,000
Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0
Series B-I 0 Series B-I 7,500,010 Series B-I 7,000,010
Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0
Series B-I 0 Series B-I 0 Series B-I 0
Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0
Series B-I 58,485,535 Series B-I 0 Series B-I 0
Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0
Series B-I 20,167,000 Series B-I 49,737,890 Series B-I 18,710,040
Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0
Series B-I 198,397,465 Series B-I 190,262,100 Series B-I 221,789,950
Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0
Series B-I 277,050,000 Series B-I 255,000,000 Series B-I 255,000,000
Series B-II 22,950,000 Series B-II 45,000,000 Series B-II 45,000,000















ITA, S.A. de 
C.V. (Trust)
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006
TOTAL SHARES
Series BB - II  Shares                  
(no par value)
Series B - I  Shares          
(no par value)
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005
TOTAL SHARES
Series BB - II  Shares                  
(no par value)
Class of SharesClass of Shares
TOTAL SHARES
Series BB - II  Shares                  
(no par value)




Series B - I  Shares          
(no par value)
3.00% 2.33%















A grupacio n 
A ero po rturia 
Internacio nal 
II, SA  de C V









A grupacio n 
A ero po rturia 
Internacio nal 

















A grupacio n 
A ero po rturia 
Internacio nal 











Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
255,000,000 85.00% 85.00% 255,000,000 85.00% 85.00% 255,000,000 85.00% 85.00%
45,000,000 15.00% 15.00% 45,000,000 15.00% 15.00% 45,000,000 15.00% 15.00%
300,000,000 100.00% 100.00% 300,000,000 100.00% 100.00% 300,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series B-I 0 Series B-I 0 Series B-I 0
Series B-II 45,000,000 Series B-II 45,000,000 Series B-II 45,000,000
Series B-I 7,500,000 Series B-I 7,500,000 Series B-I 7,500,000
Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0
Series B-I 5,936,000 Series B-I 0 Series B-I 0
Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0
Series B-I 33,260,870 Series B-I 33,260,870 Series B-I 33,260,870
Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0
Series B-I 0 Series B-I 0 Series B-I 0
Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0
Series B-I 34,550,282 Series B-I 25,744,000 Series B-I 9,900,000
Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0
Series B-I 173,752,848 Series B-I 188,495,130 Series B-I 204,339,130
Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0 Series B-II 0
Series B-I 255,000,000 Series B-I 255,000,000 Series B-I 255,000,000
Series B-II 45,000,000 Series B-II 45,000,000 Series B-II 45,000,000
A grupacio n 
A ero po rturia 
Internacio nal 





GRUPO AEROPORTUARIO DEL SURESTE,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
15.00% 16.41%
2.50%
A grupacio n 
A ero po rturia 
Internacio nal 

























SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2002SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2003
Class of Shares
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2001
Class of Shares
Series B - I  Shares          
(no par value)
Series B - I  Shares          
(no par value)





Series BB - II  Shares                  
(no par value)
ITA, S.A. de 
C.V. (Trust)




Series BB - II  Shares                  
(no par value)
TOTAL SHARES


















A grupacio n 
A ero po rturia 
Internacio nal 



















Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series B Shares         
(no par value)
600,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series B Shares         
(no par value)
450,000,000 75.00% 100.00%
Series B Shares         
(no par value)
450,000,000 75.00% 100.00%
Series L Shares              
(no par value)
0 0.00% 0.00%
Series L Shares              
(no par value)
150,000,000 25.00% 0.00%
Series L Shares              
(no par value)
150,000,000 25.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Control & Family 
Trusts                    
shares Series B
496,500,000 82.75%
Control & Family 
Trusts                    
shares Series B
398,250,000 66.38%
Control & Family 
Trusts                    
shares Series B
398,250,000 66.38%
Control & Family 
Trusts                    
shares Series L
0 0.00%
Control & Family 
Trusts                    
shares Series L
98,250,000 16.38%
Control & Family 
Trusts                    
shares Series L
98,250,000 16.38%
Family                              
Robinson Bours
496,500,000 82.75% 97.16%
Family                              
Robinson Bours
496,500,000 82.75% 97.31%
Family                              
Robinson Bours
496,500,000 82.75% 96.89%
ADS shares B 88,961,964 14.83% 0.00% ADS shares B 40,725,252 6.79% 0.00% ADS shares B 38,970,072 6.50% 0.00%
ADS shares L 0 0.00% 0.00% ADS shares L 40,725,252 6.79% 0.00% ADS shares L 38,970,072 6.50% 0.00%
Public Float 14,538,036 2.42% 2.84% Public Float 22,049,496 3.67% 2.69% Public Float 25,559,856 4.26% 3.11%
TOTAL 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
PF shares B 14,538,036 2.42% PF shares B 11,024,748 1.84% PF shares B 12,779,928 2.13%
PF shares L 0 0.00% PF shares L 11,024,748 1.84% PF shares L 12,779,928 2.13%
14,538,036 2.42% 22,049,496 3.67% 25,559,856 4.26%
** Data F20-06 31/12/2006 ** Data Annual Rep 05 31/12/2005 ** Data F20-04 31/12/2004
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005
INDUSTRIAS BACHOCO,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
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Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series B Shares         
(no par value)
450,000,000 75.00% 100.00%
Series B Shares         
(no par value)
447,465,700 74.58% 100.00%
Series B Shares         
(no par value)
448,154,100 74.69% 100.00%
Series L Shares              
(no par value)
150,000,000 25.00% 0.00%
Series L Shares              
(no par value)
147,465,700 24.58% 0.00%
Series L Shares              
(no par value)
148,154,100 24.69% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
5,068,600 0.84% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
3,691,800 0.62% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Control & Family 
Trusts                    
shares Series B
398,250,000 66.38%
Control & Family 
Trusts                    
shares Series B
398,250,000 66.94%
Control & Family 
Trusts                    
shares Series B
398,250,000 66.79%
Control & Family 
Trusts                    
shares Series L
98,250,000 16.38%
Control & Family 
Trusts                    
shares Series L
98,250,000 16.51%
Control & Family 
Trusts                    
shares Series L
98,250,000 16.48%
Family                              
Robinson Bours
496,500,000 82.75% 93.48%
Family                              
Robinson Bours
496,500,000 83.46% 91.63%
Family                              
Robinson Bours
496,500,000 83.26% 90.77%
ADS shares B 23,983,338 4.00% 0.00% ADS shares B 12,858,702 2.16% 0.00% ADS shares B 9,411,236 1.58% 0.00%
ADS shares L 23,983,338 4.00% 0.00% ADS shares L 12,858,702 2.16% 0.00% ADS shares L 9,333,708 1.57% 0.00%
Public Float 55,533,324 9.26% 6.52% Public Float 72,713,996 12.22% 8.37% Public Float 81,063,256 13.59% 9.23%
TOTAL 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 594,931,400 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 596,308,200 100.00% 100.00%
PF shares B 27,766,662 4.63% PF shares B 36,356,998 6.11% PF shares B 40,492,864 6.79%
PF shares L 27,766,662 4.63% PF shares L 36,356,998 6.11% PF shares L 40,570,392 6.80%
55,533,324 9.26% 72,713,996 12.22% 81,063,256 13.59%
** Data F20-03 31/12/2003 ** Data Annual Rep 02 31/12/2002 ** Data Annual Rep 01 31/12/2001
INDUSTRIAS BACHOCO,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.










Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series  A  Shares            
(no par value)
1,175,800,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series  A  Shares            
(no par value)
1,175,800,000 100.00% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 1,175,800,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 1,175,800,000 100.00% 100.00%
Fam. Servitje, Mata, 
Jorba & Sendra. *
60,260,006 5.13% 5.13%
Fam. Servitje, Mata, 
Jorba & Sendra. *
155,253,679 13.20% 13.20%
Companies 762,024,408 64.81% 64.81% Companies 760,464,408 64.68% 64.68%
Public Float 353,515,586 30.07% 30.07% Public Float 260,081,913 22.12% 22.12%
TOTAL 1,175,800,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 1,175,800,000 100.00% 100.00%







Philae, S.A. de C.V. 58,173,026 4.95% Philae, S.A. de C.V. 58,173,026 4.95%
Grupo Valacci, S.A. de 
C.V.
45,947,077 3.91%




Senda, S.A. de C.V.
43,740,000 3.72%
Distribuidora Comercial 
Senda, S.A. de C.V.
43,740,000 3.72%
Marlupag, S.A. de C.V. 40,303,384 3.43% Marlupag, S.A. de C.V. 40,303,384 3.43%
TOTAL 762,024,408 64.81% TOTAL 760,464,408 64.68%










Main shareholders 0.00% Main shareholders 94,993,673 8.08%
TOTAL 60,260,006 5.13% TOTAL 155,253,679 13.20%
** Data Annual Rep 06 31/12/2006 ** Data Annual Rep 05 31/12/2005
**  The individual direct  tenancy of any of these investors does not 
reach the five percent of the total capital of the company.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005
Families Servitje, Mata, Jorba & Sendra, through some of the previous 
companies, either directly or indirectly, have a majoritarian 
shareholder ownership of Industrias BIMBO, S.A.B DE C.V.
**  The individual direct  tenancy of any of these investors does not 
reach the five percent of the total capital of the company.
* These two trust are controlled by the family Servitje Montull* These two trust are controlled by the family Servitje Montull
Families Servitje, Mata, Jorba & Sendra, through some of the previous 
companies, either directly or indirectly, have a majoritarian 
shareholder ownership of Industrias BIMBO, S.A.B DE C.V.










Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series  A  Shares            
(no par value)
1,175,800,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series  A  Shares            
(no par value)
1,175,800,000 100.00% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 1,175,800,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 1,175,800,000 100.00% 100.00%
Fam. Servitje, Mata, 
Jorba & Sendra. *
150,680,134 12.82% 12.82%
Fam. Servitje, Mata, 
Jorba & Sendra. *
162,207,580 13.80% 13.80%
Companies 762,288,408 64.83% 64.83% Companies 762,633,810 64.86% 64.86%
Public Float 262,831,458 22.35% 22.35% Public Float 250,958,610 21.34% 21.34%
TOTAL 1,175,800,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 1,175,800,000 100.00% 100.00%







Philae, S.A. de C.V. 58,173,026 4.95% Philae, S.A. de C.V. 58,173,026 4.95%
Grupo Valacci, S.A. de 
C.V.
45,947,077 3.91%




Senda, S.A. de C.V.
44,214,000 3.76%
Distribuidora Comercial 
Senda, S.A. de C.V.
44,740,000 3.81%
Marlupag, S.A. de C.V. 40,303,384 3.43% Marlupag, S.A. de C.V. 40,303,384 3.43%













Main shareholders 91,120,128 7.75% Main shareholders 104,969,514 8.93%
TOTAL 150,680,134 12.82% TOTAL 162,207,580 13.80%
** Data Annual Rep 04 31/12/2004 ** Data Annual Rep 03 31/12/2003
* These two trust are controlled by the family Servitje Montull
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2003
* These two trust are controlled by the family Servitje Montull
Families Servitje, Mata, Jorba & Sendra, through some of the previous 
companies, either directly or indirectly, have a majoritarian 
shareholder ownership of Industrias BIMBO, S.A.B DE C.V.
Families Servitje, Mata, Jorba & Sendra, through some of the previous 
companies, either directly or indirectly, have a majoritarian 
shareholder ownership of Industrias BIMBO, S.A.B DE C.V.
**  The individual direct  tenancy of any of these investors does not 
reach the five percent of the total capital of the company.
**  The individual direct  tenancy of any of these investors does not 
reach the five percent of the total capital of the company.










Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series  A  Shares            
(no par value)
1,175,800,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series  A  Shares            
(no par value)
1,175,889,069 82.72% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
245,710,931 17.28% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 1,175,800,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 1,421,600,000 100.00% 100.00%
Fam. Servitje, Mata, 
Jorba & Sendra. *
164,942,149 14.03% 14.03%
Fam. Servitje, Mata, 
Jorba & Sendra. *
164,942,149 14.03% 14.03%
Companies 762,633,810 64.86% 64.86% Companies 762,633,810 64.86% 64.86%
Public Float 248,224,041 21.11% 21.11% Public Float 248,313,110 21.12% 21.12%
TOTAL 1,175,800,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 1,175,889,069 100.00% 100.00%







Philae, S.A. de C.V. 58,173,026 4.95% Philae, S.A. de C.V. 58,173,026 4.95%
Grupo Valacci, S.A. de 
C.V.
45,947,077 3.91%




Senda, S.A. de C.V.
44,740,000 3.81%
Distribuidora Comercial 
Senda, S.A. de C.V.
44,740,000 3.80%
Marlupag, S.A. de C.V. 40,303,384 3.43% Marlupag, S.A. de C.V. 40,303,384 3.43%













Main shareholders 107,704,083 9.16% Main shareholders 107,704,083 9.16%
TOTAL 164,942,149 14.03% TOTAL 164,942,149 14.03%
** Data Annual Rep 02 31/12/2002 ** D ata A nnual info rm 01 31/12/2001
GRUPO BIMBO,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
**  The individual direct  tenancy of any of these investors does not 
reach the five percent of the total capital of the company.
**  The individual direct  tenancy of any of these investors does not 
reach the five percent of the total capital of the company.
* These two trust are controlled by the family Servitje Montull
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2002 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2001
Families Servitje, Mata, Jorba & Sendra, through some of the previous 
companies, either directly or indirectly, have a majoritarian 
shareholder ownership of Industrias BIMBO, S.A.B DE C.V.
Families Servitje, Mata, Jorba & Sendra, through some of the previous 
companies, either directly or indirectly, have a majoritarian 
shareholder ownership of Industrias BIMBO, S.A.B DE C.V.





SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
15,778,133,836 66.67% 66.67% 7,676,623,102 66.67% 66.67% 3,704,060,248 66.67% 66.67%
7,889,066,918 33.33% 33.33% 3,838,311,511 33.33% 33.33% 1,852,030,124 33.33% 33.33%
23,667,200,754 100.00% 100.00% 11,514,934,613 100.00% 100.00% 5,556,090,372 100.00% 100.00%
Series A shares 482,890,832 Series A shares 247,448,228 Series A shares 123,717,026
Series B shares 241,445,416 Series B shares 123,724,074 Series B shares 61,858,513
CPOS as Shrs A 1,116,400,000 CPOS as Shrs A 627,000,000 CPOS as Shrs A 307,600,000
CPOS as Shrs B 558,200,000 CPOS as Shrs B 313,500,000 CPOS as Shrs B 153,800,000
ADS as Shrs A 1,099,662,064 ADS as Shrs A 777,705,736 ADS as Shrs A 377,978,960
ADS as Shrs B 549,831,032 ADS as Shrs B 388,852,868 ADS as Shrs B 188,989,480
CPOS as Shrs A 3,596,130,278 CPOS as Shrs A 1,418,380,716 CPOS as Shrs A 997,182,354
CPOS as Shrs B 1,798,065,139 CPOS as Shrs B 709,190,358 CPOS as Shrs B 498,591,177
CPOS as Shrs A 9,483,050,662 CPOS as Shrs A 4,606,088,422 CPOS as Shrs A 1,897,581,908
CPOS as Shrs B 4,741,525,331 CPOS as Shrs B 2,303,044,211 CPOS as Shrs B 948,790,954
Series A 15,778,133,836 Series A 7,676,623,102 Series A 3,704,060,248
Series B 7,889,066,918 Series B 3,838,311,511 Series B 1,852,030,124
Data AR-06 31/12/2006  Data AR-05 31/12/2005 DataAR-04 31/12/2004
CEMEX,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005
Series A  Shares                   
(no par value)
Series A  Shares                   
(no par value)
Series A  Shares                   
(no par value)
Class of Shares Class of Shares Class of Shares
TOTAL SHARES TOTAL SHARES TOTAL SHARES
Series B  Shares                  
(no par value)
Series B  Shares                  
(no par value)































CPOs in Trust 26.92% 0.00%
TOTAL 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 100.00% 100.00%
ADSs
TOTAL 100.00%
ADSs 60.10% 0.00% ADSs 60.00% 0.00%
Each CPO represents two series A shares and one new series B share, while 
each ADS represents ten CPOs.
Each CPO represents two series A shares and one new series B share, while 
each ADS represents ten CPOs.
The shares acquired through our subsidiaries (by means of CPOs),  are 
voted at the direction of CEMEX management.
The shares acquired through our subsidiaries (by means of CPOs),  are 
voted at the direction of CEMEX management.
The shares acquired through our subsidiaries (by means of CPOs),  are 
voted at the direction of CEMEX management.
As of March 31, 2007, no individual director or member of the senior 
management beneficially owned one percent or more of any class of CEMEX 
outstanding capital stock.  However, the senior management and directors 
and their immediate families owned, collectively, approximately 4.74%  of 
the outstanding shares, including shares underlying stock options and 
restricted CPOs under the ESOPs.
All ADSs are deemed to be held by non-Mexican nationals.
100.00%
Each CPO represents two series A shares and one new series B share, while 
each ADS represents five  CPOs.
All ADSs are deemed to be held by non-Mexican nationals.
As of March 31, 2006, no individual director or member of the senior 
management beneficially owned one percent or more of any class of CEMEX 
outstanding capital stock.  However, the senior management and directors 
and their immediate families owned, collectively, approximately 3.9%  of the 
outstanding shares, including shares underlying stock options and restricted 
CPOs under the ESOPs.
All ADSs are deemed to be held by non-Mexican nationals.
As of March 31, 2005, no individual director or member of the senior 
management beneficially owned one percent or more of any class of CEMEX 
outstanding capital stock.  However, the senior management and directors 
and their immediate families owned, collectively, approximately 6.34%  of 
the outstanding shares, including shares underlying stock options and 
restricted CPOs under the ESOPs.
51.23% 0.00%





Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
3,548,893,516 66.67% 66.67% 3,331,308,318 66.67% 66.67% 3,216,936,746 66.67% 66.67%
1,774,446,758 33.33% 33.33% 1,665,654,159 33.33% 33.33% 1,608,468,373 33.33% 33.33%
5,323,340,274 100.00% 100.00% 4,996,962,477 100.00% 100.00% 4,825,405,119 100.00% 100.00%
Series A shares 125,002,848 Series A shares 186,989,876 Series A shares 198,550,764
Series B shares 62,501,424 Series B shares 93,494,938 Series B shares 99,082,391
CPOS as Shrs A 306,000,000 CPOS as Shrs A 290,000,000 CPOS as Shrs A 292,000,000
CPOS as Shrs B 153,000,000 CPOS as Shrs B 145,000,000 CPOS as Shrs B 146,000,000
ADS as Shrs A 272,474,030 CPOS as Shrs A 948,861,466 CPOS as Shrs A 969,685,340
ADS as Shrs B 136,237,015 CPOS as Shrs B 474,430,733 CPOS as Shrs B 484,923,340
CPOS as Shrs A 934,885,645 CPOS as Shrs A 1,905,456,976 CPOS as Shrs A 1,756,700,642
CPOS as Shrs B 467,442,823 CPOS as Shrs B 952,728,488 CPOS as Shrs B 878,462,642
CPOS as Shrs A 1,910,530,993 Series A 3,331,308,318 Series A 3,216,936,746
CPOS as Shrs B 955,265,496 Series B 1,665,654,159 Series B 1,608,468,373
Series A 3,548,893,516
Series B 1,774,446,758
Data AR-03 31/12/2003  DataAR-02 31/12/2002  DataAR-01 31/12/2001
CEMEX,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
Each CPO represents two series A shares and one new series B share, while 
each ADS represents five  CPOs.
The shares acquired through our subsidiaries (by means of CPOs),  are 
voted at the direction of CEMEX management.
As of March, 2002, no individual director or member of the senior management 
beneficially owned one percent or more of any class of CEMEX outstanding capital 
stock, but Mr. Fernando Ruíz Aredondo who owns around 1.83 percent.  
Furthermore, the senior management and directors and their immediate families 
owned, collectively, approximately 6.49% of the outstanding shares, including 
shares underlying stock options and restricted CPOs under the ESOPs.
Each CPO represents two series A shares and one new series B share, while 
each ADS represents five  CPOs.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2003
Series A  Shares                   
(no par value)
Series A  Shares                   
(no par value)
Series A  Shares                   
(no par value)
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2002 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2001
Class of Shares Class of Shares Class of Shares
TOTAL SHARES TOTAL SHARES TOTAL SHARES
Series B  Shares                  
(no par value)
Series B  Shares                  
(no par value)




















CPOs in Trust 28.48% 0.00% CPOs in Trust 30.14% 0.00%
0.00%CPOs in Trust 26.34% 0.00% ADSs 57.20% 0.00% ADSs 54.61%
53.83% 0.00% TOTAL 100.00% 100.00%TOTAL
As of March 19, 2004, no individual director or member of the senior 
management beneficially owned one percent or more of any class of 
CEMEX outstanding capital stock.  However, the senior management and 
directors and their immediate families owned, collectively, approximately 
5.75%  of the outstanding shares, including shares underlying stock options 
and restricted CPOs under the ESOPs.
100.00% 100.00%
As of December, 2002, no individual director or member of the senior management 
beneficially owned one percent or more of any class of CEMEX outstanding capital 
stock, but Mr. Fernando Ruíz Aredondo who owns around 1.88 percent.  
Furthermore, the senior management and directors and their immediate families 
owned, collectively, approximately 5.8% of the outstanding shares, including shares 
underlying stock options and restricted CPOs under the ESOPs.
The shares acquired through our subsidiaries (by means of CPOs),  are 
voted at the direction of CEMEX management.
The shares acquired through our subsidiaries (by means of CPOs),  are 
voted at the direction of CEMEX management.
TOTAL 100.00% 100.00%
Each CPO represents two series A shares and one new series B share, while 
each ADS represents five  CPOs.






Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series B Shares            
(no par value)
359,330,813 99.94% 100.00%
Series B Shares            
(no par value)
359,330,813 99.94% 100.00%
Series B Shares            
(no par value)
359,203,903 99.90% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
223,040 0.06% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
223,040 0.06% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
349,950 0.10% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 359,553,853 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 359,553,853 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 359,553,853 100.00% 100.00%
Luis Alejandro Soberón 
Kuri
86,391,426 24.04% 24.04%
Luis Alejandro Soberón 
Kuri
37,693,802 10.49% 10.49%

















Centauro Capital, S.A. 
de C.V.
30,075,989 8.37% 8.37%
Centauro Capital, S.A. 
de C.V.
30,065,367 8.37% 8.37%
Public Float 258,939,387 72.06% 72.06%
Trust for executives & 
employees
4,635,367 1.29% 1.29%
Trust for executives & 
employees
4,490,049 1.25% 1.25%
TOTAL 359,330,813 100.00% 100.00% Public Float 272,911,752 75.95% 75.95% Public Float 272,959,046 75.99% 75.99%
TOTAL 359,330,813 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 359,203,903 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 06 31/12/2006 ** Data Annual Rep 05 31/12/2005 ** Data Annual Rep 04 31/12/2004
CORPORACIÓN INTERAMERICANA DE ENTRETENIMIENTO,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004
* Mr. Luis Alejandro Soberón Kuri, who is the founder of CIE and the 
Chairman of its BOD, has the faculty to decide the vote of the shares 
belonging to Mr. González Calvillo & Mr. González Compeán, 
Centauro Capital and the "Trust" for Executives and Employees.
*Even though Mr. Luis Alejandro Soberón Kuri, the founder, and Mr. 
Rodrigo Humberto González Calvillo and Mr. Federico González 
Compeán, members of the BOD and Chief Officers, does not own the 
majority of the capital stock of CIE, it is deemed that they control the 
company  since other investors' shares have been voluntarily voted in 
the same way as founder shares did.
** Centauro Capital is a company funded by Mr. Luis Alejandro 
Soberón Kuri, who holds the majority of its shares.
** Centauro Capital is a company funded by Mr. Luis Alejandro 
Soberón Kuri, who holds the majority of its shares.
* Mr. Luis Alejandro Soberón Kuri, who is the founder of CIE and the 
Chairman of its BOD, has the faculty to decide the vote of the shares 
belonging to Mr. González Calvillo & Mr. González Compeán, 





Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series B Shares            
(no par value)
309,203,903 99.89% 100.00%
Series B Shares            
(no par value)
309,203,903 99.89% 100.00%
Series B Shares            
(no par value)
305,887,520 100.00% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
349,950 0.11% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
349,950 0.11% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 309,553,853 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 309,553,853 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 305,887,520 100.00% 100.00%
Luis Alejandro Soberón 
Kuri
37,691,956 12.19% 12.19%
Luis Alejandro Soberón 
Kuri
37,691,956 12.19% 12.19%
Luis Alejandro Soberón 
Kuri
42,212,478 13.80% 13.80%
Trust for Founders 14,006,937 4.53% 4.53% Trust for Founders 14,006,937 4.53% 4.53% Trust for Founders 14,040,237 4.59% 4.59%
Trust for executives & 
employees
4,792,660 1.55% 1.55%
Trust for executives & 
employees
5,040,024 1.63% 1.63%
Trust for executives & 
employees
6,056,573 1.98% 1.98%
Centauro Capital, S.A. 
de C.V.
16,758,852 5.42% 5.42%
Centauro Capital, S.A. 
de C.V.
16,758,852 5.42% 5.42%
Centauro Capital, S.A. 
de C.V.
16,579,104 5.42% 5.42%
Public Float 235,953,498 76.31% 76.31% Public Float 235,706,135 76.23% 76.23% Public Float 226,999,129 74.21% 74.21%
TOTAL 309,203,903 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 309,203,903 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 305,887,520 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 03 31/12/2003 ** Data Annual Rep 02 31/12/2002 ** Data Annual Rep 01 31/12/2001
* Mr. Luis Alejandro Soberón Kuri, who is the founder of CIE and the 
Chairman of its BOD, has the faculty to decide the vote of the shares 
under the "Trust for Founders "  and the "Trust for Executives and 
Employees".
** Centauro Capital is a company funded by Mr. Luis Alejandro 
Soberón Kuri, who holds the majority of its shares.
* Mr. Luis Alejandro Soberón Kuri, who is the founder of CIE and the 
Chairman of its BOD, has the faculty to decide the vote of the shares 
under the "Trust for Founders "  and the "Trust for Executives and 
Employees".
** Centauro Capital is a company funded by Mr. Luis Alejandro 
Soberón Kuri, who holds the majority of its shares.
* Mr. Luis Alejandro Soberón Kuri, who is the founder of CIE and the 
Chairman of its BOD, has the faculty to decide the vote of the shares 
under the "Trust for Founders "  and the "Trust for Executives and 
Employees".
** Centauro Capital is a company funded by Mr. Luis Alejandro 
Soberón Kuri, who holds the majority of its shares.
CORPORACIÓN INTERAMERICANA DE ENTRETENIMIENTO,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.






                            Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
883,991,296 99.90% 100.00%
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
883,991,296 99.90% 100.00%
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
220,997,824 99.90% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
896,000 0.10% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
896,000 0.10% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
224,000 0.10% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 884,887,296 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 884,887,296 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 221,221,824 100.00% 100.00%
   






































Public Float 205,830,848 23.28% 23.28% Public Float 40,124,126 18.16% 18.16%
Public Float 205,830,848 23.28% 23.28% TOTAL 883,991,296 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 220,997,824 100.00% 100.00%
TOTAL 883,991,296 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 06 31/12/2006 ** Data Annual Rep 05 31/12/2005 ** Data Annual Rep 04 31/12/2004
CORPORACION MOCTEZUMA,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.





Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
220,997,824 99.90% 100.00%
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
220,997,824 99.90% 100.00%
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
220,997,824 99.90% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
224,000 0.10% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
224,000 0.10% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
224,000 0.10% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 221,221,824 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 221,221,824 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 221,221,824 100.00% 100.00%
   

















































Public Float 28,816,107 13.04% 13.04% Public Float 28,816,107 13.04% 13.04% Public Float 29,600,085 13.39% 13.39%
TOTAL 220,997,824 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 220,997,824 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 220,997,824 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 03 31/12/2003 ** Data Annual Rep 02 31/12/2002 ** Data Annual Rep 01 31/12/2001
CORPORACION MOCTEZUMA,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.












Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series  I  Shares            
(no par value)
750,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series  I  Shares            
(no par value)
750,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 750,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 750,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Fam. GROSSMAN 445,726,006 59.43% 59.43% Fam. GROSSMAN 445,726,006 59.43% 59.43%
Coca-Cola Company 156,558,000 20.87% 20.87% Coca-Cola Company 156,558,000 20.87% 20.87%
Executives 0 0.00% 0.00% Executives 0 0.00% 0.00%
General Public 147,715,994 19.70% 19.70% General Public 147,715,994 19.70% 19.70%
TOTAL 750,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 750,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Trusts CONTINENTAL I* 
and CONTINENTAL II*
442,128,106 58.95%
Trusts CONTINENTAL I* 
and CONTINENTAL II*
442,128,106 58.95%
** The Coca-Cola 
Company
156,558,000 20.87%
** The Coca-Cola 
Company
156,558,000 20.87%
Cynthia H Grossman and 
Bruce E Grosmman
3,597,900 0.48%
Cynthia H Grossman and 
Bruce E Grosmman
3,597,900 0.48%
Jorge A Tirado del Pozo 0.00% Jorge A Tirado del Pozo 0.00%
Marcos Aguilar Romo 0.00% Marcos Aguilar Romo 0.00%
Carlos Valdés Govea 0.00% Carlos Valdés Govea 0.00%
Roberto Martinez Garza 0.00% Roberto Martinez Garza 0.00%
Sergio Garza Treviño 0.00% Sergio Garza Treviño 0.00%
Miguel A Rábago Vite 0.00% Miguel A Rábago Vite 0.00%
TOTAL 602,284,006 80.30% TOTAL 602,284,006 80.30%
** Data Annual Rep 06 31/12/2006 ** Data Annual Rep 05 31/12/2005
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005
GRUPO CONTINENTAL,  S.A.B.
** The Coca-Cola company tenancy is through subsidiaries and trusts 
(i.e. indirect ownership).
* Cynthia H Grossman & Bruce E Grossman are the trustees of the 
trust CONTINENTAL I and the trust CONTINENTAL II.  This tenancy 
was inherited from the funder and majoritarian shareholder Dr Burton 
E Grossman.
* Cynthia H Grossman & Bruce E Grossman are the trustees of the 
trust CONTINENTAL I and the trust CONTINENTAL II.  This tenancy 
was inherited from the funder and majoritarian shareholder Dr Burton 
E Grossman.













Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series  I  Shares            
(no par value)
750,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series  I  Shares            
(no par value)
750,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 750,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 750,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Fam. GROSSMAN 445,726,006 59.43% 59.43% Fam. GROSSMAN 445,726,006 59.43% 59.43%
Coca-Cola Company 156,558,000 20.87% 20.87% Coca-Cola Company 156,558,000 20.87% 20.87%
Executives 0 0.00% 0.00% Executives 0 0.00% 0.00%
General Public 147,715,994 19.70% 19.70% General Public 147,715,994 19.70% 19.70%
TOTAL 750,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 750,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Trusts CONTINENTAL I* 
and CONTINENTAL II*
442,128,106 58.95%
Trusts CONTINENTAL I* 
and CONTINENTAL II*
442,128,106 58.95%
** The Coca-Cola 
Company
156,558,000 20.87%
** The Coca-Cola 
Company
156,558,000 20.87%
Cynthia H Grossman and 
Bruce E Grosmman
3,597,900 0.48%
Cynthia H Grossman and 
Bruce E Grosmman
3,597,900 0.48%
Jorge A Tirado del Pozo 0.00% Jorge A Tirado del Pozo 0.00%
Marcos Aguilar Romo 0.00% Marcos Aguilar Romo 0.00%
Carlos Valdés Govea 0.00% Carlos Valdés Govea 0.00%
Roberto Martinez Garza 0.00% Roberto Martinez Garza 0.00%
Sergio Garza Treviño 0.00% Sergio Garza Treviño 0.00%
Miguel A Rábago Vite 0.00% Miguel A Rábago Vite 0.00%
TOTAL 602,284,006 80.30% TOTAL 602,284,006 80.30%
** Data Annual Rep 04 31/12/2004 ** Data Annual Rep 03 31/12/2003
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2003
** The Coca-Cola company tenancy is through subsidiaries and trusts 
(i.e. indirect ownership).
** The Coca-Cola company tenancy is through subsidiaries and trusts 
(i.e. indirect ownership).
GRUPO CONTINENTAL,  S.A.B.
* Cynthia H Grossman & Bruce E Grossman are the trustees of the trust 
CONTINENTAL I and the trust CONTINENTAL II.  This tenancy was 
inherited from the funder and majoritarian shareholder Dr Burton E 
Grossman.
* Cynthia H Grossman & Bruce E Grossman are the trustees of the 
trust CONTINENTAL I and the trust CONTINENTAL II.  This tenancy 











Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series  I  Shares            
(no par value)
749,980,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series  I  Shares            
(no par value)
748,713,200 99.83% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
20,000 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
1,286,800 0.17% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 750,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 750,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Fam. GROSSMAN 445,726,006 59.43% 59.43% Fam. GROSSMAN 445,726,006 59.53% 59.53%
Coca-Cola Company 156,558,000 20.87% 20.87% Coca-Cola Company 156,558,000 20.91% 20.91%
Executives 0 0.00% 0.00% Executives 3,804,800 0.51% 0.51%
General Public 147,695,994 19.69% 19.69% General Public 142,624,394 19.05% 19.05%
TOTAL 749,980,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 748,713,200 100.00% 100.00%
Trusts CONTINENTAL I* 
and CONTINENTAL II*
442,128,106 58.95%
Trusts CONTINENTAL I* 
and CONTINENTAL II*
442,128,106 59.05%
** The Coca-Cola 
Company
156,558,000 20.87%
** The Coca-Cola 
Company
156,558,000 20.91%
Cynthia H Grossman and 
Bruce E Grosmman
3,597,900 0.48%
Cynthia H Grossman and 
Bruce E Grosmman
3,597,900 0.48%
Jorge A Tirado del Pozo 0.00% Jorge A Tirado del Pozo 2,194,000 0.29%
Marcos Aguilar Romo 0.00% Marcos Aguilar Romo 1,375,500 0.18%
Carlos Valdés Govea 0.00% Carlos Valdés Govea 177,000 0.02%
Roberto Martinez Garza 0.00% Roberto Martinez Garza 34,000 0.00%
Sergio Garza Treviño 0.00% Sergio Garza Treviño 21,300 0.00%
Miguel A Rábago Vite 0.00% Miguel A Rábago Vite 3,000 0.00%
TOTAL 602,284,006 80.31% TOTAL 606,088,806 80.95%
** Data Annual Rep 02 31/12/2002 ** D ata A nnual R epo rt  01 31/12/2001
** The Coca-Cola company tenancy is through subsidiaries and trusts 
(i.e. indirect ownership).
* Cynthia H Grossman & Bruce E Grossman are the trustees of the 
trust CONTINENTAL I and the trust CONTINENTAL II.  This tenancy 
was inherited from the funder and majoritarian shareholder Dr Burton 
E Grossman.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2002 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2001
** The Coca-Cola company tenancy is through subsidiaries and trusts 
(i.e. indirect ownership).
GRUPO CONTINENTAL,  S.A.B.
* Cynthia H Grossman & Bruce E Grossman are the trustees of the trust 
CONTINENTAL I and the trust CONTINENTAL II.  This tenancy was 







                            Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
238,885,114 84.03% 100.00%
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
236,102,147 83.05% 100.00%
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
232,220,938 80.46% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
45,406,050 15.97% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
48,189,017 16.95% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
56,409,666 19.54% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 284,291,164 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 284,291,164 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 288,630,604 100.00% 100.00%



















GDS 0 0.00% 0.00% GDS 0 0.00% 0.00% GDS 16,496,440 7.10% 0.00%
Public Float 64,754,329 27.11% 27.11% Public Float 47,912,837 20.29% 20.29% Public Float 18,577,343 8.00% 8.61%
TOTAL 238,885,114 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 236,102,147 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 232,220,938 100.00% 100.00%
Data Annual Rep 06 Jun-07 Data Annual Rep 05 Jun-06 Data Annual Rep 04 Jun-05
The controlling beneficial shareholders of our company are the 
heirs of Mr. Hugo Salinas Rocha, which includes Mr. Ricardo B. 
Salinas, Mr. Hugo Salinas Price and Mrs.Esther Pliego de 
Salinas (collectively, the "Controlling Shareholders").
The controlling beneficial shareholders of our company are the 
heirs of Mr. Hugo Salinas Rocha, which includes Mr. Ricardo B. 
Salinas, Mr. Hugo Salinas Price and Mrs.Esther Pliego de 
Salinas (collectively, the "Controlling Shareholders").
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004
The controlling beneficial shareholders of our company are the 
heirs of Mr. Hugo Salinas Rocha, which includes Mr. Ricardo B. 
Salinas, Mr. Hugo Salinas Price and Mrs.Esther Pliego de 
Salinas (collectively, the "Controlling Shareholders").






Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
237,040,833 82.13% 100.00%
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
241,590,634 83.70% 100.00%
 Series A Shares                        
(no par value)
1,249,147,610 34.40% 38.43%
Shares in company's 
treasury
51,589,771 17.87% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
47,039,970 16.30% 0.00%
 Series B Shares                        
(no par value)
2,001,705,795 55.12% 61.57%
TOTAL SHARES 288,630,604 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 288,630,604 100.00% 100.00%
 Series L Shares                        
(no par value)
380,535,321 10.48% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 3,631,388,726 100.00% 100.00%















39,903,095 16.52% 17.87% **CPOs 256,312,260 7.06% 0.00%
GDS 17,926,864 7.56% 0.00% GDS 18,283,844 7.57% 0.00% GDS 256,312,260 7.06% 0.00%
Public Float 4,504,621 1.90% 2.06% Public Float 14,870,069 6.16% 6.66% Public Float 886,769,738 24.42% 21.25%
TOTAL 237,040,833 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 241,590,634 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 3,631,388,726 100.00% 100.00%
Data Annual Rep 03 Jun-04 Data Annual Rep 02 Jun-03 Data Annual Rep 01 Feb-02
The controlling beneficial shareholders of our company are the 
heirs of Mr. Hugo Salinas Rocha, which includes Mr. Ricardo B. 
Salinas, Mr. Hugo Salinas Price and Mrs.Esther Pliego de 
Salinas (collectively, the "Controlling Shareholders").
The controlling beneficial shareholders of our company are the 
heirs of Mr. Hugo Salinas Rocha, which includes Mr. Ricardo B. 
Salinas, Mr. Hugo Salinas Price and Mrs.Esther Pliego de 
Salinas (collectively, the "Controlling Shareholders").
The controlling beneficial shareholders of our company are the 
heirs of Mr. Hugo Salinas Rocha, which includes Mr. Ricardo B. 
Salinas, Mr. Hugo Salinas Price and Mrs.Esther Pliego de Salinas 
(collectively, the "Controlling Shareholders").
GRUPO ELEKTRA,  S.A.  DE  C.V.







SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
9,246,420,270 51.68% 100.00% 3,082,140,090 51.68% 100.00% 2,737,740,090 51.68% 100.00%
4,322,355,540 24.16% 0.00% 1,440,785,180 24.16% 0.00% 1,279,785,180 24.16% 0.00%
4,322,355,540 24.16% 0.00% 1,440,785,180 24.16% 0.00% 1,279,785,180 24.16% 0.00%
17,891,131,350 100.00% 100.00% 5,963,710,450 100.00% 100.00% 5,297,310,450 100.00% 100.00%
Series B 6,914,592,885 Series B 2,211,344,965 Series B 1,926,075,625
Subseries DB 0 Subseries DB 0 Subseries DB 0
Subseries DL 0 Subseries DL 0 Subseries DL 0
Series B 104,143,407 Series B 33,894,053 Series B 64,955,675
Subseries DB 75,817,764 Subseries DB 25,682,796 Subseries DB 18,133,710
Subseries DL 75,817,764 Subseries DL 25,682,796 Subseries DL 18,133,710
Series B 1,145,424,218 Series B 381,808,073 Series B 463,922,128
Subseries DB 2,290,848,436 Subseries DB 763,616,145 Subseries DB 927,844,256
Subseries DL 2,290,848,436 Subseries DL 763,616,145 Subseries DL 927,844,256
Series B 1,082,259,760 Series B 455,092,999 Series B 282,786,662
Subseries DB 1,955,689,340 Subseries DB 651,486,239 Subseries DB 333,807,215
Subseries DL 1,955,689,340 Subseries DL 651,486,239 Subseries DL 333,807,215
Series B 9,246,420,270 Series B 3,082,140,090 Series B 2,737,740,090
Subseries D B 4,322,355,540 Subseries D B 1,440,785,180 Subseries D B 1,279,785,180
Subseries D L 4,322,355,540 Subseries D L 1,440,785,180 Subseries D L 1,279,785,180






















Sub-series  DL  Shares          
(no par value)
Sub-series  DL  Shares          
(no par value)












ADRs 32.01% 0.00% ADRs
Sub-series  DB  Shares          
(no par value)
Sub-series  DB  Shares          
(no par value)
Sub-series  DB  Shares          
(no par value)
FOMENTO ECONÓMICO MEXICANO,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005
Class of Shares Class of Shares Class of Shares
Series  B  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  B  Shares          
(no par value)












Series B 13,440,804 Series B 4,480,268 Series B 4,954,368
Subseries DB 26,654,808 Subseries DB 8,884,936 Subseries DB 8,881,736
Subseries DL 26,654,808 Subseries DL 8,884,936 Subseries DL 8,881,736
Series B 7,491,102 Series B 2,497,034 Series B 2,276,517
Subseries DB 14,976,204 Subseries DB 4,992,068 Subseries DB 4,553,034
Subseries DL 14,976,204 Subseries DL 4,992,068 Subseries DL 4,553,034
Series B 69,401,775 Series B 23,133,925 Series B 20,821,980
Subseries DB 12,754,950 Subseries DB 4,251,650 Subseries DB 4,031,160
Subseries DL 12,754,950 Subseries DL 4,251,650 Subseries DL 4,031,160
Series B 5,151,345 Series B 1,717,115 Series B 36,568,920
Subseries DB 10,302,690 Subseries DB 3,434,230 Subseries DB 0
Subseries DL 10,302,690 Subseries DL 3,434,230 Subseries DL 0
Series B 8,658,381 Series B 2,065,711 Series B 333,890
Subseries DB 11,129,112 Subseries DB 4,119,912 Subseries DB 667,780
Subseries DL 11,129,112 Subseries DL 4,119,912 Subseries DL 667,780
Series B 104,143,407 Series B 33,894,053 Series B 64,955,675
Subseries D B 75,817,764 Subseries D B 25,682,796 Subseries D B 18,133,710
Subseries D L 75,817,764 Subseries D L 25,682,796 Subseries D L 18,133,710
Data AR-06 31/12/2006 Data AR-05 31/12/2005 Data AR-04 31/12/2004
0.21% 0.08%0.21% 0.08%






















The following table sets forth the individual share ownership NOT 
aggregated into the trust Voting , but that also belongs to the  members 





The following table sets forth the individual share ownership NOT 
aggregated into the trust Voting , but that also belongs to the  members 
of the BOD forming this trust.
The following table sets forth the individual share ownership NOT 
aggregated into the trust Voting , but that also belongs to the  members 








































Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
2,737,740,090 51.68% 100.00% 2,737,740,090 51.68% 100.00% 2,737,740,090 51.68% 100.00%
1,279,785,180 24.16% 0.00% 1,279,785,180 24.16% 0.00% 1,279,785,180 24.16% 0.00%
1,279,785,180 24.16% 0.00% 1,279,785,180 24.16% 0.00% 1,279,785,180 24.16% 0.00%
5,297,310,450 100.00% 100.00% 5,297,310,450 100.00% 100.00% 5,297,310,450 100.00% 100.00%
Series B 1,907,373,675 Series B 1,473,334,215 Series B 1,493,648,070
Subseries DB 0 Subseries DB 0 Subseries DB 0
Subseries DL 0 Subseries DL 0 Subseries DL 0
Series B 83,144,125 Series B 154,421,535 Series B 66,567,240
Subseries DB 18,133,710 Subseries DB 18,133,710 Subseries DB 38,452,540
Subseries DL 18,133,710 Subseries DL 18,133,710 Subseries DL 38,452,540
Series B 65,282,220 Series B 94,582,020 Series B 95,857,320
Subseries DB 30,564,440 Subseries DB 189,164,040 Subseries DB 191,714,640
Subseries DL 30,564,440 Subseries DL 189,164,040 Subseries DL 191,714,640
Series B 344,964,132 Series B 234,444,855 Series B 201,819,303
Subseries DB 820,492,705 Subseries DB 658,053,749 Subseries DB 595,353,246
Subseries DL 820,492,705 Subseries DL 658,053,749 Subseries DL 595,353,246
Series B 336,975,938 Series B 780,957,465 Series B 879,848,157
Subseries DB 410,594,325 Subseries DB 414,433,681 Subseries DB 454,264,754
Subseries DL 410,594,325 Subseries DL 414,433,681 Subseries DL 454,264,754
Series B 2,737,740,090 Series B 2,737,740,090 Series B 2,737,740,090
Subseries D B 1,279,785,180 Subseries D B 1,279,785,180 Subseries D B 1,279,785,180
Subseries D L 1,279,785,180 Subseries D L 1,279,785,180 Subseries D L 1,279,785,180






































Series  B  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  B  Shares          
(no par value)
Sub-series  DB  Shares          
(no par value)
Sub-series  DB  Shares          
(no par value)
Sub-series  DB  Shares          
(no par value)
Sub-series  DL  Shares          
(no par value)
Sub-series  DL  Shares          
(no par value)




FOMENTO ECONÓMICO MEXICANO,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2003 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2002 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2001
Class of Shares Class of Shares Class of Shares

















Series B 4,440,868 Series B 38,956,978 Series B 1,362,310
Subseries DB 8,881,736 Subseries DB 8,881,736 Subseries DB 5,320
Subseries DL 8,881,736 Subseries DL 8,881,736 Subseries DL 5,320
Series B 2,276,517 Series B 42,989,332 Series B 10,419,080
Subseries DB 4,553,034 Subseries DB 4,553,034 Subseries DB 20,838,160
Subseries DL 4,553,034 Subseries DL 4,553,034 Subseries DL 20,838,160
Series B 20,821,980 Series B 11,011,980 Series B 11,011,980
Subseries DB 4,031,160 Subseries DB 4,031,160 Subseries DB 4,031,160
Subseries DL 4,031,160 Subseries DL 4,031,160 Subseries DL 4,031,160
Series B 55,270,870 Series B 55,270,870 Series B 42,270,176
Subseries DB 0 Subseries DB 0 Subseries DB 10,570,512
Subseries DL 0 Subseries DL 0 Subseries DL 10,570,512
Series B 333,890 Series B 6,192,375 Series B 1,503,694
Subseries DB 667,780 Subseries DB 667,780 Subseries DB 3,007,388
Subseries DL 667,780 Subseries DL 667,780 Subseries DL 3,007,388
Series B 83,144,125 Series B 154,421,535 Series B 66,567,240
Subseries D B 18,133,710 Subseries D B 18,133,710 Subseries D B 38,452,540
Subseries D L 18,133,710 Subseries D L 18,133,710 Subseries D L 38,452,540
Data AR-03 31/12/2003 Data AR-03 31/12/2003 Data AR-03 31/12/2003
TOTAL 3.60% 5.64%
The following table sets forth the individual share ownership NOT 
aggregated into the trust Voting , but that also belongs to the members 

























The following table sets forth the individual share ownership NOT 
aggregated into the trust Voting , but that also belongs to the members 





The following table sets forth the individual share ownership NOT 
aggregated into the trust Voting , but that also belongs to the members 










































        
                            Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series A-1 Shares                        
(no par value)
2,336,728,700 85.13% 100.00%
Series A-1 Shares                        
(no par value)
2,345,144,900 85.43% 100.00%
Series A-1 Shares                        
(no par value)
2,384,620,254 86.87% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
408,271,300 14.87% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
399,855,100 14.57% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
360,379,746 13.13% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 2,745,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 2,745,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 2,745,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Family Slim 1,015,343,329 43.45% 65.18% Family Slim 1,014,304,429 43.25% 64.88% Family Slim 1,063,790,778 44.61% 66.92%
ADRs 778,909,567 33.33% 0.00% ADRs 781,714,967 33.33% 0.00% ADRs 794,873,418 33.33% 0.00%
Public Float 542,475,804 23.22% 34.82% Public Float 549,125,504 23.42% 35.12% Public Float 525,956,058 22.06% 33.08%
TOTAL 2,336,728,700 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 2,345,144,900 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 2,384,620,254 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 06 31/12/2006 ** Data Annual Rep 05 31/12/2005 ** Data Annual Rep 04 31/12/2004
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004










Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series A-1 Shares                        
(no par value)
837,460,500 100.00% 100.00%
Series A-1 Shares                        
(no par value)
866,065,800 94.65% 100.00%
Series A-1 Shares                        
(no par value)
890,250,000 97.30% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
77,539,500 9.26% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
48,934,200 5.35% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
24,750,000 2.70% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 915,000,000 109.26% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 915,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 915,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Family Slim 326,757,232 39.02% 58.53% Family Slim 317,221,400 36.63% 54.94% Family Slim 158,758,492 17.83% 34.19%
ADRs 279,153,500 33.33% 0.00% ADRs 288,688,600 33.33% 0.00% ADRs 425,947,918 47.85% 0.00%
Public Float 231,549,768 27.65% 41.47% Public Float 260,155,800 30.04% 45.06% Public Float 305,543,590 34.32% 65.81%
TOTAL 837,460,500 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 866,065,800 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 890,250,000 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 03 31/12/2003 ** Data Annual Rep 02 31/12/2002 ** Data Annual Rep 01 31/12/2001
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2002 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2001
GRUPO CARSO,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.











Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series Unique                       
(no par value)
327,403,598 97.04% 100.00%
Series Unique                       
(no par value)
331,294,198 98.19% 100.00%
Series Unique                       
(no par value)
334,204,598 99.05% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
9,996,402 2.96% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
6,105,802 1.81% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
3,195,402 0.95% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 337,400,000 100.00% 0.00% TOTAL SHARES 337,400,000 100.00% 0.00% TOTAL SHARES 337,400,000 100.00% 0.00%
CAMSA 250,000,000 76.36% 76.36% CAMSA 250,000,000 75.46% 75.46% CAMSA 250,000,000 74.80% 74.80%
Public Float 77,403,598 23.64% 23.64% Public Float 81,294,198 24.54% 24.54% Public Float 84,204,598 25.20% 25.20%
TOTAL 327,403,598 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 331,294,198 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 334,204,598 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 06 31/12/2006 ** Data Annual Rep 05 31/12/2005 ** Data Annual Rep 04 31/12/2004
GRUPO CEMENTOS DE CHIHUAHUA,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.











Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series Unique                       
(no par value)
333,845,507 98.95% 100.00%
Series Unique                       
(no par value)
332,185,007 98.45% 100.00%
Series B                       
(no par value)
332,185,007 98.45% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
3,554,493 1.05% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
5,214,993 1.55% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
5,214,993 1.55% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 337,400,000 100.00% 0.00% TOTAL SHARES 337,400,000 100.00% 0.00% TOTAL SHARES 337,400,000 100.00% 0.00%
CAMSA 250,000,000 74.88% 74.88% CAMSA 250,000,000 75.26% 75.26% CAMSA 250,000,000 75.26% 75.26%
Public Float 83,845,507 25.12% 25.12% Public Float 82,185,007 24.74% 24.74% Public Float 82,185,007 24.74% 24.74%
TOTAL 333,845,507 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 332,185,007 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 332,185,007 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 03 31/12/2003 ** Data Annual Rep 02 31/12/2002 ** Data Annual Rep 01 31/12/2001
GRUPO CEMENTOS DE CHIHUAHUA,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.









        
                            Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series B Shares                        
(no par value)
531,719,655 100.00% 100.00%
Series B Shares                        
(no par value)
536,322,667 99.98% 100.00%
Series B Shares                        
(no par value)
532,711,159 100.00% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
23,400 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
112,100 0.02% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
2,600 0.00% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 531,743,055 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 536,434,767 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 532,713,759 100.00% 100.00%
Controlling Group 83,607,540 15.72% 15.99% Controlling Group 103,483,077 19.29% 19.62% Controlling Group 118,288,456 22.20% 23.10%
CPOs 0 0.00% 0.00% CPOs 0 0.00% 0.00% CPOs 2,720,000 0.51% 0.00%
ADRs & GDSs 8,799,000 1.65% 0.00% ADRs & GDSs 8,799,000 1.64% 0.00% ADRs & GDSs 8,799,000 1.65% 0.00%
Public Float 439,313,115 82.62% 84.01% Public Float 424,040,590 79.06% 80.38% Public Float 402,903,703 75.63% 76.90%
TOTAL 531,719,655 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 536,322,667 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 532,711,159 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 06 31/12/2006 ** Data Annual Rep 05 31/12/2005 ** Data Annual Rep 04 31/12/2004
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004









Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series B Shares                        
(no par value)
104,373,833 99.85% 100.00%
Series B Shares                        
(no par value)
102,392,313 99.00% 100.00%
Series B Shares                        
(no par value)
100,472,530 99.98% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
161,000 0.15% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
1,034,500 1.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
23,400 0.02% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 104,534,833 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 103,426,813 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 100,495,930 100.00% 100.00%
Controlling Group 27,855,514 26.69% 33.74% Controlling Group 34,372,556 33.57% 39.58% Controlling Group 34,372,556 34.21% 41.86%
CPOs 4,390,000 4.21% 0.00% CPOs 2,670,000 2.61% 0.00% CPOs 4,000,000 3.98% 0.00%
ADRs & GDSs 8,799,000 8.43% 0.00% ADRs & GDSs 8,799,000 8.59% 0.00% ADRs & GDSs 8,799,000 8.76% 0.00%
Public Float 63,329,319 60.68% 66.26% Public Float 56,550,757 55.23% 60.42% Public Float 57,300,974 57.03% 62.51%
TOTAL 104,373,833 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 102,392,313 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 104,472,530 103.98% 104.36%
** Data Annual Rep 03 31/12/2003 ** Data Annual Rep 02 31/12/2002 ** Data Annual Rep 01 31/12/2001
CORPORACION GEO,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.




        
                            Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series "Unique" Shares                        
(no par value)
925,047,006 94.16% 100.00%
Series "Unique" Shares                        
(no par value)
925,452,206 94.18% 100.00%
Series "Unique" Shares                        
(no par value)
915,557,206 93.65% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
57,342,871 5.84% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
57,140,271 5.82% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
62,087,771 6.35% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 982,389,877 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 982,592,477 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 977,644,977 100.00% 100.00%
Angel Losada Moreno 123,031,252 13.30% 13.30% Angel Losada Moreno 123,085,143 13.30% 13.30% Angel Losada Moreno 121,769,108 13.30% 13.30%
Ma Teresa Losada 
Moreno
123,031,252 13.30% 13.30%
Ma Teresa Losada 
Moreno
123,085,143 13.30% 13.30%
Ma Teresa Losada 
Moreno
121,769,108 13.30% 13.30%
Rosa Ma Losada 
Moreno
123,031,252 13.30% 13.30%
Rosa Ma Losada 
Moreno
123,085,143 13.30% 13.30%
Rosa Ma Losada 
Moreno
121,769,108 13.30% 13.30%










Ma Pilar Arsuaga 
Losada
40,702,068 4.40% 4.40%
Ma Pilar Arsuaga 
Losada
40,719,897 4.40% 4.40%
Ma Pilar Arsuaga 
Losada
40,284,517 4.40% 4.40%
Ana Ma Arsuaga 
Losada
40,702,068 4.40% 4.40%
Ana Ma Arsuaga 
Losada
40,719,897 4.40% 4.40%
Ana Ma Arsuaga 
Losada
40,284,517 4.40% 4.40%
Family LOSADA 602,205,601 65.10% 65.10% Family LOSADA 602,469,386 65.10% 65.10% Family LOSADA 596,027,741 65.10% 65.10%
Lomoinvest, S.A. de 
C.V.
28,676,457 3.10% 3.10%
Lomoinvest, S.A. de 
C.V.
28,689,018 3.10% 3.10% *Lomoinvest, S.A. de C.V. 28,382,273 3.10% 3.10%
BANCO NACIONAL DE 
MEXICO
146,157,427 15.80% 15.80%
BANCO NACIONAL DE 
MEXICO
146,221,449 15.80% 15.80%
BANCO NACIONAL DE 
MEXICO
144,658,039 15.80% 15.80%
Inbursa Trust 76,778,901 8.30% 8.30% Inbursa Trust 76,812,533 8.30% 8.30% Inbursa Trust 75,991,248 8.30% 8.30%
Public Float 71,228,619 7.70% 7.70% Public Float 71,259,820 7.70% 7.70% Public Float 70,497,905 7.70% 7.70%
TOTAL 925,047,006 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 925,452,206 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 915,557,206 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 06 31/12/2006 ** Data Annual Rep 05 31/12/2005 ** Data Annual Rep 04 31/12/2004
*FAMILY LOSADA owns Lomoinvest, S.A. de C.V.
GRUPO GIGANTE,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.




Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series "Unique" Shares                        
(no par value)
915,162,262 93.63% 100.00%
Series "Unique" Shares                        
(no par value)
915,192,262 93.63% 100.00%
Series "Unique" Shares                        
(no par value)
915,931,948 93.67% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
62,285,243 6.37% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
62,285,243 6.37% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
61,900,400 6.33% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 977,447,505 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 977,477,505 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 977,832,348 100.00% 100.00%
Angel Losada Moreno 122,631,743 13.40% 13.40% Angel Losada Moreno 122,635,763 13.40% 13.40% Family LOSADA 641,827,557 70.07% 70.07%
Ma Teresa Losada 
Moreno
122,631,743 13.40% 13.40%
Ma Teresa Losada 
Moreno
122,635,763 13.40% 13.40% Controempresas 30,178,350 3.29% 3.29%
Rosa Ma Losada 
Moreno
122,631,743 13.40% 13.40%






Angel Losada Gomez 110,734,634 12.10% 12.10% Angel Losada Gomez 110,738,264 12.10% 12.10%








41,183,652 4.50% 4.50% Inbursa Trust 81,012,637 8.84% 8.84%
Ma Pilar Arsuaga 
Losada
41,182,302 4.50% 4.50%
Ma Pilar Arsuaga 
Losada
41,183,652 4.50% 4.50% Public Float 40,422,515 4.41% 4.41%
Ana Ma Arsuaga 
Losada
41,182,302 4.50% 4.50%
Ana Ma Arsuaga 
Losada
41,183,652 4.50% 4.50% TOTAL 915,931,948 100.00% 100.00%
Family LOSADA 602,176,768 65.80% 65.80% Family LOSADA 602,196,508 65.80% 65.80%
Lomoinvest, S.A. de 
C.V.
28,370,030 3.10% 3.10%
Lomoinvest, S.A. de 
C.V.
28,370,960 3.10% 3.10%
BANCO NACIONAL DE 
MEXICO
90,601,064 9.90% 9.90%
BANCO NACIONAL DE 
MEXICO
144,600,377 15.80% 15.80%
Inbursa Trust 75,958,468 8.30% 8.30% Inbursa Trust 75,960,958 8.30% 8.30%
Public Float 118,055,932 12.90% 12.90% Public Float 64,063,458 7.00% 7.00%
TOTAL 915,162,262 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 915,192,262 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 03 31/12/2003 ** Data Annual Rep 02 31/12/2002 ** Data Annual Rep 01 31/12/2001
GRUPO GIGANTE,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.










                            Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
304,211,640 99.52% 100.00%
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
304,084,840 99.48% 100.00%
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
286,123,805 99.60% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
1,477,693 0.48% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
1,604,493 0.52% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
1,153,155 0.40% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 305,689,333 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 305,689,333 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 287,276,960 100.00% 100.00%










Family López del 
Bosque
66,259,404 21.78% 21.78%
Family López del 
Bosque
66,073,701 21.73% 21.73%
Family López del 
Bosque
66,073,701 23.09% 23.09%
Public Float 71,975,904 23.66% 23.66% Public Float 72,938,899 23.99% 23.99% Public Float 56,301,704 19.68% 19.68%
TOTAL 304,211,640 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 304,084,840 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 286,123,805 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 06 31/12/2006 ** Data Annual Rep 05 31/12/2005 ** Data Annual Rep 04 31/12/2004
GRUPO INDUSTRIAL SALTILLO,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.










Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
286,068,405 99.58% 100.00%
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
283,547,705 98.70% 100.00%
Unique Series Shares                        
(no par value)
282,585,920 98.37% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
1,208,555 0.42% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
3,729,255 1.30% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
4,691,040 1.63% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 287,276,960 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 287,276,960 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 287,276,960 100.00% 100.00%










Family López del 
Bosque
66,073,701 23.10% 23.10%
Family López del 
Bosque
66,073,701 23.30% 23.30%
Family López del 
Bosque
71,452,060 25.29% 25.29%
Public Float 56,246,304 19.66% 19.66% Public Float 53,725,604 18.95% 18.95% Public Float 47,385,460 16.77% 16.77%
TOTAL 286,068,405 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 283,547,705 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 282,585,920 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 03 31/12/2003 ** Data Annual Rep 02 31/12/2002 ** Data Annual Rep 01 31/12/2001
GRUPO INDUSTRIAL SALTILLO,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.




                            Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series  B  Shares                        
(no par value)
2,572,607,000 99.14% 100.00%
Series  B  Shares                        
(no par value)
2,594,352,485 99.98% 100.00%
Series  B  Shares                        
(no par value)
865,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
22,393,000 0.86% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
647,515 0.02% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 2,595,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 2,595,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 865,000,000 100.00% 100.00%













Germán Larrea Mota 
Velasco
330,072,082 12.83% 12.83%























Goldman Sach & Co.
72,114,045 2.80% 2.80%
Bearn Stearns & Co. 
Inc.
54,630,391 2.11% 2.11%
Bearn Stearns & Co. 
Inc.
21,417,336 2.48% 2.48%
Beatriz Alemán de 
Girón
59,044,377 2.30% 2.30% RMC Dexia IST-Client 41,305,508 1.59% 1.59%
Customers of 








Morgan Stanley Intl. 
Lond Safekeeping
13,102,261 1.51% 1.51%
JPM Chase Bank 
tready A/C
33,302,574 1.29% 1.29%
JPM Chase Bank 
tready A/C
33,694,255 1.30% 1.30%









Royal Trust Corp. Of 
Canada- Client Ac.
10,384,293 1.20% 1.20%
Public Float 960,508,942 37.34% 37.34% Public Float 1,074,500,168 41.42% 41.42% Public Float 343,012,085 39.65% 39.65%
TOTAL 2,572,607,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 2,594,352,485 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 865,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Data AR-06 31/12/2006 Data AR-05 31/12/2005 Data AR-04 31/12/2004
GRUPO  MEXICO,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.




Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series  B  Shares                        
(no par value)
865,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series  B  Shares                        
(no par value)
651,646,640 100.00% 100.00%
Series  B  Shares                        
(no par value)
651,646,640 100.00% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 865,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 651,646,640 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 651,646,640 100.00% 100.00%































Beatriz Alemán de 
Girón
15,838,903 1.83% 1.83%
Grupo Joave, S.A. de 
C.V.




Grupo Miave, S.A. de 
C.V.
15,182,842 2.33% 2.33%
Grupo Miave, S.A. de 
C.V.
15,182,842 2.33% 2.33%
Fondo Inbursa F/008 
Telmex Pensiones
13,860,101 1.60% 1.60%
Grupo Bav, S.A. de 
C.V.
15,092,093 2.32% 2.32%
Grupo Joave, S.A. de 
C.V.
15,092,093 2.32% 2.32%







Grupo Bav, S.A. de 
C.V.
15,092,093 2.32% 2.32%
Royal Trust Corp. Of 
Canada- Client Ac.














Public Float 386,103,434 44.64% 44.64% Public Float 166,215,713 25.51% 25.51% Public Float 200,529,187 30.77% 30.77%
TOTAL 865,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 651,646,640 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 651,646,640 100.00% 100.00%
Data AR-03 31/12/2003 Data AR-02 31/12/2002 Data AR-01 31/12/2001
GRUPO  MEXICO,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.








SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
1,459,389,728 44.88% 56.10% 1,459,389,728 44.88% 56.10% 1,459,389,728 44.88% 56.10%
1,142,017,984 35.12% 43.90% 1,142,017,984 35.12% 43.90% 1,142,017,984 35.12% 43.90%
650,351,920 20.00% 0.00% 650,351,920 20.00% 0.00% 650,351,920 20.00% 0.00%
3,251,759,632 100.00% 100.00% 3,251,759,632 100.00% 100.00% 3,251,759,632 100.00% 100.00%
Series A 1,459,389,728 Series A 1,459,389,728 Series A 1,459,389,728
Series B 0 Series B 0 Series B 0
Series C 0 Series C 0 Series C 0
Series A 0 Series A 0 Series A 0
Series B 1,142,017,984 Series B 1,142,017,984 Series B 1,142,017,984
Series C 0 Series C 0 Series C 0
Series A 0 Series A 0 Series A 0
Series B 0 Series B 0 Series B 0
Series C 650,351,920 Series C 650,351,920 Series C 650,351,920
Series A 1,459,389,728 Series A 1,459,389,728 Series A 1,459,389,728
Series B 1,142,017,984 Series B 1,142,017,984 Series B 1,142,017,984
Series C 650,351,920 Series C 650,351,920 Series C 650,351,920
31/12/2006 31/12/2005 31/12/2004
Series  B,  Class II          
(no par value)
Series  B,  Class II          
(no par value)
56.10%







Series  C,  Class II         
(no par value)
Series  A,  Class I          
(no par value)
Series  A,  Class I          
(no par value)
44.88%
TOTAL SHARES TOTAL SHARES








Series  C,  Class II         
(no par value)
44.88%
GRUPO MODELO,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005
Class of Shares Class of Shares Class of Shares































TOTAL 100.000% 100.000% TOTAL
20.00%
100.000%








Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
1,459,389,728 44.88% 56.10% 1,459,389,728 44.88% 56.10% 1,459,389,725 44.88% 56.10%
1,142,017,984 35.12% 43.90% 1,142,017,984 35.12% 43.90% 1,142,017,984 35.12% 43.90%
650,351,920 20.00% 0.00% 650,351,920 20.00% 0.00% 650,351,920 20.00% 0.00%
3,251,759,632 100.00% 100.00% 3,251,759,632 100.00% 100.00% 3,251,759,629 100.00% 100.00%
Series A 1,459,389,728 Series A 1,459,389,728 Series A 1,459,389,728
Series B 0 Series B 0 Series B 0
Series C 0 Series C 0 Series C 0
Series A 0 Series A 0 Series A 0
Series B 1,142,017,984 Series B 1,142,017,984 Series B 1,142,017,984
Series C 0 Series C 0 Series C 0
Series A 0 Series A 0 Series A -3
Series B 0 Series B 0 Series B 0
Series C 650,351,920 Series C 650,351,920 Series C 650,351,920
Series A 1,459,389,728 Series A 1,459,389,728 Series A 1,459,389,725
Series B 1,142,017,984 Series B 1,142,017,984 Series B 1,142,017,984
Series C 650,351,920 Series C 650,351,920 Series C 650,351,920
31/12/2003 31/12/2002 31/12/2001
GRUPO MODELO,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2003
TOTAL SHARES
Series  B,  Class II          
(no par value)
Series  A,  Class I          
(no par value)
Series  B,  Class II          
(no par value)
Series  C,  Class II         
(no par value)
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2002 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2001
Series  C,  Class II         
(no par value)
Class of SharesClass of Shares
Series  A,  Class I          
(no par value)
Series  B,  Class II          
(no par value)
Class of Shares
Series  A,  Class I          
(no par value)
TOTAL SHARES










































TOTAL 100.000% 100.000% TOTAL 100.000%
Shares 
Public Float






Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series  B                        
(no par value)
482,549,952 100.00% 100.00%
Series  B                        
(no par value)
452,549,952 100.00% 100.00%































Directors & Officers 
as a group
169,255 0.04% 0.04%
Directors & Officers 
as a group
191,811 0.04% 0.05%
Directors & Officers 
as a group
6,021,289 1.33% 1.61%
ADRs 77,235,272 16.01% 0.00% ADRs 77,235,272 17.07% 0.00% ADRs 77,235,272 17.09% 0.00%
Public Float 53,421,118 11.07% 13.18% Public Float 17,483,449 3.86% 4.66% Public Float 26,373,695 5.83% 7.04%
TOTAL 482,549,952 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 452,549,952 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 452,049,643 100.00% 100.00%
Data 20-F/A 06 31/12/2006 Data 20-F 05 31/12/2005 Data 20-F 04 31/12/2004
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004
GRUMA,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
Of the shares beneficially owned by Archer-Daniels-Midland, 
24,566,561  shares are held through a Mexican corporation jointly 
owned and controlled by Mr. González Barrera, who has sole 
authority to determine how these shares are voted. 
Of the shares beneficially owned by Archer-Daniels-Midland, 
24,566,561  shares are held through a Mexican corporation jointly 
owned and controlled by Mr. González Barrera, who has sole 
authority to determine how these shares are voted. 
Of the shares beneficially owned by Archer-Daniels-Midland, 
24,566,561  shares are held through a Mexican corporation jointly 
owned and controlled by Mr. González Barrera, who has sole 






Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series  B                        
(no par value)
450,133,443 99.47% 100.00%
Series  B                        
(no par value)
441,402,386 97.54% 100.00%
Series  B                        
(no par value)
441,725,086 97.61% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
2,416,509 0.53% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
11,147,566 2.46% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
10,824,866 2.39% 0.00%



















Directors & Officers 
as a group
6,842,308 1.52% 1.81%
Directors & Officers 
as a group
11,958,006 2.71% 3.24%
Directors & Officers 
as a group
8,913,365 2.02% 2.42%
ADRs 72,549,884 16.12% 0.00% ADRs 72,613,236 16.45% 0.00% ADRs 72,719,336 16.46% 0.00%
Public Float 27,438,161 6.10% 7.27% Public Float 14,396,757 3.26% 3.90% Public Float 17,657,998 4.00% 4.79%
TOTAL 450,133,443 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 441,402,386 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 441,725,086 100.00% 100.00%
Data 20-F-03 31/12/2003 Data 20-F-02 31/12/2002 Data AR-01 31/12/2001
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2001
Of the shares beneficially owned by Archer-Daniels-Midland, 
24,566,561  shares are held through a Mexican corporation jointly 
owned and controlled by Mr. González Barrera, who has sole 
authority to determine how these shares are voted. 
Of the shares beneficially owned by Archer-Daniels-Midland, 
24,566,561  shares are held through a Mexican corporation jointly 
owned and controlled by Mr. González Barrera, who has sole 
authority to determine how these shares are voted. 
Of the shares beneficially owned by Archer-Daniels-Midland, 
24,566,561  shares are held through a Mexican corporation jointly 
owned and controlled by Mr. González Barrera, who has sole 
authority to determine how these shares are voted. 
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2003 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2002






Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series  Unique                        
(no par value)
405,177,479 97.57% 100.00%
Series  Unique                        
(no par value)
404,245,330 97.34% 100.00%












TOTAL SHARES 415,272,845 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 415,272,845 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 1,947,902,353 100.00% 100.00%
Family Quintana 31,993,173 7.90% 73.62% Family Quintana 31,993,173 7.91% 83.25% Family Quintana 166,465,200 8.93% 59.03%
Management Trust 12,508,238 3.09% 0.00% Management Trust 11,243,235 2.78% 0.00% Management Trust 65,936,086 3.54% 0.00%
Employee Trust 143 0.00% 0.00% Employee Trust 300,443 0.07% 0.00% Employee Trust 1,802,658 0.10% 0.00%
Fundacion Trust 8,585,022 2.12% 0.00% Fundacion Trust 8,585,022 2.12% 0.00% Fundacion Trust 51,760,136 2.78% 0.00%
CPOs 232,677,882 57.43% 0.00% CPOs 258,484,984 63.94% 0.00% CPOs 718,105,216 38.50% 0.00%
ADRs 17,017,454 4.20% 0.00% ADRs 31,126,890 7.70% 0.00% ADRs 164,124,762 8.80% 0.00%
Public Float 102,395,567 25.27% 26.38% Public Float 62,511,583 15.46% 16.75% Public Float 696,860,056 37.36% 40.97%
TOTAL 405,177,479 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 404,245,330 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 1,865,054,114 100.00% 100.00%
Data 20-F/A 06 31/12/2006 Data 20-F 05 31/12/2005 Data 20-F 04 31/12/2004
EMPRESAS  ICA,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004
None of our directors or executive officers (other than Mr. 
Quintana) is the beneficial owner of more than 1% of any class of 
capital stock, other than through the management trust.
None of our directors or executive officers (other than Mr. 
Quintana) is the beneficial owner of more than 1% of any class of 
capital stock, other than through the management trust.
None of our directors or executive officers (other than Mr. 
Quintana) is the beneficial owner of more than 1% of any class of 







Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series  Unique                        
(no par value)
1,682,389,166 86.37% 100.00%
Series  Unique                        
(no par value)
621,561,433 89.65% 100.00%
Series  Unique                        
(no par value)
621,561,433 89.65% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
265,513,187 13.63% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
71,736,606 10.35% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
71,736,606 10.35% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 1,947,902,353 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 693,298,039 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 693,298,039 100.00% 100.00%
Grupo Inbursa 260,170,768 15.46% 16.62%
Family Quintana 162,390,200 9.65% 41.84% Family Quintana 88,647,200 14.26% 76.19% Family Quintana 88,646,600 14.26% 44.88%
Management Trust 88,548,214 5.26% 0.00% Management Trust 99,244,011 15.97% 0.00% Management Trust 0 0.00% 0.00%
Employee Trust 2,398,158 0.14% 0.00% Employee Trust 2,867,158 0.46% 0.00% Employee Trust 0 0.00% 0.00%
Fundacion Trust 51,760,136 3.08% 0.00% Fundacion Trust 51,760,136 8.33% 0.00% Fundacion Trust 0 0.00% 0.00%
CPOs 349,936,947 20.80% 0.00% CPOs 131,149,462 21.10% 0.00% CPOs 131,149,462 21.10% 0.00%
ADRs 116,757,808 6.94% 0.00% ADRs 131,149,462 21.10% 0.00% ADRs 131,771,024 21.20% 0.00%
Public Float 650,426,935 38.66% 41.54% Public Float 116,744,003 18.78% 23.81% Public Float 269,994,347 43.44% 55.12%
TOTAL 1,682,389,166 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 621,561,433 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 621,561,433 100.00% 100.00%
Data 20-F-03 31/12/2003 Data 20-F-02 31/12/2002 Data AR-01 31/12/2001
EMPRESAS  ICA,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2003 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2002 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2001
None of our directors or executive officers (other than Mr. 
Quintana) is the beneficial owner of more than 1% of any class of 
capital stock, other than through the management trust.
None of our directors or executive officers (other than Mr. Quintana) 
is the beneficial owner of more than 1% of any class of capital 
stock, other than through the management trust.
None of our directors or executive officers (other than Mr. Quintana) 
is the beneficial owner of more than 1% of any class of capital stock, 









Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series B                        
(no par value)
436,574,580 100.00% 100.00%
Series B                        
(no par value)
436,574,580 100.00% 100.00%
Series B                        
(no par value)
120,169,248 100.00% 100.00%











M ANUFACTURERA DE 
TUBOS, SA DE CV
96,046,408 22.00% 22.00%
OPERADORA DE 
M ANUFACTURERA DE 
TUBOS, SA DE CV
96,046,408 22.00% 22.00%
OPERADORA DE 
M ANUFACTURERA DE 
TUBOS, SA DE CV
30,402,820 25.30% 25.30%
COM PAÑIA 








M EXICANA DE TUBOS, 
SA DE CV
4,566,431 3.80% 3.80%
Public Float 154,547,401 35.40% 35.40% Public Float 154,110,827 35.30% 35.30% Public Float 30,522,989 25.40% 25.40%
TOTAL 436,574,580 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 436,574,580 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 120,169,248 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 06 31/12/2006 ** Data Annual Rep 05 31/12/2005 ** Data Annual Rep 04 31/12/2004
ICH,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.









Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series B                        
(no par value)
120,169,248 100.00% 100.00%
Series B                        
(no par value)
82,675,545 100.00% 100.00%
Series B                        
(no par value)
82,675,545 100.00% 100.00%




























Public Float 6,116,851 5.09% 5.09% Public Float 7,073,520 8.56% 8.56% Public Float 10,875,410 13.15% 13.15%
TOTAL 120,169,248 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 82,675,545 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 82,675,545 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 03 31/12/2003 ** Data Annual Rep 02 31/12/2002 ** Data Annual Rep 01 31/12/2001
ICH,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.









Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series A Shares              
(no par value)
592,927,075 52.02% 52.02%
Series A Shares              
(no par value)
601,960,175 52.03% 52.03%
Series A Shares              
(no par value)
608,394,275 52.02% 52.02%
Series B Shares               
(no par value)
546,917,440 47.98% 47.98%
Series B Shares               
(no par value)
555,044,040 47.97% 47.97%
Series B Shares               
(no par value)
561,189,040 47.98% 47.98%










CPOs "A"                            
(NAFINSA Trust)
377,288,534 33.10% 0.00%
CPOs "A"                            
(NAFINSA Trust)
443,132,614 38.30% 0.00%
CPOs "A"                            
(NAFINSA Trust)
378,944,994 32.40% 0.00%
ADRs 53,572,692 4.70% 0.00% ADRs 61,321,223 5.30% 0.00% ADRs 61,987,916 5.30% 0.00%
Public Float 162,997,766 14.30% 49.74% Public Float 98,345,358 8.50% 49.42% Public Float 168,419,997 14.40% 49.42%
TOTAL 1,139,844,515 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 1,157,004,215 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 1,169,583,315 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 06 31/12/2006 ** Data Annual Rep 05 31/12/2005 ** Data Annual Rep 04 31/12/2004
KIMBERLY-CLARK DE MEXICO,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.









Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series A Shares              
(no par value)
617,688,575 52.03% 52.03%
Series A Shares              
(no par value)
626,329,875 52.02% 52.02%
Series A Shares              
(no par value)
640,470,475 52.02% 52.02%
Series B Shares               
(no par value)
569,533,840 47.97% 47.97%
Series B Shares               
(no par value)
577,686,940 47.98% 47.98%
Series B Shares               
(no par value)
590,716,610 47.98% 47.98%










CPOs "A"                            
(NAFINSA Trust)
445,208,406 37.50% 0.00%
CPOs "A"                            
(NAFINSA Trust)
421,405,885 35.00% 0.00%
CPOs "A"                            
(NAFINSA Trust)
430,915,480 35.00% 0.00%
ADRs 54,612,231 4.60% 0.00% ADRs 42,140,589 3.50% 0.00% ADRs 43,091,548 3.50% 0.00%
Public Float 118,722,242 10.00% 49.79% Public Float 163,746,287 13.60% 50.36% Public Float 167,441,444 13.60% 50.36%
TOTAL 1,187,222,415 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 1,204,016,815 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 1,231,187,085 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 03 31/12/2003 ** Data Annual Rep 02 31/12/2002 ** Data Annual Rep 01 31/12/2001
KIMBERLY-CLARK DE MEXICO,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.




SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
992,078,519 53.73% 62.96% 844,078,519 45.71% 53.57% 844,078,519 45.71% 53.57%
583,545,678 31.60% 37.04% 731,545,678 39.62% 46.43% 731,545,678 39.62% 46.43%
270,906,004 14.67% 0.00% 270,906,004 14.67% 0.00% 270,906,004 14.67% 0.00%
1,846,530,201 100.00% 100.00% 1,846,530,201 100.00% 100.00% 1,846,530,201 100.00% 100.00%
Series A 992,078,519 Series A 844,078,519 Series A 844,078,519
Series D 0 Series D 0 Series D 0
Series L 0 Series L 0 Series L 0
Series A 0 Series A 0 Series A 0
Series D 583,545,678 Series D 731,545,678 Series D 731,545,678
Series L 0 Series L 0 Series L 0
Series A 0 Series A 0 Series A 0
Series D 0 Series D 0 Series D 0
Series L 229,723,700 Series L 236,014,180 Series L 234,775,710
Series A 0 Series A 0 Series A 0
Series D 0 Series D 0 Series D 0
Series L 41,182,304 Series L 34,891,824 Series L 36,130,294
Series A 992,078,519 Series A 844,078,519 Series A 844,078,519
Series D 583,545,678 Series D 731,545,678 Series D 731,545,678
Series L 270,906,004 Series L 270,906,004 Series L 270,906,004
Data AR-06 31/12/2006 Data AR-05 31/12/2005 Data AR-04 31/12/2004
COCA-COLA FEMSA,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005
Class of Shares Class of Shares Class of Shares
Series  D  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  D  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  D  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  A Shares          
(no par value)
Series  A Shares          
(no par value)
Series  A Shares          
(no par value)
TOTAL SHARES TOTAL SHARES TOTAL SHARES
Series  L  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  L  Shares          
(no par value)







ADRs 12.44% 0.00% ADRs
*FEMSA is the owner of 100% of CIBSA's (Compañía Internacional de Bebidas, 
S.A. de C.V.) shares.
**The Coca-Cola company indirectly owns these shares through its subsidiaries 
The Inmex Corporation, Dulux CBAI 2003, B.V. And Dulux CBEXINMX 2003, B.V.
Each ADS represents 10 Series L shares.
*FEMSA is the owner of 100% of CIBSA's (Compañía Internacional de Bebidas, 
S.A. de C.V.) shares.
**The Coca-Cola company indirectly owns these shares through its subsidiaries 
The Inmex Corporation, Dulux CBAI 2003, B.V. And Dulux CBEXINMX 2003, B.V.


























0.00% ADRs 12.71% 0.00%
TOTAL 100.000% 100.000% 100.000%
*FEMSA is the owner of 100% of CIBSA's (Compañía Internacional de Bebidas, 
S.A. de C.V.) shares.
**The Coca-Cola company indirectly owns these shares through its subsidiaries 
The Inmex Corporation, Dulux CBAI 2003, B.V. And Dulux CBEXINMX 2003, B.V.






Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
844,078,519 45.71% 53.57% 726,750,000 51.00% 62.96% 726,750,000 51.00% 62.96%
731,545,678 39.62% 46.43% 427,500,000 30.00% 37.04% 427,500,000 30.00% 37.04%
270,906,004 14.67% 0.00% 270,750,000 19.00% 0.00% 270,750,000 19.00% 0.00%
1,846,530,201 100.00% 100.00% 1,425,000,000 100.00% 100.00% 1,425,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series A 844,078,519 Series A 726,750,000 Series A 726,750,000
Series D 0 Series D 0 Series D 0
Series L 0 Series L 0 Series L 0
Series A 0 Series A 0 Series A 0
Series D 731,545,678 Series D 427,500,000 Series D 427,500,000
Series L 0 Series L 0 Series L 0
Series A 0 Series A 0 Series A 0
Series D 0 Series D 0 Series D 0
Series L 249,233,524 Series L 254,505,000 Series L 255,088,260
Series A 0 Series A 0 Series A 0
Series D 0 Series D 0 Series D 0
Series L 21,672,480 Series L 16,245,000 Series L 15,661,740
Series A 844,078,519 Series A 726,750,000 Series A 726,750,000
Series D 731,545,678 Series D 427,500,000 Series D 427,500,000
Series L 270,906,004 Series L 270,750,000 Series L 270,750,000
Data AR-03 31/12/2003 Data AR-02 31/12/2002 Data AR-01 31/12/2001
COCA-COLA FEMSA,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2003 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2002 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2001
Class of Shares Class of Shares
Series  D  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  D  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  D  Shares          
(no par value)
Class of Shares
Series  A Shares          
(no par value)
Series  A Shares          
(no par value)
Series  A Shares          
(no par value)
TOTAL SHARES TOTAL SHARES TOTAL SHARES
Series  L  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  L  Shares          
(no par value)








































*Grupo Industrial EMPREX, S.A. DE C.V is a subsidiary of FEMSA that owns 
99.98% of EMPREX's shares.
ADRs
**Impulsora de Mercados, S.A. de C.V. Is a subsidiary owened by The Coca-Cola 
company.
0.00%17.90%ADRs 13.50% 0.00% ADRs 17.86% 0.00%
Each ADS represents 10 Series L shares.
*Grupo Industrial EMPREX, S.A. DE C.V is a subsidiary of FEMSA that owns 
99.98% of EMPREX's shares.
**Impulsora de Mercados, S.A. de C.V. Is a subsidiary owened by The Coca-Cola 
company.
Each ADS represents 10 Series L shares.
TOTAL
*FEMSA is the owner of 100% of CIBSA's (Compañía Internacional de Bebidas, 
S.A. de C.V.) shares.
**The Coca-Cola company indirectly owns these shares through its subsidiaries 
The Inmex Corporation, Dulux CBAI 2003, B.V. And Dulux CBEXINMX 2003, B.V.







Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series Unique Shares                           
(no par value)
122,412,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series B Shares               
(no par value)
121,200,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series B Shares               
(no par value)
120,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
TOTAL SHARES 122,412,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 121,200,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 120,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
* INVERCER, S. A. 62,462,147 51.03% 51.03% * INVERCER, S. A. 61,843,710 51.03% 51.03% * INVERCER, S. A. 61,231,395 51.03% 51.03%
Public Float 59,949,853 48.97% 48.97% Public Float 59,356,290 48.97% 48.97% Public Float 58,768,605 48.97% 48.97%
TOTAL 122,412,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 121,200,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 120,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 06 31/12/2006 ** Data Annual Rep 05 31/12/2005 ** Data Annual Rep 04 31/12/2004
Family Valdés Canale 21,299,688 17.40% 17.40% Family Valdés Canale 20,967,600 17.30% 17.30% Family Valdés Canale 20,400,000 17.00% 17.00%
Family Rubio Elusúa 18,729,036 15.30% 15.30% Family Rubio Elusúa 18,907,200 15.60% 15.60% Family Rubio Elusúa 18,840,000 15.70% 15.70%
Family Elusúa González 10,037,784 8.20% 8.20% Family Elusúa González 9,817,200 8.10% 8.10% Family Elusúa González 9,480,000 7.90% 7.90%
Family Toussaint Elusúa 9,548,136 7.80% 7.80% Family Toussaint Elusúa 9,453,600 7.80% 7.80% Family Toussaint Elusúa 9,360,000 7.80% 7.80%
Family Barragán Elusúa 9,548,136 7.80% 7.80% Family Barragán Elusúa 9,453,600 7.80% 7.80% Family Barragán Elusúa 9,360,000 7.80% 7.80%
Family Elusúa Roblez 9,425,724 7.70% 7.70% Family Elusúa Roblez 9,332,400 7.70% 7.70% Family Elusúa Roblez 9,240,000 7.70% 7.70%
78,588,504 64.20% 77,931,600 64.30% 76,680,000 63.90%
Families holding more than five percent of the shares of LAMOSA 
are as follows,
Families holding more than five percent of the shares of LAMOSA 
are as follows,
Families holding more than five percent of the shares of LAMOSA 
are as follows,
* INVERCER, S.A. and DESARROLLADORA CORPORATIVA, S.A. 
hold more than five percent of the total shares of the company each. 
* INVERCER, S.A. and DESARROLLADORA CORPORATIVA, S.A. 
hold more than five percent of the total shares of the company each. 
* INVERCER, S.A. and DESARROLLADORA CORPORATIVA, S.A. 
hold more than five percent of the total shares of the company 
each. 
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004
GRUPO LAMOSA,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
311 
 
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series B Shares               
(no par value)
120,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series B Shares               
(no par value)
120,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series B Shares               
(no par value)
120,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
TOTAL SHARES 120,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 120,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 120,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
* INVERCER, S. A. 61,231,395 51.03% 51.03% * INVERCER, S. A. 61,231,395 51.03% 51.03% * INVERCER, S. A. 61,231,395 51.03% 51.03%
Public Float 58,768,605 48.97% 48.97% Public Float 58,768,605 48.97% 48.97% Public Float 58,768,605 48.97% 48.97%
TOTAL 120,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 120,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 120,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 03 31/12/2003 ** Data Annual Rep 02 31/12/2002 ** Data Annual Rep 01 31/12/2001




Family Rubio Elusúa 18,960,000 15.80% 15.80% Family Valdés Canale 12,246,280 10.21% 10.21%
Júan Miguel Rubio 
Elosúa
249,655 0.21% 0.21%
Family Elusúa González 9,480,000 7.90% 7.90% Family Elusúa González 9,055,299 7.55% 7.55%
José Alfonso Rubio 
Elosúa
369,055 0.31% 0.31%










Luis Eduardo Valdés 
Gámes
13,000 0.01% 0.01%








45 0.00% 0.00% Enrique Alvarez-Tostado 18,180 0.02% 0.02%
















58,711,345 48.93% 52,273,733 43.56% 1,573,332 1.31%
* INVERCER, S.A. and DESARROLLADORA CORPORATIVA, S.A. 
hold more than five percent of the total capital of the company 
each. 
Families holding more than five percent of the shares of LAMOSA 
and executives holding more than one percent of the company 
share are the followings,
Families that through INVERCER, S.A. hold more than five percent of 
the shares of LAMOSA and directors and executives holding more 
than one percent of the company share are as follows,
The individual tenancy of the directors and the main executives 
of LAMOSA is the following,
* INVERCER, S.A. is a company controlled by the Family Elosúa 
Muguerza . 
* INVERCER, S.A.; DESARROLLADORA CORPORATIVA, S.A.  And 
BANAMEX, S.A. (through a third party) hold more than five percent 
of the total capital of the company each. 
GRUPO LAMOSA,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.











Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
1,144,750,000 85.29% 100.00% 1,144,750,000 85.29% 100.00%
197,446,100 14.71% 0.00% 197,446,100 14.71% 0.00%
1,342,196,100 100.00% 100.00% 1,342,196,100 100.00% 100.00%
Series 1 80,863,159 Series 1 80,863,359
Series C-1 17,358,554 Series C-1 17,364,568
Series 1 219,919,450 Series 1 1,063,886,641
Series C-1 0 Series C-1 180,081,532
Series 1 215,700,424 Series 1 1,144,750,000
















Series C-1  Shares                  
(no par value)
Series C-1  Shares                  
(no par value)
Class of Shares Class of Shares
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005
Series 1  Shares          
(no par value)
Series 1  Shares          
(no par value)
B anco  
N acio nal de 




































EL PUERTO DE LIVERPOOL,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
*Data AR-06 * Data AR-05
*El Puerto de Liverpool does not know who are the beneficiaries of each trusts, 
so that none of them can be considered as controlling shareholders of 
LIVERPOOL,  according to the law, except by Mr. Max Michael and his Family 





















SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
1,144,750,000 85.29% 100.00% 1,144,750,000 85.29% 100.00%
197,446,100 14.71% 0.00% 197,446,100 14.71% 0.00%
1,342,196,100 100.00% 100.00% 1,342,196,100 100.00% 100.00%
Series 1 263,162,802 Series 1 204,367,324
Series C-1 144,208,777 Series C-1 10,499,371
Series 1 881,587,198 Series 1 397,209,337
Series C-1 53,237,323 Series C-1 19,330,141
Series 1 1,144,750,000 Series 1 543,173,339
Series C-1 197,446,100 Series C-1 167,616,588
TOTAL Series 1 1,144,750,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series C-1 197,446,100
31/12/2004 31/12/2003
Series C-1  Shares                  
(no par value)
Series C-1  Shares                  
(no par value)
Class of Shares Class of Shares
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2003
Series 1  Shares          
(no par value)
Series 1  Shares          
(no par value)















* El Puerto de Liverpool  declares that from the total amount of shares 
Series 1  of the controlling group, 397,209,337 shares belong to some 
members of the BOD, while the rest of these shares (204,367,324) 
belong to the other controlling investors who are not part of the BOD.
EL PUERTO DE LIVERPOOL,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
*DataAR-04
Public Float 52.96%

















Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
1,144,750,000 85.29% 100.00% 1,144,750,000 85.29% 100.00%
197,446,100 14.71% 0.00% 197,446,100 14.71% 0.00%
1,342,196,100 100.00% 100.00% 1,342,196,100 100.00% 100.00%
Series 1 213,537,324 Series 1 213,537,324
Series C-1 10,499,371 Series C-1 10,499,371
Series 1 489,924,337 Series 1 489,924,337
Series C-1 20,982,141 Series C-1 20,982,141
Series 1 441,288,339 Series 1 441,288,339
Series C-1 165,964,588 Series C-1 165,964,588
TOTAL Series 1 1,144,750,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL Series 1 1,144,750,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series C-1 197,446,100 Series C-1 197,446,100
31/12/2002 31/12/2002
Series 1  Shares          
(no par value)
Series C-1  Shares                  
(no par value)
Series C-1  Shares                  
(no par value)
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2001
Class of Shares Class of Shares
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2002
Series 1  Shares          
(no par value)



















Public Float 45.24% 38.55% 45.24%
38.06%
* El Puerto de Liverpool  declares that from the total amount of shares  
Series 1 of the controlling group, 489,924,337 shares belong to some 
members of the BOD, while the rest of these shares (213,537,324) 
belong to the other controlling investors who are not part of the BOD.
EL PUERTO DE LIVERPOOL,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.




SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
462,778,822 80.22% 100.00% 465,796,822 80.74% 100.00% 466,701,522 80.90% 100.00%
106,748,812 18.50% 0.00% 108,578,312 18.82% 0.00% 108,571,612 18.82% 0.00%
7,360,985 1.28% 0.00% 2,513,485 0.44% 0.00% 1,615,485 0.28% 0.00%
576,888,619 100.00% 100.00% 576,888,619 100.00% 100.00% 576,888,619 100.00% 100.00%
Series A 236,017,199 Series A 237,556,379 Series A 238,017,776
Series L 0 Series L 0 Series L 0
Series A 76,680,546 Series A 76,680,546 Series A 76,680,546
Series L 0 Series L 0 Series L 0
Series A 6,343,962 Series A 6,243,762 Series A 6,415,162
Series L 1,017,600 Series L 1,017,600 Series L 1,017,600
Series A 20,000 Series A 20,000 Series A 20,000
Series L 48,000 Series L 48,000 Series L 48,000
Series A 143,717,115 Series A 145,296,135 Series A 145,568,038
Series L 105,683,212 Series L 107,512,712 Series L 107,506,012
Series A 462,778,822 Series A 465,796,822 Series A 466,701,522
Series L 106,748,812 Series L 108,578,312 Series L 108,571,612
31/12/2006 31/12/2005 31/12/2004
Class of Shares Class of Shares Class of Shares
Series L   Shares                  
(no par value)
Series L   Shares                  
(no par value)















GRUPO POSADAS,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005
Series A  Shares          
(no par value)
Series A  Shares          
(no par value)













Shares in company's 
treasury
Shares in company's 
treasury











Public Float 43.79% 37.85% Public Float 44.01% 37.95%
0.00%ADSs 0.01% 0.00% ADSs 0.01% 0.00% ADSs 0.01%
Public Float 43.99% 37.95%
** Data AR-06 ** Data AR-05 ** Data F20-04
TOTAL TOTAL 100.00% 100.00%TOTAL 100.00% 100.00%
GRUPO POSADAS set a share-scheme into the "Employee Trust" for the 
benefit of its employees and the employees of its subsidiaries.
*The "Warranty Trust" was set as guarantee regarding a banking loan 
negotiated in March 2003, so that these shares cannot be voted.
*The "Warranty Trust" was set as guarantee regarding a banking loan 
negotiated in March 2003, so that these shares cannot be voted.
GRUPO POSADAS set a share-scheme into the "Employee Trust" for the 
benefit of its employees and the employees of its subsidiaries.
GRUPO POSADAS set a share-scheme into the "Employee Trust" for the 
benefit of its employees and the employees of its subsidiaries.
*The "Warranty Trust" was set as guarantee regarding a banking loan 




Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
448,644,945 80.31% 100.00% 467,683,526 84.88% 100.00% 428,183,677 79.56% 100.00%
108,716,212 19.46% 0.00% 81,955,363 14.87% 0.00% 108,403,212 20.14% 0.00%
1,257,685 0.23% 0.00% 1,369,185 0.25% 0.00% 1,621,185 0.30% 0.00%
558,618,842 100.00% 100.00% 551,008,074 100.00% 100.00% 538,208,074 100.00% 100.00%
Series A 228,808,922 Series A 243,195,434 Series A 222,655,512
Series L 0 Series L 0 Series L 0
Series A 58,410,768 Series A 50,800,000 Series A 38,000,000
Series L 0 Series L 0 Series L
Series A 6,413,162 Series A 80,162 Series A 581,362
Series L 1,746,250 Series L Series L 638,700
Series A 400,000 Series A Series A
Series L 48,000 Series L 1,620,000 Series L 1,620,000
Series A 154,612,093 Series A 173,607,930 Series A 166,946,803
Series L 106,921,962 Series L 80,335,363 Series L 106,144,512
Series A 448,644,945 Series A 467,683,526 Series A 428,183,677
Series L 108,716,212 Series L 81,955,363 Series L 108,403,212
31/12/2003 31/12/2002 31/12/2001
Class of Shares Class of Shares Class of Shares
GRUPO POSADAS,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2003 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2002 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2001
Series L   Shares                  
(no par value)
Series L   Shares                  
(no par value)
Series L   Shares                  
(no par value)
Series A  Shares          
(no par value)
Series A  Shares          
(no par value)

















TOTAL SHARES TOTAL SHARES TOTAL SHARES
0.00% ADSs 0.30% 0.00%0.00% ADSs 0.29%
Shares in company's 
treasury
Shares in company's 
treasury



















Public Float 46.20% 41.65% Public Float 50.89% 42.85%Public Float 46.92% 40.32%
100.00%TOTAL 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 100.00% 100.00%
*The "Warranty Trust" was set as guarantee regarding a banking loan 
negotiated in March 2003, so that these shares cannot be voted.
*The "Warranty Trust" was set as guarantee regarding a banking loan 
negotiated in March 2003, so that these shares cannot be voted.
*The "Warranty Trust" was set as guarantee regarding a banking loan 
negotiated in March 2003, so that these shares cannot be voted.
GRUPO POSADAS set a share-scheme into the "Employee Trust" for the 
benefit of its employees and the employees of its subsidiaries.
GRUPO POSADAS set a share-scheme into the "Employee Trust" for the 
benefit of its employees and the employees of its subsidiaries.
GRUPO POSADAS set a share-scheme into the "Employee Trust" for the 
benefit of its employees and the employees of its subsidiaries.
TOTAL 100.00%




Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series A Shares               
(no par value)
0 0.00% 0.00%
Series A Shares               
(no par value)
0 0.00% 0.00%
Series A Shares               
(no par value)
0 0.00% 0.00%
Series B Shares               
(no par value)
421,214,706 100.00% 100.00%
Series B Shares               
(no par value)
137,929,599 100.00% 100.00%
Series B Shares               
(no par value)
133,542,984 100.00% 100.00%
TOTAL SHARES 421,214,706 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 137,929,599 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 133,542,984 100.00% 100.00%
* INDUSTRIAS CH, S. A. 
B.  DE  C.V.
260,184,672 61.77% 61.77%
* INDUSTRIAS CH, S. A. B.  
DE  C.V.
117,240,159 85.00% 85.00%





93,977,250 22.31% 22.31% Public Float 20,689,440 15.00% 15.00% Public Float 19,497,276 14.60% 14.60%
Operadora de 
M anufacturera de 
Tubos, S.A. De C.V.
25,707,345 6.10% 6.10% TOTAL 137,929,599 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 133,542,984 100.00% 100.00%
Aceros Laminados 






Herramientas CH, S.A. 
de C.V.
2,117,073 0.50% 0.50%
Compañía M exicana 
de Tubos, S.A. de C.V.
3,629,274 0.86% 0.86%
Public Float 25,615,560 6.08% 6.08%
TOTAL 421,214,706 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 06 31/12/2006 ** Data Annual Rep 05 31/12/2005 ** Data Annual Rep 04 31/12/2004
GRUPO SIMEC,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
*INDUSTRIAS CH, S.A.B. de C.V. is the controlling shareholder of 
GRUPO SIMEC, holding directly and indirectly (by means of its 
subsidiaries) roughly 84 percent of the total shares of the company.
*INDUSTRIAS CH, S.A.B. de C.V. is the controlling shareholder of 
GRUPO SIMEC, holding around 85 percent of the total shares of the 
company.
*INDUSTRIAS CH, S.A.B. de C.V. is the controlling shareholder of 
GRUPO SIMEC, holding around 85 percent of the total shares of the 
company.







Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series A Shares               
(no par value)
0 0.00% 0.00%
Series A Shares               
(no par value)
0 0.00% 0.00%
Series A Shares               
(no par value)
200,995,159 11.24% 0.00%
Series B Shares               
(no par value)
131,973,022 100.00% 100.00%
Series B Shares               
(no par value)
2,160,625,003 100.00% 100.00%
Series B Shares               
(no par value)
1,587,456,966 88.76% 88.76%
TOTAL SHARES 131,973,022 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 2,160,625,003 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 1,788,452,125 100.00% 88.76%
* INDUSTRIAS CH, S. A. B.  
DE  C.V.
111,913,123 84.80% 84.80%
* INDUSTRIAS CH, S. A. B.  
DE  C.V.
1,782,515,627 82.50% 82.50%
* INDUSTRIAS CH, S. A. 
B.  DE  C.V.
1,475,473,003 82.50% 82.50%
Public Float 20,059,899 15.20% 15.20% Public Float 378,109,376 17.50% 17.50% Public Float 312,979,122 17.50% 17.50%
TOTAL 131,973,022 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 2,160,625,003 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 1,788,452,125 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 03
31/12/2003
** Data Annual Rep 02
31/12/2002
** Data Annual Rep 01
31/12/2001
GRUPO SIMEC,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2002 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2001
*INDUSTRIAS CH, S.A.B. de C.V. is the controlling shareholder of 
GRUPO SIMEC, holding around 85 percent of the total shares of the 
company.
*INDUSTRIAS CH, S.A.B. de C.V. is the controlling shareholder of 
GRUPO SIMEC, holding around 83 percent of the total shares of the 
company.
*INDUSTRIAS CH, S.A.B. de C.V. is the controlling shareholder of 
GRUPO SIMEC, holding around 83 percent of the total shares of 
the company.










Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series B Shares         
(no par value)
1,800,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series B Shares         
(no par value)
600,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series B Shares         
(no par value)
600,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 1,800,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Families Martin 








Bringas & Martin 
Soberon
517,051,443 86.18% 86.18%
Public Float 248,845,671 13.82% 13.82% Public Float 82,948,557 13.82% 13.82% Public Float 82,948,557 13.82% 13.82%
TOTAL 1,800,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 06 31/12/2006 ** Data Annual Rep 05 31/12/2005 ** Data Annual Rep 04 31/12/2004
SORIANA,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.










Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series B Shares         
(no par value)
600,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series B Shares         
(no par value)
600,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series B Shares         
(no par value)
600,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Families Martin 








Bringas & Martin 
Soberon
504,027,881 84.00% 84.00%
Public Float 110,699,207 18.45% 18.45% Public Float 106,837,979 17.81% 17.81% Public Float 95,972,119 16.00% 16.00%
TOTAL 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 600,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 03 31/12/2003 ** Data Annual Rep 02 31/12/2002 ** Data Annual Rep 01 31/12/2001
SORIANA,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.










                            Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series A-1  Shares                        
(no par value)
3,492,470,400 100.00% 100.00%
Series A-1  Shares                        
(no par value)
3,497,375,500 100.00% 100.00%
Series A-1  Shares                        
(no par value)
3,538,821,170 100.00% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 3,492,470,400 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 3,497,375,500 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 3,538,821,170 100.00% 100.00%
   
Carlos Slim Helú y 
Carlos, M arco 
Antonio y Patrick 
Slim Domit
2,863,825,728 82.00% 82.00%
Carlos Slim Helú y 
Carlos, M arco 
Antonio y Patrick 
Slim Domit
2,867,847,910 82.00% 82.00%
Carlos Slim Helú y 
Carlos, M arco 
Antonio y Patrick 
Slim Domit
2,866,445,148 81.00% 81.00%
Public Float 628,644,672 18.00% 18.00% Public Float 629,527,590 18.00% 18.00% Public Float 672,376,022 19.00% 19.00%
TOTAL 3,492,470,400 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 3,497,375,500 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 3,538,821,170 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 06 31/12/2006 ** Data Annual Rep 05 31/12/2005 ** Data Annual Rep 04 31/12/2004
CARSO GLOBAL TELECOM,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.










Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series A-1  Shares                        
(no par value)
3,632,042,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series A-1  Shares                        
(no par value)
3,706,690,800 100.00% 100.00%
Series A-1  Shares                        
(no par value)
3,757,265,966 100.00% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
0 0.00% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 3,632,042,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 3,706,690,800 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 3,757,265,966 100.00% 100.00%
   
Carlos Slim Helú y 
Carlos, M arco 
Antonio y Patrick 
Slim Domit
2,869,313,180 79.00% 79.00%
Carlos Slim Helú y 
Carlos, M arco 
Antonio y Patrick 
Slim Domit
2,742,951,192 74.00% 74.00%
Carlos Slim Helú y 
Carlos, M arco 
Antonio y Patrick 
Slim Domit
2,695,086,877 71.73% 71.73%
Public Float 762,728,820 21.00% 21.00% Public Float 963,739,608 26.00% 26.00% Public Float 1,062,179,089 28.27% 28.27%
TOTAL 3,632,042,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 3,706,690,800 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 3,757,265,966 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 03 31/12/2003 ** Data Annual Rep 02 31/12/2002 ** Data Annual Rep 01 31/12/2001
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2001
CARSO GLOBAL TELECOM,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.









Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
8,115,000,000 40.87% 94.83% 8,115,000,000 38.61% 94.55%
442,000,000 2.23% 5.17% 468,000,000 2.23% 5.45%
11,301,000,000 56.91% 0.00% 12,436,000,000 59.17% 0.00%
19,858,000,000 100.00% 100.00% 21,019,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series AA 6,000,000,000 Series AA 6,000,000,000
Series A 92,000,000 Series A 92,000,000
Series L 4,636,000,000 Series L 4,050,000,000
Series AA 1,799,500,000 Series AA 1,799,500,000
Series A 0 Series A 0
Series L 0 Series L 0
Series AA 0 Series AA 0
Series A 0 Series A 0
Series L 939,700,000 Series L 1,007,700,000
Series AA 0 Series AA 0
Series A 0 Series A 0
Series L 621,300,000 Series L 1,091,600,000
Series AA 315,500,000 Series AA 0
Series A 350,000,000 Series A 0
Series L 5,104,000,000 Series L 929,200,000
Series AA 8,115,000,000 Series AA 315,500,000
Series A 442,000,000 Series A 376,000,000




Series AA 6,000,000,000 Series AA 6,000,000,000
Series A 92,000,000 Series A 92,100,000
Series L 4,784,600,000 Series L 4,089,100,000
Series AA 130,400,000 Series AA 130,400,000
Series A 0 Series A 0
Series L 0 Series L 0
Series AA 6,130,400,000 Series AA 6,130,400,000
Series A 92,000,000 Series A 92,100,000
Series L 4,784,600,000 Series L 4,089,100,000
Data AR-06 10/04/2007 Data AR-05 08/06/2006
54.77% 71.19% 48.44% 70.98%
The following tab le sets forth the share ownership of the officers and 
directors  who own more than one percent of any class of the capital of 
Teléfonos de México .
C arlo s Slim 
H elú & 
C arlo s, 
M arco  
A nto nio  y 
P atrick Slim 
*Carso Global TELECOM is deemed to control Teléfonos de México .
According to reposts of beneficial ownership of the company filed with the 
SEC, Carso Global TELECOM is controlled by Mr. Carlos Slim Helú and 







Class of Shares Class of Shares
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005
21.03%
Series  AA  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  A  Shares          
(no par value)







Series  AA  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  A  Shares          
(no par value)
48.25% 70.98%












The following tab le sets forth the share ownership of the officers and 
directors  who own more than one percent of any class of the capital of 
Teléfonos de México .
55.43%
100.000%




















According to reposts of beneficial ownership of the company filed with the 
SEC, Carso Global TELECOM is controlled by Mr. Carlos Slim Helú and 
members of his immediate family.
C arlo s Slim 
H elú & 
C arlo s, 
M arco  
A nto nio  y 





A nto nio  
C o sí o  A riño  
y A nto nio  
C o sí o  P ando
0.66% 1.52%
TOTAL
















SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
4,063,000,000 35.15% 94.25% 4,063,000,000 33.44% 94.01%
248,000,000 2.15% 5.75% 259,000,000 2.13% 5.99%
7,249,000,000 62.71% 0.00% 7,828,000,000 64.43% 0.00%
11,560,000,000 100.00% 100.00% 12,150,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series AA 3,000,000,000 Series AA 3,000,000,000
Series A 46,000,000 Series A 46,000,000
Series L 1,746,200,000 Series L 1,484,300,000
Series AA 899,700,000 Series AA 899,700,000
Series A 0 Series A 0
Series L 0 Series L 0
Series AA 0 Series AA 0
Series A 0 Series A 0
Series L 516,300,000 Series L 587,200,000
Series AA 0 Series AA 0
Series A 0 Series A 0
Series L 576,000,000 Series L 512,900,000
Series AA 0 Series AA 163,300,000
Series A 0 Series A 213,000,000
Series L 474,100,000 Series L 5,243,600,000
Series AA 163,300,000 Series AA 4,063,000,000
Series A 202,000,000 Series A 259,000,000




Series AA 3,000,000,000 Series AA 3,000,000,000
Series A 46,000,000 Series A 46,000,000
Series L 1,829,500,000 Series L 1,502,800,000
Series AA 65,200,000 Series AA 65,200,000
Series A 0 Series A 0
Series L 0 Series L 0
Series AA 3,065,200,000 Series AA 3,065,200,000
Series A 46,000,000 Series A 46,000,000
Series L 1,829,500,000 Series L 1,502,800,000
Data AR-04 17/05/2005 Data AR-03 06/06/2004
42.18% 70.66% 37.44% 70.48%
C arlo s Slim 
H elú & 
C arlo s, 
M arco  
A nto nio  y 









According to reposts of beneficial ownership of the company filed with the 
SEC, Carso Global TELECOM is controlled by Mr. Carlos Slim Helú and 





Series  AA  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  A  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  L  Shares          
(no par value)
TOTAL SHARES








The following tab le sets forth the share ownership of the officers and 
directors  who own more than one percent of any class of the capital of 




Class of Shares Class of Shares
Series  AA  Shares          
(no par value)








Series  A  Shares          
(no par value)




























C arlo s Slim 
H elú & 
C arlo s, 
M arco  
A nto nio  y 




TELÉFONOS DE MÉXICO,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
According to reposts of beneficial ownership of the company filed with the 
SEC, Carso Global TELECOM is controlled by Mr. Carlos Slim Helú and 
members of his immediate family.
The following tab le sets forth the share ownership of the officers and 
directors  who own more than one percent of any class of the capital of 









Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
4,136,000,000 32.90% 93.55% 4,268,000,000 32.65% 93.27%
285,000,000 2.27% 6.45% 308,000,000 2.36% 6.73%
8,152,000,000 64.84% 0.00% 8,495,000,000 64.99% 0.00%
12,573,000,000 100.00% 100.00% 13,071,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Series AA 3,000,000,000 Series AA 3,000,000,000
Series A 46,000,000 Series A 46,000,000
Series L 1,123,000,000 Series L 1,086,900,000
Series AA 972,800,000 Series AA 1,059,900,000
Series A 0 Series A 0
Series L 0 Series L 0
Series AA 0 Series AA 0
Series A 0 Series A 0
Series L 640,800,000 Series L 707,400,000
Series AA 0 Series AA 0
Series A 0 Series A 0
Series L 414,600,000 Series L 476,500,000
Series AA 163,200,000 Series AA 208,100,000
Series A 239,000,000 Series A 262,000,000
Series L 5,973,600,000 Series L 6,224,200,000
Series AA 4,136,000,000 Series AA 4,268,000,000
Series A 285,000,000 Series A 308,000,000
Series L 8,152,000,000 Series L 8,495,000,000
Series AA 3,000,000,000 Series AA 3,000,000,000
Series A 46,000,000 Series A 46,000,000
Series L 1,141,500,000 Series L 1,092,900,000
Series AA 65,200,000 Series AA 65,200,000
Series A 0 Series A 0
Series L 0 Series L 0
Series AA 3,065,200,000 Series AA 3,065,200,000
Series A 46,000,000 Series A 46,000,000
Series L 1,141,500,000 Series L 1,092,900,000




The following tab le sets forth the share ownership of the officers and 
directors  who own more than one percent of any class of the capital of 
Teléfonos de México .
C arlo s Slim 
H elú & 
C arlo s, 
M arco  
A nto nio  y 
P atrick Slim 
5.10%
The following tab le sets forth the share ownership of the officers and 
directors  who own more than one percent of any class of the capital of 
Teléfonos de México .
C arlo s Slim 
H elú & 
C arlo s, 
M arco  
A nto nio  y 
































Series  A  Shares          
(no par value)




Series  AA  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  A  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  L  Shares          
(no par value)
TOTAL SHARES
*Carso Global TELECOM is deemed to control Teléfonos de México .
According to reposts of beneficial ownership of the company filed with the 
SEC, Carso Global TELECOM is controlled by Mr. Carlos Slim Helú and 







SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2001
Class of Shares
Series  AA  Shares          
(no par value)

















TELÉFONOS DE MÉXICO,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
*Carso Global TELECOM is deemed to control Teléfonos de México .
According to reposts of beneficial ownership of the company filed with the 
SEC, Carso Global TELECOM is controlled by Mr. Carlos Slim Helú and 




SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
112,923,156,365 33.83% 68.14% 114,599,087,440 33.55% 67.86% 114,733,004,440 33.53% 67.84%
52,806,617,049 15.82% 31.86% 54,281,436,395 15.89% 32.14% 54,399,283,355 15.90% 32.16%
84,010,468,901 25.17% 0.00% 86,356,772,406 25.28% 0.00% 86,544,256,206 25.29% 0.00%
84,010,468,901 25.17% 0.00% 86,356,772,406 25.28% 0.00% 86,544,256,206 25.29% 0.00%
333,750,711,216 100.00% 100.00% 341,594,068,647 100.00% 100.00% 342,220,800,207 100.00% 100.00%
Series A 54,649,375,593 Series A 54,649,375,593 Series A 62,006,754,804
Series B 1,526,458,516 Series B 1,526,458,516 Series B 8,000,952,231
Series D 2,428,456,730 Series D 2,428,456,730 Series D 12,728,787,641
Series L 2,428,456,730 Series L 2,428,456,730 Series L 12,728,787,641
Series A 3,677,147,625 Series A 3,435,215,250 Series A 3,799,350,000
Series B 3,235,889,910 Series B 3,022,989,420 Series B 3,343,428,000
Series D 5,148,006,675 Series D 4,809,301,350 Series D 5,319,090,000
Series L 5,148,006,675 Series L 4,809,301,350 Series L 5,319,090,000
Series A 6,424,000,000 Series A 3,266,224,500 Series A 3,472,909,500
Series B 5,653,120,000 Series B 2,874,277,560 Series B 3,056,160,360
Series D 8,993,600,000 Series D 4,572,714,300 Series D 4,862,073,300
Series L 8,993,600,000 Series L 4,572,714,300 Series L 4,862,073,300
Series A 48,171,547,825 Series A 53,247,186,775 Series A 45,453,029,814
Series B 42,390,962,086 Series B 46,857,524,362 Series B 39,998,666,227
Series D 67,440,166,955 Series D 74,546,061,485 Series D 63,634,241,724
Series L 67,440,166,955 Series L 74,546,061,485 Series L 63,634,241,724
Series A 1,085,322 Series A 1,085,322 Series A 960,322
Series B 186,537 Series B 186,537 Series B 76,537
Series D 238,541 Series D 238,541 Series D 63,541
Series L 238,541 Series L 238,541 Series L 63,541
GRUPO TELEVISA,  S.A.B.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005
Class of Shares Class of Shares
Series  D  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  B  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  D  Shares          
(no par value)
Class of Shares
Series  B  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  A  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  A  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  A  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  B  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  D  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  L  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  L  Shares          
(no par value)































































Series A 112,923,156,365 Series A 114,599,087,440 Series A 114,733,004,440
Series B 52,806,617,049 Series B 54,281,436,395 Series B 54,399,283,355
Series D 84,010,468,901 Series D 86,356,772,406 Series D 86,544,256,206
Series L 84,010,468,901 Series L 86,356,772,406 Series L 86,544,256,206
Series A 52,991,825,693 Series A 52,991,825,693 Series A 52,991,825,693
Series B 67,814,604 Series B 67,814,604 Series B 67,814,604
Series D 107,886,870 Series D 107,886,870 Series D 107,886,870
Series L 107,886,870 Series L 107,886,870 Series L 107,886,870
Series A 1,657,549,900 Series A 1,657,549,900 Series A 4,972,649,700
Series B 1,458,643,912 Series B 1,458,643,912 Series B 4,375,931,745
Series D 2,320,569,860 Series D 2,320,569,860 Series D 6,961,709,595
Series L 2,320,569,860 Series L 2,320,569,860 Series L 6,961,709,595
Series A Series A Series A 4,042,279,411
Series B Series B Series B 3,557,205,882
Series D Series D Series D 5,659,191,176
Series L Series L Series L 5,659,191,176
Series A 54,649,375,593 Series A 54,649,375,593 Series A 62,006,754,804
Series B 1,526,458,516 Series B 1,526,458,516 Series B 8,000,952,231
Series D 2,428,456,730 Series D 2,428,456,730 Series D 12,728,787,641



















































On August 17, 2005, the “Investor Trust” released its Shares held in the 
Shareholder Trust, which represented 19.84% of the Shares held then through the 
Shareholder Trust .  The Azcárraga Trust  beneficially owns 87.29% of the 
Televisa shares held through the Shareholder Trust and the Inbursa Trust 
beneficially owns 12.71%  of the Televisa  shares held through the Shareholder 
Trust.  Televisa shares held through the Shareholder Trust are voted by the 
trustee as instructed by a Technical Committee comprising four members — three 
appointed by the Azcárraga Trust and one appointed by the Inbursa Trust .  As 
long as non-Mexicans own more than a minimal number of A Shares, Mr. 
Azcárraga Jean will control the majority of A Shares and certain key matters 
including dividend payments, mergers, spin-offs, changes in corporate 
purpose, changes of nationality and amendments to the anti-takeover 
provisions of our bylaws , which require his vote in favour.
** Data F20-05
Approximately 45.02%  of the outstanding A Shares,  2.66%  of the 
outstanding B Shares, 2.78%  of the outstanding D Shares and 2.78%  of 
the outstanding L Shares are held through the Stockholder Trust , 
including shares in the form of CPOs .  The beneficiaries of the 
Stockholder Trust are a trust for the benefit of Emilio Azcárraga Jean , or 
the Azcárraga Trust, and a trust for the benefit of Promotora Inbursa, S.A. 
de C.V., or the Inbursa Trust.   The Azcárraga Trust  beneficially owns 
87.29%  of the Televisa shares held through the Stockholder Trust, while 
the Inbursa Trust beneficially owns 12.71% .
Televicentro's equity in Televisa is currently owned through the Shareholder 
Trust , by the following trusts: a trust for the benefit of Emilio Azcárraga Jean, 
the Azcárraga Trust ; a trust for the benefit of Promotora Inbursa  S.A. de C.V. , 
the Inbursa Trust ; and a trust for the benefit of five individual members of the 
Aramburuzabala and Fernández families,  the Investor Trust .  Approximately 
49.87% of the outstanding A Shares, 13.35% of the outstanding B Shares, 13.90% 
of the outstanding D Shares and 13.90% of the outstanding L Shares of TLEVISA 
are held through a this trust, including shares in the form of CPOs.  The shares 
held through the Shareholder Trust are voted by the trustee  as instructed by a 
Technical Committee comprising five members  — three appointed by the 





Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
4,467,109,061 50.70% 100.00% 4,464,612,424 50.72% 100.00% 4,482,392,507 50.61% 100.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
2,171,632,182 24.65% 0.00% 2,169,110,325 24.64% 0.00% 2,186,933,525 24.69% 0.00%
2,171,632,182 24.65% 0.00% 2,169,110,325 24.64% 0.00% 2,186,933,525 24.69% 0.00%
8,810,373,425 100.00% 100.00% 8,802,833,074 100.00% 100.00% 8,856,259,557 100.00% 100.00%
Series A 2,348,235,209 Series A 2,349,826,492 Series A 2,349,826,492
Series B 0 Series B 0 Series B 0
Series D 52,806,227 Series D 54,397,510 Series D 54,397,510
Series L 52,806,227 Series L 54,397,510 Series L 54,397,510
Series A 143,861,820 Series A 175,185,820 Series A 426,513,520
Series B 0 Series B 0 Series B 0
Series D 143,861,820 Series D 175,185,820 Series D 426,513,520
Series L 143,861,820 Series L 175,185,820 Series L 426,513,520
Series A 116,053,520 Series A 215,951,440 Series A 244,861,940
Series B 0 Series B 0 Series B 0
Series D 116,053,520 Series D 215,951,440 Series D 244,861,940
Series L 116,053,520 Series L 215,951,440 Series L 244,861,940
Series A 161,786,000 Series A 161,786,000 Series A 144,326,000
Series B Series B 0 Series B 0
Series D 161,786,000 Series D 161,786,000 Series D 144,326,000
Series L 161,786,000 Series L 161,786,000 Series L 144,326,000
Series A 1,697,124,615 Series A 1,561,789,555 Series A 1,316,834,555
Series B 0 Series B 0 Series B 0
Series D 1,697,124,615 Series D 1,561,789,555 Series D 1,316,834,555
Series L 1,697,124,615 Series L 1,561,789,555 Series L 1,316,834,555
GRUPO TELEVISA,  S.A.B.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2003 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2002 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2001
Class of Shares
Series  D  Shares          
(no par value)
Class of Shares
Series  A  Shares          
(no par value)





Series  D  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  B  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  B  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  D  Shares          
(no par value)
Class of Shares
Series  A  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  A  Shares          
(no par value)
TOTAL SHARES
Series  L  Shares          
(no par value)
TOTAL SHARES









































































Series A 47,897 Series A 73,117 Series A 30,000
Series B 0 Series B 0 Series B 0
Series D 0 Series D 0 Series D 0
Series L 0 Series L 0 Series L 0
Series A 4,467,109,061 Series A 4,464,612,424 Series A 4,482,392,507
Series B 0 Series B 0 Series B 0
Series D 2,171,632,182 Series D 2,169,110,325 Series D 2,186,933,525
Series L 2,171,632,182 Series L 2,169,110,325 Series L 2,186,933,525
31/12/2003 31/12/2002 31/12/2001
TOTAL 0.00% 0.00% TOTAL
TOTAL 100.00%
0.001% 0.000% 0.001%0.002% TOTAL
100.00%TOTAL 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL
** Data F20-03 ** Data F20-02
The ownership of Televicentro’s equity is currently as follows:  * Emilio 
Azcárraga Jean  owns 55.29% , the SINCA Inbursa Trus t owns 
24.70% , the Aramburuzabala family  owns 16.21%  and the  Fernández 
family  owns 3.80% .  The SINCA Inbursa Trust has agreed to vote its 
24.70% stock interest in the same manner as Emilio Azcárraga Jean 
votes , as long as Mr. Azcárraga Jean owns at least 27.0% of the capital 
stock of Televicentro.  The interests of the Aramburuzabala and 
Fernández families are held through the Investor Trust .
The ownership of Televicentro’s equity is currently held through the 
Shareholder Trust, for the benefit of the Azcárraga Trust,  the Inbursa 
Trust  and the Investor Trust, as follows: the Azcárraga Trust 55.29% ; the 
Inbursa Trust 24.70% ; and the Investor Trust 20.01% .  The Investor Trust 
holds the interests of the Aramburuzabala family (16.21%)  and the 
Fernández family (3.80% ).  Emilio Azcárraga Jean is the sole beneficiary 
of the Azcárraga Trust and has sole power to determine the investment 
and voting decisions made by the trust.
100.00%
The ownership of Televicentro’s equity is currently as follows:  * Emilio 
Azcárraga Jean  owns 55.29% , the SINCA Inbursa Trust  owns 
24.70% , the Aramburuzabala family  owns 16.21%  and the  Investor 
Trust owns  20.01%.  Families Arambuzabala (16.21%)  and Fernández 
(3.80%)  are the only beneficiaries of the Investor trust.  The SINCA 
Inbursa Trust  has agreed to vote its 24.70% stock interest in the same 
manner as Emilio Azcárraga Jean votes , as long as Mr. Azcárraga Jean 
















Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
4,589,900,390 43.52% 100.00% 4,638,973,690 43.99% 100.00%
2,120,017,487 20.10% 0.00% 2,169,090,787 20.57% 0.00%
2,120,017,487 20.10% 0.00% 2,169,090,787 20.57% 0.00%
1,715,899,630 16.27% 0.00% 1,568,679,730 14.87% 0.00%
10,545,834,994 100.00% 100.00% 10,545,834,994 100.00% 100.00%
Series A 3,122,109,129 Series A 3,122,109,129
Series D-A CPOs 820,151,848 Series D-A CPOs 820,151,848
Series D-L CPOs 820,151,848 Series D-L CPOs 820,151,848
Series A 167,400,041 Series A 167,400,041
Series D-A CPOs 144,147,949 Series D-A CPOs 144,147,949
Series D-L CPOs 144,147,949 Series D-L CPOs 144,147,949
Series A 188,900,281 Series A 188,900,281
Series D-A CPOs 44,226,751 Series D-A CPOs 44,226,751
Series D-L CPOs 44,226,751 Series D-L CPOs 44,226,751
Series A 1,111,490,939 Series A 1,160,564,239
Series D-A CPOs 1,111,490,939 Series D-A CPOs 1,160,564,239
Series D-L CPOs 1,111,490,939 Series D-L CPOs 1,160,564,239
Series A 4,589,900,390 Series A 4,638,973,690
Series D-A 
CPOs









Data AR-06 31/12/2006 Data AR-05 31/12/2005
TV AZTECA,  S.A.  DE  C.V.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005
Series  A  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  A  Shares          
(no par value)
Class of Shares Class of Shares
Series  D-L  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  D-L  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  D-A  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  D-A  Shares          
(no par value)
Shares in company's 
treasury

































83.73% 100.00% TOTAL 85.13%TOTAL 100.00%
*The CPOs, each representing one A Share, one D-A Share and one D-L 
Share, are traded on the Mexican Stock Exchange
*The CPOs, each representing one A Share, one D-A Share and one D-L 
Share, are traded on the Mexican Stock Exchange
With the exception of Mr. Ricardo B. Salinas Pliego , there are no 
directors or officers  who beneficially own more than 1% of TV Azteca’s 
shares. 
As of May 2006, Azteca Holdings -a controlled company by Mr. Ricardo B. 
Salinas Pliego- owns Grupo Desarrollo Inmobiliario Salinas (known 
before as Grupo COTSA), which is a subsidiary of Azteca Holdings. 
As of May 2007, Azteca Holdings -a controlled company by Mr. Ricardo B. 
Salinas Pliego- owns Grupo Desarrollo Inmobiliario Salinas (known 
before as Grupo COTSA), which is a subsidiary of Azteca Holdings. 
With the exception of Mr. Ricardo B. Salinas Pliego , there are no 















SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
4,699,453,589 43.45% 100.00% 4,703,278,513 43.49% 100.00%
2,229,570,687 20.61% 0.00% 2,233,395,611 20.65% 0.00%
2,229,570,687 20.61% 0.00% 2,233,395,611 20.65% 0.00%
1,657,240,031 15.32% 0.00% 1,645,765,259 15.22% 0.00%
10,815,834,994 100.00% 100.00% 10,815,834,994 100.00% 100.00%
Series A 3,122,109,128 Series A 3,119,793,128
Series D-A CPOs 820,151,848 Series D-A CPOs 817,835,848
Series D-L CPOs 820,151,848 Series D-L CPOs 817,835,848
Series A 165,900,041 Series A 165,882,192
Series D-A CPOs 142,647,949 Series D-A CPOs 142,630,100
Series D-L CPOs 142,647,949 Series D-L CPOs 142,630,100
Series A 188,900,281 Series A 188,900,281
Series D-A CPOs 44,226,751 Series D-A CPOs 44,226,751
Series D-L CPOs 44,226,751 Series D-L CPOs 44,226,751
Series A 1,222,544,139 Series A 1,228,702,912
Series D-A CPOs 1,222,544,139 Series D-A CPOs 1,228,702,912
Series D-L CPOs 1,222,544,139 Series D-L CPOs 1,228,702,912
Series A 4,699,453,589 Series A 4,703,278,513
Series D-A 
CPOs









Data AR-04 31/12/2004 Data F20-03 31/12/2003
TV AZTECA,  S.A.  DE  C.V.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2003
Series  A  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  A  Shares          
(no par value)
Class of Shares Class of Shares
Series  D-L  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  D-L  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  D-A  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  D-A  Shares          
(no par value)
TOTAL SHARES
Shares in company's 
treasury





























84.78% 100.00%TOTAL 84.68% 100.00%
As of May 2005, Azteca Holdings -a controlled company by Mr. Ricardo B. 
Salinas Pliego- owns Alternativas COTSA (known before as Grupo 
COTSA), which is a subsidiary of Azteca Holdings. 
*The CPOs, each representing one A Share, one D-A Share and one D-L 
Share, are traded on the Mexican Stock Exchange
Grupo COTSA is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Azteca Holdings
TOTAL
With the exception of Mr. Ricardo B. Salinas Pliego , there are no 
directors or officers  who beneficially own more than 1% of TV Azteca’s 
shares. 
*The CPOs, each representing one A Share, one D-A Share and one D-L 
Share, are traded on the Mexican Stock Exchange
With the exception of Mr. Ricardo B. Salinas Pliego , there are no 











Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
4,668,790,769 43.17% 100.00% 4,668,790,769 43.17% 100.00%
2,198,907,871 20.33% 0.00% 2,198,907,871 20.33% 0.00%
2,198,907,871 20.33% 0.00% 2,198,907,871 20.33% 0.00%
1,749,228,483 16.17% 0.00% 1,749,228,483 16.17% 0.00%
10,815,834,994 100.00% 100.00% 10,815,834,994 100.00% 100.00%
Series A 3,163,693,409 Series A 3,163,693,405
Series D-A CPOs 818,062,599 Series D-A CPOs 818,062,599
Series D-L CPOs 818,062,599 Series D-L CPOs 818,062,599
Series A 165,882,192 Series A 165,882,192
Series D-A CPOs 142,630,100 Series D-A CPOs 142,630,100
Series D-L CPOs 142,630,100 Series D-L CPOs 142,630,100
Series A 189,000,000 Series A 189,000,000
Series D-A CPOs 44,000,000 Series D-A CPOs 44,000,000
Series D-L CPOs 44,000,000 Series D-L CPOs 44,000,000
Series A 1,150,215,168 Series A 1,150,215,172
Series D-A CPOs 1,194,215,172 Series D-A CPOs 1,194,215,172
Series D-L CPOs 1,194,215,172 Series D-L CPOs 1,194,215,172
Series A 4,668,790,769 Series A 4,668,790,769
Series D-A 
CPOs









Data F20-02 31/12/2002 Data AR-01 31/12/2001
TV AZTECA,  S.A.  DE  C.V.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2002 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2001
Series  A  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  A  Shares          
(no par value)
Class of Shares Class of Shares
Series  D-L  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  D-L  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  D-A  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  D-A  Shares          
(no par value)
TOTAL SHARES TOTAL SHARES
Shares in company's 
treasury




























TOTAL 83.83% 100.00% TOTAL 83.83% 100.00%
*The CPOs, each representing one A Share, one D-A Share and one D-L 
Share, are traded on the Mexican Stock Exchange
Grupo COTSA is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Azteca Holdings
With the exception of Mr. Ricardo B. Salinas Pliego , there are no 
directors or officers  who beneficially own more than 1% of TV Azteca’s 
shares. 
*The CPOs, each representing one A Share, one D-A Share and one D-L 
Share, are traded on the Mexican Stock Exchange
Grupo COTSA is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Azteca Holdings
With the exception of Mr. Ricardo B. Salinas Pliego , there are no 









Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series A Shares         
(no par value)
341,026,871 88.15% 100.00%
Series A Shares         
(no par value)
273,400,000 84.38% 100.00%
Series A Shares         
(no par value)
273,000,000 84.26% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
28,319,069 7.32% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
28,300,000 8.73% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
28,300,000 8.73% 0.00%
"Stock Options  
Trust"
17,511,203 4.53% 0.00%
"Stock Options  
Trust"
22,300,000 6.88% 0.00%
"Stock Options  
Trust"
22,700,000 7.01% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 386,857,143 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 324,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 324,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Families                             
Sada Gonzalez & 
Sada Treviño
91,747,065 26.90% 52.18%
Families                             
Sada Gonzalez & 
Sada Treviño
85,180,635 31.16% 57.13%
Families                             
Sada Gonzalez & 
Sada Treviño
82,582,929 30.25% 60.25%
CPOs 86,200,000 25.28% 0.00% CPOs 71,000,000 25.97% 0.00% CPOs 81,900,000 30.00% 0.00%
Public Float 163,079,806 47.82% 47.82% Public Float 117,219,365 42.87% 42.87% Public Float 108,517,071 39.75% 39.75%
TOTAL 341,026,871 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 273,400,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 273,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
** Data F20-06 31/12/2006 ** Data F20-05 31/12/2005 ** Data F20-04 31/12/2004
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004








Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting Class of Shares no. shares Capital REAL Voting
Series A Shares         
(no par value)
271,000,000 83.64% 100.00%
Series A Shares         
(no par value)
276,000,000 85.19% 100.00%
Series A Shares         
(no par value)
273,700,000 84.48% 100.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
28,300,000 8.73% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
23,300,000 7.19% 0.00%
Shares in company's 
treasury
25,600,000 7.90% 0.00%
"Stock Options  
Trust"
24,700,000 7.62% 0.00%
"Stock Options  
Trust"
24,700,000 7.62% 0.00%
"Stock Options  
Trust"
24,700,000 7.62% 0.00%
TOTAL SHARES 324,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 324,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL SHARES 324,000,000 100.00% 100.00%
Families                             
Sada Gonzalez & 
Sada Treviño
82,082,096 30.29% 52.32%
Families                             
Sada Gonzalez & 
Sada Treviño
85,840,354 31.10% 55.56%
Families                             
Sada Gonzalez & 
Sada Treviño
83,097,454 30.36% 57.98%
CPOs 59,700,000 22.03% 0.00% CPOs 67,500,000 24.46% 0.00% CPOs 75,600,000 27.62% 0.00%
Public Float 129,217,904 47.68% 47.68% Public Float 122,659,646 44.44% 44.44% Public Float 115,002,546 42.02% 42.02%
TOTAL 271,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 276,000,000 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL 273,700,000 100.00% 100.00%
** Data F20-03 31/12/2003 ** Data F20-02 31/12/2002 ** Data F20-01 31/12/2001
VITRO,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.









SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2004
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
8,445,307,985 98.52% 100.00% 4,261,064,135 98.57% 100.00% 4,316,653,121 98.78% 100.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
127,060,583 1.48% 0.00% 61,894,000 1.43% 0.00% 53,521,611 1.22% 0.00%
8,572,368,568 100.00% 100.00% 4,322,958,135 100.00% 100.00% 4,370,174,732 98.78% 100.00%
Series V 5,766,000,000 Series V 2,847,000,000 Series V 2,803,000,000
Series C 0 Series C 0 Series C 0
Series V 2,679,307,985 Series V 1,414,064,135 Series V 1,513,653,121
Series C 0 Series C 0 Series C 0
Series V 8,445,307,985 Series V 4,261,064,135 Series V 4,316,653,121
Series C 0 Series C 0 Series C 0
31/12/2006 31/12/2005 31/12/2004
100.00%TOTAL100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 05 ** Data Annual Rep 04** Data Annual Rep 06
31.73%
Intersalt, S. 




Public Float31.73% Public Float 33.19% 33.19% 35.07%35.07%
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2006
WAL*MART DE MEXICO,  S.A.B.  DE  C.V.
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2005
Series C  Shares                  
(no par value)
Series C  Shares                  
(no par value)









de R.L. de 
C.V.
64.93%
Series  V  Shares          
(no par value)
TOTAL SHARES TOTAL SHARES TOTAL SHARES
Class of Shares
Series  V  Shares          
(no par value)
Series  V  Shares          
(no par value)
Class of Shares Class of Shares
64.93%68.27%
Intersalt, S. 
de R.L. de 
C.V.
66.81% 66.81%









Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting no. shares Capital REAL Voting
3,909,124,724 88.18% 100.00% 3,909,124,724 87.61% 100.00% 3,909,124,724 87.97% 100.00%
461,768,271 10.42% 0.00% 489,532,671 10.97% 0.00% 483,682,593 10.88% 0.00%
62,011,850 1.40% 0.00% 63,246,450 1.42% 0.00% 51,050,781 1.15% 0.00%
4,432,904,845 100.00% 100.00% 4,461,903,845 100.00% 100.00% 4,443,858,098 100.00% 100.00%
Series V 2,730,000,000 Series V 2,730,000,000 Series V 2,729,806,612
Series C 36,000,000 Series C 36,000,000 Series C 0
Series V 1,179,124,724 Series V 1,179,124,724 Series V 1,179,318,112
Series C 425,768,271 Series C 453,532,671 Series C 483,682,593
Series V 3,909,124,724 Series V 3,909,124,724 Series V 3,909,124,724
Series C 461,768,271 Series C 489,532,671 Series C 483,682,593
31/12/2003 31/12/2002 31/12/2001** Data Annual Rep 01
100.00%TOTAL 100.00% 100.00%
** Data Annual Rep 03 ** Data Annual Rep 02
37.86% 30.17%Public Float 37.12% 30.16%
100.00%TOTAL 100.00% 100.00% TOTAL
Public FloatPublic Float 36.72% 30.16%
Class of Shares
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2003 SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2002












Series C  Shares                  
(no par value)
Series C  Shares                  
(no par value)
SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 2001
Intersalt, S. 
de R.L. de 
C.V.
63.28%











Series  V  Shares          
(no par value)
Intersalt, S. 
de R.L. de 
C.V.
69.84%
